Index: The Evidential Argument from the Holocaust against Theism

This article will serve as a hub for organizing past and future responses to my evidential argument from the Holocaust against theism. 

1: Logical Form of the Argument

The first five steps are a cumulative case based on independent facts about the badness of the Holocaust. Step 1 is an application of Draper's argument from pain and pleasure to the Holocaust; it is defended in the original article.

(1) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the biologically gratuitous physical pain experienced by many, if not most, Holocaust victims, i.e., 
Pr(E1 | N) >! Pr(E1 |T).

The next step appeals to the horrendous nature of the Holocaust. I think horrendous evils are much more probable on naturalism than on theism, but that is not the claim I am making here. Because I am making a cumulative case argument, I have to show that each additional item of evidence is more probable on naturalism than on theism, while in effect adding the previous item(s) of evidence into the background information. In probability notation, I need to show Pr(E2 | E1 & N) >! Pr(E2 | E1 & T), not Pr(E2 | N) >! Pr(E2 | T). I defend the former inequality in the original article. 

(2) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to Holocaust victims who experienced and/or witnessed events so horrific that the events constituted prima facie reasons for each victim to doubt whether the victim's life (given their inclusion in the Holocaust) was a great good to the victim on the whole, i.e.,

Pr(E2 | E1 & N) >! Pr(E2 | E1 & T).

The third step appeals to a specific aspect of the problem of divine hiddenness, the problem of divine silence during suffering, as it relates to Holocaust victims who experienced biologically gratuitous suffering and horrendous evil. Again,  I defend the premise in the original article, but it may be restated in plain English as follows.

(3) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the fact that so many victims of the Holocaust did not report feeling God's comforting presence, i.e.,
Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & N) > Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & T). 

The fourth step appeals to another aspect of the problem of divine hiddenness, this time focusing on what John Schellenberg calls "former believers" and applying it to Holocaust survivors. Again,  I defend the premise in the original article, but it may be restated in plain English as follows.

(4) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the fact that so many devout Jewish survivors of the Holocaust became nonbelievers, i.e.,

Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & E3 & N) > Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & E3& T).

From steps 1-4, it follows that:

(5) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the Holocaust, i.e., Pr(E | N) >! Pr(E | T).

The next step of the argument is based upon Paul Draper's theory of intrinsic probability, which says that intrinsic probability is determined by modesty, coherence, and nothing else. Because naturalism is both more modest and more coherent than theism, it follows that the intrinsic probability of naturalism is greater than the intrinsic probability of theism. This premise is not defended in my article, but instead may be found in Draper's defense of the second premise in what he calls the "low priors argument." 

Using the word "simplicity" as a more concise way to say "has greater intrinsic probability," we get:

(6) Naturalism is much simpler than Theism. 

The next step of the argument is designed to preempt objections that other items of evidence (such as the finite age of the universe, the life-permitting conditions of the universe, the contingency of the universe, objective moral values, etc.) favor theism and such items of evidence outweigh the evidence represented by E1-E4. The basic strategy is to show that known facts about good and evil, such as E1-E4, decisively outweigh the theistic evidence. This premise is not defended in my article, but instead may be found in Draper's defense of what he calls the "decisive evidence argument." So the seventh step of the argument is:

(7) Any epistemic advantages that Theism has over Naturalism (i.e., any factors that raise the ratio of the probability of Theism to the probability of Naturalism) do not, even when combined, suffice to offset the epistemic advantages that Naturalism has over Theism if premises 5 and 6 are true. 

From steps 5-7, it follows from Bayes' Theorem that:

(8) Theism is probably false. 

The two inferences in this argument--the first from 1-4 to 5 and the second from 5-7 to 8--are deductively correct. Therefore, if there is something wrong with this argument, then there must be something with at least if not more of the six premises (1-4, 6-7).

2: Non-Objections

I classify a reply as a "non-objection" if it does not constitute a defeater to one or more premises of the argument; and if does not challenge the inference of the argument. What follows is a list of some of the non-objections I have seen.

2.1: Dismissive Replies

• "Why bad thing happen if God real?"

2.2: Confused Replies

• "You don't really have an argument. You made a statement. Actually just a subjective inference."
• "No. It's merely evidence."

2.2: Irrelevant Replies

2.2.1. The Concept of "God" 

• Objection: "All this can show is an inconsistency between a particular concept of “God” and that “God” creating the world as you have conceived it."
• Objection: "The argument is presupposed on a false attribution error, i.e., that God's existence is dependent on the absence of suffering. This premise presupposes that God is contingent, rather than necessary; therefore, God is not actually God; because, necessary (i.e., self caused) is an attribute of God. The absence of this attribute, reduces God to the caused, rather than the uncaused causer.  Therefore, the argument does not refute the existence of God; instead, it refutes a subjective idea of God predicated on a different set of attributes to those present in God Himself. Argument rejected on the grounds of false attribution error."

2.2.2. Other Replies

• "If God didn’t exist we wouldn’t know the difference between good and evil."
• "Why single out the Holocaust? The "holocaust" could also describe the 10 million murdered under Stalin, or the 170 million murdered under Mao Tse-tung. Nazism was just one of the atrocities of man against man."

3: Objections

3.1: Objections to Multiple Premises

3.2.1: Flip Objections 

In interscholastic and intercollegiate debate, to "flip" or "turn" argument is to take one of your opponent's arguments and to use it as an argument for your position and/or against theirs. 

Objection: The Holocaust argument presupposes objective (moral) good and evil, but objective (moral) good and evil require God.

Reply: LINK

Objection: The Holocaust argument includes several items in our background information, such as the existence of the universe, conscious beings capable of experiencing pain, and so forth. These things are evidence favoring theism over naturalism.

Reply: First, some items alleged to be theistic evidence, such as the existence of the universe, do not favor theism over naturalism. Second, I agree that at least one fact in our background information, consciousness, favors theism over naturalism. The fact that it favors theism over naturalism does not, by itself, negate the claim that the specific facts identified in the Holocaust argument favor naturalism. 

3.2: Objections to Individual Premises

3.2.1: Objections to (1)
3.2.2: Objections to (2)
3.2.3: Objections to (3)
3.2.4: Objections to (4)
3.2.5: Objections to (5)
3.2.6: Objections to (6)
3.2.7: Objections to (7)

Is It Impossible to Prove Atheism?

(Originally published on 1 September 2023; revised version published on 7 September 2023; revised again on 10 September 2023.)

