In order to keep the original URL working, I decided to post updates to the original post rather than make new posts. I am announcing it here for those of you who may not have noticed the updates to the original post.
In my reply, I cover the following topics: purpose, values, standards, duties, freedom, and human dignity.
Enjoy!
It is an honor to announce that Mount Saint Vincent University philosopher J.L. Schellenberg has a new book coming out on the philosophy of Christianity: What God Would Have Known: How Human Intellectual and Moral Development Undermines Christian Doctrine (Oxford University Press, 2024).
Schellenberg motivates the need for this book on OUP's website in a provocative blog post entitled, "Has Christian philosophy been having it too easy?" Schellenberg writes:
Oddly—I almost said bizarrely—the past half century has seen no thorough discussion by analytical philosophers of arguments that directly oppose classical Christian ideas about the nature of reality: arguments against, say, Christian ideas about sin or salvation or the divinity of Jesus. And so Christian philosophy has been able to grow and grow and grow without ever encountering a serious challenge to the truth of the doctrine on which it relies.
And so it should come as no surprise that, In What God Would Have Known, Schellenberg scrutinizes the content of the Christian revelation against all of the new information humanity has learned in the many centuries since Christian doctrine was first formed. What sort of new information does Schellenberg have in mind? According to the book's description:
Newly discovered facts, not just about such things as evolution and the formation of the New Testament but also about mental illness, violent punishment, the relations between women and men, and the status of same-sex intimacy, suggest detailed new arguments against the content of the Christian revelation —Schellenberg designs and defends twenty—when the prior understanding of the purported revealer is taken into account.
If this sounds interesting to you, then I have good news. I'm told the book will be available for purchase in the UK at the end of May; it will be available in North America in July. For a limited time, OUP is offering early buyers of the book a 30% discount code if they buy the book directly from OUP. Use the discount code in the image below and then head on over to the book's page at OUP to order.
LINK to Book at OUP: https://global.oup.com/academic/product/what-god-would-have-known-9780198912323?q=9780198912323&cc=gb&lang=en#
1. No Good Reason to Think (1) Is True
2. There is Good Reason to Think (1) Is False
2.1. Values
2.2.1. Terminology
2.2.2. Arguments for a Theistic Grounding of Moral Values
2.2.3. Arguments for a Non-Theistic Grounding of Moral Values
2.2. Duties
2.2.1. Exposition
2.2.2. Arguments for a Theistic Grounding of Moral Obligation
2.2.3. Arguments for a Non-Theistic Grounding of Moral Obligation
2.3. Freedom
2.3.1. Terminology
2.3.2. Arguments for the Necessity of Free Will
2.3.3. Arguments against the Necessity of Free Will
2.4. Purpose
2.4.1. Exposition
2.4.2. Arguments for the Necessity of (Agential) Purpose
2.4.3. Arguments against the Necessity of (Agential) Purpose
2.5.1. Exposition
2.5.1.1. General Systems of Ethics
2.5.1.2. "Thin" and "Thick" Moral Standards
2.5.2. Arguments for a Theistic Grounding of Moral Standards
2.5.3. Arguments for a Non-Theistic Grounding of Moral Standards
2.6. Human Dignity
2.6.1. Exposition
2.6.3. Arguments against the Necessity of Dignified Beings
2.6.4. Arguments against Human Exceptionalism
This article will serve as a hub for organizing past and future responses to my evidential argument from the Holocaust against theism.
The first five steps are a cumulative case based on independent facts about the badness of the Holocaust. Step 1 is an application of Draper's argument from pain and pleasure to the Holocaust; it is defended in the original article.
(1) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the biologically gratuitous physical pain experienced by many, if not most, Holocaust victims, i.e.,
Pr(E1 | N) >! Pr(E1 |T).
