Why Are Members of the Clergy Assumed to be Moral Experts?

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 18, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

At http://www.uncg.edu/~nphuntbu/lectures.html (site now discontinued), I found a set of lecture notes entitled "Why religion is irrelevant to ethics". Here is a quotation I particularly liked:

Why are members of the clergy (who presumably are experts in the theology of their particular sect) assumed to be experts in ethics? Why put them on ethics ommissions rather than taxi drivers or literature professors?

This issue obviously boils down to presuppositions. If you assume a priori that a member of the clergy is an expert on ethics, the above questions will be a non-starter. If, however, your mind is open to the idea that just because someone is a member of the clergy, they are not automatically qualified to be an expert on ethics, then this question will be more interesting to you.

LINK: Stairs on Parsons on Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 18, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

An Argument from Moral Realism to Atheism

In a recent article, Quentin Smith formulates a creative argument for atheism based on the combination of moral realism and infinite spacetime. Smith formulates his argument as follows:

1. Moral realism is true.
2. The universe in which we live is infinite.
3. At least one relevant version of an aggregative theory of values is true.
4. Therefore, God does not exist.

LINK: A Bayesian Analysis of the Cumulative Effects of Independent Eyewitness Testimony for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 18, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

I just discovered this essay by John DePoe which defends a Bayesian technique to measure the cumulative effect of independent eyewitness testimony for the Resurrection. Check it out:

The Scale of the Universe as Evidence for Naturalism?

In his book, The Non-Existence of God, philosopher Nicholas Everitt provides the first detailed analysis and defense of the argument from scale for God's nonexistence. Everitt formulates his argument as follows:

(1) If the God of classical theism existed, with the purposes traditionally ascribed to him, then he would create a universe on a human scale, i.e. one that is not unimaginably large, unimaginably old, and in which human beings form an unimaginably tiny part of it, temporally and spatially.
(2) The world does not display a human scale.
(3) Therefore, there is evidence against the hypothesis that the God of classical theism exists with the purposes traditionally ascribed to him.

Jerry Coyne on Goodness without God

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 17, 2011 and then republished on February 24, 2016. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

(Originally published on 17 October 2011)

Jerry Coyne recently wrote an op-ed in USA Today entitled, "As Atheists Know, You Can Be Good Without God." Christian philosopher Matt Flanagan wrote an excellent critique, not of Coyne's claim that nonbelievers can be good without God (which Flanagan grants), but of pretty much everything else Coyne wrote related to metaethics. I wanted to highlight a couple of areas where I especially agree with Flanagan, since Flanagan points out some errors that a scientist wihout philosophical training can make. I also want to state where I disagree with Flanagan.

First, what is the focus of Coyne's critique? According to Flanagan:

The argument that our instinctive sense of right and wrong “is strong evidence for [God’s] existence” found its most important formulation in a 1979 article by Yale Philosopher Robert Adams.

Let me begin by saying that I am familiar with Adams' work and have great respect for it, especially his magisterial, Fine and Infinite Goods. Also, I agree with Flanagan that Adams' work has been influential among theists. Finally, I agree with Flanagan that nothing Coyne writes in any way undermines Adams' moral argument(s) for theism.

It doesn't follow, however, that Coyne is to be faulted, in the way Flanagan criticizes him, for not criticizing or refuting Adams' argument. Coyne is writing in USA Today, not a professional philosophical journal, so I think it's reasonable to expect Coyne to tailor his message to his audience. While I have no empirical data to back this up, if you want to name philosophers, I suspect that C.S. Lewis' moral argument for God's existence is probably much more influential among the average reader of USA Today than the work of Robert Adams. And Lewis does appeal to a variety of moral phenomena in in Mere Christianity as part of his moral argument for God's existence. That phenomena includes not only what Lewis calls the "Moral Law," but also moral emotions (e.g., guilt, obligation). Thus, I think it is legitimate for Coyne to offer a naturalistic explanation for moral emotions. In this sense, I think Flanagan is being unfair to criticize Coyne for not interacting with Adams.

On the other hand, Flanagan is absolutely correct when he says there is a difference between moral obligation and the feeling of obligation. So even if, for the sake of argument, Coyne is successful in offering a naturalistic explanation for the feeling of obligation, it doesn't follow that Coyne has explained moral obligation in general.

Second, Coyne is simply wrong when he claims that moral emotions "couldn't" come from the will or commands of God, even if we assume that Euthyphro dilemma is a fatal objection to divine command theories (DCT) of moral obligation. That is much too strong of a claim. Again, using the obligation vs. feeling of obligation distinction, at most the Euthyphro dilemma refutes the claim that moral obligation in general comes from God; it does not in any way prevent a theistic explanation for moral emotions, including feelings of obligation.

But is the Euthyphro dilemma a fatal objection to DCT of moral obligation? That's not obvious to me at all.  I've read a lot of recent work by theists refining, clarifying, and defending sophisticated versions of DCT. While I am not prepared to take a definitive stance on the matter yet, here my sympathies lie with Flanagan. Why? That would be the topic for another post, some other time. :)

Update 24-Feb-16:

After the original publication of this post, I published my Primary on Religion and Morality. I cover many of these same topics in slightly greater detail there. LINK

LINK: Study on Religious Belief Systems of Persons with High Functioning Autism

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 17, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

Catherine Caldwell-Harris and Patrick McNamara have published a very intriguing study in the cognitive science of religion entitled, "Religious Belief Systems of Persons with High Functioning Autism." Here is the abstract:

The cognitive science of religion is a new field which explains religious belief as emerging from normal cognitive processes such as inferring others' mental states, agency detection and imposing patterns on noise. This paper investigates the proposal that individual differences in belief will reflect cognitive processing styles, with high functioning autism being an extreme style that will predispose towards nonbelief (atheism and agnosticism). This view was supported by content analysis of discussion forums about religion on an autism website (covering 192 unique posters), and by a survey that included 61 persons with HFA. Persons with autistic spectrum disorder were much more likely than those in our neurotypical comparison group to identify as atheist or agnostic, and, if religious, were more likely to construct their own religious belief system. Nonbelief was also higher in those who were attracted to systemizing activities, as measured by the Systemizing Quotient.

LINK: Anthony Aguirre on the Multiverse Hypothesis

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 17, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

Anthony Aguirre is a physicist at UC Santa Cruz. He wrote a paper in 1995 on the multiverse hypothesis. Here is the paper's abstract:

The notion that there are many "universes" with different properties is one answer to the question of "why is the universe so hospitable to life?" This notion also naturally follows from current ideas in eternal inflation and string/M theory. But how do we test such a "multiverse" theory: which of the many universes do we compare to ours? This paper enumerates would would seem to be essential ingredients for making testable predictions, outlines different strategies one might take within this framework, then discusses some of the difficulties and dangers inherent in these approaches. Finally, I address the issue of whether there may be some general, qualitative predictions that multiverse theories might share.

More Defense of William Lane Craig

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 17, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Wow, my post defending William Lane Craig has generated a lot of feedback. Given the interest in that topic, I thought it would be valuable to go through in detail an example of the sort of unfair attack I've seen a few atheists heap on Dr. Craig. Over at the Rational Response Squad forums, I discovered this 2010 post by "HisWilliness" (HW), where the author comments on Craig's debate with Shelly Kagan. HW writes:

That's actually what I mean when I say "destroyed". Ordinarily, WLC's opponents are so flummoxed by him (because he's supposed to be a philosopher, and he seems to grant himself the luxury of not addressing questions posed to him) that they get caught up in the weight of the overwhelming insanity of his position. That can flat rattle a thoughtful person!

But because Kagan is so talented and practiced at lecturing (as evidenced by his online course on death) he's well suited to show Craig for the phony that he is. Kagan is the real deal, in that he can both rattle off an argument and also think about it on the spot. Craig merely appears to be a philosopher in that sense, especially in other debates where no-one is clever enough to take him to task for just one argument at a time.

And then further down the thread, HW writes:

Not a joke like WLC's education is apparently a joke, another kind.