1: Introduction

“Performative" or "pragmatic inconsistency arguments” attempt to show that some action with respect to some proposition is inconsistent with the proposition. You will sometimes hear people call such propositions “self-defeating,” but that isn’t technically accurate. It isn’t the proposition itself which is self-defeating; it is taking some action with respect to the proposition -- like asserting, believing, or defending it – which is self-defeating. For example, consider the proposition, “It is impossible to know anything.” It is logically possible that the proposition is true, but it is logically inconsistent to know that proposition is true. If you somehow knew that it was true, then you would know that it is false. That’s an example of a performative or pragmatic inconsistency argument.

Here are some other examples of propositions which lend themselves nicely to performative or pragmatic inconsistency arguments:

• "I do not exist."
• "I am dead."
• "I cannot assert or communicate anything."
• "I cannot talk."
• "I don't intend to be understood at all."

All of the above examples involve a first-person ("I") statement, but I'm not sure if a performative or pragmatic inconsistency must be a first-person statement. I'll leave that aside.

2: Exposition

Does atheism involve a pragmatic inconsistency? Before I can discuss this, I first need to define my terms. The word "atheism" is polysemous: it has multiple legitimate meanings. By "metaphysical atheism," I mean the proposition, "God does not exist." By "psychological atheism," I mean the psychological state in which a person lacks the belief that God exists. This post is about metaphysical, not psychological, atheism. For brevity, in the remainder of the post, I will use "atheism" to mean only metaphysical atheism.

According to some thinkers, the action of asserting the truth of atheism is a pragmatic inconsistency. For example, the late Christian philosopher Greg Bahnsen once said:

It's standard fare these days to point out that a universal negative cannot  be proven in an a posteriori fashion.  On the basis of experience, how could I prove universally there is no God? [...] God might be on the back side of the fourth moon of Jupiter.  Since I haven't examined the back side of the fourth moon of Jupiter, it's at least possible that God exists and I haven't encountered him yet.  So to say that there is no God is a very strong claim.  Atheists usually get hammered about that, that they're claiming too much.  In fact, in order to say 'there is no God,' ... you would have to be omniscient.  But if you were omniscient, you would be God. Therefore, the only person who could say 'there is no God' is God.  God  would not deny Himself.  So no one can say there is no God.[1]

This suggests the following argument, which I call the "unprovability of universal negatives argument."

(1) The only way to prove a universal negative in an a posteriori fashion is to exhaustively search for all possible sources of evidence of a thing and find no evidence.

(2) But it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to conduct such a search.

Therefore:

(3) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove a universal negative in an a posteriori fashion.

Defenders of the "unprovability of atheism argument" add two additional steps:

(4) The proposition, "God does not exist," is a universal negative.

From (3) and (4), it follows that:

(5) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove, "God does not exist," in an a posteriori fashion.

In the passage quoted above, however, Bahnsen suggests another argument which adds onto the first five steps. Atheism entails that there is no God, but the action of claiming to know that atheism is true presupposes that the person making that assertion has God-like knowledge. So we have:

(6) The action of claiming to know, "God does not exist," presupposes that the speaker is God. 

From (5) and (6), it follows that:

(7) If a finite, moral being claims to know, "God does not exist," then it is true that God does not exist and it is false that God does not exist.

From (7) and the Law of Noncontradiction, it follows that: 

(8) Any claims made by a finite, mortal being to know, "God does not exist," on an a posteriori basis should not be accepted.

I shall call the inference from (5) - (7) the "pragmatic inconsistency of knowing atheism" argument.  

3: Assessment

I shall argue that both the unprovability of atheism argument and the related pragmatic inconsistency of atheism arguments are unsound.

3.1: The Unprovability of Atheism Argument

Here, again, is the unprovability of atheism argument.

(3) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove a universal negative in an a posteriori fashion.

(4) The proposition, "God does not exist," is a universal negative.

Therefore:

(5) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove, "God does not exist," in an a posteriori fashion.

One immediate problem with this argument is its name. From the fact, if it is a fact, that it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove atheism in an a posteriori fashion, it does not follow that it is impossible for such beings to prove atheism in a priori fashion. One or more internal inconsistency arguments against God's existence might be sound. But let that pass.

Some philosophers deny the truth of the second premise, (4). For example, in his famous debate with Frank Zindler, William Lane Craig argued as follows.

[...] the statement that God does not exist is not a universal negative; it’s a singular negative statement. Certainly you can prove negative singular statements such as there is no planet between Venus and the Earth. You could provide arguments to show that a singular negative statement is true [...].[2]

Strictly speaking, the first quoted sentence is correct. Categorical propositions are propositions which assert or deny relationships between classes; universal negatives are categorical propositions which have the form, "No S are P." Atheism is not a universal negative in this strict sense. But the statement, "God does not exist," is the same as saying, "No (existing) thing is God." That restatement of atheism is a universal generalization; it is has the form, "There are no S's."[3] Therefore, a proponent of the unprovability of atheism argument might replace "universal negative" with "universal generalization" yielding the following revised version of the "unprovability of universal negatives argument," which gets renamed as the "unprovability of universal generalizations argument."

(1') The only way to prove a universal generalization in an a posteriori fashion is to exhaustively search for all possible sources of evidence of a thing and find no evidence.

(2) But it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to conduct such a search.

Therefore:

(3') It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove a universal generalization in an a posteriori fashion.

The "unprovability of atheism argument" would then become:

(4') The proposition, "God does not exist," is a universal generalization.

Therefore:

(5) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove, "God does not exist," in an a posteriori fashion.

The meaning of the word "prove" is ambiguous, but the last two steps of the pragmatic inconsistency argument (steps 6 and 7) provide a clue. That argument targets not atheism, but what is sometimes called "gnostic atheism," the claim to know that God does not exist. This suggests that, at least for Bahnsen, to "prove" a universal generalization means to succeed in demonstrating that belief in the universal generalization can rise to the level of knowledge. So let's revise the first two arguments one more time.

The "unprovability of universal generalizations argument" gets renamed as the "unknowability of universal generalizations argument."

(1'') The only way to reasonably believe a negative universal generalization on an a posteriori basis is to exhaustively search for all possible sources of evidence of a thing and find no evidence.

(2) But it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to conduct such a search.

Therefore:

(3'') It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe a negative universal generalization in an a posteriori fashion.

Likewise, the "unprovability of atheism argument" becomes the "unknowability of atheism argument."

(4') The proposition, "God does not exist," is a negative universal generalization.

Therefore:

(5') It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe, "God does not exist," on an a posteriori basis.

