Index: The Evidential Argument from the Holocaust against Theism

This article will serve as a hub for organizing past and future responses to my evidential argument from the Holocaust against theism. 

1: Logical Form of the Argument

The first five steps are a cumulative case based on independent facts about the badness of the Holocaust. Step 1 is an application of Draper's argument from pain and pleasure to the Holocaust; it is defended in the original article.

(1) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the biologically gratuitous physical pain experienced by many, if not most, Holocaust victims, i.e., 
Pr(E1 | N) >! Pr(E1 |T).

The next step appeals to the horrendous nature of the Holocaust. I think horrendous evils are much more probable on naturalism than on theism, but that is not the claim I am making here. Because I am making a cumulative case argument, I have to show that each additional item of evidence is more probable on naturalism than on theism, while in effect adding the previous item(s) of evidence into the background information. In probability notation, I need to show Pr(E2 | E1 & N) >! Pr(E2 | E1 & T), not Pr(E2 | N) >! Pr(E2 | T). I defend the former inequality in the original article. 

(2) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to Holocaust victims who experienced and/or witnessed events so horrific that the events constituted prima facie reasons for each victim to doubt whether the victim's life (given their inclusion in the Holocaust) was a great good to the victim on the whole, i.e.,

Pr(E2 | E1 & N) >! Pr(E2 | E1 & T).

The third step appeals to a specific aspect of the problem of divine hiddenness, the problem of divine silence during suffering, as it relates to Holocaust victims who experienced biologically gratuitous suffering and horrendous evil. Again,  I defend the premise in the original article, but it may be restated in plain English as follows.

(3) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the fact that so many victims of the Holocaust did not report feeling God's comforting presence, i.e.,
Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & N) > Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & T). 

The fourth step appeals to another aspect of the problem of divine hiddenness, this time focusing on what John Schellenberg calls "former believers" and applying it to Holocaust survivors. Again,  I defend the premise in the original article, but it may be restated in plain English as follows.

(4) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the fact that so many devout Jewish survivors of the Holocaust became nonbelievers, i.e.,

Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & E3 & N) > Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & E3& T).

From steps 1-4, it follows that:

(5) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the Holocaust, i.e., Pr(E | N) >! Pr(E | T).

The next step of the argument is based upon Paul Draper's theory of intrinsic probability, which says that intrinsic probability is determined by modesty, coherence, and nothing else. Because naturalism is both more modest and more coherent than theism, it follows that the intrinsic probability of naturalism is greater than the intrinsic probability of theism. This premise is not defended in my article, but instead may be found in Draper's defense of the second premise in what he calls the "low priors argument." 

Using the word "simplicity" as a more concise way to say "has greater intrinsic probability," we get:

(6) Naturalism is much simpler than Theism. 

The next step of the argument is designed to preempt objections that other items of evidence (such as the finite age of the universe, the life-permitting conditions of the universe, the contingency of the universe, objective moral values, etc.) favor theism and such items of evidence outweigh the evidence represented by E1-E4. The basic strategy is to show that known facts about good and evil, such as E1-E4, decisively outweigh the theistic evidence. This premise is not defended in my article, but instead may be found in Draper's defense of what he calls the "decisive evidence argument." So the seventh step of the argument is:

(7) Any epistemic advantages that Theism has over Naturalism (i.e., any factors that raise the ratio of the probability of Theism to the probability of Naturalism) do not, even when combined, suffice to offset the epistemic advantages that Naturalism has over Theism if premises 5 and 6 are true. 

From steps 5-7, it follows from Bayes' Theorem that:

(8) Theism is probably false. 

The two inferences in this argument--the first from 1-4 to 5 and the second from 5-7 to 8--are deductively correct. Therefore, if there is something wrong with this argument, then there must be something with at least if not more of the six premises (1-4, 6-7).

2: Non-Objections

I classify a reply as a "non-objection" if it does not constitute a defeater to one or more premises of the argument; and if does not challenge the inference of the argument. What follows is a list of some of the non-objections I have seen.

2.1: Dismissive Replies

• "Why bad thing happen if God real?"