I find these comments appalling, not to mention illogical. Consider the first quotation. In its logical form, HW's argument seems to be the following.

(1) If a debater is caught completely off guard by their opponents' comments in a single debate, then that debater is a phony and not a real philosopher.
(2) WLC was caught completely off guard by Shelly Kagan's points in their debate.
(3) Therefore, WLC is a phony and not a philosopher.

For the record, I agree with (2); Craig's performance in his debate with Kagan was quite out of character. But (1) is false. Just as in the National Football League anything can happen on "any given Sunday," any philosopher, even one who is usually very good at debating, can have a bad day in a given debate. Absolutely nothing follows from a single debate performance about a person's knowledge of philosophy. The conclusion of this argument is false.

Turning to HW's attack on WLC's education, again, I would offer the following reply. Look in the mirror. What are your philosophical credentials? Do you have a Ph.D. in philosophy? If not, why should anyone at all care what you think of WLC's--or, for that matter, anyone else's--credentials in philosophy?

And calling Craig a "phony" or dismissing his education as a "joke" is rude, a personal attack that is completely unjustified and has no relevance to the merits of his arguments. Just as we should not tolerate misbehavior by theists, we should not tolerate misbehavior by atheists, either. As a simple matter of common courtesy, I hope that HW apologizes to WLC for these remarks.

Justin Barrett's "Hyperactive Agency Detection Device" (HADD)

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 17, 2011. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Another item for the "not new, but new for me" category. Justin Barrett is a cognitive scientist of religion and the author of Why Would Anyone Believe in God? In that book, Barrett advances an intriguing explanatory hypothesis for why most people believe in God: the Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (HADD) hypothesis.

I have to admit that, when I first heard about HADD, I considered it to be very plausible on the assumption that humans are the products of evolution. It reminds me of Stewart Guthrie's important book, Faces in the Clouds. What is interesting about HADD is that it appears to provide a plausible explanation for the pervasiveness of theistic belief, even on the assumption that theism is false.

Of course, the truth of HADD, if it is true, does not in any way logically contradict theism. I think the significance of HADD is that, if true, it provides a defeater for an argument for God's existence based on the fact of the pervasiveness of theistic belief. (I'll have to think about this, but for the same reason it may also provide a defeater for C.S. Lewis's argument from desire. Perhaps Victor Reppert or another Lewis scholar can comment on that.)

I haven't yet researched what sort of critical responses, if any, have been offered to HADD. It will be most interesting to follow the debate and research on this topic.

The Implausibility of Appealing to the Many-Worlds Hypothesis to Defeat the Fine-Tuning Argument

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 17, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

I know what I am about to write will be controversial among atheists--one of them may (?) be a certain professional physicist who writes regularly for The Secular Outpost--but I have never agreed with the idea of appealing to the hypothesis of multiple universes ("multiverse") as an objection to the fine-tuning argument for God's existence. Philosopher Bradley Monton is much more knowledgeable about the intersection of philosophy and physics than I am, so I felt good to discover he has the same concerns I do.

I like the way he begins his post:

Some physicists seem to think that the only good reply to the fine-tuning argument for God is an appeal to many universes. If that’s right, that puts the fine-tuning argument on pretty strong ground.

LINK

FWIW, I posted something to The Secular Outpost about 5 years ago with a link to a sophisticated critique of the multiverse hypothesis. LINK

LINK: Monton on "Design Inferences in an Infinite Universe"

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 17, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.] 

Yet another one for the "not new, but new for me" category. Philosopher Bradley Monton has written an extremely intriguing essay on design inferences in an infinite universe. Here is the abstract:

This paper addresses two main questions. First, how does one determine that something has the features it does as a result of design, as opposed to for example chance? Second, how are inferences to design affected when one makes the (plausible) assumption that the universe is spatially infinite? I will show that arguments for the existence of God based on the improbable development of life don’t go through under the supposition that the universe is spatially infinite. I will also show that the model of design inferences promulgated by William Dembski is flawed, because it has the consequence that one can never infer design in a spatially infinite universe. My model for design inferences has the (desirable) consequence that there are circumstances where a seeming miracle can count as evidence for the existence of God, even if one would expect that type of event to naturalistically occur in a spatially infinite universe.

LINK

LINK: Schellenberg's Review of The Cambridge Companion to Atheism

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 16, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

J.L. Schellenberg is arguably one of the leading philosophers of religion in the world and, among other things, the philosopher who formulated the argument from divine hiddenness for atheism. Schellenberg reviewed The Cambridge Companion to Atheism (ed. Michael Martin) in the Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

Here is the conclusion of Schellenberg's review:

I myself think that a good case for atheism (understood as disbelief of traditional theism) can be developed, but the arguments in this book leave one with the impression that the case is weaker than it is, and it must be said that the available arguments for theism are stronger than they are here suggested to be. Still, the student or nonspecialist will be able to take away from both the philosophical and the nonphilosophical discussions that this work contains a pretty good idea of which issues are important to the understanding and assessment of atheism, and should be stimulated — if only through disagreement — to think more carefully about those issues for herself. 

LINK

Summary and Assessment of the Craig-Drange Debate (1997)

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 16, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

(This is yet another old debate summary and assessment from my archives. I think I wrote this around 1998. I am posting it here unchanged.)

On February 26, 1997 at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, William Lane Craig debated Theodore Drange of West Virginia University. The topic was, "Does God exist?"

Note: video of the debate is available online here.

SPECIAL NOTE REGARDING THIS DEBATE SUMMARY

Drange did not address each of Craig's theistic arguments in turn. Instead, he made three general observations about Craig's overall case. Thus, the numbering scheme I have used to summary the debaters arguments does not always match up. Each of the debaters tried to impose their own organizational structure on the arguments in the debate, and I did not consider it appropriate for me to choose one organizational structure over another in my summary.

Unfortunately, this necessarily makes the debate summary harder to follow than it would have been if both debaters had adopted the same organizational format, and I have more to say about that in my summary at the end. With respect to Drange's atheological arguments, the outline structure DOES match up. However, with respect to Craig's theistic arguments, the outline structure DOES NOT match up. This means that, for example, "II,A,1," in Craig's speeches DOES NOT match up with "II,A,1," in Drange's speeches.

CRAIG'S OPENING STATEMENT

I. No good reason to think atheism is true

II. Good reason to think theism is true
A. Kalam cosmological argument
(1) Anything which begins to exist must have a cause
(2) The universe began to exist
(3) Therefore, the universe must have a cause

B. Fine-tuning argument
- Life-permitting universes are vastly more improbable than life-permitting universes. The odds of a life-permitting universe like ours coming into existence by chance are so remote that our universe must be the result of intelligent design.

C. Moral argument
(1) If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist.
(2) But objective moral values exist.
(3) Therefore, God exists.

D. Resurrection of Jesus
- The Resurrection of Jesus is the best explanation for 3 historical facts:
1. The empty tomb
2. The post-resurrection appearances
3. The very origin of the Christian faith
- this entails a divine miracle and the existence of God

E. Religious Experience
- This isn't an argument for God's existence; rather, it's the claim that you can know God exists wholly apart from arguments

DRANGE'S OPENING STATEMENT

I. Arguments for Atheism
A. Argument from Evil
(1) God, by definition, is (among other things) an all-loving deity who strongly desires love and worship from humans and who wants everyone to be aware of his existence.
(2) Hence, probably, if God were to exist, then he would not have permitted there to be as much suffering and premature death among humans as there actually is.
(3) But there is that much suffering and premature death, and so probably God does not exist.

B. Argument from Nonbelief
(1) (same as above)
(4) Hence, probably, if God were to exist, then he would not have permitted there to be as much nonbelief (in God and the afterlife) among humans as there actually is.
(5) But there is that much nonbelief, and so probably God does not exist.