Now consider the first two premises (steps 1'' and 2) in light of this clarification of "prove." 

The second premise (step 2) is false. Purely on the basis of experience, one can know that at least some negative universal generalizations are true. Some objects or beings are defined in such a way that, if they exist, they exist at a specific location and at a specific time. For example, consider the title, "Seattle Seahawks Superbowl 60 Most Valuable Player (MVP)." Let "NO SEAHAWKS MVP" refer to the negative universal generalization, "The Seattle Seahawks Superbowl 60 MVP does not exist." If the Seattle Seahawks do not advance to Superbowl 60 (or if they advance but do not win), then NO SEAHAWKS MVP is true: the person described by that title does not exist. In that case, an "exhaustive search" doesn't require superhuman or supernatural abilities. One could reasonably believe NO SEAHAWKS MVP by simply watching Superbowl 60 or reading about it after the fact.

One might object that, even in my highly specified example, the inference to NO SEAHAWKS MVP isn't deductively valid; it is at least possible that there is a global media conspiracy to spread misinformation about the outcome of Superbowl 60, one's sensory organs are defective, or one is literally delusional and imagining sense data not received by one's sensory organs. This objection fails because one does not need absolute certainty to be reasonable in holding a belief. Even if one did not know NO SEAHAWKS MVP, one would still be reasonable in believing NO SEAHAWKS MVP. Contrary to what Bahnsen implies, a person can reasonably believe something they don't claim to know. For the same reason, Bahnsen has not given us a good reason to believe that the first premise (step 1'') is true. 

A proponent of the unknowability of atheism argument might grant the above objections and concede that humans can reasonably believe at least some negative universal generalizations, while at the same time insist that there is something special about God such that humans cannot reasonably believe atheism. Here I think it is useful to follow Jeanine Diller in making a distinction between global and local versions of atheism.[4] "Global atheism" is the proposition, "God does not exist," for all concepts of God, including concepts of God which no one has yet even considered. In contrast, "local atheism" is the proposition, "God does not exist," for a specific concept of God. This distinction suggests two further versions of the "unknowability of atheism" argument.

I will call the first of these two versions the "unknowability of global atheism" argument.

(1*) The only way to reasonably believe global atheism on an a posteriori basis is to exhaustively search for all possible sources of evidence of God, for every possible concept of God, and find no evidence.

(2) But it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to conduct such a search.

Therefore: 

(5*) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe global atheism on an a posteriori basis.

The second version, of course, is the "unknowability of local atheism" argument.

(1**) The only way to reasonably believe local atheism on an a posteriori basis is to exhaustively search for all possible sources of evidence of God, for a single concept of God, and find no evidence.

(2) But it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to conduct such a search.

Therefore: 

(5**) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe local atheism on an a posteriori basis.

The first argument is, I believe, much more promising than the second. In light of the fact that there are surely legitimate concepts of "God" which no human has ever conceived, it is difficult to imagine how, on the basis of experience, one could be confident in the belief that all local theisms are false. In other words, in the context of global atheism, the second premise (step 2) seems to be true. Of course, the fact that I cannot conceive of such a justification does not rule out the possibility that one exists. But it seems unlikely that anyone in the year 2023 could reasonably believe global atheism is true. As John Schellenberg has persuasively argued, there are numerous signs of 

human intellectual immaturity at the macro level, and we've seen enough evidence of it to say that maturity--the realization (or near realization) of a deep and wide understanding of reality--may yet be a long way off.[5]

Further support for Schellenberg's immaturity hypothesis comes from the work of Paul Draper. In a recent article, Draper explores the conjunction of "merotheism" (God is a proper part of nature) and "monopsychism" (there is exactly one mind or subject of consciousness). He calls this novel version of theism "panpsychotheism" (all-minds-[are]-God-ism).[6] The important point to notice here is that, although some of the greatest minds in history have thought about God, there is no indication that anyone else had thought of this view. All by itself, this single example is evidence that there are other conceptions of God which no one has previously conceived. 

In contrast, I think the second argument fails and for essentially the same reason given earlier. At least some God concepts entail or make probable certain states of affairs which be confirmed or disconfirmed by experience. For example, suppose that, in honor of Richard Swinburne, we define a "Swinburne God" as

a being with most of the following properties: being a person without a body (that is, a spirit), present everywhere (that is, omnipresent), the creator of the universe, perfectly free, able to do anything (that is, omnipotent), knowing all things (that is, omniscient), perfectly good, a source of moral obligation, eternal, a necessary being, holy, and worthy of worship. [7]

Let "Swinburnian theism" be the proposition, "The Swinburne God exists." Swinburnian theism clearly entails other propositions; one does not need to know that one of those entailments is false in order to reasonably believe that one of those entailments (and, by extension, Swinburnian theism itself) is false.[8] This is why I think the second premise (step 2) of the "unknowability of local atheism" argument fails.

3.2: The Pragmatic Inconsistency of Believing Atheism Argument

In the last section, we saw that the unprovability of atheism argument is not successful, but can be at least partially repaired by transforming it into the unknowability of atheism argument. The conclusion of that argument is:

(5') It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe, "God does not exist," on an a posteriori basis.

Defenders of the pragmatic inconsistency argument should then revise the last three steps as follows.

(6') The action of reasonably believing, "God does not exist," presupposes that the speaker is God. 

From (5') and (6'), it follows that: 

(7') If a finite, mortal being reasonably believes, "God does not exist," on an a posteriori basis then it is true that God does not exist and it is false that God does not exist.

From (7') and the Law of Noncontradiction, it follows that: 

(8') It is impossible for a finite, mortal being to reasonably believe, "God does not exist," on an a posteriori basis. 

This argument fails for two reasons. First, its second premise, (6'), is false. Even if it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe atheism on an a posteriori basis, it does not follow that it is impossible for such beings to reasonably believe atheism on an a priori basis. One does not have to be omniscient in order to know, much less reasonably believe, that there is a successful a priori argument for local atheism.

For example, here is one schema for what I call an "internal inconsistency argument" for local atheism.

(9) If God existed, then He would have property P1.

(10) If God existed, then He would have property P2.

(11) Any being with property P1 would have some further property P3.

(12) Any being with property P2 would not have property P3.

