Moving to Substack

I've decided to move to Substack. All of my previous posts on Blogger will remain here, but my new posts may be found at:

https://secularoutpost.substack.com/

Setting the Record Straight: A Reply to John D. Mueller’s Atheism: Pro and Con

In March 2022, John D. Mueller published an essay titled Atheism: Pro and Con at the Ethics & Public Policy Center (EPPC). That piece is framed as a response to version 2 of my draft paper, Do Euthyphro-Style Dilemmas Provide a Decisive Refutation of Theistic Metaethics? (Interested readers may read version 4 of the paper on Academia.edu.) What follows is a clarification of the record and a reply to Mueller’s claims.

1. Context: The History of a 'Discussion' That Never Happened

I uploaded a discussion draft of my paper to Academia.edu, clearly labeled as such and explicitly requesting that it not be cited. Academia.edu notified other users who had expressed an interest in metaethics of the paper and auto-created a "discussion" page linked to it. I recall seeing comments from Mueller and others, but was shocked to discover that Mueller had uploaded his own paper to Academia.edu responding to the discussion draft. Because none of the comments on the discussion page engaged with my essay, I decided to delete the entire discussion page. 

Fast forward to today (09/06/2025). I discovered that Mueller republished his “response” on the EPPC site, but added the misleading heading “Jeffery Lowder’s Final Reply.”  That section links to the now-deleted Academia discussion page, as though it were evidence of my engagement with him. Readers are left with the impression that I replied to Mueller and then retracted my reply.

That never happened. The only “discussion” was Mueller posting his response on Academia and then later on the EPPC website.

For the record:

• I never replied to Mueller on Academia.edu.

• I never posted, and therefore never deleted, any “final reply.”

The only “discussion” was Mueller posting his response on Academia and then later on the EPPC website.

2. The Euthyphro Dilemma: What Mueller Concedes

Early in his essay, Mueller writes:

“But since Lowder wisely does not endorse Plato’s dilemma as uniformly valid, I confine myself…”

That is a concession. My paper surveys a range of theistic metaethical theories — global divine command theory, modified divine command theory, divine nature theory, and others — and assesses the reach of Euthyphro-style dilemmas against them. I explicitly do not claim the dilemma is a universal refutation. Mueller acknowledges this. Which means: in terms of what my paper actually argues, he registers no disagreement.

3. Naturalism vs Theism: My Debate with Frank Turek

Mueller also links to my 2018 opening statement from a debate with Frank Turek. That statement, now available at Secular Frontier, lays out a structured case for naturalism over theism. In it, I defend three contentions:

1. The best explanation is the one with the greatest balance of intrinsic probability (modesty + coherence) and accuracy (evidential fit).

2. Naturalism is intrinsically more probable than theism.

3. Naturalism is a more accurate explanation than theism, supported by seven evidential lines:

• Existence of physical reality

• Success of science without the supernatural

• Biological evolution (BONES: Biogeography, Organs, Natural selection, Embryology, Stratified fossil record)

• The biological role and moral randomness of pain and pleasure

• Mind–brain dependence

• Neurological bases of empathy and apathy

• Nonresistant nonbelief

Mueller engage none of these arguments. Instead, he replaces them with a rhetorical “scoreboard”:

“All you have offered is the unsupported and unsupportable assertion that God cannot exist or create a universe because you say so. Let’s review the score:

Time — Universes
(t = 0) — 0
(t > 0) — 1

The evidence favors Creation.”

This “scoreboard” bears no resemblance to the Bayesian framework or evidential lines I actually argued. To readers unfamiliar with my work, his summary misrepresents my position. My Euthyphro paper does not claim, presuppose, or even suggest that God “cannot” exist. The person making unsupported claims about what “the evidence” shows is Mueller. To say “The evidence favors Creation” without argument is, in effect, to claim that God exists because he says so. 

Because Turek made a similar claim in our debate, here I will simply repeat what I said in rebuttal in that debate:

Turek likes to say: “Atheists think no one created the universe out of nothing, and I don’t have enough faith to believe that.” My reply is simple: I don’t either, which is why I don’t believe that. As physicist Sean Carroll emphasizes, we must distinguish between the Big Bang model (an extraordinarily successful account of the evolution of the universe from very early on) and the Big Bang event (a hypothetical singular moment we know almost nothing about).