II. Craig's Arguments for Theism
A. Many of Craig's arguments attempt to explain alleged "facts" which are NOT facts.
1. "The origin of the universe" is not a fact to be explained. Craig should cite the existence of the universe.
2. "The complex order in the universe" is not a fact to be explained. Craig should cite as the fact to be explained the life-permitting  combination of physical constants.
3. Craig he takes objective moral values as a fact to be explained, but there are no objective moral values.
4. Craig takes the resurrection of Jesus as a fact to be explained, but it is obviously NOT that. It is illegitimate to regard the Bible as reporting historical fact.
5. Craig himself admits that the "argument" from religious experience is not an argument. Moreover, why shouldn't we accept atheism on the basis of atheist experiences?

B. All of Craig's arguments put forward the God Hypothesis as the best explanation there is for something, but the God Hypothesis cannot be that, for the simple reason that it is unclear, obscure, and hard to understand. Craig takes God to be a timeless, changeless, immaterial person, and that is a totally incomprehensible notion. Such a notion is useless for purposes of explanation, since the purpose of explanation is to clarify, enlighten, and create greater understanding than before. For that reason, it is impossible for the God Hypothesis to be the best explanation for anything whatever, and so each of Craig's arguments is a failure on that basis alone. God is no more of an explanation than the hypothesis that "Santa Claus is operating through the fifth dimension."

C. After we have gotten straight about what the actual fact is to be explained, for each of Craig's arguments there are alternate  explanations at least as good as the God Hypothesis:
1. Kalam cosmological argument
a. Universe might be beginningless
b. Time began with the universe. The universe did not come out of nothingness.
c. Maybe there is a hyperuniverse
2. Fine-tuning argument
a. Other combinations of physical constants might be equally unique and special in some way.

CRAIG'S FIRST REBUTTAL

I. No good reason to think atheism is true
A. Argument from Evil
1. Premise (2) does not following from premise (1)
2. It is not obvious that God wants to remove suffering. God's purpose may be to have people come to know God (e.g., El Salvador)

B. Argument from Nonbelief
1. Premise (4) does not follow from premise (1). It may not be within God's power to make people freely believe. Also, the  issue here is NOT awareness of God, but belief IN God.
2. God has an overriding desire to have people believe in God (which again is not the same thing as having people believe that God exists). Even demons are theists.
3. God does not want to reveal the gospel message to people He knows will reject it. (my paraphrase)

II. There is good reason to think theism is true.
- Drange has the burden of proof to show an incoherence in the idea of a timeless God. Quoted The Timelessness of God by John Yates  to support the coherence of God.

A. Kalam cosmological argument
1. Contradicted by a priori and empirical arguments to the contrary.
2. Quotes Barrow and Tipler, the universe came into existence out of nothing.
3. Vacuum fluctuation models abandoned in the 1970s. Quotes Christopher Isham: vacuum fluctuation models have been  abandoned on empirical grounds. If vacuum fluctuation models were true, then universes would collide with one another and coalesce.
4. The atheist position, "that the universe just popped into existence uncaused out of nothing", takes more faith to believe than theism.

B. Fine-tuning argument
1. It's irrational to believe the complexity in the universe came about by chance.

C. Moral argument
1. Quotes Michael Ruse. Objective moral values do exist. Does Drange believe that rape is morally permissible?

D. Resurrection of Jesus
1. No assumption of Biblical inerrancy; the New Testament
accounts of the Resurrection should be believed on the basis that a consensus of New Testament scholars accept them as  historical.

E. Religious Experience
1. Theists have no reason to deny the veridicality of their experiences in the absence of defeaters to Craig's arguments.
2. Craig's theistic arguments constitute defeaters of atheistic experiences; therefore, atheists have reasons to disbelieve such experiences.

DRANGE'S FIRST REBUTTAL

I. Arguments for Atheism
A. Argument from Evil
1. The argument from evil is based on an inductive inference
2. Why does God permit so many children to suffer and die?

B. Argument from Nonbelief
1.1. Don't understand "freely believe". We believe according to the evidence.
1.2. Can't believe IN God without believing THAT God exists. Once people know the truth of theism, they can make a free  will decision to follow God. However, if they are not even  aware that God exists, how can they choose to follow or not  follow God?
2. Eternal damnation should motivate God to increase awareness of the gospel message.

II. Craig's Theistic Arguments
A. Many of Craig's arguments attempt to explain alleged "facts" which  are NOT facts.
3. Objective moral values do not exist.

B. It is impossible for the God Hypothesis to be the best explanation for anything whatever.
1. Craig's God is very obscure.
2. Certain passages in the Bible (e.g., Gen 6:6, Ex 3:2, etc.) contradict Craig's conception of a timeless God.

C. There are alternate explanations at least as good as the God Hypothesis.
1. The existence of the universe:
b. What does it mean to cause time? Causes must temporally precede their effects.
c. Vacuum fluctuation models ARE supported by empirical evidence. Cosmology is a rapidly changing and growing field.

2. The life-permitting combination of physical constants:
a. A theory of everything would explain why the physical constants have to be the way they are.
b. Then again, the constants may be a brute fact. Other values of the physical constants might have supported other highly-interesting arrangements, including the possibility of minds, and so there is no reason to claim that our particular combination of constants is anything special.
c. Many Worlds Theory.

3. Our moral intuitions about rape:
a. Moral feelings and intuitions may be genetically based.
b. Morality is the product of social conditioning.
c. Even if there are objective moral values, God is not necessary to explain them.

CRAIG'S SECOND REBUUTAL

I. No good reason to think atheism is true
A. Argument from Evil
1. My hypothesis is not improbable. In the context of suffering, people come to know and believe in God.

B. Argument from Nonbelief
4. God is evident in nature, conscience, etc.
5. This argument is a joke. People could make God not exist by
not believing in Him. This argument is the ultimate in
buck-passing.

II. There are good reasons to think theism is true.
- the timelessness of God
1. Biblical passages may contain anthropomorphisms
2. God can cause effects in time.

A. Kalam cosmological argument
2. Causes do NOT have to precede their effects in time; they can be simultaneous. God's causing the universe was simultaneous with the Big Bang.
3.1. Vacuum fluctuation models don't work
3.2. atheism has no explanation of the existence of the universe

B. Fine-tuning argument
1.1. Structure in sand analogy: nobody would believe that came about by chance.
1.2. No theory of everything will ever be discovered.
1.3. Certain boundary conditions would have to be put in by hand
2. No physical, carbon-based life would be possible in a universe with different physical constants.
3.1. Speculative. Moreover, theism is simpler.
3.2. No known mechanism for generating many worlds. Any such mechanism would itself require fine-tuning.
3.3. No evidence to believe this is true, apart from the existence of intelligent life.

C. Moral argument
1. Do you believe that rape is objectively wrong?

D. Resurrection of Jesus
1. Drange did not address

E. Religious Experience
1. Drange did not address

DRANGE'S SECOND REBUTTAL

I. Arguments for Atheism
A. Argument from Evil
1. Reducing suffering would increase theistic belief. Will all the non-Christians in the world be tortured forever in Hell?

B. Argument from Nonbelief
2. God should provide more evidence for His existence, and He should not be reluctant to do so.
3.1. Why are there so many nonbelievers in Asia?
4. How is God evident in nature? Craig's abstract appeals to alleged evidences for the existence of God are NOT evident in nature. Conscience can be explained in other ways.
5. People are not responsible for their nonbelief.

II. Craig's Theistic Arguments
A. Many of Craig's arguments attempt to explain alleged "facts" which are NOT facts.
3. Craig takes objective moral values as a fact to be explained, but there are no objective moral values.
a. No objective procedure for settling moral disputes.
b. Objective moral values are not observable.
c. There are ambiguous moral issues.

B. It is impossible for the God Hypothesis to be the best explanation for anything whatever.
1. Craig has not yet presented a cumulative case. How does Craig know that each of the gods allegedly established in each theistic argument is in fact the same god?

C. There are alternative explanations at least as good as the God Hypothesis.
1. The existence of the universe:
b. Bowling ball on pillow not simultaneous causation. The cause comes before the effect.

2. The life-permitting combination of physical constants:
b. Structure in sand analogy is a bad analogy. Don't have relevant background knowledge about the universe.

3. Our moral intuitions about rape:
c. The existence of objective moral values is compatible with the non-existence of God.