The next step appeals to the horrendous nature of the Holocaust. I think horrendous evils are much more probable on naturalism than on theism, but that is not the claim I am making here. Because I am making a cumulative case argument, I have to show that each additional item of evidence is more probable on naturalism than on theism, while in effect adding the previous item(s) of evidence into the background information. In probability notation, I need to show Pr(E2 | E1 & N) >! Pr(E2 | E1 & T), not Pr(E2 | N) >! Pr(E2 | T). I defend the former inequality in the original article.
(2) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to Holocaust victims who experienced and/or witnessed events so horrific that the events constituted prima facie reasons for each victim to doubt whether the victim's life (given their inclusion in the Holocaust) was a great good to the victim on the whole, i.e.,Pr(E2 | E1 & N) >! Pr(E2 | E1 & T).
The third step appeals to a specific aspect of the problem of divine hiddenness, the problem of divine silence during suffering, as it relates to Holocaust victims who experienced biologically gratuitous suffering and horrendous evil. Again, I defend the premise in the original article, but it may be restated in plain English as follows.
(3) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the fact that so many victims of the Holocaust did not report feeling God's comforting presence, i.e.,
Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & N) > Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & T).
The fourth step appeals to another aspect of the problem of divine hiddenness, this time focusing on what John Schellenberg calls "former believers" and applying it to Holocaust survivors. Again, I defend the premise in the original article, but it may be restated in plain English as follows.
(4) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the fact that so many devout Jewish survivors of the Holocaust became nonbelievers, i.e.,Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & E3 & N) > Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & E3& T).
(5) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the Holocaust, i.e., Pr(E | N) >! Pr(E | T).
The next step of the argument is based upon Paul Draper's theory of intrinsic probability, which says that intrinsic probability is determined by modesty, coherence, and nothing else. Because naturalism is both more modest and more coherent than theism, it follows that the intrinsic probability of naturalism is greater than the intrinsic probability of theism. This premise is not defended in my article, but instead may be found in Draper's defense of the second premise in what he calls the "low priors argument."
Using the word "simplicity" as a more concise way to say "has greater intrinsic probability," we get:
(6) Naturalism is much simpler than Theism.
The next step of the argument is designed to preempt objections that other items of evidence (such as the finite age of the universe, the life-permitting conditions of the universe, the contingency of the universe, objective moral values, etc.) favor theism and such items of evidence outweigh the evidence represented by E1-E4. The basic strategy is to show that known facts about good and evil, such as E1-E4, decisively outweigh the theistic evidence. This premise is not defended in my article, but instead may be found in Draper's defense of what he calls the "decisive evidence argument." So the seventh step of the argument is:
(7) Any epistemic advantages that Theism has over Naturalism (i.e., any factors that raise the ratio of the probability of Theism to the probability of Naturalism) do not, even when combined, suffice to offset the epistemic advantages that Naturalism has over Theism if premises 5 and 6 are true.
From steps 5-7, it follows from Bayes' Theorem that:
(8) Theism is probably false.
The two inferences in this argument--the first from 1-4 to 5 and the second from 5-7 to 8--are deductively correct. Therefore, if there is something wrong with this argument, then there must be something with at least if not more of the six premises (1-4, 6-7).(Originally published on 1 September 2023; revised version published on 7 September 2023; revised again on 10 September 2023.)
“Performative" or "pragmatic inconsistency arguments” attempt to show that some action with respect to some proposition is inconsistent with the proposition. You will sometimes hear people call such propositions “self-defeating,” but that isn’t technically accurate. It isn’t the proposition itself which is self-defeating; it is taking some action with respect to the proposition -- like asserting, believing, or defending it – which is self-defeating. For example, consider the proposition, “It is impossible to know anything.” It is logically possible that the proposition is true, but it is logically inconsistent to know that proposition is true. If you somehow knew that it was true, then you would know that it is false. That’s an example of a performative or pragmatic inconsistency argument.
Here are some other examples of propositions which lend themselves nicely to performative or pragmatic inconsistency arguments:
All of the above examples involve a first-person ("I") statement, but I'm not sure if a performative or pragmatic inconsistency must be a first-person statement. I'll leave that aside.