Cosmologists can trace the expansion of the universe back to the Planck Era, just after the start of expansion, but what happened at the start of that era remains unknown. Thus, we know that the universe’s expansion had a beginning, but we don’t know whether the universe itself did.

Turek appeals to Einstein’s General Relativity, as if it proved the universe itself had a beginning. But that overstates the case. As Carroll explains:

“The Big Bang [event] is a prediction of general relativity, but singularities where the density is infinitely big are exactly where we expect general relativity to break down—they are outside the theory’s domain of applicability.”

In other words, general relativity describes the universe up to the Planck Era, but not beyond. Using it to infer that the universe itself had a beginning exceeds the theory’s domain.

That is why Mueller’s scoreboard—“at t = 0 there were zero universes, at t > 0 there is one”—doesn’t follow. It assumes precisely what cosmologists caution us against assuming: that the Big Bang event was the absolute beginning of the universe itself.

I have always accepted the data in support of the Big Bang model, but I have never thought it was a "killer" piece of evidence for theism. In fact, I don't think it is evidence for theism at all. I thought that when I was a theist. I thought that when I was an agnostic. And I think that now as an atheist. 

4. The Bigger Problem

In both his response to my Euthyphro paper and his comments on my debate opening, Mueller consistently avoids the arguments. He does not address my taxonomy of theistic metaethics. He does not engage the arbitrariness or triviality problems facing divine-command accounts. He does not interact with the Bayesian framework or the seven evidential lines favoring naturalism. 

This is particularly disappointing coming from a scholar at the Ethics & Public Policy Center, an institution whose mission is to “apply the riches of the Jewish and Christian traditions to contemporary questions of law, culture, and politics.” Surely, a serious application of those “riches” to the philosophical questions I raise would involve more than rhetoric and sidestepped arguments. Instead, Mueller substitutes autobiographical testimony (“I used to be an atheist”) and the unsupported claim that atheism is “untenable.” That may serve as an apologetic appeal, but it does not qualify as a philosophical rebuttal, nor does it fulfill his institution's stated purpose.

5. Conclusion

Serious debate requires engaging with arguments as they are actually presented, not substituting caricatures or rhetorical flourishes. Mueller concedes my main thesis — that Euthyphro-style dilemmas are not universally decisive — and then changes the subject. When he links to my debate statement, he ignores its arguments and portrays me as offering only an “unsupported assertion.”

That is misleading. Readers who want to see my actual case can read it here: Opening Statement from My Debate with Frank Turek.

I welcome substantive engagement, but engagement means addressing the arguments, not ignoring them and not giving the appearance of a back-and-forth exchange that never took place.

Beyond Euthyphro: The Quadrilemma Against Theistic Grounding of Moral Values

Here's a sketch of an argument against the necessity of God for (objective) moral values.

Consider the following position:

DNT-A: Moral values are grounded in God's nature.

The motivation for this position collapses once we map the logical space of possible grounding relations. Once the options are laid out, it becomes clear: God or God's nature is not required to ground moral values.

The Quadrilemma

If objective moral values exist, their ultimate foundation must be either ungrounded, abstractly grounded, mentally grounded, or physically grounded. 

• Ungrounded. Some moral values are fundamental. For example, "kindness is good" is simply a brute, foundational truth.
• Abstract grounding. Some moral values are grounded in other abstract properties or value-relations. For example, the badness of cruelty may be grounded in the disvalue of causing suffering.
• Mental grounding. Some moral values are grounded in a mind or intellect, such as a divine being's valuing activity.
• Physical grounding. Some moral values are grounded in facts about the natural world, such as human flourishing, evolutionary facts about cooperation, or the requirements of well-being.

These four horns are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. There are no further intelligible options for grounding moral values.

Objection: God's Nature is Sui Generis

One might object that the grounding of morality in God is sui generis—a unique, fifth kind of relation not captured by these categories. But is it? To count as a legitimate fifth option, it is not enough simply to assert that it is sui generis. The proponent must explain what this fifth option is and how it differs from physical, mental, and abstract grounding. Unless and until such an account is provided, there is no reason to accept it as a genuine alternative. Therefore, the quadrilemma covers all the intelligible philosophical options.

Why God's Nature Is Not Necessary

Now consider the implications of each horn.

