Beyond Euthyphro: The Quadrilemma Against Theistic Grounding of Moral Values

Here's a sketch of an argument against the necessity of God for (objective) moral values.

Consider the following position:

DNT-A: Moral values are grounded in God's nature.

The motivation for this position collapses once we map the logical space of possible grounding relations. Once the options are laid out, it becomes clear: God or God's nature is not required to ground moral values.

The Quadrilemma

If objective moral values exist, their ultimate foundation must be either ungrounded, abstractly grounded, mentally grounded, or physically grounded. 

• Ungrounded. Some moral values are fundamental. For example, "kindness is good" is simply a brute, foundational truth.
• Abstract grounding. Some moral values are grounded in other abstract properties or value-relations. For example, the badness of cruelty may be grounded in the disvalue of causing suffering.
• Mental grounding. Some moral values are grounded in a mind or intellect, such as a divine being's valuing activity.
• Physical grounding. Some moral values are grounded in facts about the natural world, such as human flourishing, evolutionary facts about cooperation, or the requirements of well-being.

These four horns are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. There are no further intelligible options for grounding moral values.

Objection: God's Nature is Sui Generis

One might object that the grounding of morality in God is sui generis—a unique, fifth kind of relation not captured by these categories. But is it? To count as a legitimate fifth option, it is not enough simply to assert that it is sui generis. The proponent must explain what this fifth option is and how it differs from physical, mental, and abstract grounding. Unless and until such an account is provided, there is no reason to accept it as a genuine alternative. Therefore, the quadrilemma covers all the intelligible philosophical options.

Why God's Nature Is Not Necessary

Now consider the implications of each horn.

• Ungrounded: If some values are (ontologically) fundamental, then they do not depend on God by definition. While a theist might respond by proposing God (or His nature) is the ultimate ground of axiology, this view is counterintuitive, less parsimonious, and possibly incoherent.

• Abstract grounding: If values are grounded in abstract properties like <kindness> or <justice>, it's far more parsimonious to say that they are grounded in abstract properties, full stop, than it is to say “and they are essential properties of God.”  Why the middleman? There is no compelling reason to require that moral values be instantiated in God rather than being recognized as foundational abstract properties. 

• Physical grounding: If values are grounded in natural or physical facts, then again God is unnecessary.

• Mental grounding: If values are grounded in a mind, then God is a candidate. But this option is inconsistent with DNT-A, which says that moral values are grounded in God's nature, not God's mind. Proponents of DNT-A might try to reconcile this with their 'nature' claim by asserting that God's mind and nature are identical. Not only does this move depend on the highly contested and arguably incoherent doctrine of divine simplicity, it still fails to show that God is necessary. The grounding could potentially be in a different sort of mind, making the theistic option one possibility among others, not a requirement.

Beyond Euthyphro

The famous Euthyphro dilemma pressed divine command theory with two horns: are things good because God commands them, or does God command them because they are good? Some thinkers have argued that Modified Divine Command Theory, with its appeal to God’s essentially good nature, shows that the Euthyphro dilemma is a false dilemma.

But the quadrilemma is more difficult to escape. It does not presuppose voluntarism or command theory. It partitions the entire logical space of value grounding. And once the options are on the table, the apologetic claim that (objective) moral values require God can no longer be sustained.

Conclusion

The Quadrilemma Against Theistic Grounding shows that God is never necessary to ground objective moral values. At most, God offers one possible grounding among others. The real question is not whether objective moral values can exist without God. They can. The real question is which grounding theory has the best explanatory virtues, such as parsimony and coherence. On these grounds, non-theistic options appear to have a distinct advantage.

Theistic vs. Naturalistic Grounding of Moral Value

Seth Dillon, the CEO of The Babylon Bee, recently tweeted the following:

Sure, atheists have moral values — they just can't ground them in anything. Read Alex Rosenberg's "The Atheist's Guide to Reality." He acknowledges that in God's absence, morality is nothing but a useful fiction. He argues that if atheism is true, the moral feelings we've… https://t.co/HSufKX5ay5

— Seth Dillon (@SethDillon) August 7, 2023

A Modest Proposal for Religion and Morality Terminology: Part 4 (Discovered vs Invented)

Source: PXFuel; License: Public Domain 

4. Discovered vs Invented

Having reviewed the terminology to describe the positions that moral sentences are either are (or are not) capable of being true or false, I am now going to explore the philosophical territory under cognitivism. When cognitivists talk about the truth value of moral sentences, it is useful to distinguish between the source and nature of these sentences. Allow me to explain. 

Again, consider the following moral sentences.

• Do unto others what you would have them do to you.
• Plural marriage, involving one husband and multiple wives, is acceptable.
• It is the duty of parents to ensure that their daughters are 'circumcised,' i.e., have their clitoris removed.

By definition, if cognitivism is true, each of those sentences is either true or false. But what makes each of them true or false? Here are two indirect answers to that question.

• discovered: whatever it is that makes moral sentences true or false, it is something that "we" recognize and which is beyond "our" control.
• invented: a mind (or something like a mind) decides which moral sentences are true or false.

