My Call Into "Catholic Answers" with Trent Horn

 LINK (HT: Real Atheology)

The Moral Psychology Argument for Atheism

(Note: I am clearing out my backlog of draft blog posts but I am officially on a hiatus from blogging. What this means is that while you are free to comment on this post, readers should not expect engagement from me anytime soon.)

Updated 7-January-2022

John Jung Park's 2017 paper revives an old argument for atheism: errors in human moral judgment due to various psychological biases provides a reason to think God does not exist. Park's argument refers to "framing effects." Following another one of Park's papers, we may say that moral framing effects occur when 

morally irrelevant differences in the way a scenario is presented affect people’s moral judgments regarding that scenario.

Here's an example (taken from Park's 2021 paper):

Save vs. Kill: Petrinovich and O’Neill (1996, Exp. 1) reported that some participants indicated that they would do one act when the act was described in terms of how many people it would save (Save condition) but would not do that act when the act was described in terms of how many people it would kill (Kill condition), even though they had been told that the act would have both effects.

LINK: A Remembrance of Tom Flynn

LINK

LINK: Bruce Langtry's Reply to Schellenberg's Logical Argument from Evil for Atheism

(Note: Although I am technically on hiatus from blogging for 1-3 years, while clearing out my inbox I came across an email about this article, so I'm mentioning it here.)

Abstract

J. L. Schellenberg, in “A New Logical Problem of Evil,” argues that (if God exists) God has, of necessity, a disappreciation of evil, operating at a metalevel in such a way as to give God a non-defeasible reason to rule out actualizing a world containing evil. He also argues that since God’s motive in creating the world is to share with finite beings the good that God experiences prior to creation, which is good without evil, it follows that God will create a world that contains no evil. I investigate in detail the foregoing lines of argument and provide grounds for rejecting them.

LINK: Michael Antony's Review of Reasonable Atheism by Aikin and Talisse

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 8, 2011. It was republished here on November 9, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link has also been updated to reflect its current location as of November 8, 2011.]

Bede Rundle's Obituary; Why There is Something Rather Than Nothing

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 19, 2011. It was republished here on November 9, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Philosopher Bede Rundle has died.

If you hadn't heard of him and you are reading this blog, then you will almost certainly want to read his book, Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing (Oxford University Press, 2004). Here's a summary of Rundle's argument, taken from his obituary:

Since this universe is contingent, that is to say it might not have existed, at some point it did not exist, and at a later point it came into existence. Since something can only begin to exist in relation to something else already existing (for instance, a football match can only start if the players are on the field), a non-contingent, necessary thing, God, must have existed for this universe to begin to exist. Had there been no necessary thing, God, there would be nothing now.

Unlike most recent philosophers, Rundle found some truth in this argument. In his version, we must indeed claim that if nothing had existed, nothing would exist now, in other words that it is impossible that nothing at all should have existed. For to say that there might have been nothing "then" (before the Big Bang) or "now" presupposes a temporal framework of reference, and thus space, motion and objects.

However, this does not fully vindicate Aquinas, for "the only thing which would provide a setting into which our universe might make an entrée would be another universe". There is no necessary entity, God, but some physical thing or other must have always necessarily existed.

If correct, this argument has dramatic consequences for most humans and their religious or scientific beliefs about the origin of the world, for it undermines the idea of an absolutely first event of the world, whether Creation or Big Bang. Rundle also casts doubt on the notion of divine agency and indeed the coherence of the notion of God.

Rundle's obituary may be found here. (HT: Leiter Reports)

Secular Outpost contributor Stephen Law's review may be found on his blog here.

Pope Blames Atheism for Concentration Camps

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 30, 2011. It was republished here on November 9, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

I'm going to quote, without commentary, what the Pope had to say on Thursday about atheism.

If one basic type of violence today is religiously motivated and thus confronts religions with the question as to their true nature and obliges all of us to undergo purification, a second complex type of violence is motivated in precisely the opposite way: as a result of God’s absence, his denial and the loss of humanity which goes hand in hand with it. The enemies of religion – as we said earlier – see in religion one of the principal sources of violence in the history of humanity and thus they demand that it disappear. But the denial of God has led to much cruelty and to a degree of violence that knows no bounds, which only becomes possible when man no longer recognizes any criterion or any judge above himself, now having only himself to take as a criterion. The horrors of the concentration camps reveal with utter clarity the consequences of God’s absence.

The absence of God leads to the decline of man and of humanity. But where is God? Do we know him, and can we show him anew to humanity, in order to build true peace? Let us first briefly summarize our considerations thus far. I said that there is a way of understanding and using religion so that it becomes a source of violence, while the rightly lived relationship of man to God is a force for peace. In this context I referred to the need for dialogue and I spoke of the constant need for purification of lived religion. On the other hand I said that the denial of God corrupts man, robs him of his criteria and leads him to violence.

