Index: The Evidential Argument from the Holocaust against Theism

This article will serve as a hub for organizing past and future responses to my evidential argument from the Holocaust against theism. 

1: Logical Form of the Argument

The first five steps are a cumulative case based on independent facts about the badness of the Holocaust. Step 1 is an application of Draper's argument from pain and pleasure to the Holocaust; it is defended in the original article.

(1) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the biologically gratuitous physical pain experienced by many, if not most, Holocaust victims, i.e., 
Pr(E1 | N) >! Pr(E1 |T).

The next step appeals to the horrendous nature of the Holocaust. I think horrendous evils are much more probable on naturalism than on theism, but that is not the claim I am making here. Because I am making a cumulative case argument, I have to show that each additional item of evidence is more probable on naturalism than on theism, while in effect adding the previous item(s) of evidence into the background information. In probability notation, I need to show Pr(E2 | E1 & N) >! Pr(E2 | E1 & T), not Pr(E2 | N) >! Pr(E2 | T). I defend the former inequality in the original article. 

(2) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to Holocaust victims who experienced and/or witnessed events so horrific that the events constituted prima facie reasons for each victim to doubt whether the victim's life (given their inclusion in the Holocaust) was a great good to the victim on the whole, i.e.,

Pr(E2 | E1 & N) >! Pr(E2 | E1 & T).

The third step appeals to a specific aspect of the problem of divine hiddenness, the problem of divine silence during suffering, as it relates to Holocaust victims who experienced biologically gratuitous suffering and horrendous evil. Again,  I defend the premise in the original article, but it may be restated in plain English as follows.

(3) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the fact that so many victims of the Holocaust did not report feeling God's comforting presence, i.e.,
Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & N) > Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & T). 

The fourth step appeals to another aspect of the problem of divine hiddenness, this time focusing on what John Schellenberg calls "former believers" and applying it to Holocaust survivors. Again,  I defend the premise in the original article, but it may be restated in plain English as follows.

(4) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the fact that so many devout Jewish survivors of the Holocaust became nonbelievers, i.e.,

Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & E3 & N) > Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & E3& T).

From steps 1-4, it follows that:

(5) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the Holocaust, i.e., Pr(E | N) >! Pr(E | T).

The next step of the argument is based upon Paul Draper's theory of intrinsic probability, which says that intrinsic probability is determined by modesty, coherence, and nothing else. Because naturalism is both more modest and more coherent than theism, it follows that the intrinsic probability of naturalism is greater than the intrinsic probability of theism. This premise is not defended in my article, but instead may be found in Draper's defense of the second premise in what he calls the "low priors argument." 

Using the word "simplicity" as a more concise way to say "has greater intrinsic probability," we get:

(6) Naturalism is much simpler than Theism. 

The next step of the argument is designed to preempt objections that other items of evidence (such as the finite age of the universe, the life-permitting conditions of the universe, the contingency of the universe, objective moral values, etc.) favor theism and such items of evidence outweigh the evidence represented by E1-E4. The basic strategy is to show that known facts about good and evil, such as E1-E4, decisively outweigh the theistic evidence. This premise is not defended in my article, but instead may be found in Draper's defense of what he calls the "decisive evidence argument." So the seventh step of the argument is:

(7) Any epistemic advantages that Theism has over Naturalism (i.e., any factors that raise the ratio of the probability of Theism to the probability of Naturalism) do not, even when combined, suffice to offset the epistemic advantages that Naturalism has over Theism if premises 5 and 6 are true. 

From steps 5-7, it follows from Bayes' Theorem that:

(8) Theism is probably false. 

The two inferences in this argument--the first from 1-4 to 5 and the second from 5-7 to 8--are deductively correct. Therefore, if there is something wrong with this argument, then there must be something with at least if not more of the six premises (1-4, 6-7).

2: Non-Objections

I classify a reply as a "non-objection" if it does not constitute a defeater to one or more premises of the argument; and if does not challenge the inference of the argument. What follows is a list of some of the non-objections I have seen.

2.1: Dismissive Replies

• "Why bad thing happen if God real?"

2.2: Confused Replies

• "You don't really have an argument. You made a statement. Actually just a subjective inference."
• "No. It's merely evidence."

2.2: Irrelevant Replies

2.2.1. The Concept of "God" 

• Objection: "All this can show is an inconsistency between a particular concept of “God” and that “God” creating the world as you have conceived it."
• Objection: "The argument is presupposed on a false attribution error, i.e., that God's existence is dependent on the absence of suffering. This premise presupposes that God is contingent, rather than necessary; therefore, God is not actually God; because, necessary (i.e., self caused) is an attribute of God. The absence of this attribute, reduces God to the caused, rather than the uncaused causer.  Therefore, the argument does not refute the existence of God; instead, it refutes a subjective idea of God predicated on a different set of attributes to those present in God Himself. Argument rejected on the grounds of false attribution error."

2.2.2. Other Replies

• "If God didn’t exist we wouldn’t know the difference between good and evil."
• "Why single out the Holocaust? The "holocaust" could also describe the 10 million murdered under Stalin, or the 170 million murdered under Mao Tse-tung. Nazism was just one of the atrocities of man against man."