Each of these two options has two sub-options: one limited to humans and one which includes humans and any supernatural beings which might exist, such as gods and God.

• discovered by humans: whatever it is that makes moral sentences true or false, it is something that humans recognize and which is beyond humans' control.
• discovered by minds: whatever it is that makes moral sentences true or false, it is something that minds (or something like minds) recognize and which is beyond their control.
• invented by humans: humans decide which moral sentences true or false
• invented by minds: a mind (or something like a mind) decides which moral sentences are true or false.

The distinction between "discovered" and "invented" captures most, if not all, of what philosophers mean when they talk about the "objectivity" or "subjectivity" of "morality" in a purely ontological sense, i.e., what "exists" in reality.[1] But the discovered-vs.-invented distinction has a major advantage over the ontological objectivity-vs.-subjectivity distinction. Even among philosophers who define the terms "objective" and "subjective" in an ontological sense, there is disagreement about how to apply that distinction to God (and ethical theories in which God plays a major role). Some philosophers maintain that "discovered by humans" is a sufficient condition for ontological objectivity, while others insist that ontological objectivity means mind-independent and so "discovered by minds" (including God) is a necessary and sufficient condition for ontological objectivity. In contrast, the two distinctions -- discovered-vs.-invented by humans-vs.-minds -- bypasses that semantic swamp entirely and does so in a way easily understandable by everyone.

Notes

[1] In this sentence, replace "morality" with "social moral system or Socratic moral system."

Nicholas Rescher on Objective Values

(Note: The following post was originally written on October 19, 2011, but was never quite finished. I am publishing it now "as is." I am clearing out my backlog of draft blog posts but I am officially on a hiatus from blogging. What this means is that while you are free to comment on this post, readers should not expect engagement from me anytime soon.)

I have always been uncomfortable with Craig's references to "values" in his defense of his moral argument for theism. What does Craig mean by "values"? I found a passage in Nicholas Rescher's INTRODUCTION TO VALUE THEORY that I found very helpful and worth posting. In the following excerpt, Rescher discusses the issue of whether values are in any sense objective:

One of the central tasks of such a theory of evaluation in general is to make a critical examination of the generic features of the mechanisms for applying the concept of value. Here two questions above all have been at the forefront of discussion: (1) Is value a property of objects (like color) or is it a relationship (like ownership) that arises out of circumstances linking the value object with the valuing subject in some special way, in which case the further question of objectivity vs. subjectivity arises: is valuation personal and relative; does value reside strictly "in the mind of the beholder," or does it have an objective grounding? (2) Is the value of an object something to be apprehended only in subjective experience (like the taste of a food or a drink) intuitively--or is its attribution to be based on impersonally specifiable criteria whose satisfaction can be determined by some objective examination akin to the scientific investigation of things?

An enormous literature has sprung up around these metatheoretical questions regarding valuation. We cannot here pursue the matter at the length required for an adequate discussion. In consequence, we shall content ourselves with formulating our own position in a brief and dogmatic way. As we see it, a paradigm model of evaluation can be found in the work of the land appraiser. The assessed value at issue (that of land) is relational: it is not a property inherent in the land itself (like the rockiness of its soil) but arises out of its relationship to people in its environment and has to do with various attitudes that people have toward the features exhibited by this valued item. Evaluation is this generally "principled," i.e., based on criteria that take account of objective features of the items (real or assumed) that are being evaluated. Value has, therefore, an objective basis and can be assessed, by impersonal standards or criteria that can be taught to an evaluator through training. Value--in this conception--is relational (in viewing the value of an object as something that arises from the nature of its interactions with people, or perhaps intelligent beings generally) but objective (since evaluation is, in general, based on objectively establishable and interpersonally operative standards).
The controversy about the objectivity of value comes down to this: Is something valuable because it is valued (and so, solely, because it is regarded by people in a certain way), or is something valued--properly and correctly valued--when it is valuable, that is, when it is objectively possessed of certain value-endowing features? The question can be put in another way by asking what type of valuing situation is to be taken as typical. Is the paradigm evaluation that of a postage stamp, whose sole value resides in the fact that men wish to own it? Or is the paradigm evaluation that of an apple whose value, quite apart from the fact of its being desired, resides in its possession of those characteristics that make for its being nourishing, palatable, hunger-appeasing, etc.? (Note that it is only in this second case--when having value requires the possession of certain features--that one can speak of something that is valued as being rightly or correctly valued.)

Put in these terms the question (it would seem) virtually answers itself. Both types of value situations arise. There are postage stamp cases, where values derive from being subjectively valued, and apple cases, where value inheres objectively in value-endowing features. There are mere valuings of the de gustibus non est disputandum kind that lie beyond direct criticism, and there are well-founded valuings that can be correct or incorrect on the basis of an objective foundation. An adequate theory of value has to be prepared to take both types of valuing into account.
-- Nicholas Rescher, Introduction to Value Theory (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1982), pp. 55-56.

What stands out to me after reading Rescher's explanation is just how irrelevant the existence of God is to all of this. If values are objective, that is not because God does or does not exist. If values are subjective, that is not because God does or does not exist. Either way the existence or nonexistence of God is irrelevant to the objectivity of value.