2.2: Confused Replies

• "You don't really have an argument. You made a statement. Actually just a subjective inference."
• "No. It's merely evidence."

2.2: Irrelevant Replies

2.2.1. The Concept of "God" 

• Objection: "All this can show is an inconsistency between a particular concept of “God” and that “God” creating the world as you have conceived it."
• Objection: "The argument is presupposed on a false attribution error, i.e., that God's existence is dependent on the absence of suffering. This premise presupposes that God is contingent, rather than necessary; therefore, God is not actually God; because, necessary (i.e., self caused) is an attribute of God. The absence of this attribute, reduces God to the caused, rather than the uncaused causer.  Therefore, the argument does not refute the existence of God; instead, it refutes a subjective idea of God predicated on a different set of attributes to those present in God Himself. Argument rejected on the grounds of false attribution error."

2.2.2. Other Replies

• "If God didn’t exist we wouldn’t know the difference between good and evil."
• "Why single out the Holocaust? The "holocaust" could also describe the 10 million murdered under Stalin, or the 170 million murdered under Mao Tse-tung. Nazism was just one of the atrocities of man against man."

3: Objections

3.1: Objections to Multiple Premises

3.2.1: Flip Objections 

In interscholastic and intercollegiate debate, to "flip" or "turn" argument is to take one of your opponent's arguments and to use it as an argument for your position and/or against theirs. 

Objection: The Holocaust argument presupposes objective (moral) good and evil, but objective (moral) good and evil require God.

Reply: LINK

Objection: The Holocaust argument includes several items in our background information, such as the existence of the universe, conscious beings capable of experiencing pain, and so forth. These things are evidence favoring theism over naturalism.

Reply: First, some items alleged to be theistic evidence, such as the existence of the universe, do not favor theism over naturalism. Second, I agree that at least one fact in our background information, consciousness, favors theism over naturalism. The fact that it favors theism over naturalism does not, by itself, negate the claim that the specific facts identified in the Holocaust argument favor naturalism. 

3.2: Objections to Individual Premises

3.2.1: Objections to (1)
3.2.2: Objections to (2)
3.2.3: Objections to (3)
3.2.4: Objections to (4)
3.2.5: Objections to (5)
3.2.6: Objections to (6)
3.2.7: Objections to (7)

More on Plantinga, Atheism, and Moral Obligation

Today I remembered Plantinga wrote a very interesting article on naturalism and obligation back in 2010 in the journal Faith and Philosophy. I just checked my archives and made an interesting discovery. First, that article reinforces my belief that Plantinga believes atheism (and, indeed, naturalism) and moral obligation are incompatible. Second, in that article, Plantinga explicitly says he is not going to argue directly for that incompatibility claim; rather, he intends to "display" the failure of the most natural way of arguing that naturalism can accommodate moral obligation. In his own words:

I propose to support the claim that naturalism cannot accommodate morality—not by showing directly that it can’t, but by displaying the failure of the most natural way of arguing that it can.

Imagine how Plantinga would have reacted if Mackie said, "I'm not going to directly argue for the claim that God and evil are incompatible. Rather, I'm going to indirectly argue for it by displaying the failure of the most natural way of arguing that God and evil are compatible." Surely Plantinga would have replied: "Even if Mackie succeeds at that task, that still falls short of what he needs to defend his logical argument from evil: a rigorous defense of the claim that God and evil are incompatible." And Plantinga would have been right.

By similar reasoning, then, it seems to me that the Autonomous Morality Defender ("Defender") would be just as correct to use a parallel reply to Plantinga. Even if Plantinga's article succeeds in showing that the "most natural way of arguing that" naturalism can "accommodate morality" fails, Plantinga would still fall short of what he needs to defend his 'logical' argument from morality for theism.