3: Objections

3.1: Objections to Multiple Premises

3.2.1: Flip Objections 

In interscholastic and intercollegiate debate, to "flip" or "turn" argument is to take one of your opponent's arguments and to use it as an argument for your position and/or against theirs. 

Objection: The Holocaust argument presupposes objective (moral) good and evil, but objective (moral) good and evil require God.

Reply: LINK

Objection: The Holocaust argument includes several items in our background information, such as the existence of the universe, conscious beings capable of experiencing pain, and so forth. These things are evidence favoring theism over naturalism.

Reply: First, some items alleged to be theistic evidence, such as the existence of the universe, do not favor theism over naturalism. Second, I agree that at least one fact in our background information, consciousness, favors theism over naturalism. The fact that it favors theism over naturalism does not, by itself, negate the claim that the specific facts identified in the Holocaust argument favor naturalism. 

3.2: Objections to Individual Premises

3.2.1: Objections to (1)
3.2.2: Objections to (2)
3.2.3: Objections to (3)
3.2.4: Objections to (4)
3.2.5: Objections to (5)
3.2.6: Objections to (6)
3.2.7: Objections to (7)

The Holocaust is Strong Evidence Against Theism

(Revised 27 April 2022)

(Revised 1 March 2022)

(Revised 14 February 2022)

(Revised 7 February 2022)

The following tweet recently appeared on my Twitter feed: 

Primo Levi Auschwitz survivor
"The notions that our world comes from God and is governed by God are hard to sustain if one looks seriously at evil. What egocentric presumption to think that God listens for our repentance and acts accordingly!" pic.twitter.com/J2gNxTEdNt

— Dave of Letters (@liverational22) August 6, 2021

In this blog post, I intend to defend a weaker version of Primo Levi's claim. I do not claim that Auschwitz makes God's existence impossible. Rather, I intend to argue that the Holocaust is extremely strong evidence against theism and, other evidence held equal, makes God's existence improbable.

My Call Into "Catholic Answers" with Trent Horn

 LINK (HT: Real Atheology)

Link: The Metaphilosophy of Naturalism

Abstract: The metaphilosophy of naturalism is about the nature and goals of naturalist philosophy. A real or hypothetical person who knows the nature, goals and consequences of naturalist philosophy may be called an “informed naturalist.” An informed naturalist is justified in drawing certain conclusions about the current state of naturalism and the research program that naturalist philosophers ought to undertake. One conclusion is that the great majority of naturalist philosophers have an unjustified belief that naturalism is true and an unjustified belief that theism (or supernaturalism) is false. I explain this epistemic situation in this paper. I also articulate the goals an informed naturalist would recommend to remedy this situation. These goals, for the most part, have as their consequence the restoring of naturalism to its original state (approximately, to a certain degree, given the great difference in the specific theories), which is the state it possessed in Greco-Roman philosophy before naturalism was “overwhelmed” in the Middle Ages, beginning with Augustine (naturalism had critics as far back as Xenophanes, sixth century B.C.E., but it was not “overwhelmed” until much later). Contemporary naturalists still accept, unwittingly, the redefinition of naturalism that began to be constructed by theists in the fifth century C.E. and that underpins our basic world-view today.

LINK

Victor Reppert on the Argument from Evil as a Reductio

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on June 12, 2012 and then republished on February 22, 2016. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

(Redated post originally published on 12 June 2012)

Can atheist who rejects moral realism press the argument from evil? Many theists, including William Lane Craig and Ravi Zacharias, have argued that the answer is "no." In my old critique of one of Zacharias's books, I wrote the following.

Zacharias presents two objections to AE. First, he suggests that it is incoherent for atheists to appeal to evil as evidence of the nonexistence of God since objective moral evil could not exist if there is no God (p. 48). Yet, as I argued above, objective moral values are logically possible even if there is no God. And the atheist need not postulate the existence of objective moral values in order to use evil as evidence for atheism. An argument from evil might not contain any normative premises; the atheist could appeal to God's loving nature rather than God's moral nature.[13] For example:

(1) If a perfectly loving God were to exist, then he would not permit the occurrence of any unjustifiable suffering.
(2) But unjustifiable suffering does occur.
(3) Therefore, a perfectly loving God does not exist.

To emphasize the point (though I consider this unnecessary), the atheist might even change the name of the argument from "the Argument from Evil" to "the Argument from Unjustifiable Suffering."[14]

Most importantly, AE may be understood as a challenge to the internal coherence of a theistic worldview. An AE can be understood as saying something like the following:

Look. You theists believe that X, Y, and Z are evil. You theists believe that God is good. You theists believe that good persons are opposed to evil. So you theists need to explain why a god who is good (in your sense of 'good') would allow so much apparently pointless evil (in your sense of 'evil'). If you can't explain it, then that is a problem for the internal coherence of your worldview.[15]

When AE is understood in this way, it doesn't presuppose that there are objective moral values.

