Pro-God Atheism

For many former theists-turned-atheists, the loss of belief in God is a source of sadness. Consider these words from Christian-turned-atheist philosopher J.L. Schellenberg, taken from the conclusion of his landmark book, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (Cornell University Press, 1993).

P.S. Now ask yourself: how often do you find atheist-turned-theist philosophers writing a book defending some argument for God's existence, such that the book's conclusion expresses the hope that other people will be able to refute his or her argument for God?

Atheism and the Laws of Logic

Daniel (@DarwinToJesus) recently tweeted the following:

#1. The laws of logic: There are three basic foundational laws of logic.
1. The law of identity (A* is A*)
2. The law of non contradiction (A* is not/cannot be B* in the same place and time)
3. The law of the excluded middle (every proposition is either true, or false)

These…

— Daniel (@darwintojesus) April 23, 2023

Theistic vs. Naturalistic Grounding of Moral Value

Seth Dillon, the CEO of The Babylon Bee, recently tweeted the following:

Sure, atheists have moral values — they just can't ground them in anything. Read Alex Rosenberg's "The Atheist's Guide to Reality." He acknowledges that in God's absence, morality is nothing but a useful fiction. He argues that if atheism is true, the moral feelings we've… https://t.co/HSufKX5ay5

— Seth Dillon (@SethDillon) August 7, 2023

New Paper Refuting Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy"

Terence Irwin	Elizabeth Anscombe

Irwin, T. The Philosophy and History of the Moral ‘Ought’: Some of Anscombe’s Objections. Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10398-w

Abstract: According to G.E.M Anscombe’s paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, modern moral philosophy has introduced a spurious concept of moral obligation, and has therefore made a mistake that the Greeks, and Aristotle in particular, avoided. Anscombe argues that the modern concepts of obligation, duty, and the moral ‘ought’ are the remnants of an earlier, but post-Aristotelian conception of ethics, and that they ought to be abandoned. An examination of Anscombe’s historical and philosophical claims shows that we have no reason to take them seriously. In particular, they rest on a misinterpretation of Scholastic views on ‘ought’ and obligation.

The Pragmatic Inconsistency of Responding to Nihilism with Despair

(1) Necessarily, if metaethical nihilism is true, then nothing matters.

(2) Responding with despair to the (supposed) truth of metaethical nihilism presupposes the falsity of metaethical nihilism.

Therefore:

(3) If one responds with despair to the (supposed) truth of metaethical nihilism, then it is true that nothing matters and it is false that nothing matters. [From 1-2]

Therefore:

(4) It is impossible to consistently respond with despair to metaethical nihilism. [From 3 and LNC]

They key insight of this argument is that if metaethical nihilism is true, then literally nothing, including metaethical nihilism itself, matters.

Draft Essay: Naturalism, Theism, Badness, and Moral Law: A Critique of Ravi Zacharias

 

Overview:

1: Introduction

2: Logical Arguments from Evil

(a) Historical Context 

(b) Zacharias's Framing of the Problem of Evil

3: Zacharias's "Work of God" Theodicy

4: Changing the Subject: Morality Without God

(a) Do Atheists Who Run An Argument from 'Evil' Contradict Themselves?

(b) Quote-Mining Atheists Who Reject Objective Morality

(c) Bogus Appeals to Authority Aside, Do Russell, Mackie, and Dawkins Have Good Arguments?

LINK

Empathy and Apathy: An Evidential Problem for Theists

Serial killer Ted Bundy

Image Source: Florida Memory Project; License: Public Domain

1. Definitions

Following Paul Draper, I'm going to define my terms as follows.[1]

By "naturalism," I mean the view that the physical exists and, if the mental exists, the physical explains why the mental exists.  If naturalism is true, then there are no purely mental beings which can exist apart from a physical body and so there is no God or any person or being much like God.

