On X (the site formerly known as Twitter), a Christian apologist named Daniel (last name unknown) claims that objective morality proves atheism. On July 10, 2023, he posted a lengthy thread in which he introduces his argument, clarifies his terms, and answers objections. His argument, which is identical to William Lane Craig's most recent moral argument, is as follows:
(1) If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties could not exist.
(2) Objective moral values and duties do exist.
(3) Therefore, God exists.
The argument is valid: if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. But are the premises true?
Atheists themselves disagree on whether (2) is true. Among atheist philosophers, Nietzsche and J.L. Mackie are probably the two most famous atheists who have denied the existence of objective moral values and duties. But there have been countless atheist philosophers who affirm the existence of objective moral values and duties, including G.E. Moore, Erik Wielenberg, Quentin Smith, Wes Morriston, Michael Martin, David Brink, Michael Huemer, and many others. I count myself in the second group and join Daniel in affirming the truth of his second premise.[1]
What, then, about (1)? Contrary to Daniel (and channeling my inner William Lane Craig), I shall defend two basic contentions. First, Daniel has given no good reason to think that (1) is true. Second, there are good reasons to think that (1) is false.
1. No Good Reason to Think (1) Is True
1.1. The Inessential Objection
In Part 2.1 of Daniel's thread, he identifies six moral phenomena which he believes to be necessary conditions for the existence of objective morality: (a) objective values; (b) objective duties; (c) objective moral standard; (d) human dignity; (e) free will; (f) real purpose. I will defend the position that four of these (b, d, e, and f) are inessential for the existence of objective morality.
Let's consider each of these in turn.
(a) Objective Values: Daniel claims that objective values are necessary for objective morality. In his words, "values are what make an action or state of affairs GOOD or BAD." I agree. I'm not aware of any philosopher who has defended the idea that morality itself could be objective if there are no objective (moral) values.
(b) Objective Duties: Although I join Daniel in affirming objective duties, I do not think he adequately defends the claim that they are necessary for objective morality. This can be seen from his own stated definition of "objective morality" in part 4.1 of his thread, where he writes: "in order for morality to be objective, there must be something factually true about moral actions, regardless of opinion." I have no quarrel with his definition. Instead, I would simply point out that, on his own definition of objective morality, objective duties aren't necessary for morality as a whole to be objective. For example, it could be the case that moral values are objective and some version of virtue ethics is true, a version which doesn't involve moral duties at all. To avoid any potential misunderstandings, I'm not a virtue ethicist. Furthermore, I think objective moral duties exist. But the mere fact that such a view is even possible shows that objective duties are not a necessary precondition for objective morality.
(c) Objective Moral Standard: I want to quote Daniel's exposition of this point in its entirety. He writes:
An objective moral standard: Objective morality means that right and wrong exist FACTUALLY, without any importance of human opinion. Even if the ENTIRE WORLD decide rape is good and fine, it would still be wrong, end of story. Without the existence of God, where would an objective moral standard exist which we could hypothetically go to in order to know what actions are actually right or wrong?
-If God does exist then his perfect nature would be the standard, whatever God would do would be the correct answer, so there WOULD exist a perfect objective moral standard if a perfect God exists.
Unfortunately, this does not explain how a "moral standard" differs from moral values and duties. For my part, I interpret the expression "moral standard" to mean "the set of all objective moral values and duties." But that entails that a "moral standard" is not an independent necessary condition for objective morality.[2]
(d) Human Dignity: As with "moral standard," Daniel does not explicitly define what he means by "human dignity." As I interpret him, he seems to equate "human dignity" with the thesis that humans have objective (moral) value. Assuming that is indeed what he means, the next question is this: why should anyone believe that "human dignity" is a necessary precondition for "objective morality"? As with objective duties, I believe that Daniel's own stated definition of "objective morality" proves that human dignity isn't a necessary condition for "objective morality." Daniel has mixed up moral ontology (objective morality) with general systems of ethics (theories like deontology, consequentialism, etc.). It could be the case that objective morality (in Daniel's sense) exists and that there is no human dignity, either because humans exist without dignity or because humans don't exist at all. For example, suppose that God exists and that God created angels who existed for a million years before God created human beings. During that time, God issues commands to the angels. If one believes, as Daniel does, that some version of Divine Command Theory is true, then God's commands to the angels would constitute their moral duties. This situation would satisfy Daniel's definition of "objective morality" and so proves that human dignity is not necessary for objective morality.
