LINK: Dave Harker on A Surprise for Horwich (and Some Advocates of the Fine-Tuning Argument (which does not include Horwich (as far as I know)))

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 23, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

Abstract

The judgment that a given event is epistemically improbable is necessary but insufficient for us to conclude that the event is surprising. Paul Horwich has argued that surprising events are, in addition, more probable given alternative background assumptions that are not themselves extremely improbable. I argue that Horwich’s definition fails to capture important features of surprises and offer an alternative definition that accords better with intuition. An important application of Horwich’s analysis has arisen in discussions of fine-tuning arguments. In the second part of the paper I consider the implications for this argument of employing my definition of surprise. I argue that advocates of fine-tuning arguments are not justified in attaching significance to the fact that we are surprised by examples of fine-tuning.

LINK: Anthony Aguirre on the Multiverse Hypothesis

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 17, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

Anthony Aguirre is a physicist at UC Santa Cruz. He wrote a paper in 1995 on the multiverse hypothesis. Here is the paper's abstract:

The notion that there are many "universes" with different properties is one answer to the question of "why is the universe so hospitable to life?" This notion also naturally follows from current ideas in eternal inflation and string/M theory. But how do we test such a "multiverse" theory: which of the many universes do we compare to ours? This paper enumerates would would seem to be essential ingredients for making testable predictions, outlines different strategies one might take within this framework, then discusses some of the difficulties and dangers inherent in these approaches. Finally, I address the issue of whether there may be some general, qualitative predictions that multiverse theories might share.

The Implausibility of Appealing to the Many-Worlds Hypothesis to Defeat the Fine-Tuning Argument

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 17, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

I know what I am about to write will be controversial among atheists--one of them may (?) be a certain professional physicist who writes regularly for The Secular Outpost--but I have never agreed with the idea of appealing to the hypothesis of multiple universes ("multiverse") as an objection to the fine-tuning argument for God's existence. Philosopher Bradley Monton is much more knowledgeable about the intersection of philosophy and physics than I am, so I felt good to discover he has the same concerns I do.

I like the way he begins his post:

Some physicists seem to think that the only good reply to the fine-tuning argument for God is an appeal to many universes. If that’s right, that puts the fine-tuning argument on pretty strong ground.

LINK

FWIW, I posted something to The Secular Outpost about 5 years ago with a link to a sophisticated critique of the multiverse hypothesis. LINK

LINK: Mikael Stenmark on Evolution, Purpose, and God

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 21, 2011. It was republished here on November 9, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Abstract

A number of biologists maintain that the recent developments in evolutionary biology have profound implications for religion, morality and our self-understanding. The author focuses on the issue whether evolutionary biology has any relevance for a religious understanding of the meaning of life. First, the question about the meaning of life is clarified. Second, the argument of biologists such as Richard Dawkins, Stephen Jay Gould and Edward O. Wilson, that evolutionary theory undermines the religious belief that there is a purpose or meaning to the existence of the universe and to human life in particular, is evaluated. The author maintains that this argument has some merit, but that it nevertheless fails both to be a purely scientific argument and to establish the intended conclusion.

LINK

Addendum (October 21, 2011): Stenmark identifies and criticizes the following argument.

(1) All individual species that come into existence through the process of evolution are random (that is, have a low probability) with respect to what evolutionary theory (or more broadly, the sciences) can predict or retrospectively explain;

(2) Therefore, the existence of human beings lacks an ultimate meaning, in particular, their existence is not the result of a divine purpose or intention.
(3) The only things that we can know anything about are the ones science can discover.

(4) The existence of Homo sapiens is planned by God only if the species’ existence is intended by God and it is likely that its emergence will take place for that reason.

(5) But all individual species that come into existence through the process of evolution are random (that is, have a low probability) with respect to what evolutionary theory (or more broadly, the sciences) can predict or retrospectively explain.

(6) Therefore, the existence of human beings lacks an ultimate meaning; in particular, their existence is not the result of God’s purposes, intentions or plans.

Sophisticated Critique of Many Worlds Explanation of Fine-Tuning

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on February 18, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. I have also updated the link to reflect the new location of the essay]

The following essay was recommended to me by Paul Draper. The paper is not a defense of the fine-tuning argument, but he regards it as one of the best critiques of the many worlds explanation of fine-tuning:

Roger White, "Fine-tuning and Multiple Universes," forthcoming in Nous
http://web.mit.edu/rog/www/papers/fine_tuning.pdf (PDF)

Here is some info about the author:

ROGER WHITE, (Ph.D., MIT), Assistant Professor of Philosophy, specializes in philosophy of science, epistemology, and metaphysics. He is currently focusing on epistemological issues in the philosophy of science, particularly those having to do with probability and explanation. His main interests in metaphysics concern matters of identity and essential properties. He is the author of "Fine-tuning and Multiple Universes" (Nous).