By "supernaturalism," I mean the view that the mental exists and, if the physical exists, the mental explains why anything physical exists.  If supernaturalism is true, then there is no purely physical matter which can exist without some sort of ultimate mental creator. "Personal supernaturalism" is a type of supernaturalism; it adds on the claims that one or more personal mental entities exist and, if a physical world exists, it or they produced the physical world for a purpose. "Theism" is a type of personal supernaturalism; it adds on the claim that there is just one mental entity, God, who is all-powerful, all-knowing, and morally perfect. 

"Otherism" is a catch-all category. It says that both naturalism and supernaturalism are false. 

The Divine-vs.-Human Argument against Christianity

1. If Christianity were true, then Christ is divine. [Given]

2. If Christianity were true, then Christ is human. [Given]

3. If Christ is divine, then Christ is immutable. [1: divine nature entails immutability]

4. If Christ is human, then Christ is mutable. [2: human nature entails mutability]

Therefore:

5. If Christianity were true, then it would be true that Christ is immutable and it would be false that Christ is immutable. [From 1-4]

Therefore:

6. It is impossible for Christianity to be true. [From 5 by the law of noncontradiction]

Assessing the Transcendence-vs.-Personhood Argument for the Impossibility of God

Source: Alchetron

In this post, I want to assess an argument for atheism called the Transcendence-vs.-Personhood Argument (hereafter, "TvP Argument"). The first section is an exposition of the argument as formulated by Theodore Drange. The second section is a partial assessment of the argument. The work of William Lane Craig appears prominently in this section. Craig is a highly regarded philosopher of time and philosopher of religion who has written extensively on the relationship between God and time. He is also, of course, a theist. Thus, his work on divine eternity provides a useful "test case" for the TvP Argument. 

Paul Davies' Compound Argument against Timeless and Temporal Concepts of God

Credit: Christopher Michel; License: CC BY-SA 4.0

 

In his 1983 book, God and the New Physics, Paul Davies writes:

Christians believe that God is eternal. The word ‘eternal’ has, however, been used to mean two rather different things. In the simpler version, eternal means everlasting, or existing without beginning or end for an infinite duration. There are grave objections to such an idea of God, however. A God who is in time is subject to change. But what causes that change? If God is the cause of all existing things (as the cosmological argument of Chapter 3 suggests), then does it make sense to talk about that ultimate cause itself changing?

In the earlier chapters we have seen how time is not simply there, but is itself part of the physical universe. It is ‘elastic’ and can stretch or shrink according to well-defined mathematical laws which depend on the behaviour of matter. Also, time is closely linked to space, and space and time together express the operation of the gravitational field. In short, time is involved in all the grubby details of physical processes just as much as matter. Time is not a divine quality, but can be altered, physically, even by human manipulation. A God who is in time is, therefore, in some sense caught up in the operation of the physical universe. Indeed, it is quite likely that time will cease to exist at some stage in the future (as we shall see in Chapter 15). In that case God's own position is obviously insecure. Clearly, God cannot be omnipotent if he is subject to the physics of time, nor can he be considered the creator of the universe if he did not create time. In fact, because time and space are inseparable, a God who did not create time, created space neither. But as we have seen, once spacetime existed, the appearance of matter and order in the universe could have occurred automatically as the result of perfectly natural activity. Thus, many would argue that God is not really needed as a creator at all except to create time (strictly, spacetime). 

So we are led to the other meaning of the word eternal — ‘timeless’....

A timeless God is free of the problems mentioned above, but suffers from the shortcomings already discussed on page 38. He cannot be a personal God who thinks, converses, feels, plans, and so on for these are all temporal activities. It is hard to see how a timeless God can act at all in time (although it has been claimed that this is not impossible). We have also seen how the sense of the existence of the self is intimately associated with the experience of a time-flow. A timeless God could not be considered a ‘person’ or individual in any sense that we know. Misgivings of this score have led a number of modern theologians to reject this view of an eternal God. Paul Tillich writes: ‘If we call God a living God, we affirm that he includes temporality and with this a relation to the modes of time.’ 3 The same sentiment is echoed by Karl Barth: ‘Without God's complete temporality the content of the Christian message has no shape.’

