Another "Impossibility" Argument Against Theism: The Aseity-vs-Temporal Argument

An Impossible (or Penrose) Triangle

Source: OpenClipArt; License: CC 

The Aseity-vs-Temporal Argument

temporal theism =df. theism conjoined with the proposition, "God is necessarily temporal"

(1) If temporal theism is true, then God is a se. [Premise]

(2) If temporal theism is true, then God is temporal. [Premise]

(3) If God is a se, then God is self-existent, independent, and underived. [From the definition of a se]

(4) If God is timeless sans creation and temporal with creation, then God is not necessarily temporal. 

(5) Therefore, it is impossible for God to be both a se and necessarily temporal. (from 3 and 4)

(6) Hence, it is impossible for temporal theism to be true. (from 1, 2, and 5)

To avoid any misunderstandings, I am merely sketching an argument, not defending it. I claim only that it is valid, not that it is sound.

The Argument from the Psychological Relevance of Logical Laws

Introduction

In his book C.S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea: In Defense of the Argument from Reason, Victor Reppert lists nine presuppositions of rational inference.

1. States of mind have a relation to the world we call intentionality, or about-ness.

2. Thoughts and beliefs can be either true or false.

3. Human beings can be in the condition of accepting, rejecting or suspending belief about propositions.

4. Logical laws exist.

5. Human beings are capable of apprehending logical laws.

6. The state of accepting the truth of a proposition plays a crucial causal role in the production of other beliefs, and the propositional content of mental states is relevant to the playing of this causal role.

7. The apprehension of logical laws plays a causal role in the acceptance of the conclusion of the argument as true.

8. The same individual entertains thoughts of the premises and then draws the conclusion.

9. Our processes of reasoning provide us with a systematically reliable way of understanding the world around us.[1]

Commenting on this list of presuppositions, Reppert writes, "It seems to me that all of these elements of reasoning are prima facie difficult to fit within the framework of philosophical naturalism."[2] Here I want to quickly sketch how I would assess one of Reppert's supporting arguments for that claim.

Two "Impossibility" Arguments against (Craigean) Christianity

An Impossible (or Penrose) Triangle

Source: OpenClipArt; License: CC 

Introduction

In my recent video assessment of the late Dr. Gordon Stein's opening statement in his debate with Greg Bahnsen on, "Does God Exist?", I described two possible ways of defending the non-existence of something. First, I said that one way to defend a universal negative is to use what I call an "impossibility argument." Second, I said that one way to defend a particular negative is to use what I call an "improbability argument." 

As I explained in the video, there are two caveats. First, I do not claim that these two types of arguments are an exhaustive list of the various argument patterns which might be used to support universal or particular negatives. Second, my names for these argument patterns are not standard. For example, a standard name for one type of improbability argument is "evidential argument." The standard name for one type of impossibility argument is "logical argument." For example, J.L. Mackie's famous "logical argument from evil" argues that God is impossible because theism is logically inconsistent with evil. I don't like that name because it sounds funny to outsiders. Imagine an atheist saying, "I'm going to defend a logical argument for atheism." That invites the question, "As opposed to what? An illogical argument for atheism?" While my names are nonstandard, I think they are more intuitive than the standard argument names and so I prefer my names for that reason.

In this article, I will quickly sketch two impossibility arguments for a particular negative: the proposition, "Craigean Christianity is false," where "Craigean Christianity" means the version of Christianity defended by William Lane Craig.