LINK (HT: Godless in Italy)

LINK: Ted Poston on the Problem of Social Evil

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 30, 2011. It was republished here on November 9, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

According to Ted Poston, the problem of evil includes more than just the familiar categories of moral evil and natural evil. It also includes social evil, which he defines as any pain or suffering brought about by game-theoretic interactions of many individuals. Social evils cannot be reduced to natural or moral evil. Moreover, traditional defenses for natural and moral evil fail against the problem of social evil.

LINK: Follow-up on Republicans United Against Atheists

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 28, 2011. It was republished here on November 9, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Earlier this week, I posted a link to an article describing how Newt Gingrich questioned the trustworthiness of atheists in a Republican presidential debate. I just stumbled upon a post at another blog that examines the logical consequences of Gingrich's statement.

LINK

LINK: The Myth of Militant Atheism

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 28, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. ]

"[W]hile millions of atheists are indeed walking our streets, it would be difficult to find even one who could accurately be described as militant. In all of American history, it is doubtful that any person has ever been killed in the name of atheism. In fact, it would be difficult to find evidence that any American has ever even been harmed in the name of atheism. It just does not happen, because the notion of "militant atheism" is entirely fantasy."

LINK: From Friendly Atheism to Friendly Natural Theology

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 19, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

Jeffery Johnson, "From Friendly Atheism to Friendly Natural Theology: The Case for Modesty in Religious Epistemology" Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy Vol. 7 2003.

Abstract

Philosophical theists argue with great ingenuity and sophistication that there is excellent evidence in support of the existence of the God of western theism. Philosophical atheists argue with equal skill that the evidence is negative. Both sides can't be right. But, this seems to imply that one camp is guilty of serious epistemological error. I explore in this essay a way of understanding good theological evidence that mitigates charges of intellectual error or blindness. According to a position that Rowe calls friendly atheism, the atheist can argue that the relevant evidence supports his or her view, but that theists are rationally justified in believing that God exists in spite of the intense suffering that manifest in this world. I will argue that friendly atheism, and more generally friendly natural theology, when articulated in more detail, and with great care, represents an important metaphilosophical insight about use of evidence in theological contexts.

LINK

LINK: "God and Moral Law" by Mark Murphy

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 19, 2011. It was republished here on November 9, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Though I disagree with his conclusions, I've always respected the writings of Christian philosopher Mark Murphy on the relationship between God and morality. He has written a book, God and the Moral Law: On the Theistic Explanation of Morality, which will be published by Oxford University Press early next year. Based on the description of the book, it sounds extremely interesting. Murphy criticizes natural law theory and divine command theory, which are the most dominant theistic accounts of morality.

In their place, he defends a new theistic account of morality, which is apparently analogous to how many theists have traditionally understood the relationship between God and the laws of nature. In an attempt to find out more about his new theistic account of morality, I did a web search and discovered a paper he read at Notre Dame's Center for Philosophy of Religion, "God and Moral Law," which appears to provide an overview of his approach. Anyone interested in the relationship between God and morality will surely want to read this.

LINK: Is Moral Autonomy Incompatible with the Existence of God?

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 26, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

The late James Rachels wrotes an essay, "God and Moral Autonomy," in which he defends an argument for the nonexistence of God based on the impossibility of a being worthy of worship. Peter Lupu and Bill Vallicella have an interesting exchange about the argument on the latter's Maverick Philosopher blog (see here).

LINKS: Theistic Defenses Against the Euthyphro Dilemma

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 26, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

(Another item from the backlog in my Drafts folder)

I've discovered two essays online and one essay offline which provide interesting responses to the Euthyphro dilemma.

1. Steve Lovell, "God as the Grounding of Moral Objectivity: Defending Against the Euthyphro."
2. Michael Sudduth, "Is it Coherent to Suppose that God is both Morally Good and 'Above Morality'?" (2004)
3. William Alston, "“Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists.” In Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, ed. Michael D. Beaty. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990, 303-326.

Since #3 is not available online, I'll attempt to provide a brief summary here.