Does atheism involve a pragmatic inconsistency? Before I can discuss this, I first need to define my terms. The word "atheism" is polysemous: it has multiple legitimate meanings. By "metaphysical atheism," I mean the proposition, "God does not exist." By "psychological atheism," I mean the psychological state in which a person lacks the belief that God exists. This post is about metaphysical, not psychological, atheism. For brevity, in the remainder of the post, I will use "atheism" to mean only metaphysical atheism.
According to some thinkers, the action of asserting the truth of atheism is a pragmatic inconsistency. For example, the late Christian philosopher Greg Bahnsen once said:
It's standard fare these days to point out that a universal negative cannot be proven in an a posteriori fashion. On the basis of experience, how could I prove universally there is no God? [...] God might be on the back side of the fourth moon of Jupiter. Since I haven't examined the back side of the fourth moon of Jupiter, it's at least possible that God exists and I haven't encountered him yet. So to say that there is no God is a very strong claim. Atheists usually get hammered about that, that they're claiming too much. In fact, in order to say 'there is no God,' ... you would have to be omniscient. But if you were omniscient, you would be God. Therefore, the only person who could say 'there is no God' is God. God would not deny Himself. So no one can say there is no God.[1]
This suggests the following argument, which I call the "unprovability of universal negatives argument."
(1) The only way to prove a universal negative in an a posteriori fashion is to exhaustively search for all possible sources of evidence of a thing and find no evidence.
(2) But it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to conduct such a search.
Therefore:
(3) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove a universal negative in an a posteriori fashion.
Defenders of the "unprovability of atheism argument" add two additional steps:
(4) The proposition, "God does not exist," is a universal negative.
From (3) and (4), it follows that:
(5) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove, "God does not exist," in an a posteriori fashion.
In the passage quoted above, however, Bahnsen suggests another argument which adds onto the first five steps. Atheism entails that there is no God, but the action of claiming to know that atheism is true presupposes that the person making that assertion has God-like knowledge. So we have:
(6) The action of claiming to know, "God does not exist," presupposes that the speaker is God.
From (5) and (6), it follows that:
(7) If a finite, moral being claims to know, "God does not exist," then it is true that God does not exist and it is false that God does not exist.
From (7) and the Law of Noncontradiction, it follows that:
(8) Any claims made by a finite, mortal being to know, "God does not exist," on an a posteriori basis should not be accepted.
I shall call the inference from (5) - (7) the "pragmatic inconsistency of knowing atheism" argument.
I shall argue that both the unprovability of atheism argument and the related pragmatic inconsistency of atheism arguments are unsound.
Here, again, is the unprovability of atheism argument.
(3) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove a universal negative in an a posteriori fashion.
(4) The proposition, "God does not exist," is a universal negative.
Therefore:
(5) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove, "God does not exist," in an a posteriori fashion.
One immediate problem with this argument is its name. From the fact, if it is a fact, that it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove atheism in an a posteriori fashion, it does not follow that it is impossible for such beings to prove atheism in a priori fashion. One or more internal inconsistency arguments against God's existence might be sound. But let that pass.
Some philosophers deny the truth of the second premise, (4). For example, in his famous debate with Frank Zindler, William Lane Craig argued as follows.
[...] the statement that God does not exist is not a universal negative; it’s a singular negative statement. Certainly you can prove negative singular statements such as there is no planet between Venus and the Earth. You could provide arguments to show that a singular negative statement is true [...].[2]
Strictly speaking, the first quoted sentence is correct. Categorical propositions are propositions which assert or deny relationships between classes; universal negatives are categorical propositions which have the form, "No S are P." Atheism is not a universal negative in this strict sense. But the statement, "God does not exist," is the same as saying, "No (existing) thing is God." That restatement of atheism is a universal generalization; it is has the form, "There are no S's."[3] Therefore, a proponent of the unprovability of atheism argument might replace "universal negative" with "universal generalization" yielding the following revised version of the "unprovability of universal negatives argument," which gets renamed as the "unprovability of universal generalizations argument."