(e) Free Will: Although he doesn't explicitly say this, I take it that by "free will" Daniel means libertarian freedom. Why does he claim that free will is necessary for objective morality? He writes:
If free will does not exist then all our choices would be pre-determined. ... For a being to be able to be “obligated,” that being must be able to be aware of the obligation AND be able to RESPOND, or not respond, to the obligation.
But this argument can be easily dispatched by noting that, at best, libertarian freedom is a prerequisite for certain moral concepts, such as moral duties, to be applicable; it is not a prerequisite for objective morality. Furthermore, Daniel evinces no awareness of compatibilism. That position is so named because its defenders believe that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility. In order to show that free will is necessary for objective moral duties, Daniel must first refute compatibilism. He has not done so. Indeed, he has not even tried to do so in his (lengthy) thread.[3]
(f) 'Real' Purpose: According to Daniel, 'real' purpose is necessary for 'real' values to exist. (I've put the word 'real' in scare quotes because the word "purpose" is polysemous and it is question-begging for Daniel to label his view in a way that presupposes it is correct.) He writes:
In order for objective morality to exist, real purpose must exist. For example, we know if our team scores a touchdown that’s good because we know the rules of football and the goal. However, if there are no rules, no purpose, then there can be no “good” thing. Purpose is required for real values like “good” and “bad” to exist.
The word “purpose” is polysemous: it has multiple related meanings. In the functional sense of the word, a biological entity has a purpose if it serves a function. In the agential sense of the word, however, the term “purpose” is used to refer to the goals of an agent. To have a purpose on this definition, it does not suffice to show that a thing serves a function. Instead, one must show that a thing aims or strives towards goals selected by an agent. Notice that atheism is compatible with functional purpose but not agential purpose (for humans or the universe as a whole). Charitably interpreted, then, it seems to me that Daniel wants to argue that agential purpose is a necessary condition of objective morality.
Once again, however, Daniel's ambition is betrayed by his own definition of "objective morality." Recall that Daniel defines "objective morality" as follows:
-in order for morality to be objective, there must be something factually true about moral actions, regardless of opinion. For example, it is true** that it is wrong to torture babies for fun. If morality is not objective then there would be no moral facts, just opinions and preferences.
I agree with Daniel that a deep connection between a
purpose of human life and morality is possible, but I do not agree that it is
necessary. To see this, consider Larry Arnhart’s secular version of Natural Law
Theory, which he calls Darwinian Natural Right. According to Darwinian Natural
Right, the good is the desirable; by "desirable," Arnhart means
the (at least) twenty natural desires that are manifested in diverse ways in
all human societies throughout history. As Arnhart explains, Darwinian
Natural Right, like Natural Law Theory in general, is a system of hypothetical
imperatives:
... natural moral judgment as based on hypothetical imperatives that have a "given/if/then" structure: Given what we know about the nature of human beings and the world in which they live, if we want to pursue happiness while living in society with each other, then we ought to adopt a social structure that conforms to human nature in promoting human happiness in society. So, for example, given what we know about human vulnerability and human propensities to violent aggression, if we want to pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity in our society, then we ought to have laws against murder, rape, assault, and theft. Consequently, the laws against murder, rape, assault, and theft are natural moral laws. I have elaborated this thought in some posts here, here, and here.
Furthermore, Darwinian Natural Right is not based upon a presupposition that human beings were created for a purpose, end, or goal. Therefore, Darwinian Natural Right is an example of an ethical theory which does not presuppose that human beings were created for a purpose. Thus, it is false that 'real' purpose (=objective, agential purpose) is necessary for objective morality. The fact that some things are good for human beings does not presuppose a purpose for the existence of human beings.[4]
Summary: Of Daniel's six moral phenomena, only one (objective moral value) is necessary for objective morality. One item (objective moral standard) is redundant, while the remaining items (objective moral duties, human dignity, free will, and real purpose) are not necessary in order for "objective morality," as he defines it, to exist.