• Ungrounded: If some values are (ontologically) fundamental, then they do not depend on God by definition. While a theist might respond by proposing God (or His nature) is the ultimate ground of axiology, this view is counterintuitive, less parsimonious, and possibly incoherent.

• Abstract grounding: If values are grounded in abstract properties like <kindness> or <justice>, it's far more parsimonious to say that they are grounded in abstract properties, full stop, than it is to say “and they are essential properties of God.”  Why the middleman? There is no compelling reason to require that moral values be instantiated in God rather than being recognized as foundational abstract properties. 

• Physical grounding: If values are grounded in natural or physical facts, then again God is unnecessary.

• Mental grounding: If values are grounded in a mind, then God is a candidate. But this option is inconsistent with DNT-A, which says that moral values are grounded in God's nature, not God's mind. Proponents of DNT-A might try to reconcile this with their 'nature' claim by asserting that God's mind and nature are identical. Not only does this move depend on the highly contested and arguably incoherent doctrine of divine simplicity, it still fails to show that God is necessary. The grounding could potentially be in a different sort of mind, making the theistic option one possibility among others, not a requirement.

Beyond Euthyphro

The famous Euthyphro dilemma pressed divine command theory with two horns: are things good because God commands them, or does God command them because they are good? Some thinkers have argued that Modified Divine Command Theory, with its appeal to God’s essentially good nature, shows that the Euthyphro dilemma is a false dilemma.

But the quadrilemma is more difficult to escape. It does not presuppose voluntarism or command theory. It partitions the entire logical space of value grounding. And once the options are on the table, the apologetic claim that (objective) moral values require God can no longer be sustained.

Conclusion

The Quadrilemma Against Theistic Grounding shows that God is never necessary to ground objective moral values. At most, God offers one possible grounding among others. The real question is not whether objective moral values can exist without God. They can. The real question is which grounding theory has the best explanatory virtues, such as parsimony and coherence. On these grounds, non-theistic options appear to have a distinct advantage.

Finished My Massive Reply to Daniel's Moral Argument for Theism

In order to keep the original URL working, I decided to post updates to the original post rather than make new posts. I am announcing it here for those of you who may not have noticed the updates to the original post.

LINK

In my reply, I cover the following topics: purpose, values, standards, duties, freedom, and human dignity.

Enjoy!

Schellenberg's Forthcoming Book on the Philosophy of Christianity: "What God Would Have Known"

It is an honor to announce that Mount Saint Vincent University philosopher J.L. Schellenberg has a new book coming out on the philosophy of Christianity: What God Would Have Known: How Human Intellectual and Moral Development Undermines Christian Doctrine (Oxford University Press, 2024). 

Schellenberg motivates the need for this book on OUP's website in a provocative blog post entitled, "Has Christian philosophy been having it too easy?" Schellenberg writes:

Oddly—I almost said bizarrely—the past half century has seen no thorough discussion by analytical philosophers of arguments that directly oppose classical Christian ideas about the nature of reality: arguments against, say, Christian ideas about sin or salvation or the divinity of Jesus. And so Christian philosophy has been able to grow and grow and grow without ever encountering a serious challenge to the truth of the doctrine on which it relies.

And so it should come as no surprise that, In What God Would Have Known, Schellenberg scrutinizes the content of the Christian revelation against all of the new information humanity has learned in the many centuries since Christian doctrine was first formed. What sort of new information does Schellenberg have in mind? According to the book's description:

Newly discovered facts, not just about such things as evolution and the formation of the New Testament but also about mental illness, violent punishment, the relations between women and men, and the status of same-sex intimacy, suggest detailed new arguments against the content of the Christian revelation —Schellenberg designs and defends twenty—when the prior understanding of the purported revealer is taken into account.

If this sounds interesting to you, then I have good news. I'm told the book will be available for purchase in the UK at the end of May; it will be available in North America in July. For a limited time, OUP is offering early buyers of the book a 30% discount code if they buy the book directly from OUP. Use the discount code in the image below and then head on over to the book's page at OUP to order.