The Holocaust is Strong Evidence Against Theism

(Revised 27 April 2022)

(Revised 1 March 2022)

(Revised 14 February 2022)

(Revised 7 February 2022)

The following tweet recently appeared on my Twitter feed: 

Primo Levi Auschwitz survivor
"The notions that our world comes from God and is governed by God are hard to sustain if one looks seriously at evil. What egocentric presumption to think that God listens for our repentance and acts accordingly!" pic.twitter.com/J2gNxTEdNt

— Dave of Letters (@liverational22) August 6, 2021

In this blog post, I intend to defend a weaker version of Primo Levi's claim. I do not claim that Auschwitz makes God's existence impossible. Rather, I intend to argue that the Holocaust is extremely strong evidence against theism and, other evidence held equal, makes God's existence improbable.

My Call Into "Catholic Answers" with Trent Horn

 LINK (HT: Real Atheology)

Theological Ethics as Dogma

(Note: The following post was originally written on October 19, 2011, but was never quite finished. I am publishing it now "as is." I am clearing out my backlog of draft blog posts but I am officially on a hiatus from blogging. What this means is that while you are free to comment on this post, readers should not expect engagement from me anytime soon.)

Apologists have said, ad nauseum, that atheists are guilty of presupposing a priori the truth of metaphysical naturalism in both their arguments and in their responses to theistic arguments. Phillip Johnson is especially notorious for this in his criticisms of evolutionists. And N.T. scholars like Gary Habermas, William Lane Craig and Craig Blomberg do this when criticizing their liberal critics, like Antony Flew, Gerd Ludemann, and especially John Dominic Crossan.

While there have been nontheists who may be guilty of that charge, naturalistic atheists don't need to presuppose naturalism in order to make their case. But in this article I wish to focus on a different point. I believe that the Christian focus on presuppositions reveals a rhetorical strategy that has been extremely effective for Christians. As someone who has spent a lot of time thinking about metaethics, it occurred to me that it might be fruitful to turn the tables on proponents of theistic metaethics. The more I learn about atheistic metaethics, the more it seems to me that many proponents of theistic metaethics are just blatantly presupposing, a priori, that ethics cannot be secular. In other words, some proponents of theological ethics rule out the possibility of naturalistic ethics a priori.

For an example of how such an objection to theistic writings on religion and morality would look, I went to arn.org, one of the official sites for evolution denier Phillip Johnson. At that site, I found an article titled, "Evolution as Dogma: The Establishment of Naturalism," which sounded like an article concerned exclusively with the alleged a priori presupposition of naturalism in science. And indeed it was. So using Johnson's words as a starting point, I developed my own 'paraphrase' of Johnson, except that I directed the accusation of bias against theists who discount secular ethics. Here is what I came up with:

Theistic metaethics is so deeply ingrained in the thinking of many educated people today that they find it difficult even to imagine any other way of looking at things. To such people, theistic metaethics seems so logically appealing that only a modest amount of confirming evidence is needed to prove the whole system, and so they point to the "objectivity" of morality as virtually conclusive. Even if they do develop doubts about, say, whether God's commands are needed for moral duties, their belief that an objective morality requires a theistic grounding is undisturbed. Because they believe morality is objective and that their Bible tells them that God must be sovereign over everything that exists, it follows that morality must be dependent upon God if it is objective.

The same situation looks quite different to people who accept the possibility of moral values and duties which are not dependent on God. To such people, who include both nontheists and theists, the idea that God could make cruelty morally valuable or torture a moral duty is absurd. From their perspective, there is no relevant difference between saying, on the one hand, that an all-powerful God can do anything which is logically possible and, on the other hand, that a morally perfect God can do anything which is morally permissible. If it is no violation of God's sovereignty to say that God cannot do the logically impossible (such as make it both true and false that unicorns exist), then it should equally be no violation of God's sovereignty to say that God cannot make the immoral (such as the slaughter of the Canaanites) moral just by issuing a command. But this is unimportant to a thoroughgoing devotee of theistic metaethics, who feels that apologetics is doing just fine so long as it can offer an foundation for ethics that is merely consistent with theism, no matter how implausible.

Victory in the dispute over secular vs. religious ethics therefore belongs to the party with the cultural authority to establish the ground rules that govern the discourse. If the autonomy of ethics is admitted as a serious possibility, theistic metaethics cannot win, and if it is excluded a priori theistic metaethics cannot lose. 