1.2. The Underdetermination Objection
(a) Objective Values: As we saw in the last sub-section, Daniel is charitably interpreted as affirming an agential view of purpose. Similarly, he seems to presuppose this view when defending the idea that theism better accounts for objective values than atheism. He writes:
without God, how can one justify assigning objective values like “good” or “bad” to random actions or states of affairs in a cosmos that just happened to create life by accident? It simply can’t. If there is no God, there is no objective “good,” there is only what IS. It is… what it is. The fact that my grass IS green, says nothing about if it is *GOOD* that my grass happens to be green. Good* implies built in goals, intent, and a way things actually SHOULD be, and this simply cannot exist if there is no builder of everything. Furthermore, values like “goodness” cannot be founded on inanimate objects, but must be rooted in a personal being. An inanimate object like a tree can be neither good nor bad, only personal beings can be good or bad. (italics mine)
(b) Objective Duties: Daniel's claim about objective duties suffers from essentially the same problem as his claim about objective values: theism underdetermines the relationship between God and moral duties. I agree with Daniel that if theism is true, it is possible that the Divine Command Theory (DCT) is true (and so our moral duties are constitutes by God's commands). Theism, however, does not the entail the truth of DCT. In plain English, if theism is true, it is also possible, and no less likely, that DCT is false and some other theory about moral duty is true. What might that theory be? One option is Natural Law Theory (NLT), which says that moral duties are ultimately grounded in facts about human nature and human flourishing. NLT is, in fact, the moral theory favored by the Catholic Church. Although NLT is compatible with theism, it does not require theism. Darwinian Natural Right, mentioned earlier, is a version of NLT and is entirely compatible with atheism.
(c) Objective Moral Standard: As explained earlier, I consider "moral standard" to be redundant with "moral value and duty." Accordingly, the underdetermination objection applies here as well.
Summary: Because theism by itself underdetermines the relationship between God and moral values and duties, theism by itself is not even a potential explanation for objective values. Because theism is not even a potential explanation for objective values, it follows that theism cannot be a "better" explanation for objective values than atheism.
1.3. The Prior Obligations Objection
Philosophers from Plato onwards have repeatedly criticized the suggestion that moral obligations are created by God’s commands. The commands of a legitimate human ruler do not create obligations: if such a ruler tells you to do X, this makes it obligatory for you to do X only if it is already obligatory for you to do whatever the ruler tells you (within the sphere in which X lies). The same applies to God. He can make it obligatory for us to do Y by so commanding only because there is first a general obligation for us to obey him. His commands, therefore, cannot be the source of moral obligation in general: for any obligation that they introduce, there must be a more fundamental obligation that they presuppose. This criticism decisively excludes one way in which it might be thought that God could create morality.
1.4. The Moral Axiology vs. Moral Deontology Objection
1.5. The Moral Ontology vs. Moral Psychology Objection
1.6. The Lack of a Comparative Argument Objection
Daniel's final characteristic of moral obligation is universality. What reason does he give for thinking that theism better explains the universal nature of moral obligation than atheism? He writes, "Moral obligations are universal: God, as a necessary being, is eternal and governs all of creation, so his will extends over all things, times, and places." I agree with this sentence, but I don't understand why Daniel thinks that supports the claim that theism explains the universal nature of moral obligation.
The deeper problem with his implied argument, however, is purely logical. Imagine two competing explanations (H1 and H2) for some some fact F. Now suppose a defender of H1 makes the following argument:
4. H1 explains F.
Therefore, it is probable that:
5. H1 explains F better than H2.
I think everyone would agree that such an argument fails because it has a defective logical structure. The conclusion makes a comparative claim: it says that H1 is better than H2. The argument, however, has only a single premise and that premise says nothing at all about H2's ability to explain F. Maybe H2 explains F just as well as H1. Or maybe H2 is an even better explanation than H1. Because the argument does not contain a premise which addresses these possibilities, the argument does not make the conclusion probable.
This is the problem with what Daniel has written regarding theism, atheism, and the universality of moral obligation. Even if it is (or were?) the case that theism explains the universality of moral obligation, Daniel has given no reason at all to think that theism offers a better explanation than atheism.
Furthermore, moral supervenience is an excellent reason to think that it is false that (theism offers a better explanation than atheism for the universality of moral obligation). To put the point somewhat crudely, by "moral supervenience" I mean the idea that there is no moral difference between two actions or states of affairs without a non-moral difference. Moral supervenience by itself does not favor theism or atheism.