There is thus a grave and fundamental difficulty in reconciling all the traditional attributes of God. Modern physics, with its discovery of the mutability of time, drives a wedge between God's omnipotence and the existence of his personality. It is difficult to argue that God can have both these qualities.[1]

Two Types of Weak Arguments for Theism: "God of the Gaps" vs. "Weak Naturalistic Explanations"

1. God of the Gaps Arguments

On my old team blog (Secular Outpost, which was migrated from Patheos and renamed as Secular Frontier), I proposed the following schema for God of the Gaps Arguments (hereafter, "Gap Arguments").

(1) There is some puzzling phenomenon P which science cannot at present explain.

(2) Theism does explain P.

Therefore:

(3) P is more likely on the assumption that God exists than on the assumption God does not exist.

Possible values for P may certainly include, but are not limited to, the origin of the universe, the life-permitting conditions of the universe, the origin of life itself (i.e., not evolution), the origin of consciousness, near-death experiences, and so forth. What is important to note here is that merely referring to alleged "hard" cases for naturalism is not a sufficient condition to make a theistic argument a Gap Argument. Rather, the following are necessary and sufficient conditions for a theistic argument to qualify as a Gap Argument: (a) the argument must refer to scientific ignorance; and (b) the argument must not include a premise about current knowledge (scientific or otherwise) which allegedly favors theism over naturalism. To see this, consider two versions of an argument from consciousness for theism.

Version 1: The Argument from Consciousness (Gap Version)

(1) Science cannot explain consciousness.
(2) Theism does explain consciousness.
Therefore:
(3) Consciousness is more likely on the assumption that God exists than on the assumption God does not exist. 

Version 2: The Argument from Consciousness (Non-Gap Version) 

(1) E ("Human consciousness exists") is known to be true, i.e., Pr(E) is close to 1.
(2) Source physicalism is not hopelessly intrinsically much more probable than theism, i.e., Pr(|N|) is not much greater than Pr(|T|).
(3) Human consciousness is antecedently more probable on the assumption that source physicalism is true than on the assumption that theism is true i.e., Pr(E | T & B) =1 > Pr(E | N & B).
Therefore:
(4) Other evidence held equal, N is probably false, i.e., Pr(N | B & E) < 1/2.

In version 2, premise (3) would then be supported by one or more arguments based on what we do know, rather than appealing to scientific ignorance.

2. Weak Naturalistic Explanations Arguments 

Weak Naturalism Explanation Arguments (hereafter, "Weak Explanation Arguments") are related to Gap Arguments, but represent a distinct type of argument. While the exact details differ, they have the following basic form.

(1) The evidence (E) regarding some known topic T is known to be true.

(2) Naturalistic explanations 1...n are weak explanations because they are ad hoc, have weak explanatory power, or both.
(3) Theism has great explanatory power. 

Therefore:

(4) Theism is true. 

Possible values for T may certainly include, but are not limited to, the origin of the universe, the life-permitting conditions of the universe, the origin of life itself (i.e., not evolution), the origin of consciousness, near-death experiences, the historicity of Jesus' resurrection, and so forth. What is important to note here is that merely referring to alleged "weak" naturalistic explanations is not a sufficient condition to make a theistic argument a Weak Explanation Argument. Rather, the following are necessary and sufficient conditions for a theistic argument to qualify as a Weak Explanation Argument: (a) the argument must refer to the weakness of naturalistic explanations; and (b) the argument must not include a premise about the (alleged) strength of the theistic explanation. To see this, consider two versions of an argument for the historicity of the Resurrection.

Again, let's compare and contrast two versions of an argument for the historicity of the Resurrection. 