OUP Promotion Code for What God Would Have Known

Source: OUP; License: OUP

LINK to Book at OUP: https://global.oup.com/academic/product/what-god-would-have-known-9780198912323?q=9780198912323&cc=gb&lang=en#

Reply to Daniel's Moral Argument for Theism

1. No Good Reason to Think (1) Is True

1.1. The Inessential Objection

1.2. The Underdetermination Objection

1.3. The Prior Obligations Objection

1.4. The Moral Axiology vs. Moral Deontology Objection

1.5. The Moral Ontology vs. Moral Psychology Objection

1.6. The Lack of a Comparative Argument Objection

1.7. The False Evidence Objection

2. There is Good Reason to Think (1) Is False

2.1. Values

2.2.1. Terminology

2.2.2. Arguments for a Theistic Grounding of Moral Values

Theistic Value Grounding Argument

2.2.3. Arguments for a Non-Theistic Grounding of Moral Values

The Non-Necessity of Mental Grounding

The Aseity of Abstract Objects

2.2. Duties

 2.2.1. Exposition

 2.2.2. Arguments for a Theistic Grounding of Moral Obligation

 "Laws Require a Lawgiver"

 "Humans are God's Property"

 2.2.3. Arguments for a Non-Theistic Grounding of Moral Obligation

The Prior Obligations Objection

The Epistemological Objection 

 2.3. Freedom

2.3.1. Terminology

2.3.2. Arguments for the Necessity of Free Will

The No Responsibility Argument 

The No Obligation Argument

2.3.3. Arguments against the Necessity of Free Will 

Moral Value without Free Will

Moral Obligation without Free Will

2.4. Purpose 

2.4.1. Exposition

2.4.2. Arguments for the Necessity of (Agential) Purpose

2.4.3. Arguments against the Necessity of (Agential) Purpose 

Value Simpliciter without Agential Purpose

Prudential Value without Agential Purpose

Subjective Purpose Cannot Ground Objective Value 

2.5. Standards

2.5.1. Exposition

2.5.1.1. General Systems of Ethics

2.5.1.2. "Thin" and "Thick" Moral Standards

2.5.2. Arguments for a Theistic Grounding of Moral Standards

2.5.3. Arguments for a Non-Theistic Grounding of Moral Standards

2.6. Human Dignity

2.6.1. Exposition

2.6.2. Arguments for the Necessity of Human Dignity 

2.6.3. Arguments against the Necessity of Dignified Beings

2.6.4. Arguments against Human Exceptionalism 

 

---

Index: The Evidential Argument from the Holocaust against Theism

This article will serve as a hub for organizing past and future responses to my evidential argument from the Holocaust against theism. 

1: Logical Form of the Argument

The first five steps are a cumulative case based on independent facts about the badness of the Holocaust. Step 1 is an application of Draper's argument from pain and pleasure to the Holocaust; it is defended in the original article.

(1) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the biologically gratuitous physical pain experienced by many, if not most, Holocaust victims, i.e., 
Pr(E1 | N) >! Pr(E1 |T).

The next step appeals to the horrendous nature of the Holocaust. I think horrendous evils are much more probable on naturalism than on theism, but that is not the claim I am making here. Because I am making a cumulative case argument, I have to show that each additional item of evidence is more probable on naturalism than on theism, while in effect adding the previous item(s) of evidence into the background information. In probability notation, I need to show Pr(E2 | E1 & N) >! Pr(E2 | E1 & T), not Pr(E2 | N) >! Pr(E2 | T). I defend the former inequality in the original article. 

(2) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to Holocaust victims who experienced and/or witnessed events so horrific that the events constituted prima facie reasons for each victim to doubt whether the victim's life (given their inclusion in the Holocaust) was a great good to the victim on the whole, i.e.,

Pr(E2 | E1 & N) >! Pr(E2 | E1 & T).

The third step appeals to a specific aspect of the problem of divine hiddenness, the problem of divine silence during suffering, as it relates to Holocaust victims who experienced biologically gratuitous suffering and horrendous evil. Again,  I defend the premise in the original article, but it may be restated in plain English as follows.

(3) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the fact that so many victims of the Holocaust did not report feeling God's comforting presence, i.e.,
Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & N) > Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & T). 

The fourth step appeals to another aspect of the problem of divine hiddenness, this time focusing on what John Schellenberg calls "former believers" and applying it to Holocaust survivors. Again,  I defend the premise in the original article, but it may be restated in plain English as follows.

(4) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the fact that so many devout Jewish survivors of the Holocaust became nonbelievers, i.e.,

Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & E3 & N) > Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & E3& T).