1.7. The False Evidence Objection
Human Dignity: I interpret "dignity" to mean "having moral standing." To say that a person has moral standing is to say that a person can be the beneficiary of a moral duty. For example, a newborn baby has moral standing: I have a moral duty not to torture it for fun even though the baby is unable to understand moral concepts or even understand language.
My own view is that humans have dignity (=moral standing), but not in the way that Daniel seems (?) to think they do. Allow me to explain. I could be wrong, but I think Daniel's view is roughly the following:
(ALL HUMANS) All human beings, regardless of whether they are persons, have moral standing.
(NO NON-HUMAN ANIMALS) No non-human animals, regardless of whether they are persons, have moral standing.
My own view is that both (ALL HUMANS) and (NO NON-HUMAN ANIMALS) are false. What confers moral standing is not species membership, but personhood. Human embryos and humans in permanent vegetative states are not persons; in religious language, we might say "there is no soul attached to such bodies." Furthermore, some non-human animals, including whales, dolphins, elephants, and primates, can also qualify as persons. Like a newborn human baby, they do not understand abstract moral concepts, but they can be harmed from their own internal point of view.
Free Will: Compared to the amount of time I've spent thinking about metaethics, I've spent little time thinking about free will vs. determinism. In other words, I don't have a "studied view" on the matter. With that caveat out of the way, my own view can be summed up with the following two theses:
(POTENTIAL THEISTIC EVIDENCE) If humans have libertarian freedom, that does seem antecedently more likely on the assumption that theism is true than on the assumption that source physicalism (which entails atheism) is true, and so constitutes some evidence favoring theism over atheism.
(LIBERTARIAN INCOHERENCE) I have reluctantly come to believe that the concept of libertarian freedom is probably incoherent. If it is incoherent, then it isn't an item of evidence at all.
'Real' Purpose: My response to Daniel regarding purpose is essentially the same as my response regarding free will. If the kind of purpose he has in mind existed, that would be evidence favoring theism over atheism, but I deny that such a purpose exists and Daniel has given no independent evidence to think otherwise.
2. There Is Good Reason to Think (1) Is False
Many nonphilosophers criticize philosophy for the amount of time it spends on definitions. There is probably some truth to the idea that the focus on semantics has been excessive. At the same time, it would be a mistake to overcorrect and completely neglect rigorous definitions. Just as mathematicians and scientists often use real numbers, not integers, to express precise values for variables in their equations, philosophers often use rigorous definitions to express important distinctions between the various meanings which words may have. This is especially important in metaethics. Consider the following very incomplete list of key terms: morality, ethics, objective, subjective, knowledge, skepticism, value, moral value, duty, justification, intrinsic, and extrinsic. Each of these terms (and many more which could be listed) are polysemous: they have multiple legitimate meanings. If one wants to avoid the illusion of communication (whereby person A mistakenly thinks they have correctly understood person B because, unknown to each other, A and B use different definitions of the same polysemous term), it is crucial to use precise definitions.
2.1. Impersonal Objective Value
2.1.1. Exposition
The term value (from the Latin valere, meaning “to be of worth”) is highly elastic. Sometimes it is used narrowly as a synonym for good or valuable, and sometimes it is used broadly for the whole scope of evaluative terms, ranging from the highest good through the indifferent to the worst evil, comprising positive, neutral, as well as negative “values.” In the narrow sense the opposite of value is evil or disvalue, but in the broader sense its opposite is fact, that which suggests that values are not recognized in the same way as empirical facts are. … [5]
The controversy about the objectivity of value comes down to this: Is something valuable because it is valued (and so, solely because it is regarded by people in a certain way), or is something valued—properly and correctly valued—when it is valuable, that is when it is objectively possessed of certain value-endowing features?[6]
By saying that values are objective, then, I mean that “objects and actions are good to man and for the sake of reaching a specific goal.” Both aspects are crucial to objectivity: values reflect facts, but they reflect facts as evaluated by human beings, relative to the goal of living. The moral prescriptions derived from values—the beliefs that particular actions are right or wrong—are correspondingly objective.[7]
(6) If atheism is true, then there is no grounding for objective moral values.