(13) Therefore, it is impossible for any being to have properties P1 and P2. (from 11 and 12)

(14) Hence, it is impossible for God to exist. (from 9, 10 and 13)

The basic idea is to show that if God existed, then he would have two properties P1 and P2. The next step is to show that property P1 entails some third property P3, while property P2 entails the denial of property P3. Since it is impossible for any being both to have and not have P3, it follows that that being cannot exist. While it might or might not be the case that there are no successful arguments of this type for local atheism, it really doesn't matter one way or the other for the purpose of this post. The speaker does not need to be omniscient in order to know the truth of (9) - (12).

Second, the argument's conclusion, (8'), does not follow from (5') - (7'). (6') refers to the action of claiming to reasonably believe, "God does not exist," but does not specify that that knowledge is based upon an a posteriori basis.

As with the unknowability of atheism argument, let us now consider two versions of the pragmatic inconsistency argument based on the distinction between global and local atheism. The global version can be summarized as follows:

(5*) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe global atheism on an a posteriori basis.

(6*) The action of reasonably believing global atheism presupposes that the speaker is God. 

Therefore:

(7*) If a finite, mortal being reasonably believes global atheism on an a posteriori basis, then global atheism is true and global atheism is false.

Therefore:

(8*) It is impossible for a finite, mortal being to reasonably believe global atheism on an a posteriori basis. 

There are two problems with this argument. The first is that it is invalid: (6*) refers to the action of claiming to reasonably believe global atheism but does not specify that that knowledge is based upon an a posteriori basis. It seems to me that this objection could be avoided by revising the argument again as follows:

(5**) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe global atheism.

(6**) The action of reasonably believing global atheism presupposes that the speaker is God. 

Therefore:

(7**) If a finite, mortal being reasonably believes global atheism, then global atheism is true and global atheism is false.

Therefore:

(8**) It is impossible for a finite, mortal being to reasonably believe global atheism.

That solves the problem identified by the first objection, but brings into sharper focus the second objection. Even if we assume that premise (5**) can be adequately defended, premise (6**) does not seem to be true. If premise (5**) is true, then it seems that the action of claiming to reasonably believe global atheism presupposes that the speaker has knowledge which greatly exceeds that of any human being in history. But "has knowledge which greatly exceeds that of any human being in history" is not a sufficient condition for being God. First, it's far from obvious that such knowledge requires omniscience, and many conceptions of God posit an omniscient being, not just a really smart being. Second, even if the speaker's actions did presuppose that the speaker is omniscient, being omniscient is not a sufficient condition for being God. It is at least conceivable that there exists an omniscient being which does not have any of the other attributes typically associated with God, such as omnipotence, moral perfection, eternity, aseity, sovereignty, immutability, necessity, etc.  

I don't know how Bahnsen would respond to this objection. Perhaps Bahnsen could show that the speaker's actions require such a superhuman degree of knowledge that the speaker's actions presuppose that the speaker is not necessarily God, but at least a supernatural being. Since metaphysical naturalism rules out the existence of any supernatural beings, not just God, the argument could then be transformed into a pragmatic inconsistency argument against believing metaphysical naturalism. 

Now consider the local version of the pragmatic inconsistency argument, which can be summarized as follows:

(5#) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe local atheism on an a posteriori basis.

(6#) The action of reasonably believing local atheism presupposes that the speaker is God. 

Therefore:

(7#) If a finite, mortal being reasonably believes global atheism on an a posteriori basis, then global atheism is true and global atheism is false.

Therefore:

(8#) It is impossible for a finite, mortal being to reasonably believe local atheism on an a posteriori basis.  

This argument suffers from the same defects as its global counterpart. Unlike the global pragmatic inconsistency argument, however, I am doubtful that the second premise, in this case (6#), can be repaired by replacing "God" with "supernatural being." For ordinary human knowledge is all that is needed to reasonably believe that some local theisms are false. Thus, the action of claiming to reasonably believe local atheism does not appear to be a pragmatic inconsistency, at least not in any sense related to the issues discussed in this post. 

4: Conclusion

In this post, I have considered two arguments: the unprovability of atheism argument and the pragmatic inconsistency of knowing atheism argument. The unprovability of atheism argument is best and most charitably understood as the unknowability of atheism argument, which has two versions. The unknowability of global atheism argument seems promising, but the unknowability of local atheism argument fails. For at least some concepts of "God," one can reasonably believe that local atheism is true. Finally, the pragmatic inconsistency argument fails because one does not need to be superhuman, much less omniscient, in order to reasonably believe the truth of the premises of an internal inconsistency argument. Perhaps there is a successful global pragmatic inconsistency argument (against the action of believing naturalism), but the local pragmatic inconsistency argument seems hopeless.[9]

Notes

[1] “Michael Martin Under the Microscope” audiocassette, tape 3.

[2] William Lane Craig, “Second Rebuttal Speech” Atheism vs. Christianity (January 1993), https://www.reasonablefaith.org/media/debates/atheism-vs.-christianity

[3] Thanks to Paul Draper for helping me to see this clearly.

[4] Diller, J. "Global and local atheisms." Int J Philos Relig 79, 7–18 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-015-9550-1

[5] J.L. Schellenberg, Progressive Atheism: How Moral Evolution Changes the God Debate (New York: Bloombsury, 2019), p. 50.

[6] Paul Draper, "Panpsychotheism." In Current Controversies in Philosophy of Religion (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 160-177.

[7] Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (2nd ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 1.

[8] For an example of such an argument, see Paul Draper's formulation and defense of his "Decisive Evidence Argument" in Draper, Paul, "Atheism and Agnosticism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/atheism-agnosticism/>.

[9] Thanks to Paul Draper for some very helpful conversations which significantly improved the quality of this post. Any errors are, of course, solely my responsibility.

The Columbine Mass Shooting and the Myth of Cassie Bernall's Martyrdom

Mark D. Linville has published a short booklet with Ravi Zacharias International Ministries (RZIM) entitled, "Is Everything Permitted? Moral Values in a World Without God?" The booklet begins with the following statement by Linville:

Few news stories have had the profound effect on me as did the shooting rampage at Columbine High School.

Can you guess where this is headed? Linville continues:

More on Plantinga, Atheism, and Moral Obligation

Today I remembered Plantinga wrote a very interesting article on naturalism and obligation back in 2010 in the journal Faith and Philosophy. I just checked my archives and made an interesting discovery. First, that article reinforces my belief that Plantinga believes atheism (and, indeed, naturalism) and moral obligation are incompatible. Second, in that article, Plantinga explicitly says he is not going to argue directly for that incompatibility claim; rather, he intends to "display" the failure of the most natural way of arguing that naturalism can accommodate moral obligation. In his own words:

I propose to support the claim that naturalism cannot accommodate morality—not by showing directly that it can’t, but by displaying the failure of the most natural way of arguing that it can.