From steps 1-4, it follows that:

(5) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the Holocaust, i.e., Pr(E | N) >! Pr(E | T).

The next step of the argument is based upon Paul Draper's theory of intrinsic probability, which says that intrinsic probability is determined by modesty, coherence, and nothing else. Because naturalism is both more modest and more coherent than theism, it follows that the intrinsic probability of naturalism is greater than the intrinsic probability of theism. This premise is not defended in my article, but instead may be found in Draper's defense of the second premise in what he calls the "low priors argument." 

Using the word "simplicity" as a more concise way to say "has greater intrinsic probability," we get:

(6) Naturalism is much simpler than Theism. 

The next step of the argument is designed to preempt objections that other items of evidence (such as the finite age of the universe, the life-permitting conditions of the universe, the contingency of the universe, objective moral values, etc.) favor theism and such items of evidence outweigh the evidence represented by E1-E4. The basic strategy is to show that known facts about good and evil, such as E1-E4, decisively outweigh the theistic evidence. This premise is not defended in my article, but instead may be found in Draper's defense of what he calls the "decisive evidence argument." So the seventh step of the argument is:

(7) Any epistemic advantages that Theism has over Naturalism (i.e., any factors that raise the ratio of the probability of Theism to the probability of Naturalism) do not, even when combined, suffice to offset the epistemic advantages that Naturalism has over Theism if premises 5 and 6 are true. 

From steps 5-7, it follows from Bayes' Theorem that:

(8) Theism is probably false. 

The two inferences in this argument--the first from 1-4 to 5 and the second from 5-7 to 8--are deductively correct. Therefore, if there is something wrong with this argument, then there must be something with at least if not more of the six premises (1-4, 6-7).

2: Non-Objections

I classify a reply as a "non-objection" if it does not constitute a defeater to one or more premises of the argument; and if does not challenge the inference of the argument. What follows is a list of some of the non-objections I have seen.

2.1: Dismissive Replies

• "Why bad thing happen if God real?"

2.2: Confused Replies

• "You don't really have an argument. You made a statement. Actually just a subjective inference."
• "No. It's merely evidence."

2.2: Irrelevant Replies

2.2.1. The Concept of "God" 

• Objection: "All this can show is an inconsistency between a particular concept of “God” and that “God” creating the world as you have conceived it."
• Objection: "The argument is presupposed on a false attribution error, i.e., that God's existence is dependent on the absence of suffering. This premise presupposes that God is contingent, rather than necessary; therefore, God is not actually God; because, necessary (i.e., self caused) is an attribute of God. The absence of this attribute, reduces God to the caused, rather than the uncaused causer.  Therefore, the argument does not refute the existence of God; instead, it refutes a subjective idea of God predicated on a different set of attributes to those present in God Himself. Argument rejected on the grounds of false attribution error."

2.2.2. Other Replies

• "If God didn’t exist we wouldn’t know the difference between good and evil."
• "Why single out the Holocaust? The "holocaust" could also describe the 10 million murdered under Stalin, or the 170 million murdered under Mao Tse-tung. Nazism was just one of the atrocities of man against man."

3: Objections

3.1: Objections to Multiple Premises

3.2.1: Flip Objections 

In interscholastic and intercollegiate debate, to "flip" or "turn" argument is to take one of your opponent's arguments and to use it as an argument for your position and/or against theirs. 

Objection: The Holocaust argument presupposes objective (moral) good and evil, but objective (moral) good and evil require God.

Reply: LINK

Objection: The Holocaust argument includes several items in our background information, such as the existence of the universe, conscious beings capable of experiencing pain, and so forth. These things are evidence favoring theism over naturalism.

Reply: First, some items alleged to be theistic evidence, such as the existence of the universe, do not favor theism over naturalism. Second, I agree that at least one fact in our background information, consciousness, favors theism over naturalism. The fact that it favors theism over naturalism does not, by itself, negate the claim that the specific facts identified in the Holocaust argument favor naturalism. 

3.2: Objections to Individual Premises

3.2.1: Objections to (1)
3.2.2: Objections to (2)
3.2.3: Objections to (3)
3.2.4: Objections to (4)
3.2.5: Objections to (5)
3.2.6: Objections to (6)
3.2.7: Objections to (7)