William Alston splits the horns of the Euthyphro dilemma by taking different horns for different moral concepts. Alston divides moral concepts into two groups: axiological and deontological. Axiological concepts include things like moral goodness and badness, while deontological concepts include things like moral obligation, duty, and ought. Alston argues that deontological concepts depend on God's commands, while axiological concepts depend on God himself. Alston summarizes his strategy as follows:

"It only remains to set out explicitly the relationship between the positions I have suggested to escape each of the two horns. That relationship derives from the distinction between value and obligation, more specifically the moral forms thereof. To blunt the first horn I have suggested that we take divine commands to be constitutive only of moral obligation, only of facts of the form 'S morally ought to do A', 'S morally ought not to do B', and 'S is morally permitted to do C', leaving value and goodness, moral and otherwise, to be otherwise constituted. ... To deal with the second horn, and to fill out the view with an account of goodness and value, we take it that the supreme standard of goodness, including moral goodness, is God Himself, that particular individual, rather than some general principle or Platonic idea."

Wes Morriston has written an interesting article that partially discusses Alston's approach. As I read him, Morriston mainly focuses on what Alston has to say about the relationship between axiological concepts and God, not deontological concepts and God. Morriston isn't impressed. Commenting on Alston's approach (and William Lane Craig's similar approach), he concludes:

What Alston and Craig have done is simply to substitute necessary truths about God for necessary truths about moral goodness. But even if this has the effect of making all moral truths depend on God, it is not sufficient to put them under his control. In this crucial respect, the God-centered analysis of moral goodness does no more than a Platonist account to protect divine sovereignty.

LINKS: Ethics without God

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 26, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

(Another item from the backlog in my Drafts folder, with some more recent links added in.)

Here are some very interesting links related to ethics without God.

1. From Daniel Dennett: Robert Wright interviewed Daniel Dennett on being good without God. Video of the interview is available here; a transcript is available here.
2. From Tom Clark: Tom Clark from the Center for Naturalism blogs about "Naturalism and Nihilism."
3. From Alonzo Fyfe: Alonzo Fyfe, of Atheist Ethicist fame, finally published his book, A Better Place: Selected Essays on Desire Utilitarianism. It's a book defending moral realism without God, even assuming that no intrinsic values exist. I have not read Fyfe's book, but it certainly looks interesting.
4. From Larry Arnhart: author of Darwinian Natural Right. Several essays of interest, including, "The Darwinian Meaning of Life", "Does Darwinism Make Morality Fictional?", "Darwinian Ethics and the Moral History of 20th Century Barbarism", "The Evolutionary Biology of Empathy", "A Darwinian History of Human Rights and Empathy", "Remi Brague on Divine Law & Common Morality", and "Does the Life of the Mind Require a Platonic Cosmology?"

Enjoy!

LINK: Is God a Moral Compromiser?

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 24, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

Christian scholar Thom Stark has written a book-length rebuttal to Christian philosopher Paul Copan's book, Is God a Moral Monster? (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2011).  The title of Stark's book is, Is God a Moral Compromiser? A Critical Review of Paul Copan's "Is God a Moral Monster?" (second ed.). Stark's entire book is available for free as a PDF file on his website.

Observant readers will notice I included a "new atheism" label on this post, insofar as the new atheists criticize the morality of the actions attributed to God by the Bible and insofar as Copan's book is partially a response to those criticisms.

LINK: Atheist Philosopher Julian Baggini Labels New Atheism "Destructive"

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 24, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

(This is another one for the "not new, but new for me" category.)

Julian Baggini, author of the excellent book, Atheism: A Very Short Introduction, explains that the four horseman of the new atheism is a "backwards step. It reinforces what I believe is a myth, that an atheist without a bishop to bash is like a fish without water."

LINK: Jason B. Thibodeau Comments on Flannagan, Coyne, and Explaining Morality

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 24, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. I have added a summary of the linked blog post below.]

"Flannagan himself is guilty of misunderstanding Coyne’s argument about the Euthyphro dilemma and he wants to downplay some of the serious problems that the dilemma creates for God-based moral theories."

 LINK

LINK: Dave Harker on A Surprise for Horwich (and Some Advocates of the Fine-Tuning Argument (which does not include Horwich (as far as I know)))

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 23, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

Abstract

The judgment that a given event is epistemically improbable is necessary but insufficient for us to conclude that the event is surprising. Paul Horwich has argued that surprising events are, in addition, more probable given alternative background assumptions that are not themselves extremely improbable. I argue that Horwich’s definition fails to capture important features of surprises and offer an alternative definition that accords better with intuition. An important application of Horwich’s analysis has arisen in discussions of fine-tuning arguments. In the second part of the paper I consider the implications for this argument of employing my definition of surprise. I argue that advocates of fine-tuning arguments are not justified in attaching significance to the fact that we are surprised by examples of fine-tuning.

LINK: Audio of Russell-Copleston Debate on God's Existence (Part 2 of 2)

For a transcript of the debate (including other topics discussed), follow this link:

http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/copleston.htm

You can download the audio here:
http://www.archive.org/details/DebateOnTheExistenceOfGodBertrandRussellV.Fr.F...