Imagine how Plantinga would have reacted if Mackie said, "I'm not going to directly argue for the claim that God and evil are incompatible. Rather, I'm going to indirectly argue for it by displaying the failure of the most natural way of arguing that God and evil are compatible." Surely Plantinga would have replied: "Even if Mackie succeeds at that task, that still falls short of what he needs to defend his logical argument from evil: a rigorous defense of the claim that God and evil are incompatible." And Plantinga would have been right.

By similar reasoning, then, it seems to me that the Autonomous Morality Defender ("Defender") would be just as correct to use a parallel reply to Plantinga. Even if Plantinga's article succeeds in showing that the "most natural way of arguing that" naturalism can "accommodate morality" fails, Plantinga would still fall short of what he needs to defend his 'logical' argument from morality for theism.

Can We Show There is No Inconsistency between Atheism and Moral Obligation?

In a prior post, I showed that Plantinga has failed to demonstrate a contradiction between atheism and moral obligation in any of this three types of contradiction: explicit, formal, or implicit. I want to continue to my exploration of the alleged contradiction between atheism and moral obligation, this time by asking if we can show that there is no inconsistency between atheism and moral obligation. 

In the spirit of maximal transparency, what follows is mostly plagiarized material from Plantinga's book, God, Freedom, and Evil, Part I, Section a, sub-section 3, with the obvious exception that I have edited the material referring to God and evil with my own material referring to atheism and moral obligation. 

Assessing the Resurrection Hypothesis: McCullagh, Craig, Cavin, and Colombetti

In this post, I want to consider the assessment of historical hypotheses such as the alleged resurrection of Jesus (R), using the writings of William Lane Craig as a foil. In doing so, I will rely heavily upon a recent article by philosophers Robert Greg Cavin and Carolos Colombetti, but I want to be clear that I have not reviewed this post with them, so any mistakes in this post are entirely my responsibility.

While Craig's position regarding the use of Bayes' Theorem has evolved over the years, to my knowledge one thing which has not changed is his reliance upon the work of historian C. Behan McCullagh.[1] Following McCullagh, Craig argues for R using an argument pattern called "inference to the best explanation" (IBE).[2] In this post, I will argue the following three points contra Craig. First, Bayes' Theorem is the foundation for logically correct arguments for any historical hypotheses. Second, neither McCullagh's IBE criteria nor Craig's restatement of them are sufficiently clear to enable a rigorous assessment of historical hypotheses, whereas the Bayesian approach avoids these problems. Third, Craig's defense of R fails to establish that the alleged event is more probable than not.

Divine Nature Theory vs. Abstract Objects

Plato holding his Timaeus, detail from the Vatican fresco The School of Athens

Source: Web Gallery of Art; License: Public Domain

According to what I call the "Divine Nature Theory" of axiology or value (hereafter, DNT-A), value is grounded in God's nature. In contrast, moral anti-reductionism (usually called "ethical non-naturalism") says that moral value is grounded in sui generis, non-natural properties.

What is the advantage of DNT-A over moral anti-reductionism?  According to DNT-A, God’s nature, not God, is the source of moral value.  But what is the distinction between God and His nature?  God’s nature is simply the collection of God’s properties or attributes (e.g., omniscience, omnipotence, etc.).  But if that is the case, then why do we need God in order for moral value to supervene on one or more of such properties?  Or to put the point differently, why must those properties be instantiated in the person of God in order for the supervenience relationship to hold? Why can't they just exist as abstract properties? And if such properties do not need to be instantiated in the person of God, then what is the advantage of the divine nature theory over moral anti-reductionism?

Is the Combination of Atheism and Moral Obligation a Contradiction?

An Impossible (or Penrose) Triangle

Source: OpenClipArt; License: CC 

Three Types of Contradictions

Writing in 1955, the late Oxford don J.L. Mackie claimed that evil is logically inconsistent with God’s existence.

In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third would be false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions: the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere and cannot consistently adhere to all three.[1]

Consider the following set of propositions: {God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; evil exists}. Mackie claimed that the set is somehow contradictory. But how?

S.E. Cupp: Trump Has Broken American Evangelical Christianity

 LINK

Pro-God Atheism

For many former theists-turned-atheists, the loss of belief in God is a source of sadness. Consider these words from Christian-turned-atheist philosopher J.L. Schellenberg, taken from the conclusion of his landmark book, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Cornell University Press, 1993).

P.S. Now ask yourself: how often do you find atheist-turned-theist philosophers writing a book defending some argument for God's existence, such that the book's conclusion expresses the hope that other people will be able to refute his or her argument for God?

Atheism and the Laws of Logic

Daniel (@DarwinToJesus) recently tweeted the following:

#1. The laws of logic: There are three basic foundational laws of logic.
1. The law of identity (A* is A*)
2. The law of non contradiction (A* is not/cannot be B* in the same place and time)
3. The law of the excluded middle (every proposition is either true, or false)

These…

— Daniel (@darwintojesus) April 23, 2023

Theistic vs. Naturalistic Grounding of Moral Value

Seth Dillon, the CEO of The Babylon Bee, recently tweeted the following:

Sure, atheists have moral values — they just can't ground them in anything. Read Alex Rosenberg's "The Atheist's Guide to Reality." He acknowledges that in God's absence, morality is nothing but a useful fiction. He argues that if atheism is true, the moral feelings we've… https://t.co/HSufKX5ay5

— Seth Dillon (@SethDillon) August 7, 2023

New Paper Refuting Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy"

Terence Irwin	Elizabeth Anscombe

Irwin, T. The Philosophy and History of the Moral ‘Ought’: Some of Anscombe’s Objections. Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10398-w

Abstract: According to G.E.M Anscombe’s paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, modern moral philosophy has introduced a spurious concept of moral obligation, and has therefore made a mistake that the Greeks, and Aristotle in particular, avoided. Anscombe argues that the modern concepts of obligation, duty, and the moral ‘ought’ are the remnants of an earlier, but post-Aristotelian conception of ethics, and that they ought to be abandoned. An examination of Anscombe’s historical and philosophical claims shows that we have no reason to take them seriously. In particular, they rest on a misinterpretation of Scholastic views on ‘ought’ and obligation.

The Pragmatic Inconsistency of Responding to Nihilism with Despair

(1) Necessarily, if metaethical nihilism is true, then nothing matters.

(2) Responding with despair to the (supposed) truth of metaethical nihilism presupposes the falsity of metaethical nihilism.

