1. Definitions
Following Paul Draper, I'm going to define my terms as follows.[1]
By "naturalism," I mean the view that the physical exists and, if the mental exists, the physical explains why the mental exists. If naturalism is true, then there are no purely mental beings which can exist apart from a physical body and so there is no God or any person or being much like God.
By "supernaturalism," I mean the view that the mental exists and, if the physical exists, the mental explains why anything physical exists. If supernaturalism is true, then there is no purely physical matter which can exist without some sort of ultimate mental creator. "Personal supernaturalism" is a type of supernaturalism; it adds on the claims that one or more personal mental entities exist and, if a physical world exists, it or they produced the physical world for a purpose. "Theism" is a type of personal supernaturalism; it adds on the claim that there is just one mental entity, God, who is all-powerful, all-knowing, and morally perfect.
"Otherism" is a catch-all category. It says that both naturalism and supernaturalism are false.
2. Exposition
Intrinsic probability is determined by modesty, coherence, and nothing else. By "modesty," I mean a measure of how much the hypothesis asserts. The more a hypothesis claims, the more ways there are for it to be false and so, before we start looking at evidence, the less likely it is to be true. By “coherence,” I mean a measure of how well the parts of a hypothesis fit together. If the different parts count against each other, the hypothesis is less coherent and less likely to be true.[2]
Now consider naturalism and supernaturalism. They are symmetrical claims: naturalism claims that the physical explains the mental, while supernaturalism claims that the mental explains the physical. Both claims are equally modest and equally coherent. Before examining the evidence, both positions are equally likely to be true.[3]
Theism is a type of supernaturalism but could be false even if supernaturalism is true. Furthermore, theism is less modest than either supernaturalism or naturalism. Therefore, before we look at evidence, it is less likely to be true than supernaturalism or naturalism. But that entails that naturalism is intrinsically more probable than theism. So we have:
(1) Naturalism is much more probable intrinsically than theism, i.e., Pr(|N|) is much greater than Pr(|T|).
In many cases, our ability to choose do morally good actions depends upon our having properly functioning emotional capacities, especially empathy, i.e., our ability to identify what someone else is thinking or feeling and to respond to their thoughts and feelings with an appropriate emotion.[4]
We now know, thanks to the relatively new discipline of neuroscience, that certain brain abnormalities cause people to experience less or even no empathy.[5] According to Simon Baron-Cohen of Cambridge University, "There is a consensus in neuroscience that at least ten interconnected brain regions are involved in empathy."[6] For example, violent psychopaths may know in some abstract sense that their behavior is morally wrong, but utterly lack empathy.[7] This yields our next premise:
(2) "Empathy and apathy, including some moral handicaps, have a neurological basis" is known to be true.
While theism is compatible with a neurological basis for moral handicaps, the fact that at least some moral handicaps can be explained neurologically is much more probable on naturalism than on theism. If theism is true, then that means both
(a) God creates some human beings with moral handicaps that are not the result of the freely chosen actions of any human being;
and
(b) These moral handicaps make it more likely that they will harm others.
What moral justification would God have for allowing both (a) and (b) to obtain? This seems utterly surprising and completely random from a theistic, moral point of view, but precisely what we would expect on naturalism (and blind nature is indifferent to the moral consequences of brain abnormalities).[8] So we now have our third premise:
(3) The neurobiological basis of empathy and apathy is very much more likely on the assumption that the naturalism is true than it is on the assumption that theism is true, i.e., Pr(E | N) >! Pr(E | T).
Mathematicians have a formula called Bayes’ Theorem, which can be used to specify the relationship between intrinsic probability, accuracy, and the overall or final probability of a hypothesis. It follows from Bayes’ Theorem that a hypothesis is probably true, just in case it has a greater overall balance of intrinsic probability and explanatory power than do its alternatives collectively. Thus, if we abstract away all other evidence for and against God's existence, the neurobiological basis of empathy and apathy is a strong evidential challenge to theism.
(4) So, other evidence held equal, theism is probably false, i.e., Pr(T | E) < 0.5.
The words "other evidence held equal" are key. Because theism doesn't entail the non-existence of a neurological basis for moral handicaps, it is possible that some moral handicaps have a neurological basis and theism is true. Because that is possible, the neurological basis of some moral handicaps by itself does not justify the unqualified conclusion that theism is false, just as, say, the (alleged) evidence of cosmic 'fine-tuning' does not justify the unqualified conclusion that theism is true. In order to justify the conclusion that theism is false, one would need to somehow show that the total relevant evidence doesn't tip the scales in favor of theism. One way to do that would be to survey all of the other evidential arguments for theism and naturalism. That would be a monumental project. Happily, that task can be avoided by using what Draper calls the Decisive Evidence Argument.[9]
To do that, we need to add more premises. First, facts about empathy and apathy hardly exhaust what we know about good and evil. Known facts about good and evil also include facts about pain and pleasure,[10] flourishing and languishing,[11] virtue and vice,[12] triumph and tragedy,[13] and autonomy and heteronomy[14]. All of these facts favor naturalism over theism. This justifies our next premise.