(7) If theism is true, then there is a grounding for objective moral values.
(8) Theism offer a better grounding for objective moral values than atheism.
(7) If theism is true, then there is a grounding for objective moral values.
(6) If atheism is true, then there is no grounding for objective moral values.
2.1.2. Assessment
(9) If objective moral values exist, they are either grounded or ungrounded.
(10) If objective moral values are grounded, their grounding is either abstract, mental, or physical.
(11) If the grounding of objective moral values is abstract or physical, they do not require a mental grounding.
(12) If objective moral values are ungrounded, they do not require a mental grounding.
(13) If objective moral values exist, they do not require a mental grounding.
(14) If objective moral values do not require a mental grounding, then they do not require grounding in the divine intellect.
(15) If objective moral values do not require a grounding in the divine intellect, then they are not grounded in God.
(16) If objective moral values exist, then they are not grounded in God.
2.2. The Secular Source of Obligation Defense (SSOD)
2.2.1. Exposition
In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third would be false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions: the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere and cannot consistently adhere to all three.[14]
Consider the following set of propositions: {God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; evil exists}. Mackie claimed that the set is somehow contradictory. But how?
The Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga pointed out that there are three ways for a set of propositions to be inconsistent or contradictory.[15]
First, a set is explicitly contradictory if one of the members of the set is the denial or negation of another member of the set. For example, consider set A:{God exists; God does not exist}. Set A is explicitly contradictory.
Second, a set is formally contradictory if it is possible to deduce an explicit contradiction in its members by the laws of logic. Consider, for example, set B: {If all men are mortal, then Socrates is mortal; All men are mortal; and Socrates is not mortal}. Set B is not explicitly contradictory. But the first two members of that set entail Socrates is mortal. When we add Socrates is mortal to set B, we get an explicit contradiction. Because the proposition, "Socrates is mortal," follows from the first two members of the set by modus ponens, set B is formally contradictory.
Third, a set S is implicitly contradictory if there is a necessary proposition p such that the result of adding p to S is a formally contradictory set. Plantinga asks us to consider the following set, which I'll call set C: {George is older than Paul; Paul is older than Nick; and George is not older than Nick}. As Plantinga points out, set C is neither explicitly nor formally contradictory, but it is implicitly contradictory because it is not possible that all three members of set C are true. Why is it not possible? Because, as Plantinga says, the following proposition is necessarily true: "If George is older than Paul, and Paul is older than Nick, then George is older than Nick." If we add that proposition to set C, then we get an explicit contradiction.
To sum up: a set of propositions is either explicitly contradictory or it isn't. If it is, then one member of the set denies another member of the set. If it isn't explicitly contradictory but there is a contradiction, then one or more propositions must be added to the set. If the additional proposition(s) can be deduced from the members of the set by the laws of logic alone, then the set is formally contradictory. If the additional proposition(s) are instead necessary truths (or propositions deduced from necessary truths), then the set is implicitly contradictory.
Let's now turn to the question of whether there is a contradiction, in any of these three senses, between atheism and moral obligation.
2.2.2. Assessment
2.2.2.1. The Secular Source of Obligation Defense (SSOD): An Undercutting Defeater
(17) God does not exist;
and
(18) Genuine moral obligation exists.
(17') God exists.
and
(18') Genuine moral obligation does not exist.
2.2.2.1.2. Is There a Formal Contradiction?
2.2.2.1.3. Is There an Implicit Contradiction?
A naturalistic way of looking at the world, so it seems to me, has no place for genuine moral obligation of any sort; a fortiori, then, it has no place for such a category as horrifying wickedness. … There can be such a thing only if there is a way rational creatures are supposed to live, obliged to live; and the force of that normativity--its strength, so to speak--is such that the appalling and horrifying nature of genuine wickedness is its inverse. But naturalism cannot make room for that kind of normativity; that requires a divine lawgiver, one whose very nature it is to abhor wickedness.[16]
(19) Genuine moral obligation requires a divine lawgiver.