(1') The only way to prove a universal generalization in an a posteriori fashion is to exhaustively search for all possible sources of evidence of a thing and find no evidence.
(2) But it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to conduct such a search.
Therefore:
(3') It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove a universal generalization in an a posteriori fashion.
The "unprovability of atheism argument" would then become:
(4') The proposition, "God does not exist," is a universal generalization.
Therefore:
(5) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove, "God does not exist," in an a posteriori fashion.
The meaning of the word "prove" is ambiguous, but the last two steps of the pragmatic inconsistency argument (steps 6 and 7) provide a clue. That argument targets not atheism, but what is sometimes called "gnostic atheism," the claim to know that God does not exist. This suggests that, at least for Bahnsen, to "prove" a universal generalization means to succeed in demonstrating that belief in the universal generalization can rise to the level of knowledge. So let's revise the first two arguments one more time.
The "unprovability of universal generalizations argument" gets renamed as the "unknowability of universal generalizations argument."
(1'') The only way to reasonably believe a negative universal generalization on an a posteriori basis is to exhaustively search for all possible sources of evidence of a thing and find no evidence.
(2) But it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to conduct such a search.
Therefore:
(3'') It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe a negative universal generalization in an a posteriori fashion.
Likewise, the "unprovability of atheism argument" becomes the "unknowability of atheism argument."
(4') The proposition, "God does not exist," is a negative universal generalization.
Therefore:
(5') It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe, "God does not exist," on an a posteriori basis.
Now consider the first two premises (steps 1'' and 2) in light of this clarification of "prove."
The second premise (step 2) is false. Purely on the basis of experience, one can know that at least some negative universal generalizations are true. Some objects or beings are defined in such a way that, if they exist, they exist at a specific location and at a specific time. For example, consider the title, "Seattle Seahawks Superbowl 60 Most Valuable Player (MVP)." Let "NO SEAHAWKS MVP" refer to the negative universal generalization, "The Seattle Seahawks Superbowl 60 MVP does not exist." If the Seattle Seahawks do not advance to Superbowl 60 (or if they advance but do not win), then NO SEAHAWKS MVP is true: the person described by that title does not exist. In that case, an "exhaustive search" doesn't require superhuman or supernatural abilities. One could reasonably believe NO SEAHAWKS MVP by simply watching Superbowl 60 or reading about it after the fact.
One might object that, even in my highly specified example, the inference to NO SEAHAWKS MVP isn't deductively valid; it is at least possible that there is a global media conspiracy to spread misinformation about the outcome of Superbowl 60, one's sensory organs are defective, or one is literally delusional and imagining sense data not received by one's sensory organs. This objection fails because one does not need absolute certainty to be reasonable in holding a belief. Even if one did not know NO SEAHAWKS MVP, one would still be reasonable in believing NO SEAHAWKS MVP. Contrary to what Bahnsen implies, a person can reasonably believe something they don't claim to know. For the same reason, Bahnsen has not given us a good reason to believe that the first premise (step 1'') is true.
A proponent of the unknowability of atheism argument might grant the above objections and concede that humans can reasonably believe at least some negative universal generalizations, while at the same time insist that there is something special about God such that humans cannot reasonably believe atheism. Here I think it is useful to follow Jeanine Diller in making a distinction between global and local versions of atheism.[4] "Global atheism" is the proposition, "God does not exist," for all concepts of God, including concepts of God which no one has yet even considered. In contrast, "local atheism" is the proposition, "God does not exist," for a specific concept of God. This distinction suggests two further versions of the "unknowability of atheism" argument.
I will call the first of these two versions the "unknowability of global atheism" argument.
(1*) The only way to reasonably believe global atheism on an a posteriori basis is to exhaustively search for all possible sources of evidence of God, for every possible concept of God, and find no evidence.
(2) But it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to conduct such a search.
Therefore:
(5*) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe global atheism on an a posteriori basis.