In an old post, Victor Reppert says that he is aware of running the argument from evil as a reductio ad absurdum argument, but he is unconvinced. He writes:

I still maintain that important phenomena that give rise to the problem of evil are themselves deeply problematic for naturalism, including consciousness, objective moral values (and yes I know all about running it as a reductio without presupposing objective moral values--I still think subjectivism undercuts the argument).

Here's my question to Reppert: why? How does subjectivism undercut the argument? For example, how does subjectivism undercut Draper's version of the evidential argument from evil (summarized here)?

LINK: Audio of Russell-Copleston Debate on God's Existence (Part 1 of 2)

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 22, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

 

This is an excerpt from the famous BBC Radio debate between Father Frederick C. Copleston and Bertrand Russell. In this section, they discuss Leibniz's Argument from Contingency, which is a form of the Cosmological Argument. It differs from other Cosmological arguments (e.g. Kalam) in that it is consistent with an eternal universe, as it doesn't appeal to first causes, but rather the principle of sufficient reason. It can be summarized in this way:

(1) Everything that exists contingently has a reason for its existence.
(2) The universe exists contingently.

Therefore:

(3) The universe has a reason for its existence.
(4) If the universe has a reason for its existence then that reason is God.

Therefore:

(5) God exists.

For a transcript of the debate (including other topics discussed), follow this link:
http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/copleston.htm

You can download the audio here:
http://www.archive.org/details/DebateOnTheExistenceOfGodBertrandRussellV.Fr.F...

LINK: Gianluca Di Muzio on Theism and the Meaning of Life

Abstract

Theists are inclined to assert that human life would be meaningless if there was no personal immortality and God did not exist. The present paper aims to evaluate the truth of this claim. The author first explores the conception of meaning that is at the roots of the theistic position. After pointing out some difficulties with it, the author shows that, on a plausible alternative interpretation of what it is for an activity to have meaning, human life would fully qualify as meaningful even if it were not inscribed in a universal divine plan.

LINK 

Christian Critique of Certain Arguments for God's Existence based on Science

(Another backlog item)

I think this book review is interesting because it criticizes common theistic tactics for using science as evidence for God:

http://www.asa3.org/ASA/BookReviews2000-present/9-01.html#Colson

Silver's Defense of Draper's Argument from the Biological Role of Pain and Pleasure

(Another item from my drafts folder.)

David Silver has written this interesting paper on the problem of evil, "Religious Experience and the Evidential Argument from Evil," Religious Studies 38(3):339-353.

The Argument from the Biological Role of Pain and Pleasure

Informal Statement of the Argument

The naturalistic explanation for this is obvious. If animals are the products of evolution by natural selection, we would expect physical pain to aid survival. But not all physical pain and pleasure aids survival. For example, think of the horrible pain that inflicts many people with terminal illnesses. If naturalism is true, this is what we would expect: evolution by natural selection is not an intelligent process; there seems to be no way for creatures to have evolved so that they only feel pain when it will aid survival. In contrast, if theism were true, God could "fine tune" humans so that they experience pain only when it is necessary for some greater good. If God did exist, what possible reason could he have for allowing people with terminal illnesses have to endure such agonizing pain until they finally die? The chances that such a reason would intersect with the biological goal of survival is pretty slim. Thus, the biological role of pain and pleasure is more likely on naturalism than on theism.

The Scale of the Universe as Evidence for Naturalism?

In his book, The Non-Existence of God, philosopher Nicholas Everitt provides the first detailed analysis and defense of the argument from scale for God's nonexistence. Everitt formulates his argument as follows:

(1) If the God of classical theism existed, with the purposes traditionally ascribed to him, then he would create a universe on a human scale, i.e. one that is not unimaginably large, unimaginably old, and in which human beings form an unimaginably tiny part of it, temporally and spatially.
(2) The world does not display a human scale.
(3) Therefore, there is evidence against the hypothesis that the God of classical theism exists with the purposes traditionally ascribed to him.

Can a Theist be a Freethinker?

The following link goes to a featured editorial I wrote several years ago for the Secular Web. I argue that (1) a theist can be a freethinker, and (2) not all nontheists are freethinker.

LINK

Link: Time Magazine: God vs. Science

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 12, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

LINK

Interesting Article on Debating Presuppositionalists

Gene Witmer is a philosopher at the University of Florida who has recently written a paper critiquing presuppositionalism. It appears that the paper is not a formal paper intended for publication in its current form, but rather is a preprint prepared for a "talk" to the Atheist, Agnostic and Freethinking Student Association at the University of Florida.

Theism vs. Naturalism Debates: An Apples to Oranges Comparison?

I received an email from a nontheist that is somewhat critical of the idea of "naturalism vs. theism" as a debate topic because (1) not all non-naturalistic views are theistic, and (2) the topic involves a comparison of a general hypothesis (metaphysical naturalism) with an incompatible but very specific hypothesis (theism). In his opinion, the debate topic should be either "naturalism vs. supernaturalism" or "nontheism (or atheism) vs. theism."

Link: Video of Lowder-Fernandes Debate

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on September 4, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

See here.