(5) The data of good and evil strongly favors naturalism over theism.
But theists will argue that various other lines of evidence, not part of the data of good and evil, strongly favor theism over naturalism, by pointing to such data as the finite age of the universe, the contingency of the universe, the life-permitting conditions of the universe, the existence of consciousness, etc. Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that all of those things favor theism over naturalism. What now?
Draper suggests we compare and contrast theism ("omni-theism" in the quotation below) with "aesthetic deism."
Thus, it may be stipulated that, like omni-theism, aesthetic deism implies that an eternal, non-physical, omnipotent, and omniscient being created the physical world. The only difference, then, between the God of omni-theism and the deity of aesthetic deism is what motivates them. An omni-theistic God would be morally perfect and so strongly motivated by considerations of the well-being of sentient creatures. An aesthetic deistic God, on the other hand, would prioritize aesthetic goods over moral ones. While such a being would want a beautiful universe, perhaps the best metaphor here is not that of a cosmic artist, but instead that of a cosmic playwright: an author of nature who wants above all to write an interesting story.[15]
But, as Draper points out, aesthetic deism accounts for the relevant evidence at least as well as theism does:
... at least when it comes to the usual evidence taken to favor theism over competing hypotheses like naturalism, aesthetic deism accounts for that evidence at least as well as omni-theism does. For example, a deity interested in good narrative would want a world that is complex and yet ordered, that contains beauty, consciousness, intelligence, and moral agency.[16]
Thus, we now have another premise:
(6) The total evidence excluding “the data of good and evil” does not favor theism over aesthetic deism.
Interested readers may read Draper's article for the justification, but the remainder of the argument is as follows.
(7) Aesthetic deism is at least as probable intrinsically as theism.
(8) Given the total evidence excluding the data of good and evil, the data of good and evil strongly favor aesthetic deism over theism.
It follows from (6), (7), and (8) that:
(9) Aesthetic deism is many times more probable than omni-theism.
It follows from (9) that:
(10) Theism is very probably false.
In summary, it seems to me that we have here a powerful argument against theism. By itself, the neurological basis for moral handicaps like psychopathy is much more surprising on the assumption that theism is true than on the assumption it is false. When combined with other known facts about good and evil, the evidence against theism is overwhelming. Theistic attempts to show that the total evidence favors theism over naturalism, even if successful, are impotent against the rival hypothesis of aesthetic deism. Even if naturalism is false, aesthetic deism is at least as intrinsically probable as theism and is more accurate than theism. Therefore, theism is very probably false.
Notes
[1] Draper, "God and the Mystery of Evil," paper delivered at the Society of Christian Philosophers conference, September 26, 2015.
[2] Draper 2015.
[3] Paul Draper, “God and the Burden of Proof,” Secular Outpost (July 21, 2014), http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2014/07/21/new-by-paul-draper-god-and-the-burden-of-proof/, site discontinued.
[4] Simon Baron-Cohen, The Science of Evil: On Empathy and the Origins of Cruelty (New York: Basic Books, 2012), 16.
[5] Baron-Cohen 2012, 39.
[6] Baron-Cohen 2012, 28.
[7] As Baron-Cohen points out, the neurological basis for moral handicaps challenges traditional views about moral responsibility. "If zero degrees of empathy is really a form of neurological disability, to what extent can such an individual who commits a crime be held responsible for what they have done? This gets tangled up with the free will debate, for if zero degrees of empathy leaves an individual to some extent 'blind' to the impact of their actions on others’ feelings, then surely they deserve our sympathy rather than punishment." See Baron-Cohen 2012, 160.
[8] Some theists have pointed out that moral evil, such as fallen angels or demons choosing to do evil, might explain so-called “natural evils.” This argument makes the inverse point: certain natural evils explain at least some moral evil.
[11] Paul Draper, "Christian Theism and Life on Earth" in The Blackwell Companion to Science and Christianity ed. J. B. Stump and Alan G. Padgett (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2012): 306-315; Paul Draper, "Humean Arguments from Evil" in The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil ed. Justin P. McBrayer and Daniel Howard-Snyder (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2013): 67-74, 72.
[12] Draper 2013, 73; Draper 2015, 29-34.
[13] Draper 2013, 73.
[15] Draper, 2022a.
[16] Draper, 2022a.
Serial killer Ted BundyImage Source: Florida Memory Project; License: Public Domain
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