CRAIG'S THIRD REBUTTAL

I. No good reason to think atheism is true
A. Argument from evil
1. False and question-begging. Drange has to prove that reducing suffering would increase theistic belief. Indeed, in areas of intense suffering, people come to know God.

B. Argument from nonbelief
2. The actual world contains an optimum balance of belief and suffering.
3.1. Asia has more evangelical believers than North America
3.2. God IS achieving his purpose in evangelizing the world. In AD 100, there were 360 unbelievers per 1 evangelical Christian believer. Today, there are only 9 unbelievers per 1 evangelical believer.

II. Good reason to think theism is true
A. Kalam cosmological argument
2.1. Cushion and ball could have been in contact from eternity. Moreover, is not a physical object and is therefore not bound by finite signal velocities.
3.2. Takes more faith to believe the universe popped into existence uncaused out of nothing, than it does to believe in God.

B. Fine-tuning argument
1.1. In cases where we do NOT have relevant background knowledge (e.g., unknown archaeological artifacts, the search for extraterrestrial intelligence, etc.), that does not prevent  us from inferring design. Why should the universe be any different?
1.2. Alternative hypotheses are not plausible.

C. Moral argument
1.3. Unclear cases don't undermine the clear cases. God is the foundation for the clear cases.

D. Resurrection of Jesus
1. Not addressed by Drange

E. Religious Experience
1. God can change your life just as he has changed mine.

DRANGE'S THIRD REBUTTAL

I. Arguments for Atheism
A. Argument from Evil
God could kill 2 birds with one stone by appearing (or in some other way making everyone aware of his existence). It would eliminate much moral evil and it would solve the problem of nonbelief as well.

B. Argument from Nonbelief
Why did he send missionaries? Why did he command people to love him? Why did he empower his disciples to perform miracles? Why did he allow the rise of Islam?
2. 2/3 of the world is not Christian. How is that an optimum balance?

II. Craig's Theistic Arguments
A. Kalam cosmological argument
2.1. Craig's response contradicts his arguments against an actual infinite.

C. Moral argument
Agreed that there are certain cases which are clearly morally wrong.
1.3. Yet the clear cases were apprehended by genetics, social conditioning, etc.

D. Resurrection of Jesus
1. Not a historical fact
2. Contradictions in the Resurrection accounts
3. Gospels could have been embellished given how late they were written after the events they allegedly describe. The authors were not objective and neutral; they were proselytizers.

LOWDER'S ASSESSMENT OF SPECIFIC ARGUMENTS IN THE DEBATE

I. Craig's Theistic Arguments
A. Kalam Cosmological Argument (Draw)
In Drange's opening statement, he objected to Craig's argument on the grounds that time began with the universe. Therefore, Drange argued, the universe did not come out of nothingness.

B. Fine-Tuning Argument (Craig)
Although Drange presented in his second rebuttal what I consider strong objections to the fine-tuning argument, Craig presented prima facie defeaters to those objections in his third rebuttal and Drange totally dropped the argument in his last speech.

C. Moral Argument (Craig)
Again, Drange did not present any objections to Craig's argument until Drange's second rebuttal. In Craig's third (and final) rebuttal, Craig only addressed 1.3, totally dropping Drange's objections 1.1, 1.2, and 3. In Drange's third (and final) rebuttal, he also dropped 1.1, 1.2, and 3, causing the entire debate around the moral argument to center upon 1.3. Drange argued that our moral intuitions about, say, rape and child abuse are apprehended by genetics and social conditioning. Yet I'm not sure I find that line of argument convincing -- I know many of the audience members did not. Drange instead should have focused the debate on 3, which is really the heart of the controversy, anyway. The simple fact of the matter is that, contra Mackie, Craig has not given us any reason at all to believe that the existence of objective moral values makes the existence of God more likely than it would have been otherwise. Whether moral values are objective is an incidental issue for the atheist debater trying to refute the moral argument for theism. Not only is it false that objective moral values make theism probable, but it is good debate strategy for debaters to avoid contradicting the audience's intuitions.

4. Resurrection (Craig)
Unfortunately, Drange's sole objection to this species of the argument from miracles was weak. Drange disputed Craig's claim in only general terms and he presented no arguments (philosophical or historical) for the opposite conclusion, that Jesus was not Resurrected from the dead. Moreover, the objections Drange
presented in his final speech were too little, too late.

5. Religious Experience (Craig)
Drange's objections in his opening statement were solid, prima facie defeaters of Craig's "argument". Yet Drange did not defend those defeaters in subsequent speeches, whereas Craig attacked Drange's defeaters and carried the argument through the entire debate.

II. Drange's Arguments for Atheism
A. Argument from Evil (Drange)
In response to Drange's argument from evil, Craig presented his Suffering Brings about Acceptance Defense, which claims that God has an overriding desire to have people trust in Him. God's purpose does not always mean making us happy. Yet as Drange pointed out, reducing suffering would cause more people to believe in God.

B. Argument from Nonbelief (Drange)
The bulk of the debate on this argument centered on Craig's objections 2-4. Under objection 2, Craig claimed that God is not primarily interested in producing theists per se, but rather having people coming to trust in God and letting Him change their lives and so forth. In his first rebuttal, Drange responded by arguing that the possibility of eternal damnation should cause God to want to save people, therefore God should want everyone to become theists. In my opinion, this did not directly refute Craig's objection, but Craig dropped the point in his second rebuttal.

Craig revived the issue in his third rebuttal, claiming that the world contains an optimum balance of belief and suffering. Yet Drange, in his third rebuttal, noted that 2/3 of the world's population is non-Christian and it is difficult to believe that that is the best that God could do. In my opinion, this was decisive and I flowed this objection to Drange.

As far Craig's objection 3, Craig asserted that, in a nutshell, God does not want to reveal the gospel message to people He knows will reject it. Drange's reply was that it fails to explain the geographical distribution of nonbelievers. As Drange put it, why there are so many nonbelievers in Asia (and presumably elsewhere)? Moreover, I can think of two responses to Craig which Drange neglected to mention. First, Craig himself refuted his own objection. According to Craig the increase in believers in Asia and other parts of the world is a direct result of Christian missionaries. In other words, the increase in Christians can be explained naturalistically as the result of Christian proselytizing. Second, in Craig's third rebuttal, Craig pointed out how the percentage of Christians in the world population has increased over the years. But why has God taken so long -- nearly 2000 years -- to get the word out? On Craig's hypothesis, it seems incredibly unfair to the now deceased non-Christians who lived in times and places where there were no Christian missionaries to present them the Gospel message.

This leaves only objection 4. Craig claimed that God is evident in nature, conscience, etc. Drange responded by pointing out that the existence of God is NOT obvious to many people, and Craig never addressed that point.

LOWDER'S OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE DEBATE

So how, then, do we pick a "winner" of the debate when the theist wins 4 of his 5 arguments, while the atheist wins both of his arguments?

One approach might be to say that, "whoever wins the most arguments (from either side) wins the overall debate." Yet this is hardly a satisfactory approach, for it assumes that all arguments in a debate should have equal weight, and that is far from obvious. Moreover, since neither of the debaters gave us explicit instructions on how they think the arguments should be weighed, this sort of approach does not seem very fruitful for assessing the debate.

Another approach might be to adopt the principle that, "in the absence of decisive evidence for the existence of God, we should assume that God does not exist." Thus, on this approach, even though Craig won 4 of the 7 arguments in the debate, we should assume that God does not exist, for Craig did not win all of the arguments in the debate.

But is the principle true? It assumes that if God were to exist, that there would be decisive evidence for his existence, such that no honest, rational person could deny it. This assumption forms the basis for an atheological argument which Ted Drange calls, "The Lack-of-Evidence Argument" (LEA). This line of argument is well beyond the scope of this paper, however, so I shall not pursue it here.

Instead, I shall argue for the more modest approach that, if there appears to be good evidence for the existence of God and good evidence against the existence of God, and if the evidence is evenly balanced, then the rational course would be to "sit on the fence" until something comes along that would tip the balance one way or the other. A person who believes the evidence is so constituted and who sits on the fence might be called a "data-vs.-data agnostic."