Therefore:

(3) If one responds with despair to the (supposed) truth of metaethical nihilism, then it is true that nothing matters and it is false that nothing matters. [From 1-2]

Therefore:

(4) It is impossible to consistently respond with despair to metaethical nihilism. [From 3 and LNC]

They key insight of this argument is that if metaethical nihilism is true, then literally nothing, including metaethical nihilism itself, matters.

Draft Essay: Naturalism, Theism, Badness, and Moral Law: A Critique of Ravi Zacharias

 

Overview:

1: Introduction

2: Logical Arguments from Evil

(a) Historical Context 

(b) Zacharias's Framing of the Problem of Evil

3: Zacharias's "Work of God" Theodicy

4: Changing the Subject: Morality Without God

(a) Do Atheists Who Run An Argument from 'Evil' Contradict Themselves?

(b) Quote-Mining Atheists Who Reject Objective Morality

(c) Bogus Appeals to Authority Aside, Do Russell, Mackie, and Dawkins Have Good Arguments?

LINK

Empathy and Apathy: An Evidential Problem for Theists

Serial killer Ted Bundy

Image Source: Florida Memory Project; License: Public Domain

1. Definitions

Following Paul Draper, I'm going to define my terms as follows.[1]

By "naturalism," I mean the view that the physical exists and, if the mental exists, the physical explains why the mental exists.  If naturalism is true, then there are no purely mental beings which can exist apart from a physical body and so there is no God or any person or being much like God.

By "supernaturalism," I mean the view that the mental exists and, if the physical exists, the mental explains why anything physical exists.  If supernaturalism is true, then there is no purely physical matter which can exist without some sort of ultimate mental creator. "Personal supernaturalism" is a type of supernaturalism; it adds on the claims that one or more personal mental entities exist and, if a physical world exists, it or they produced the physical world for a purpose. "Theism" is a type of personal supernaturalism; it adds on the claim that there is just one mental entity, God, who is all-powerful, all-knowing, and morally perfect. 

"Otherism" is a catch-all category. It says that both naturalism and supernaturalism are false. 

The Divine-vs.-Human Argument against Christianity

1. If Christianity were true, then Christ is divine. [Given]

2. If Christianity were true, then Christ is human. [Given]

3. If Christ is divine, then Christ is immutable. [1: divine nature entails immutability]

4. If Christ is human, then Christ is mutable. [2: human nature entails mutability]

Therefore:

5. If Christianity were true, then it would be true that Christ is immutable and it would be false that Christ is immutable. [From 1-4]

Therefore:

6. It is impossible for Christianity to be true. [From 5 by the law of noncontradiction]

Assessing the Transcendence-vs.-Personhood Argument for the Impossibility of God

Source: Alchetron

In this post, I want to assess an argument for atheism called the Transcendence-vs.-Personhood Argument (hereafter, "TvP Argument"). The first section is an exposition of the argument as formulated by Theodore Drange. The second section is a partial assessment of the argument. The work of William Lane Craig appears prominently in this section. Craig is a highly regarded philosopher of time and philosopher of religion who has written extensively on the relationship between God and time. He is also, of course, a theist. Thus, his work on divine eternity provides a useful "test case" for the TvP Argument. 

Paul Davies' Compound Argument against Timeless and Temporal Concepts of God

Credit: Christopher Michel; License: CC BY-SA 4.0

 

In his 1983 book, God and the New Physics, Paul Davies writes:

Christians believe that God is eternal. The word ‘eternal’ has, however, been used to mean two rather different things. In the simpler version, eternal means everlasting, or existing without beginning or end for an infinite duration. There are grave objections to such an idea of God, however. A God who is in time is subject to change. But what causes that change? If God is the cause of all existing things (as the cosmological argument of Chapter 3 suggests), then does it make sense to talk about that ultimate cause itself changing?

In the earlier chapters we have seen how time is not simply there, but is itself part of the physical universe. It is ‘elastic’ and can stretch or shrink according to well-defined mathematical laws which depend on the behaviour of matter. Also, time is closely linked to space, and space and time together express the operation of the gravitational field. In short, time is involved in all the grubby details of physical processes just as much as matter. Time is not a divine quality, but can be altered, physically, even by human manipulation. A God who is in time is, therefore, in some sense caught up in the operation of the physical universe. Indeed, it is quite likely that time will cease to exist at some stage in the future (as we shall see in Chapter 15). In that case God's own position is obviously insecure. Clearly, God cannot be omnipotent if he is subject to the physics of time, nor can he be considered the creator of the universe if he did not create time. In fact, because time and space are inseparable, a God who did not create time, created space neither. But as we have seen, once spacetime existed, the appearance of matter and order in the universe could have occurred automatically as the result of perfectly natural activity. Thus, many would argue that God is not really needed as a creator at all except to create time (strictly, spacetime). 

So we are led to the other meaning of the word eternal — ‘timeless’....

A timeless God is free of the problems mentioned above, but suffers from the shortcomings already discussed on page 38. He cannot be a personal God who thinks, converses, feels, plans, and so on for these are all temporal activities. It is hard to see how a timeless God can act at all in time (although it has been claimed that this is not impossible). We have also seen how the sense of the existence of the self is intimately associated with the experience of a time-flow. A timeless God could not be considered a ‘person’ or individual in any sense that we know. Misgivings of this score have led a number of modern theologians to reject this view of an eternal God. Paul Tillich writes: ‘If we call God a living God, we affirm that he includes temporality and with this a relation to the modes of time.’ 3 The same sentiment is echoed by Karl Barth: ‘Without God's complete temporality the content of the Christian message has no shape.’

There is thus a grave and fundamental difficulty in reconciling all the traditional attributes of God. Modern physics, with its discovery of the mutability of time, drives a wedge between God's omnipotence and the existence of his personality. It is difficult to argue that God can have both these qualities.[1]

Two Types of Weak Arguments for Theism: "God of the Gaps" vs. "Weak Naturalistic Explanations"

1. God of the Gaps Arguments

On my old team blog (Secular Outpost, which was migrated from Patheos and renamed as Secular Frontier), I proposed the following schema for God of the Gaps Arguments (hereafter, "Gap Arguments").

(1) There is some puzzling phenomenon P which science cannot at present explain.

(2) Theism does explain P.

Therefore:

(3) P is more likely on the assumption that God exists than on the assumption God does not exist.