(1**) The only way to reasonably believe local atheism on an a posteriori basis is to exhaustively search for all possible sources of evidence of God, for a single concept of God, and find no evidence.
(2) But it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to conduct such a search.
Therefore:
(5**) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe local atheism on an a posteriori basis.
The first argument is, I believe, much more promising than the second. In light of the fact that there are surely legitimate concepts of "God" which no human has ever conceived, it is difficult to imagine how, on the basis of experience, one could be confident in the belief that all local theisms are false. In other words, in the context of global atheism, the second premise (step 2) seems to be true. Of course, the fact that I cannot conceive of such a justification does not rule out the possibility that one exists. But it seems unlikely that anyone in the year 2023 could reasonably believe global atheism is true. As John Schellenberg has persuasively argued, there are numerous signs of
human intellectual immaturity at the macro level, and we've seen enough evidence of it to say that maturity--the realization (or near realization) of a deep and wide understanding of reality--may yet be a long way off.[5]
Further support for Schellenberg's immaturity hypothesis comes from the work of Paul Draper. In a recent article, Draper explores the conjunction of "merotheism" (God is a proper part of nature) and "monopsychism" (there is exactly one mind or subject of consciousness). He calls this novel version of theism "panpsychotheism" (all-minds-[are]-God-ism).[6] The important point to notice here is that, although some of the greatest minds in history have thought about God, there is no indication that anyone else had thought of this view. All by itself, this single example is evidence that there are other conceptions of God which no one has previously conceived.
In contrast, I think the second argument fails and for essentially the same reason given earlier. At least some God concepts entail or make probable certain states of affairs which be confirmed or disconfirmed by experience. For example, suppose that, in honor of Richard Swinburne, we define a "Swinburne God" as
a being with most of the following properties: being a person without a body (that is, a spirit), present everywhere (that is, omnipresent), the creator of the universe, perfectly free, able to do anything (that is, omnipotent), knowing all things (that is, omniscient), perfectly good, a source of moral obligation, eternal, a necessary being, holy, and worthy of worship. [7]
Let "Swinburnian theism" be the proposition, "The Swinburne God exists." Swinburnian theism clearly entails other propositions; one does not need to know that one of those entailments is false in order to reasonably believe that one of those entailments (and, by extension, Swinburnian theism itself) is false.[8] This is why I think the second premise (step 2) of the "unknowability of local atheism" argument fails.
In the last section, we saw that the unprovability of atheism argument is not successful, but can be at least partially repaired by transforming it into the unknowability of atheism argument. The conclusion of that argument is:
(5') It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe, "God does not exist," on an a posteriori basis.
(6') The action of reasonably believing, "God does not exist," presupposes that the speaker is God.
From (5') and (6'), it follows that:
(7') If a finite, mortal being reasonably believes, "God does not exist," on an a posteriori basis then it is true that God does not exist and it is false that God does not exist.
From (7') and the Law of Noncontradiction, it follows that:
(8') It is impossible for a finite, mortal being to reasonably believe, "God does not exist," on an a posteriori basis.
This argument fails for two reasons. First, its second premise, (6'), is false. Even if it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe atheism on an a posteriori basis, it does not follow that it is impossible for such beings to reasonably believe atheism on an a priori basis. One does not have to be omniscient in order to know, much less reasonably believe, that there is a successful a priori argument for local atheism.
(9) If God existed, then He would have property P1.(10) If God existed, then He would have property P2.(11) Any being with property P1 would have some further property P3.(12) Any being with property P2 would not have property P3.(13) Therefore, it is impossible for any being to have properties P1 and P2. (from 11 and 12)(14) Hence, it is impossible for God to exist. (from 9, 10 and 13)
(5*) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe global atheism on an a posteriori basis.
(6*) The action of reasonably believing global atheism presupposes that the speaker is God.
Therefore:
(7*) If a finite, mortal being reasonably believes global atheism on an a posteriori basis, then global atheism is true and global atheism is false.
Therefore:
(8*) It is impossible for a finite, mortal being to reasonably believe global atheism on an a posteriori basis.