I am highly skeptical that if God really did exist, that he would allow the evidence for his existence to be so ambiguous. But when we only consider the arguments in the debate, the "data-vs.-data agnostic" position seems to encapsulate the outcome of the debate. I therefore consider the debate a draw.

However, much remains to be said. In writing this article, I have had the benefit of 1) a videotape of the debate which they can replay several times, and 2) an e-mail dialog with Drange about the debate. For people without either of these advantages, I have no doubt that Craig appeared to be the victor. Craig has several (8?) years of high school and college debating experience, as well as numerous Campus Crusade-type debates under his belt. In contrast, Drange lacks debating experience and it showed:

* Drange did not present a point-by-point refutation of Craig's theistic arguments. Instead, he adopted a highly confusing format that made it extremely difficult to match up Drange's objections with Craig's arguments. This allowed Craig's rebuttals to (superficially) sound much more stonger than they really were.

* In his opening statement, Drange easily wasted over a minute of his precious speaking time making a correction to the debate program, which contained Drange's arguments in syllogism form. He then proceeded to talk about one of the premises of his argument in an abstract way. However, an opening statement (speech) is supposed to be a forceful presentation of a debater's point of view which clearly paints a picture in the minds of the audience. In an opening statement, a debater should never say "look at my premise (2)". That would be appropriate for a philosophy class, but not for a lay public debate. Instead, the debater should just say whatever premise (2) is, and without using the word premise. In other words:

Don't Do this: "My premise (2) argues that if God were to exist, ... he would not allow as much nonbelief as there actually is."

Do This Instead: "According to the 1997 World Almanac, there are over X billion non-Christians in the world. But how could that be, if Christianity is true? If Christianity is true, then there is an all-loving God who could tell the nonbelievers His gospel message. Yet there are many people who do are not even aware of the Gospel message. Therefore, God does not exist."

I do not deny that having a summary of the arguments in the debate program can be extremely useful. However, my point is that a debater's opening statement should not rely upon the debate program at all.

* This leads to my next criticism of Drange's delivery. Drange would often present significant philosophical arguments in the debate, but he did not present any "impacts" to his arguments. An "impact" to an argument puts the argument into perspective. It answers the "So what?" question that an audience member might ask with respect to a given argument. The upshot is that Drange often appeared to win his battles without winning the war. To cite but one example, in  Drange's third rebuttal, the debate over the kalam cosmological argument boiled down to simultaneous causation. Although the significance of that objection is obvious to anyone who has studied the kalam cosmological argument, from the point of view of a lay audience member, the objection may very well have been utterly pointless because Drange failed to explain its significance. In other words:

Don't Do This: "Craig said that the bowling ball and the cushion could have been in contact from eternity. But this contradicts his own arguments against an actual infinite."

Do This Instead: "In my first speech, I argued that the universe did not come out of nothingness because, on the Big Bang theory, causes precede their effects in time, and Craig hasn't refuted that claim. He tried to argue that causes and effects can be simultaneous, but he has given us no reason to believe this ever actually happens: the bowling ball and the cushion are not simultaneous, and if they were in contact from eternity, that would contradict his own arguments against an actual infinite. Therefore, the beginning of the universe provides no reason to believe that God exists."

* Drange was unable to get all of his arguments out in the time allowed. Drange was not even able to finish his opening statement before his speaking time was up.

* Drange also sometimes used terminology inappropriate for a lay audience (e.g., "strong inductive inference", "hyperuniverse", etc.).

Although Drange is to be commended for doing as well as he did given his lack of debating experience, his speaking skills were no match for those of Craig. This was only Drange's second oral debate; his first oral debate was against Michael Horner, another Campus Crusade for Christ speaker. Debating is a skill that takes years to master. As a general rule, people who do not have years of debating experience should decline opportunities to participate in oral debates against polished speakers like Craig.

In Defense of William Lane Craig

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 14, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

After my last post on William Lane Craig and debating, I decided to do several web searches related to William Lane Craig and debating. While I obviously disagree with his arguments, I have no problem with him as a person. I suspect the majority of atheists (who know who he is) also do not. But a few of his critics have engaged in personal attacks which I think are unfair and inaccurate. As a freethinker, I think it's important to follow the evidence wherever it leads and avoid sloppy thinking. This includes sloppy thinking about our critics.

Objection: Craig is not a good philosopher.

Reply: I'm going to be blunt. This is a stupid objection. Not only does he have a Ph.D. in philosophy, but he is widely regarded as a leading expert on the philosophy of time. Before someone makes an objection like this, I would encourage them to look in the mirror. Do they have a Ph.D. in philosophy? If not, then why do think they are even competent to attack the philosophical competence of someone who does? In my experience, when I have talked to nontheistic professional philosophers of religion about Craig, they have always had respect for his philosophical abilities.

Objection: Craig is dishonest.

Reply: Maybe I am old-fashioned, but I take the charge of dishonesty extremely seriously. Anyone who levels the accusation of dishonesty has the burden of proof, and they had better make sure they attempt to get the other person's side of the story before publicly concluding that dishonesty is the best explanation.

If Craig has been dishonest, I have yet to see any evidence of that. For example, one person suggested Craig was dishonest in a debate because he used a probability calculation in a debate. According to this critic, the 'problem' was not that Craig was being dishonest in his calculations, but that he used a calculation in a debate, which was supposedly unfair to his opponent. Huh? I don't call that "dishonest." I call that making an argument.

A second allegation is that Craig is dishonest in his public debates because he uses arguments which he "knows" are false. Really? I do wonder how these people "know" what Craig thinks.

In summary, I don't agree with his arguments, but there is no need for unwarranted personal attacks. Let's focus on the arguments, please.

LINK: Matt McCormick's Atheism Blog

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 13, 2011. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

His blog isn't new, but I just discovered it and wanted to mention it here.

LINK

For those of you who do not know who Matt McCormick is, he is an atheist philosopher of religion at California State University at Sacramento.

Some (Very Incomplete) Thoughts on Luke Muehlhauser's "How to Debate William Lane Craig"

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 12, 2011. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

After writing a post about William Lane Craig and John Loftus debating, I remembered that Luke Muehlhauser (Common Sense Atheism) posted an article in April 2009 about debating William Lane Craig. (LINK) Here are some very incomplete thoughts about Luke's article.

1. I agree with Luke that many of Craig's debate opponents were unqualified, in the sense that they did not have both (a) the relevant knowledge (e.g., of philosophy of religion, metaethics, etc.); and (b) suitable debating experience.
2. I strongly disagree with Luke's assumption that Craig has 'won' literally "all" of his debates, but I do think he has 'won' most of them. Off the top of my head, I think the following opponents 'won' their debates with Craig:
   • Paul Draper
   • Doug Jesseph (the first debate, not the second debate which I consider a draw)
   • Shelly Kagan
   • Keith Parsons (both the debate on God and the debate on Christianity)
   • Michael Tooley
3. I agree with the five specific points in his section, "How to Win." On the other hand, in my experience, the people who would most benefit from following Luke's advice tend to be the same people least likely to follow it.

LINK: Mikael Stenmark on Evolution, Purpose, and God

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 21, 2011. It was republished here on November 9, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Abstract

A number of biologists maintain that the recent developments in evolutionary biology have profound implications for religion, morality and our self-understanding. The author focuses on the issue whether evolutionary biology has any relevance for a religious understanding of the meaning of life. First, the question about the meaning of life is clarified. Second, the argument of biologists such as Richard Dawkins, Stephen Jay Gould and Edward O. Wilson, that evolutionary theory undermines the religious belief that there is a purpose or meaning to the existence of the universe and to human life in particular, is evaluated. The author maintains that this argument has some merit, but that it nevertheless fails both to be a purely scientific argument and to establish the intended conclusion.

LINK

Addendum (October 21, 2011): Stenmark identifies and criticizes the following argument.