Version 1: The Argument for the Resurrection (Weak Explanation Version)

(1) The evidence (E) relevant to the alleged Resurrection of Jesus is known to be true.
(2) Each of the traditional naturalistic explanations 1...n for E are weak explanations because they are ad hoc, have weak explanatory power, or both.
(3) The Resurrection theory is a strong explanation of the evidence.
Therefore:
(4) [probable] Jesus rose from the dead.

Version 2: The Argument for the Resurrection (Non-Weak Explanation Version)

(1) The evidence (E) relevant to the alleged Resurrection of Jesus is known to be true.
(2) Each of the traditional naturalistic explanations 1...n for E are weak explanations because they are ad hoc, have weak explanatory power, or both.
(3) The Resurrection theory is a strong explanation of the evidence because it is neither ad hoc nor has weak explanatory power.
Therefore:
(4) [probable] Jesus rose from the dead.

In version 1, the argument assesses traditional naturalistic explanations by considering their background probability and explanatory power, but does not consider the background probability of the Resurrection theory. In contrast, version 2 considers background probability and explanatory power of all explanations. N.B. I think even version 2 fails, but version 2 is better than version 1. Why does version 2 fail? I'll save that for another time.

Divine Simplicity vs Trinity

Source: AnonMoos; License: Public Domain

I know that Thomists have had about centuries to come up with responses, but it just occurred to me that it is far from obvious that divine simplicity is logically consistent with the Trinity. Not making an argument; rather, just a note for future research.

Atheism and Self-Deception

Source: WallPaper Flare

I’m sure I’m not the first person to notice this, but, in light of the frequent accusation that atheists are self-deceived, it is striking how common it is for atheists to be told to behave in ways that are self-deception (or what we might call "self-deception adjacent") to cultivate theistic belief.

I’m sure I’m not the first person to notice this, but, in light of the frequent accusation that atheists are self-deceived, it is striking how common it is for atheists to be told to behave in ways that are self-deception or self-deception adjacent.m, to cultivate theistic belief

— Secular Outpost (@SecularOutpost) July 10, 2023

A Surprisingly Persuasive Disproof of God's Existence: Brownson's Ontological Problem of Evil

Source: Lehman College CUNY

I just finished reading a surprisingly persuasive disproof of God's existence. 

Thinking about Craig's Defense of the Kalam Cosmological Argument: Did God's Causing the Universe to Exist Itself Have a Cause?

William Lane Craig

Source: Wikimedia; License: Public Domain

I've been thinking about Craig's defense of the kalam cosmological argument again. In this post, I will sketch two arguments I've formulated and then briefly discuss what I perceive to be the key issue which kalam proponents (hereafter, "kalamists") are likely to dispute.

Podcast Interview with Justin Schieber of Real Atheology

Justin Schieber

A few weeks ago, Justin Schieber interviewed me for an episode of the Real Atheology podcast. That episode just dropped. 

RA040: Jeffery Jay Lowder on Philosophy of Religion

"In this episode, Justin Schieber sits down with Jeffery Jay Lowder for a wide-ranging interview. Fans of the show will no doubt be familiar with Jeff's work. From founding Infidels.org and the Secular Outpost to his contributions to The Empty Tomb and his several public debates, Jeff has earned his reputation as a fair-minded and philosophically informed atheist. We discuss the origin of infidels.org, Paul Draper's famous argument from Pain and Pleasure and everything in between."

LINK

Two Arguments for the Impossibility of an Omniscient Being

An Impossible (or Penrose) Triangle

Source: OpenClipArt; License: CC 

Version #1

1. Either God can know what it is like not to know that p or God cannot know what it is like not to know that p. 
2. If God can know what it is like not to know that p, then God is not omniscient (since to know what it is like not to know that p, there must be some p that God does not know). 
3. If God cannot know what it is like not to know that p, then God is not omniscient (since there is some p—i.e., (L) or (L*)—that God cannot know). 
4. (Therefore) Either way, God is not omniscient. 