Link: The Metaphilosophy of Naturalism

Abstract: The metaphilosophy of naturalism is about the nature and goals of naturalist philosophy. A real or hypothetical person who knows the nature, goals and consequences of naturalist philosophy may be called an “informed naturalist.” An informed naturalist is justified in drawing certain conclusions about the current state of naturalism and the research program that naturalist philosophers ought to undertake. One conclusion is that the great majority of naturalist philosophers have an unjustified belief that naturalism is true and an unjustified belief that theism (or supernaturalism) is false. I explain this epistemic situation in this paper. I also articulate the goals an informed naturalist would recommend to remedy this situation. These goals, for the most part, have as their consequence the restoring of naturalism to its original state (approximately, to a certain degree, given the great difference in the specific theories), which is the state it possessed in Greco-Roman philosophy before naturalism was “overwhelmed” in the Middle Ages, beginning with Augustine (naturalism had critics as far back as Xenophanes, sixth century B.C.E., but it was not “overwhelmed” until much later). Contemporary naturalists still accept, unwittingly, the redefinition of naturalism that began to be constructed by theists in the fifth century C.E. and that underpins our basic world-view today.

LINK

Index: Evidential Arguments for Naturalism

This is a link to my series on The Secular Outpost about evidential arguments for naturalism.

LINK

Biological Evolution as Evidence against Theism

Many conservative Christians and lay atheists alike claim that if biological evolution is true, then God does not exist. Ironically, while many conservative Christians have attacked evolution because it supposedly entails atheism, no contemporary atheist philosopher has used evolution as evidence for atheism. Indeed, the only philosopher who has formulated an argument for the claim that evolution is evidence against theism and for metaphysical naturalism is agnostic philosopher Paul Draper.

Draper defends an evidential argument from evolution for naturalism. In other words, Draper's argument does not claim that evolution is logically inconsistent with the existence of God. Rather, it claims that known facts about evolution that are consistent with theism nevertheless provide evidence against it.

This argument is focused on God in general, not necessarily the Christian God. Draper argues that, all other things held equal, known facts about the origin of complex life are prima facie evidence against theism.

Silver's Defense of Draper's Argument from the Biological Role of Pain and Pleasure

(Another item from my drafts folder.)

David Silver has written this interesting paper on the problem of evil, "Religious Experience and the Evidential Argument from Evil," Religious Studies 38(3):339-353.

Wanchick's Reply to Baggini

(Again, this is another article in my Drafts folder that was never posted before I stopped blogging. I think I wrote this in 2005 or 2006. In the spirit of clearing out the backlog, I am posting it now.)

Tom Wanchick has written a reply to or review of Julian Baggini's, Atheism: A Very Short Introduction:

The Argument from the Biological Role of Pain and Pleasure

Informal Statement of the Argument

The naturalistic explanation for this is obvious. If animals are the products of evolution by natural selection, we would expect physical pain to aid survival. But not all physical pain and pleasure aids survival. For example, think of the horrible pain that inflicts many people with terminal illnesses. If naturalism is true, this is what we would expect: evolution by natural selection is not an intelligent process; there seems to be no way for creatures to have evolved so that they only feel pain when it will aid survival. In contrast, if theism were true, God could "fine tune" humans so that they experience pain only when it is necessary for some greater good. If God did exist, what possible reason could he have for allowing people with terminal illnesses have to endure such agonizing pain until they finally die? The chances that such a reason would intersect with the biological goal of survival is pretty slim. Thus, the biological role of pain and pleasure is more likely on naturalism than on theism.

The Scale of the Universe as Evidence for Naturalism?

In his book, The Non-Existence of God, philosopher Nicholas Everitt provides the first detailed analysis and defense of the argument from scale for God's nonexistence. Everitt formulates his argument as follows:

(1) If the God of classical theism existed, with the purposes traditionally ascribed to him, then he would create a universe on a human scale, i.e. one that is not unimaginably large, unimaginably old, and in which human beings form an unimaginably tiny part of it, temporally and spatially.
(2) The world does not display a human scale.
(3) Therefore, there is evidence against the hypothesis that the God of classical theism exists with the purposes traditionally ascribed to him.