Possible values for P may certainly include, but are not limited to, the origin of the universe, the life-permitting conditions of the universe, the origin of life itself (i.e., not evolution), the origin of consciousness, near-death experiences, and so forth. What is important to note here is that merely referring to alleged "hard" cases for naturalism is not a sufficient condition to make a theistic argument a Gap Argument. Rather, the following are necessary and sufficient conditions for a theistic argument to qualify as a Gap Argument: (a) the argument must refer to scientific ignorance; and (b) the argument must not include a premise about current knowledge (scientific or otherwise) which allegedly favors theism over naturalism. To see this, consider two versions of an argument from consciousness for theism.

Version 1: The Argument from Consciousness (Gap Version)

(1) Science cannot explain consciousness.
(2) Theism does explain consciousness.
Therefore:
(3) Consciousness is more likely on the assumption that God exists than on the assumption God does not exist. 

Version 2: The Argument from Consciousness (Non-Gap Version) 

(1) E ("Human consciousness exists") is known to be true, i.e., Pr(E) is close to 1.
(2) Source physicalism is not hopelessly intrinsically much more probable than theism, i.e., Pr(|N|) is not much greater than Pr(|T|).
(3) Human consciousness is antecedently more probable on the assumption that source physicalism is true than on the assumption that theism is true i.e., Pr(E | T & B) =1 > Pr(E | N & B).
Therefore:
(4) Other evidence held equal, N is probably false, i.e., Pr(N | B & E) < 1/2.

In version 2, premise (3) would then be supported by one or more arguments based on what we do know, rather than appealing to scientific ignorance.

2. Weak Naturalistic Explanations Arguments 

Weak Naturalism Explanation Arguments (hereafter, "Weak Explanation Arguments") are related to Gap Arguments, but represent a distinct type of argument. While the exact details differ, they have the following basic form.

(1) The evidence (E) regarding some known topic T is known to be true.

(2) Naturalistic explanations 1...n are weak explanations because they are ad hoc, have weak explanatory power, or both.
(3) Theism has great explanatory power. 

Therefore:

(4) Theism is true. 

Possible values for T may certainly include, but are not limited to, the origin of the universe, the life-permitting conditions of the universe, the origin of life itself (i.e., not evolution), the origin of consciousness, near-death experiences, the historicity of Jesus' resurrection, and so forth. What is important to note here is that merely referring to alleged "weak" naturalistic explanations is not a sufficient condition to make a theistic argument a Weak Explanation Argument. Rather, the following are necessary and sufficient conditions for a theistic argument to qualify as a Weak Explanation Argument: (a) the argument must refer to the weakness of naturalistic explanations; and (b) the argument must not include a premise about the (alleged) strength of the theistic explanation. To see this, consider two versions of an argument for the historicity of the Resurrection.

Again, let's compare and contrast two versions of an argument for the historicity of the Resurrection. 

Version 1: The Argument for the Resurrection (Weak Explanation Version)

(1) The evidence (E) relevant to the alleged Resurrection of Jesus is known to be true.
(2) Each of the traditional naturalistic explanations 1...n for E are weak explanations because they are ad hoc, have weak explanatory power, or both.
(3) The Resurrection theory is a strong explanation of the evidence.
Therefore:
(4) [probable] Jesus rose from the dead.

Version 2: The Argument for the Resurrection (Non-Weak Explanation Version)

(1) The evidence (E) relevant to the alleged Resurrection of Jesus is known to be true.
(2) Each of the traditional naturalistic explanations 1...n for E are weak explanations because they are ad hoc, have weak explanatory power, or both.
(3) The Resurrection theory is a strong explanation of the evidence because it is neither ad hoc nor has weak explanatory power.
Therefore:
(4) [probable] Jesus rose from the dead.

In version 1, the argument assesses traditional naturalistic explanations by considering their background probability and explanatory power, but does not consider the background probability of the Resurrection theory. In contrast, version 2 considers background probability and explanatory power of all explanations. N.B. I think even version 2 fails, but version 2 is better than version 1. Why does version 2 fail? I'll save that for another time.

Divine Simplicity vs Trinity

Source: AnonMoos; License: Public Domain

I know that Thomists have had about centuries to come up with responses, but it just occurred to me that it is far from obvious that divine simplicity is logically consistent with the Trinity. Not making an argument; rather, just a note for future research.

Atheism and Self-Deception

Source: WallPaper Flare

I’m sure I’m not the first person to notice this, but, in light of the frequent accusation that atheists are self-deceived, it is striking how common it is for atheists to be told to behave in ways that are self-deception (or what we might call "self-deception adjacent") to cultivate theistic belief.

I’m sure I’m not the first person to notice this, but, in light of the frequent accusation that atheists are self-deceived, it is striking how common it is for atheists to be told to behave in ways that are self-deception or self-deception adjacent.m, to cultivate theistic belief

— Secular Outpost (@SecularOutpost) July 10, 2023

A Surprisingly Persuasive Disproof of God's Existence: Brownson's Ontological Problem of Evil

Source: Lehman College CUNY

I just finished reading a surprisingly persuasive disproof of God's existence. 

Thinking about Craig's Defense of the Kalam Cosmological Argument: Did God's Causing the Universe to Exist Itself Have a Cause?

William Lane Craig

Source: Wikimedia; License: Public Domain

I've been thinking about Craig's defense of the kalam cosmological argument again. In this post, I will sketch two arguments I've formulated and then briefly discuss what I perceive to be the key issue which kalam proponents (hereafter, "kalamists") are likely to dispute.

Podcast Interview with Justin Schieber of Real Atheology

Justin Schieber

A few weeks ago, Justin Schieber interviewed me for an episode of the Real Atheology podcast. That episode just dropped. 

RA040: Jeffery Jay Lowder on Philosophy of Religion

"In this episode, Justin Schieber sits down with Jeffery Jay Lowder for a wide-ranging interview. Fans of the show will no doubt be familiar with Jeff's work. From founding Infidels.org and the Secular Outpost to his contributions to The Empty Tomb and his several public debates, Jeff has earned his reputation as a fair-minded and philosophically informed atheist. We discuss the origin of infidels.org, Paul Draper's famous argument from Pain and Pleasure and everything in between."

LINK

Two Arguments for the Impossibility of an Omniscient Being

An Impossible (or Penrose) Triangle

Source: OpenClipArt; License: CC 

Version #1

1. Either God can know what it is like not to know that p or God cannot know what it is like not to know that p. 
2. If God can know what it is like not to know that p, then God is not omniscient (since to know what it is like not to know that p, there must be some p that God does not know). 
3. If God cannot know what it is like not to know that p, then God is not omniscient (since there is some p—i.e., (L) or (L*)—that God cannot know). 
4. (Therefore) Either way, God is not omniscient. 