Version #2

1. Either God can know what it is like to be finite or God cannot know what it is like to be finite. 
2. If God can know what it is like to be finite, then God is not omniscient (since to know what it is like to be finite, God must be finite). 
3. If God cannot know what it is like to be finite, then God is not omniscient (since there is something that God cannot know, namely, what it is like to be finite). 
4. (Therefore) Either way, God is not omniscient.

Both versions of this argument belong to Moti Mizrahi. See:

Mizrahi, Moti (2013). "New Puzzles About Divine Attributes." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (2):147-157.

Another "Impossibility" Argument Against Theism: The Aseity-vs-Temporal Argument

An Impossible (or Penrose) Triangle

Source: OpenClipArt; License: CC 

The Aseity-vs-Temporal Argument

temporal theism =df. theism conjoined with the proposition, "God is necessarily temporal"

(1) If temporal theism is true, then God is a se. [Premise]

(2) If temporal theism is true, then God is temporal. [Premise]

(3) If God is a se, then God is self-existent, independent, and underived. [From the definition of a se]

(4) If God is timeless sans creation and temporal with creation, then God is not necessarily temporal. 

(5) Therefore, it is impossible for God to be both a se and necessarily temporal. (from 3 and 4)

(6) Hence, it is impossible for temporal theism to be true. (from 1, 2, and 5)

To avoid any misunderstandings, I am merely sketching an argument, not defending it. I claim only that it is valid, not that it is sound.

The Argument from the Psychological Relevance of Logical Laws

Introduction

In his book C.S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea: In Defense of the Argument from Reason, Victor Reppert lists nine presuppositions of rational inference.

1. States of mind have a relation to the world we call intentionality, or about-ness.

2. Thoughts and beliefs can be either true or false.

3. Human beings can be in the condition of accepting, rejecting or suspending belief about propositions.

4. Logical laws exist.

5. Human beings are capable of apprehending logical laws.

6. The state of accepting the truth of a proposition plays a crucial causal role in the production of other beliefs, and the propositional content of mental states is relevant to the playing of this causal role.

7. The apprehension of logical laws plays a causal role in the acceptance of the conclusion of the argument as true.

8. The same individual entertains thoughts of the premises and then draws the conclusion.

9. Our processes of reasoning provide us with a systematically reliable way of understanding the world around us.[1]

Commenting on this list of presuppositions, Reppert writes, "It seems to me that all of these elements of reasoning are prima facie difficult to fit within the framework of philosophical naturalism."[2] Here I want to quickly sketch how I would assess one of Reppert's supporting arguments for that claim.

Two "Impossibility" Arguments against (Craigean) Christianity

An Impossible (or Penrose) Triangle

Source: OpenClipArt; License: CC 

Introduction

In my recent video assessment of the late Dr. Gordon Stein's opening statement in his debate with Greg Bahnsen on, "Does God Exist?", I described two possible ways of defending the non-existence of something. First, I said that one way to defend a universal negative is to use what I call an "impossibility argument." Second, I said that one way to defend a particular negative is to use what I call an "improbability argument." 

As I explained in the video, there are two caveats. First, I do not claim that these two types of arguments are an exhaustive list of the various argument patterns which might be used to support universal or particular negatives. Second, my names for these argument patterns are not standard. For example, a standard name for one type of improbability argument is "evidential argument." The standard name for one type of impossibility argument is "logical argument." For example, J.L. Mackie's famous "logical argument from evil" argues that God is impossible because theism is logically inconsistent with evil. I don't like that name because it sounds funny to outsiders. Imagine an atheist saying, "I'm going to defend a logical argument for atheism." That invites the question, "As opposed to what? An illogical argument for atheism?" While my names are nonstandard, I think they are more intuitive than the standard argument names and so I prefer my names for that reason.

In this article, I will quickly sketch two impossibility arguments for a particular negative: the proposition, "Craigean Christianity is false," where "Craigean Christianity" means the version of Christianity defended by William Lane Craig.