(1) All individual species that come into existence through the process of evolution are random (that is, have a low probability) with respect to what evolutionary theory (or more broadly, the sciences) can predict or retrospectively explain;

(2) Therefore, the existence of human beings lacks an ultimate meaning, in particular, their existence is not the result of a divine purpose or intention.
(3) The only things that we can know anything about are the ones science can discover.

(4) The existence of Homo sapiens is planned by God only if the species’ existence is intended by God and it is likely that its emergence will take place for that reason.

(5) But all individual species that come into existence through the process of evolution are random (that is, have a low probability) with respect to what evolutionary theory (or more broadly, the sciences) can predict or retrospectively explain.

(6) Therefore, the existence of human beings lacks an ultimate meaning; in particular, their existence is not the result of God’s purposes, intentions or plans.

LINK: Two Sites Related to Darwinian Ethics

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 9, 2011. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

While web browsing, I stumbled across two sites related to nontheistic and/or Darwinian ethics. Pretty much anyone interested in The Secular Outpost will probably be interested in both of these sites and for the same reasons.

1. The website for the late James Rachels. For those of you who do not know who James Rachels was, he was an important moral philosopher. Among his many publications were an interesting argument for atheism (republished on the Secular Web) and his book, Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism. The entire text of that book, along with several other books and articles, are available for free on that site.

2. Larry Arnhart's blog, "Darwinian Conservatism." Arnhart is the author of Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological Ethics of Human Nature, a magisterial defense of a secular approach to ethics that is Aristotelian, Humean, and Darwinian.

Link: Adam Lee: Conservatives Want America to be a "Christian Nation" -- Here's What That Would Actually Look Like

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 12, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

Adam Lee compares "Rick Perry's version of 'Christian values' to what the Bible really dictates."

LINK

LINK: Confessions of an Ex-Moralist

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 6, 2011. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

The New York Times recently published an essay by philosopher Joel Marks, entitled, "Confessions of an Ex-Moralist," in which he describes his decision to eliminate "all moral concepts and language from [his] thinking, feeling and actions." If you haven't already seen this, it's an enjoyable read.

LINK

Alexander Pruss's Simple Argument against Divine Command Theories

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 6, 2011. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

Here is Pruss's argument:

1.Even if God didn't forbid it, torturing the innocent would be wrong.
2.(Premise) Necessarily, torturing the innocent is wrong.
3.(Premise) Possibly, God does not forbid torturing the innocent.
4.(Premise) If divine command theory is true, then it is the case that: necessarily, something is wrong if and only if it is forbidden by God.
5.Therefore, divine command theory is not true.

LINK

LINK: Physicist David Deutsch: Immaterial Explanations Aren't Necessarily False

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 6, 2011. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

Amy Hall at Stand to Reason summarizes a video interview with Oxford physicist and atheist David Deutsch. I haven't seen the video, but her summary sure makes it sound interesting.

LINK

LINK: Michael Ruse: Little Value in New Harris Book

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 6, 2011. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

"Poor scholarship, ad hominem attacks and an obsession with religion are not the hallmarks of a solid argument."

LINK

Link: Interesting Discussion about My Article on the Possibility of Theistic Freethinkers

LINK: click here

Link: You Can Prove a Negative

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on January 1, 2009. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Philosopher Steven Hales has written an article disproving the myth, "You Can't Prove a Negative."

Abstract: It is widely believed that you can’t prove a negative. Some people even think that it is a law of logic—you can’t prove that Santa Claus, unicorns, the Loch Ness Monster, God, pink elephants, WMD in Iraq and Bigfoot don’t exist. This widespread belief is flatly, 100% wrong. In this little essay, I show precisely how one can prove a negative, to the same extent that one can prove anything at all.

Link: 15 Lines of Evidence for Evolution

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on January 1, 2009. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

Nature just published a resource "for those wishing to spread awareness of evidence for evolution by natural selection."

From the article's introduction:

Most biologists take for granted the idea that all life evolved by natural selection over billions of years. They get on with researching and teaching in disciplines that rest squarely on that foundation, secure in the knowledge that natural selection is a fact, in the same way that the Earth orbits the Sun is a fact.

Given that the concepts and realities of Darwinian evolution are still challenged, albeit rarely by biologists, a succinct briefing on why evolution by natural selection is an empirically validated principle is useful for people to have to hand. We offer here 15 examples published by Nature over the past decade or so to illustrate the breadth, depth and power of evolutionary thinking. We are happy to offer this resource freely and encourage its free dissemination.

From the table of contents:

Gems from the fossil record
1 Land-living ancestors of whales
2 From water to land
3 The origin of feathers
4 The evolutionary history of teeth
5 The origin of the vertebrate skeleton

Gems from habitats
6 Natural selection in speciation
7 Natural selection in lizards
8 A case of co-evolution
9 Differential dispersal in wild birds
10 Selective survival in wild guppies
11 Evolutionary history matters

Gems from molecular processes
12 Darwin’s Galapagos finches
13 Microevolution meets macroevolution
14 Toxin resistance in snakes and clams
15 Variation versus stability

 

Links: The Ebon Musings-DJ Grothe Debate: Is Atheism a Civil Rights Issue?

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on July 16, 2007. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The links were also updated to their current locations.]

Ebon Musings argues that atheism is a civil rights issue, while DJ Grothe argues that it is not.

LINKS:
"Atheism Is a Civil Rights Issue" by Ebon Musings
"A Reply from DJ Grothe" (includes rejoinder by Ebon Musings) by Ebon Musings

Open Letter to Theists about Abusing Atheists

In his contribution to Philosophers Without God (ed. Louise Antony, Oxford University Press, 2007), Walter Sinnott Armstrong describes the sort of bigotry he encountered after his debate book God (co-authored with William Lane Craig) was published. One theist sent him an email calling Sinnott-Armstrong

a "small minded" "egotist," "an arrogant fool," and a "pompous PhD," then added "it is pathetic that the College allows you in a classroom," and "That you don't [believe in God], I am sorry to have to inform you, calls into question your intelligence." Then it concluded, "Please be assured that this theist will impartially consider any persuasive response you can offer and, as such, I look forward to continuing this dialogue with you."

Companion Website for THE EMPTY TOMB Launched

I have just launched the official companion website for our book, The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave. The site may be accessed at the following URL:

http://theemptytomb.googlepages.com/

From Keith Augustine: Does Consciousness Depend on the Brain?

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on December 2, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

Chris Carter has recently posted an article challenging the idea that consciousness depends (for its very existence) on the brain. I've read it carefully and am underwhelmed. I have two general comments.

First, though Carter summarizes the evidence for mind-brain dependence well in the beginning, he has merely asserted--and comes nowhere near demonstrating--that William James' "transmissive hypothesis" (a variant of what Paul Edwards' called "the instrument theory," the notion that the brain is merely an instrument of the soul) is "Just as consistent with the observed facts..." Saying so is one thing. Showing it is another. Nothing in this paper does the latter.

Second, it is simply false to characterize the explanatory value of materialism and dualism, with regard to the overwhelming evidence for mind-brain dependence, as on a par. Materialism clearly explains such evidence better in demonstrable ways.

Indeed, over 80 years ago, philosopher C. D. Broad's intellectual honesty compelled him to concede as much. In a chapter titled "Empirical Arguments for Human Survival" in his 1925 classic on the philosophy of mind, The Mind and Its Place in Nature, before defending his own idiosyncratic form of dualism he dubbed "compound theory," Broad writes:

"The view that the mind is existentially dependent on the organism and on nothing else is compatible with all the normal facts, and is positively suggested by them, though they do not necessitate it. And it is the simplest possible view to take. The theory that the mind merely uses the body as an instrument is difficult to reconcile with the normal facts; and it is doubtful whether there are any well-established [paranormal] phenomena that require it."