Version #2

1. Either God can know what it is like to be finite or God cannot know what it is like to be finite. 
2. If God can know what it is like to be finite, then God is not omniscient (since to know what it is like to be finite, God must be finite). 
3. If God cannot know what it is like to be finite, then God is not omniscient (since there is something that God cannot know, namely, what it is like to be finite). 
4. (Therefore) Either way, God is not omniscient.

Both versions of this argument belong to Moti Mizrahi. See:

Mizrahi, Moti (2013). "New Puzzles About Divine Attributes." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (2):147-157.

Another "Impossibility" Argument Against Theism: The Aseity-vs-Temporal Argument

An Impossible (or Penrose) Triangle

Source: OpenClipArt; License: CC 

The Aseity-vs-Temporal Argument

temporal theism =df. theism conjoined with the proposition, "God is necessarily temporal"

(1) If temporal theism is true, then God is a se. [Premise]

(2) If temporal theism is true, then God is temporal. [Premise]

(3) If God is a se, then God is self-existent, independent, and underived. [From the definition of a se]

(4) If God is timeless sans creation and temporal with creation, then God is not necessarily temporal. 

(5) Therefore, it is impossible for God to be both a se and necessarily temporal. (from 3 and 4)

(6) Hence, it is impossible for temporal theism to be true. (from 1, 2, and 5)

To avoid any misunderstandings, I am merely sketching an argument, not defending it. I claim only that it is valid, not that it is sound.

The Argument from the Psychological Relevance of Logical Laws

Introduction

In his book C.S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea: In Defense of the Argument from Reason, Victor Reppert lists nine presuppositions of rational inference.

1. States of mind have a relation to the world we call intentionality, or about-ness.

2. Thoughts and beliefs can be either true or false.

3. Human beings can be in the condition of accepting, rejecting or suspending belief about propositions.

4. Logical laws exist.

5. Human beings are capable of apprehending logical laws.

6. The state of accepting the truth of a proposition plays a crucial causal role in the production of other beliefs, and the propositional content of mental states is relevant to the playing of this causal role.

7. The apprehension of logical laws plays a causal role in the acceptance of the conclusion of the argument as true.

8. The same individual entertains thoughts of the premises and then draws the conclusion.

9. Our processes of reasoning provide us with a systematically reliable way of understanding the world around us.[1]

Commenting on this list of presuppositions, Reppert writes, "It seems to me that all of these elements of reasoning are prima facie difficult to fit within the framework of philosophical naturalism."[2] Here I want to quickly sketch how I would assess one of Reppert's supporting arguments for that claim.

Two "Impossibility" Arguments against (Craigean) Christianity

An Impossible (or Penrose) Triangle

Source: OpenClipArt; License: CC 

Introduction

In my recent video assessment of the late Dr. Gordon Stein's opening statement in his debate with Greg Bahnsen on, "Does God Exist?", I described two possible ways of defending the non-existence of something. First, I said that one way to defend a universal negative is to use what I call an "impossibility argument." Second, I said that one way to defend a particular negative is to use what I call an "improbability argument." 

As I explained in the video, there are two caveats. First, I do not claim that these two types of arguments are an exhaustive list of the various argument patterns which might be used to support universal or particular negatives. Second, my names for these argument patterns are not standard. For example, a standard name for one type of improbability argument is "evidential argument." The standard name for one type of impossibility argument is "logical argument." For example, J.L. Mackie's famous "logical argument from evil" argues that God is impossible because theism is logically inconsistent with evil. I don't like that name because it sounds funny to outsiders. Imagine an atheist saying, "I'm going to defend a logical argument for atheism." That invites the question, "As opposed to what? An illogical argument for atheism?" While my names are nonstandard, I think they are more intuitive than the standard argument names and so I prefer my names for that reason.

In this article, I will quickly sketch two impossibility arguments for a particular negative: the proposition, "Craigean Christianity is false," where "Craigean Christianity" means the version of Christianity defended by William Lane Craig.

New Video Series on My YouTube Channel: "The Verdict Is In"

I've decided to launch a new YouTube video series, which I call "The Verdict Is In" (a play on Josh McDowell's famous book, "The Jury Is In").

The first two videos are as follows:

1. Assessment of Frank Zindler's opening statement in his famous 1991 "Atheism vs. Christianity" debate with William Lane Craig: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL5QAvmnRlfhbOAr8Aop4_beNmUi2UAimt
2. Assessment of Greg Bahnsen's opening statement in his famous 1985 "Does God Exist?" debate with Gordon Stein: https://youtu.be/tMlm0Ehz1ZU

Note: I do not intend to release further videos regarding the Craig-Zindler debate, but I do plan to record additional videos for the Bahnsen-Stein debate. Bahnsen's presuppositionalist approach is so unusual that it warrants the extra level of analysis. Plus, I intend to use Stein's performance as a case study in how not to debate.

To subscribe to my YouTube channel, go here: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC9sui0gw2ZxP2oGeXiVY_PA

Some Very Rough and Incomplete Thoughts on the Prior Improbability of the Alleged Resurrection of Jesus

Bayes Theorem

Source: Matt Buck; License: CC BY-SA 3.0

DISCLAIMER (5 May 2023): I consider this a partial blog post on the prior improbability of the alleged resurrection of Jesus. I use the word "partial" because I'm not presently motivated to write what I would consider to be the entire blog post. If my level of motivation changes in the future, I will update the blog post.

Asimov's Argument from the Bible for Atheism

Photo from New York World-Telegram & Sun, Public Domain

 

Earlier today, the "Thinking Atheist" tweeted a meme with a quotation attributed to the late Isaac Asimov:

Agree or disagree? pic.twitter.com/gkVf3fuLDo

— The Thinking Atheist (@ThinkingAtheist) January 6, 2023

Asimov's statement can be read in two ways. First, it could be an empirical claim: people who properly read the Bible tend to become atheists. Second, it could be a normative claim: people who "properly" read the Bible ought to become atheists. In my opinion, the word "properly" is doing a lot of work here; properly read, Asimov is making the normative claim.

But why believe the claim? 

On Twitter, one person replied to me and suggested that Asimov said "atheism" but really meant "the falsity of Judaism and Christianity." Maybe , but if so that's pretty embarrassing for Asimov. The distinction between "atheism" and "the falsity of Judaism and Christianity" is pretty basic. Even middle schoolers can understand it.