Paul Davies' Compound Argument against Timeless and Temporal Concepts of God

Credit: Christopher Michel; License: CC BY-SA 4.0

 

In his 1983 book, God and the New Physics, Paul Davies writes:

Christians believe that God is eternal. The word ‘eternal’ has, however, been used to mean two rather different things. In the simpler version, eternal means everlasting, or existing without beginning or end for an infinite duration. There are grave objections to such an idea of God, however. A God who is in time is subject to change. But what causes that change? If God is the cause of all existing things (as the cosmological argument of Chapter 3 suggests), then does it make sense to talk about that ultimate cause itself changing?

In the earlier chapters we have seen how time is not simply there, but is itself part of the physical universe. It is ‘elastic’ and can stretch or shrink according to well-defined mathematical laws which depend on the behaviour of matter. Also, time is closely linked to space, and space and time together express the operation of the gravitational field. In short, time is involved in all the grubby details of physical processes just as much as matter. Time is not a divine quality, but can be altered, physically, even by human manipulation. A God who is in time is, therefore, in some sense caught up in the operation of the physical universe. Indeed, it is quite likely that time will cease to exist at some stage in the future (as we shall see in Chapter 15). In that case God's own position is obviously insecure. Clearly, God cannot be omnipotent if he is subject to the physics of time, nor can he be considered the creator of the universe if he did not create time. In fact, because time and space are inseparable, a God who did not create time, created space neither. But as we have seen, once spacetime existed, the appearance of matter and order in the universe could have occurred automatically as the result of perfectly natural activity. Thus, many would argue that God is not really needed as a creator at all except to create time (strictly, spacetime). 

So we are led to the other meaning of the word eternal — ‘timeless’....

A timeless God is free of the problems mentioned above, but suffers from the shortcomings already discussed on page 38. He cannot be a personal God who thinks, converses, feels, plans, and so on for these are all temporal activities. It is hard to see how a timeless God can act at all in time (although it has been claimed that this is not impossible). We have also seen how the sense of the existence of the self is intimately associated with the experience of a time-flow. A timeless God could not be considered a ‘person’ or individual in any sense that we know. Misgivings of this score have led a number of modern theologians to reject this view of an eternal God. Paul Tillich writes: ‘If we call God a living God, we affirm that he includes temporality and with this a relation to the modes of time.’ 3 The same sentiment is echoed by Karl Barth: ‘Without God's complete temporality the content of the Christian message has no shape.’

There is thus a grave and fundamental difficulty in reconciling all the traditional attributes of God. Modern physics, with its discovery of the mutability of time, drives a wedge between God's omnipotence and the existence of his personality. It is difficult to argue that God can have both these qualities.[1]

I want to be clear that I do not claim that Davies is an atheist or even that he would endorse what I am about to write. For all I know, later in the book, Davies might provide a way to avoid his dilemma. Nevertheless, the above passage suggests a compound argument for atheism. Let's take it step by step. Consider the following excerpts of the above quotation.

Christians believe that God is eternal. The word ‘eternal’ has, however, been used to mean two rather different things. In the simpler version, eternal means everlasting, or existing without beginning or end for an infinite duration. ...

 So we are led to the other meaning of the word eternal — ‘timeless’.

Thus, Davies argues, "God is eternal" means either that God is timeless or that God is temporal and exists for an infinite amount of time. This yields the first premise which is a simple dilemma.

(1) Either God is timeless or temporal.

Let's move on and consider what Davies says about the timeless horn of the dilemma.

A timeless God is free of the problems mentioned above, but suffers from the shortcomings already discussed on page 38. He cannot be a personal God who thinks, converses, feels, plans, and so on for these are all temporal activities. It is hard to see how a timeless God can act at all in time (although it has been claimed that this is not impossible). We have also seen how the sense of the existence of the self is intimately associated with the experience of a time-flow. A timeless God could not be considered a ‘person’ or individual in any sense that we know.

"It is hard to see how a timeless God can act at all in time" and "A timeless God could not be considered a 'person' ... in any sense that we know" is the next premise.

(2) If God is timelesss, then God cannot act in time nor be considered a person. 

"Misgivings of this score have led a number of modern theologians to reject this view of an eternal God" supplies our next premise.

(3) But God is personal.

Taken together, (2) and (3) entail:

(4) Therefore, God is not timeless.

That completes the timeless horn of Davies' dilemma. But what of divine temporality? Here is Davies:

In the earlier chapters we have seen how time is not simply there, but is itself part of the physical universe. It is ‘elastic’ and can stretch or shrink according to well-defined mathematical laws which depend on the behaviour of matter. Also, time is closely linked to space, and space and time together express the operation of the gravitational field. In short, time is involved in all the grubby details of physical processes just as much as matter. Time is not a divine quality, but can be altered, physically, even by human manipulation. A God who is in time is, therefore, in some sense caught up in the operation of the physical universe.

This passage suggests the following:

(5) If God is temporal, then God would be subject to the laws of Relativity Theory.

Davies continues:

Indeed, it is quite likely that time will cease to exist at some stage in the future (as we shall see in Chapter 15). In that case God's own position is obviously insecure. Clearly, God cannot be omnipotent if he is subject to the physics of time, nor can he be considered the creator of the universe if he did not create time.

This suggests another premise: 

 (6) If God is subject to the laws of relativity theory, then God is not omnipotent.

I take the following to be a suppressed or implied premise:

(7) But God is omnipotent.

 From (5)-(7), it follows that:

(8) Therefore, God is not temporal.

(4) and (8) together yield an explicit contradiction:

 (9) Therefore, God is neither timeless not temporal.

But (1) and (9) entail:

(10) Therefore, God does not exist.

Discussion

As formulated, the argument is valid, but is it sound? Classical theists would reject premise (3) on the grounds that God is not a person. But what about so-called neo-theists or theistic personalists? It seems to me that premise (5) is false. Certainly, time as we know it (really, spacetime) in our universe is subject to the laws of relativity theory. But it isn't obvious why a neo-theist could not simply postulate some different metric of time, call it "metaphysical time," such that God could be temporal without being subject to the laws of relativity theory. To be sure, the concept of "metaphysical time" will seem absurd to naturalists. The question, however, is whether such a metric can be independently motivated--i.e., whether there are reasons to posit metaphysical time independent of a desire to avoid the conclusion of the above argument--or whether such a metric is ad hoc. Perhaps Davies considers this possibility elsewhere.

I suppose another option is that preferred by William Lane Craig, namely, that "God is timeless without creation and temporal with creation." As I have argued elsewhere, however, I think Craig's theory of God's relationship to time is incoherent.

Notes

[1] Paul C.W. Davies, God and the New Physics (Penguin Books, 1983), 133-34; cf. 38-39.