Carter fails to address any arguments to the effect that materialism (broadly conceived to include property dualism) explains the evidence for mind-brain dependence much better than any form of substance dualism--arguments even present in his main target: Corliss Lamont's The Illusion of Immortality. For instance, Carter writes:

"James then explores the various possibilities for the exact type of functional dependence between the brain and consciousness. It is normally thought of as productive, in the sense that steam is produced as a function of the kettle. But this is not the only form of function that we find in nature: we also have at least two other forms of functional dependence: the permissive function, as found in the trigger of a crossbow; and the transmissive function, as of a lens or a prism. The lens or prism do not produce the light but merely transmit it in a different form. As James writes

Similarly, the keys of an organ have only a transmissive function. They open successively the various pipes and let the wind in the air-chest escape in various ways. The voices of the various pipes are constituted by the columns of air trembling as they emerge. But the air is not engendered in the organ. The organ proper, as distinguished from its air-chest, is only an apparatus for letting portions of it loose upon the world in these peculiarly limited shapes."

In The Illusion of Immortality, Corliss Lamont directly rebutted the prism analogy, which could easily be modified to cover the organ analogy as well:

"If the human body corresponds to a colored glass ... then the living personality corresponds to the colored light that is the result of the glass.... Now while light in general will continue to exist without the colored glass ... the specific red or blue or yellow rays that the glass produces ... will certainly not persist if the glass [is] destroyed" (p. 104).

Yet Carter does not say a word in reply. And what about the simple point Paul Churchland raises in the introduction to his 1984 Matter and Consciousness:

"If there really is a distinct entity [an immaterial soul] in which reasoning, emotion, and consciousness take place, and if that entity is dependent on the brain for nothing more than sensory experiences as input and volitional executions as output [the transmissive hypothesis], then one would expect reason, emotion, and consciousness to be relatively invulnerable to direct control or pathology by manipulation or damage to the brain. But in fact the exact opposite is true. Alcohol, narcotics, or senile degeneration of nerve tissue will impair, cripple, or even destroy one's capacity for rational thought.... And the vulnerability of consciousness to anesthetics, to caffeine, and to something as simple as a sharp blow to the head, shows its very close dependence on neural activity in the brain. All of this makes perfect sense if reason, emotion, and consciousness are activities of the brain itself. But it makes very little sense if they are activities of something else entirely" (p. 20).

Carter goes on to say that all that the mind-brain dependence evidence shows is concomitant variation, not that mental activity is produced by the brain. But, as Hume has argued, if the issue is one of probability, this is precisely what concomitant variation implies: "The weakness of the body and that of the mind in infancy are exactly proportioned; their vigour in manhood, their sympathetic disorder in sickness, their common gradual decay in old age. The step further seems unavoidable; their common dissolution in death." Indeed, John Stuart Mill even recommended the "method of concomitant variation" as one of the most reliable ways to reason from effect to cause, that is, to infer the most probable common cause of a number of effects.
Let's look at Hume's example. As brain complexity increases, mental abilities also increase (in Hume's example, when you chart brain growth from infancy to adulthood; but also when differences in the intelligence of species with brains of varying complexity are compared). At the same time, as brain complexity decreases--in the progressive stages of Alzheimer's disease (Hume's "gradual decay"), say, or by progressively destroying more and more of the brain--mental acuity also decreases.

Mill's method of concomitant variation recommends that we look for a prior condition that correspondingly varies with all events of certain type in order to identify that condition as a potential cause of events of that type. In this case, the question becomes: What always varies with the varying mental capacities of (say) different organisms? The answer: The complexity of their brains. As brain complexity goes up, mental abilities increase. As brain complexity goes down, mental abilities decrease. Brain complexity, then, causes mental ability. In short, the brain causes (or "produces") the mind. If the William James' transmissive hypothesis were correct, and the brain essentially only acted as a "transceiver" for consciousness, there is no reason to think that ever increasing mental complexity would require, in step, ever increasing brain complexity. A chimpanzee or a human being can type on a typewriter, but the greater complexity of what the human being types doesn't require any increase in the complexity of their "instrument"--the typewriter. But increasing mental acuity does appear, without exception, to require increasing brain complexity. That observation is precisely the opposite of what one would predict if substance dualism were true, and exactly what we would expect if consciousness was a property of the brain.

Despite the clarity of this point, Carter concludes: "[T]he dependence of consciousness on the brain for the manner of its manifestation in the material world does not imply that consciousness depends upon the brain for its existence" [emphasis mine].

It seems to me that there is an intentional ambiguity here: what does Carter mean by 'the manifestation of consciousness'? The most natural interpretation of 'consciousness manifesting itself in the physical world' is the behavior of conscious beings. But, as Corliss Lamont argued: "A severe injury to the head ... may change an ordinarily cheerful man into a sullen and morose one subject to sudden fits of homicidal mania. If the brain and body are simply the instruments of the soul, we have to say in such a case that this personality is really still brimming over with joy and benevolence, but that unfortunately these sentiments can only express ["manifest"] themselves in dark glances, in peevish complaints and in violent attacks" (p. 100).

Evidently, then, 'the manifestation of consciousness' cannot refer to behavior, because it is demonstrable that manipulating the brain does not merely modify behavior, leaving the mind itself intact, but modifies mental functioning itself. LSD affects how you think, not merely how you behave. So what can Carter possibly mean by 'the manifestation of consciousness'?

Link: Number of Atheists Worldwide

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 12, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

ReligionFacts.com has a chart on their site, "The Big Religion Chart," summarizing the major "religions / sects / groups / philosophies / belief systems." Atheism is included in the chart and is listed as having 1.1 billion adherents worldwide. I'm virtually certain that this number is wildly overstated. The only way they can come up with a number that big is to include everyone who says they are "nonreligious." The problem with that approach, of course, is that a person can be "nonreligious" and believe in God.

LINK (HT to Jim Lippard)

Can a Theist be a Freethinker?

The following link goes to a featured editorial I wrote several years ago for the Secular Web. I argue that (1) a theist can be a freethinker, and (2) not all nontheists are freethinker.

LINK

Link: New Article on Relationship between Degree of Religious Belief and Societal Health

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 26, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

I've only skimmed this article, but I'm linking to it for others who might be interested. (Thanks to Charles Echelbarger for tipping me off to this.)

LINK

The Evidential Argument from Mind-Brain Dependence: A Reply to Bilbo

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 26, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

In my response to Victor Reppert's anti-naturalistic argument from pain, I stated that a more specific fact (consciousness is dependent upon the physical brain) about consciousness is antecedently more likely on naturalism than on theism. Bilbo provided several feedback messages in response to this claim. As I read him, he thinks the argument is no threat to Christian theists. It is apparently his view that mind-brain dependence is at least as probable on Christian theism as on naturalism, since Christian theists believe in specific, sectarian doctrines that raise the probability of mind-brain dependence. Since I think Bilbo is wrong about this, I'll explain why.

First, here is the logical form of my evidential argument.

Let D = the mind is dependent upon the physical brain.
Let T = classical theism
Let N = metaphysical naturalism

(1) D is known to be true.
(2) T is not much more probable intrinsically than N.
(3) Pr(D/N) > Pr(D/T).
(4) Other evidence held equal, T is probably false.

Note the modest nature of this argument. It doesn't claim that theism is probably false; it merely claims that evidence (D), by itself, favors N over T. This distinction is crucial since it allows for the possibility that there could be other evidence that both favors T and outweighs the evidence for N provided by D. Thus, D should be understood as a prime facie reason for rejecting T.

Let me now turn to some of Bilbo's specific comments.

Bilbo: "My first problem is that it seems more accurate to say that minds *are* the physical brain on Naturalism (not merely dependent on them). And since this has not been demonstrated, it would beg the question to assert that the postulate that "minds are the physical brain" provides evidence for Naturalism."

That would indeed beg the question, which is why I never said that! My argument is an inductive argument. It would be illegitimate to state the evidence in such a way that entails the hypothesis to be proved. Therefore, I'll stick with my original formulation of the premise ("the mind is dependent upon the physical brain").

Bilbo: "But the Christian views I mentioned also make it antecedently probable that minds will be dependent on the brain. Let's use the structure of your argument with Christian non-reductive physicalism (hereafter NRP)..."

If theism is improbable given D, then so is Christian theism (or any other more specific belief system that entails theism). Christian theism entails theism; therefore it cannot be more probable than theism. Premise (4) entails that, other evidence held equal, Christian theism is probably false.