There are two problems with this argument. The first is that it is invalid: (6*) refers to the action of claiming to reasonably believe global atheism but does not specify that that knowledge is based upon an a posteriori basis. It seems to me that this objection could be avoided by revising the argument again as follows:
(5**) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe global atheism.
(6**) The action of reasonably believing global atheism presupposes that the speaker is God.
Therefore:
(7**) If a finite, mortal being reasonably believes global atheism, then global atheism is true and global atheism is false.
Therefore:
(8**) It is impossible for a finite, mortal being to reasonably believe global atheism.
That solves the problem identified by the first objection, but brings into sharper focus the second objection. Even if we assume that premise (5**) can be adequately defended, premise (6**) does not seem to be true. If premise (5**) is true, then it seems that the action of claiming to reasonably believe global atheism presupposes that the speaker has knowledge which greatly exceeds that of any human being in history. But "has knowledge which greatly exceeds that of any human being in history" is not a sufficient condition for being God. First, it's far from obvious that such knowledge requires omniscience, and many conceptions of God posit an omniscient being, not just a really smart being. Second, even if the speaker's actions did presuppose that the speaker is omniscient, being omniscient is not a sufficient condition for being God. It is at least conceivable that there exists an omniscient being which does not have any of the other attributes typically associated with God, such as omnipotence, moral perfection, eternity, aseity, sovereignty, immutability, necessity, etc.
(5#) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe local atheism on an a posteriori basis.
(6#) The action of reasonably believing local atheism presupposes that the speaker is God.
Therefore:
(7#) If a finite, mortal being reasonably believes global atheism on an a posteriori basis, then global atheism is true and global atheism is false.
Therefore:
(8#) It is impossible for a finite, mortal being to reasonably believe local atheism on an a posteriori basis.
This argument suffers from the same defects as its global counterpart. Unlike the global pragmatic inconsistency argument, however, I am doubtful that the second premise, in this case (6#), can be repaired by replacing "God" with "supernatural being." For ordinary human knowledge is all that is needed to reasonably believe that some local theisms are false. Thus, the action of claiming to reasonably believe local atheism does not appear to be a pragmatic inconsistency, at least not in any sense related to the issues discussed in this post.
In this post, I have considered two arguments: the unprovability of atheism argument and the pragmatic inconsistency of knowing atheism argument. The unprovability of atheism argument is best and most charitably understood as the unknowability of atheism argument, which has two versions. The unknowability of global atheism argument seems promising, but the unknowability of local atheism argument fails. For at least some concepts of "God," one can reasonably believe that local atheism is true. Finally, the pragmatic inconsistency argument fails because one does not need to be superhuman, much less omniscient, in order to reasonably believe the truth of the premises of an internal inconsistency argument. Perhaps there is a successful global pragmatic inconsistency argument (against the action of believing naturalism), but the local pragmatic inconsistency argument seems hopeless.[9]
[1] “Michael Martin Under the Microscope” audiocassette, tape 3.
Mark D. Linville has published a short booklet with Ravi Zacharias International Ministries (RZIM) entitled, "Is Everything Permitted? Moral Values in a World Without God?" The booklet begins with the following statement by Linville:
Few news stories have had the profound effect on me as did the shooting rampage at Columbine High School.
Can you guess where this is headed? Linville continues:
Today I remembered Plantinga wrote a very interesting article on naturalism and obligation back in 2010 in the journal Faith and Philosophy. I just checked my archives and made an interesting discovery. First, that article reinforces my belief that Plantinga believes atheism (and, indeed, naturalism) and moral obligation are incompatible. Second, in that article, Plantinga explicitly says he is not going to argue directly for that incompatibility claim; rather, he intends to "display" the failure of the most natural way of arguing that naturalism can accommodate moral obligation. In his own words:
I propose to support the claim that naturalism cannot accommodate morality—not by showing directly that it can’t, but by displaying the failure of the most natural way of arguing that it can.