The Evidential Argument from Mind-Brain Dependence: A Reply to Bilbo

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 26, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

In my response to Victor Reppert's anti-naturalistic argument from pain, I stated that a more specific fact (consciousness is dependent upon the physical brain) about consciousness is antecedently more likely on naturalism than on theism. Bilbo provided several feedback messages in response to this claim. As I read him, he thinks the argument is no threat to Christian theists. It is apparently his view that mind-brain dependence is at least as probable on Christian theism as on naturalism, since Christian theists believe in specific, sectarian doctrines that raise the probability of mind-brain dependence. Since I think Bilbo is wrong about this, I'll explain why.

First, here is the logical form of my evidential argument.

Let D = the mind is dependent upon the physical brain.
Let T = classical theism
Let N = metaphysical naturalism

(1) D is known to be true.
(2) T is not much more probable intrinsically than N.
(3) Pr(D/N) > Pr(D/T).
(4) Other evidence held equal, T is probably false.

Note the modest nature of this argument. It doesn't claim that theism is probably false; it merely claims that evidence (D), by itself, favors N over T. This distinction is crucial since it allows for the possibility that there could be other evidence that both favors T and outweighs the evidence for N provided by D. Thus, D should be understood as a prime facie reason for rejecting T.

Let me now turn to some of Bilbo's specific comments.

Bilbo: "My first problem is that it seems more accurate to say that minds *are* the physical brain on Naturalism (not merely dependent on them). And since this has not been demonstrated, it would beg the question to assert that the postulate that "minds are the physical brain" provides evidence for Naturalism."

That would indeed beg the question, which is why I never said that! My argument is an inductive argument. It would be illegitimate to state the evidence in such a way that entails the hypothesis to be proved. Therefore, I'll stick with my original formulation of the premise ("the mind is dependent upon the physical brain").

Bilbo: "But the Christian views I mentioned also make it antecedently probable that minds will be dependent on the brain. Let's use the structure of your argument with Christian non-reductive physicalism (hereafter NRP)..."

If theism is improbable given D, then so is Christian theism (or any other more specific belief system that entails theism). Christian theism entails theism; therefore it cannot be more probable than theism. Premise (4) entails that, other evidence held equal, Christian theism is probably false.

I don't deny the potential relevance of sectarian doctrines to the issue of whether my argument is sound. They could raise Pr(D/T) or lower Pr(D/N). In order to assess the evidential significance of such doctrines, we would need to apply a principle that Draper calls the "weighted average principle" (WAP). Let H represent some Christian doctrine. Then WAP can be represented as follows.

Pr(D/T) = Pr(H/T) x Pr(D/T&H;) + Pr(~H/T) x Pr(D/T&~H)

This formula is an average because Pr(H/T) + Pr(~H/T) = 1. It is not a simple straight average, however, since those two values may not equal 1/2.

Let us consider, then, Christian non-reductive physicalism (CNRP), which Bilbo proposes as a specific doctrine that he believes raises the probability of D given (Christian) theism. Bilbo defines CNRP as "the non-existence of all supernatural beings, except for those that are or were at some point divine (angels, demons, God, etc.)." Bilbo claims that CNRP "entails the nonexistence of disembodied human minds." Using WAP, we obtain the following.

Pr(D/T) = Pr(CNRP/T) x Pr(D/T&CNRP;) + Pr(~CNRP/T) x Pr(D/T&~CNRP)

In order to reject my evidential argument, therefore, Bilbo would need to show that CNRP raises Pr(D/T) so that it is greater than or equal to Pr(D/N) by using the above formula. Does CNRP do that? I shall leave the question as an exercise for the reader.

(Note: I have borrowed heavily from ideas in another paper by Paul Draper, "More Pain and Pleasure: A Reply to Otte." I am, of course, responsible for any errors in my post.)

Link: Video of Lowder-Fernandes Debate

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on September 4, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

See here.

Denying Big God and the Little God: The Next Step for Atheists?

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on January 21, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Tom Clark at the Center for Naturalism has written an open letter to the atheist community entitled, "Denying Big God and the Little God: The Next Step for Atheists?"