I don't deny the potential relevance of sectarian doctrines to the issue of whether my argument is sound. They could raise Pr(D/T) or lower Pr(D/N). In order to assess the evidential significance of such doctrines, we would need to apply a principle that Draper calls the "weighted average principle" (WAP). Let H represent some Christian doctrine. Then WAP can be represented as follows.

Pr(D/T) = Pr(H/T) x Pr(D/T&H;) + Pr(~H/T) x Pr(D/T&~H)

This formula is an average because Pr(H/T) + Pr(~H/T) = 1. It is not a simple straight average, however, since those two values may not equal 1/2.

Let us consider, then, Christian non-reductive physicalism (CNRP), which Bilbo proposes as a specific doctrine that he believes raises the probability of D given (Christian) theism. Bilbo defines CNRP as "the non-existence of all supernatural beings, except for those that are or were at some point divine (angels, demons, God, etc.)." Bilbo claims that CNRP "entails the nonexistence of disembodied human minds." Using WAP, we obtain the following.

Pr(D/T) = Pr(CNRP/T) x Pr(D/T&CNRP;) + Pr(~CNRP/T) x Pr(D/T&~CNRP)

In order to reject my evidential argument, therefore, Bilbo would need to show that CNRP raises Pr(D/T) so that it is greater than or equal to Pr(D/N) by using the above formula. Does CNRP do that? I shall leave the question as an exercise for the reader.

(Note: I have borrowed heavily from ideas in another paper by Paul Draper, "More Pain and Pleasure: A Reply to Otte." I am, of course, responsible for any errors in my post.)

Victor Reppert's Anti-Naturalistic Argument from Pain

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 25, 2006 and then republished on February 11, 2016. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

There are a variety of approaches to formulating an argument from evil against theism. Two of the most influential versions of the evidential argument from evil were developed by atheist William Rowe and agnostic Paul Draper. Both involve appeals to pain. In a recent entry on his blog, Victor Reppert tries to turn the tables on proponents of arguments from evil (pain) by arguing that pain is a problem for atheists. Reppert formulates his argument against naturalism as follows.

1. If naturalism is true, then consciousness does not emerge.
2. If consciousness does not emerge, then pain does not exist.
3. Therefore, if naturalism is true, then pain does not exist.
4. Pain exists.
5. Therefore, naturalism is false.

Notice that premise (1) of the above argument entails that naturalism and consciousness are logically incompatible. Reppert's argument may be reasonably characterized, then, as a very specific example of a logical argument from consciousness against naturalism (as opposed to an evidential argument from consciousness as defended by Richard Swinburne). I believe this characterization is further supported by Reppert's statement, "the actual internally experienced state of pain is a huge, hard problem for atheistic naturalism, a problem that I personally consider to be logically impossible to solve."

Does Reppert literally mean what he says? As a so-called logical argument against naturalism, it isn't clear to me why this argument is in any way an improvement over logical arguments from evil against theism. In particular, Reppert has not yet presented a defense of (1) in its current form (i.e., lacking some sort of probabilistic hedge).

Perhaps, however, Reppert did not intend for his argument to be worded so strongly. Instead, he might say, we should understand his argument as an evidential argument against naturalism. If so, it seems to me that Reppert's argument from pain violates the Rule of Total Evidence. Allow me to explain. Let us assume, for the sake of argument that Reppert is correct that consciousness is antecedently more likely on theism than on naturalism. Furthermore, as Reppert points out, pain presupposes consciousness. It doesn't follow from these two assumptions, however, that the statement, "The kinds and distribution of pain we find in the world is epistemically more probable on naturalism than on theism," is false.

Here's why. Reppert has committed the fallacy of understated evidence. In general terms, we could say that Reppert has identified some general fact F (consciousness exists) about a topic X (consciousness) that is antecedently more likely on theism than on naturalism. It could still be the case that a more specific fact (S) about X is antecedently more likely on naturalism than on theism. As Paul Draper writes, "we know a lot more about phenomenal consciousness than just that it exists" ("Partisanship and Inquiry in the Philosophy of Religion," unpublished paper). Draper then gives an example of a more specific fact about consciousness, a fact that, given consciousness exists, is more probable on naturalism than on theism. As Draper explains, we also know from neuroscience that the mind is dependent upon the physical brain, a fact that is more likely on naturalism and consciousness than on theism and consciousness. Thus, as Draper concludes, "when the available evidence about consciousness is fully stated, it is far from clear that it significantly favors theism."

John Stewart and Richard Dawkins on Ted Haggard

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 25, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. Unfortunately, the link has mysteriously disappeared from Patheos and I wasn't able to quickly find it when searching on YouTube.]

 

Here is the description of the video as provided at YouTube:

"Jon Stewart analyzes the latest gay surprise as the evangelical, gay-bashing preacher, Pastor Ted, gets caught with his three-year gay lover and supplier of crystal meth. What else is new? For an added bit of spice, there is an earlier clip of Haggard lecturing Richard Dawkins on arrogance. Just too beautiful."

While Haggard's behavior (buying crystal meth and a "massage" from a gay prostitute) are clearly hugely embarrassing to evangelical Christians, what is not so clear is whether anything of philosophical significance follows from his behavior. For example, I've heard many people refer to Haggard as a "hypocrite," but the fact is that Haggard never tried to marry a man and he never claimed that homosexuality is morally acceptable. On the contrary, Haggard made it very clear that he considered his behavior morally wrong -- and he seemed pretty sincere to me when condemned himself. I conclude that Haggard sincerely believes homosexuality is wrong, but he obviously has some sort of internal struggle with his sexual orientation that prevents him from consistently behaving in accordance with that belief.

What I find much more interesting is the portion of video where Dawkins gets into a somewhat heated exchange with Haggard over science. Haggard actually has the audacity to lecture Dawkins on "intellectual arrogance." Why? Because Dawkins pointed out the absurdity of Haggard's claim that evolution is the view that things like eyes and ears came about by "accident." As Dawkins correctly points out, no evolutionary biologist believes such a thing. That Haggard would make such a statement reveals his utter ignorance of contemporary science. It's okay if evangelicals like Haggard want to reject evolution (and even urge others to do so), but the least they can do is to actually reject evolution and not some Sunday school strawman version of it.

New Blog: the Ex-Apologist

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 25, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

LINK

This blog is described as being "Dedicated to fair exposition and critique of Christianity and Christian apologetics." The anonymous author provides the following profile: "I'm currently in the late stages of a PhD program in Philosophy. I was a Christian and an "apologetics nerd" for 15 years, but deconverted at the end of 2005. " Topics of previous posts include the fine-tuning argument, empirical case for the accuracy of the New Testament, Divine Command Theories, Free Will Defense, kalam cosmological argument, and more!

Link: Witmer-Cook Debate on Presuppositionalism

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 25, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

I recently mentioned Gene Witmer's critique of presuppositionalism in an earlier post. Presuppositional apologist Gene Cook has also taken notice of Witmer's critique. The two discussed the issues on Cook's podcast. 

Link: Time Magazine: God vs. Science

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 12, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]

LINK

Interesting Article on Debating Presuppositionalists

Gene Witmer is a philosopher at the University of Florida who has recently written a paper critiquing presuppositionalism. It appears that the paper is not a formal paper intended for publication in its current form, but rather is a preprint prepared for a "talk" to the Atheist, Agnostic and Freethinking Student Association at the University of Florida.

Richard Carrier Launches Blog

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 4, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. I have also updated the link to the blog's current address.] 

LINK

Links: Two Articles about Dawkins, Dennett, and Harris

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 4, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Atheists top book charts by deconstructing God

The Church of the Non-Believers 

Link: Haggard Scandal Is Latest Setback In Tough Year For Religious Right, Says Americans United

 LINK

Links: Hovind Going to Jail For a Long Time

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 4, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

'Dr. Dino' guilty on all counts: Couple could get more than 200 years

Hard to believe a man with a Ph.D didn't know of a basic tax law

(Hat tip to Doug Krueger.)