... And our discussion thus far shows at the very least that it is no easy matter to find necessarily true propositions that yield a formally contradictory set when added to [... Mackie's set of propositions]. One wonders, therefore, why the many atheologians who confidently assert that this set is contradictory make no attempt whatever to show that it is. For the most part they are content just to assert that there is a contradiction here. Even Mackie, who sees that some "additional premises" or "quasi-logical rules" are needed, makes scarcely a beginning towards finding some additional premises that are necessarily true and that together with the members of set A formally entail an explicit contradiction.[18]
2.2.2.2. The Secular Source of Obligation Defense (SSOD): A Rebutting Defeater
To summarize our conclusions so far: although many moral apologists claim that the atheistic moral realist is involved in contradiction when he asserts the members of set D, this set, obviously, is neither explicitly nor formally contradictory; the claim, presumably, must be that it is implicitly contradictory. To make good this claim the moral apologist must find some necessarily true proposition p (it could be a conjunction of several propositions) such that the addition of p to set D yields a set that is formally contradictory. No moral apologist has produced even a plausible candidate for this role, and it certainly is not easy to see what such a proposition might be. Now we might think we should simply declare set D implicitly consistent on the principle that a proposition (or set) is to be presumed consistent or possible until proven otherwise. This course, however, leads to trouble. The same principle would impel us to declare the moral apologist's claim--that set D is inconsistent--possible or consistent. But the claim that a given set of propositions is implicitly contradictory, is itself either necessarily true or necessarily false; so if such a claim is possible, it is not necessarily false and is, therefore, true (in fact, necessarily true). If we followed the suggested principle, therefore, we should be obliged to declare set D implicitly consistent (since it hasn't been shown to be otherwise), but we should have to say the same thing about the moral apologist's claim, since we haven't shown that claim to be inconsistent or impossible. The moral apologist's claim, furthermore, is necessarily true if it is possible. Accordingly, if we accept the above principle, we shall have to declare set D both implicitly consistent and implicitly inconsistent. So all we can say at this point is that set D has not been shown to be implicitly inconsistent.
Can we go any further? One way to go on would be to try to show that set D is implicitly consistent or possible in the broadly logical sense. But what is involved in showing such a thing? Although there are various ways to approach this matter, they all resemble one another in an important respect. They all amount to this: to show that a set S is consistent you think of a possible state of affairs (it needn't actually obtain) which is such that if it were actual, then all of the members of S would be true. This procedure is sometimes called giving a model of S. For example, you might construct an axiom set and then show that it is consistent by giving a model of it; this is how it was shown that the denial of Euclid's parallel postulate is formally consistent with the rest of his postulates.
There are various special cases of this procedure to fit special circumstances. Suppose, for example, you have a pair of propositions p and q and wish to show them consistent. And suppose we say that a proposition p1 entails a proposition p2 if it is impossible that p1 be true and p2 false-if the conjunctive proposition p1 and not p2 is necessarily false. Then one way to show that p is consistent with q is to find some proposition r whose conjunction with p is both possible. in the broadly logical sense, and entails q.
How does this apply to the case before us? As follows. Remember that (17) and (18) are:
(17) God does not exist;
and
(18) Genuine moral obligation exists.
The problem, then, is to show that (17) and (18) are consistent. This could be done, as we've seen, by finding a proposition r that is consistent with (17) and such that (17) and (r) together entail (18) . One proposition that might do the trick is
(AUTONOMOUS MORALITY) Neither moral values nor the full set of genuine moral obligations of human beings are dependent upon the existence or properties of any non-human person.
If (AUTONOMOUS MORALITY) is consistent with (17), then it follows that (17) and (AUTONOMOUS MORALITY) (and hence set D) are consistent. Accordingly, one thing some critics of moral apologists have tried is to show that (AUTONOMOUS MORALITY) and (17) are consistent.One can attempt this in at least two ways. On the one hand, we could try to apply the same method again. Conceive of a possible state of affairs such that, if it obtained, genuine moral obligation existed but was not dependent on God's existence or properties. On the other hand, someone might try to show that such a state of affairs is not only conceivable, but actual.
Corresponding to these two methods of responding to theistic external inconsistency arguments from evil are two roles which critics of moral apologists can play. I will call the former "Autonomous Morality Defenders" (hereafter, "Defenders") and the latter "Autonomous Morality Atheodicists" (hereafter, "Atheodicists"). Atheodicists attempt to tell us how morality actually exists without being dependent upon God's existence or properties. In contrast, Defenders are not trying to say how morality without being dependent upon God's existence or properties; but at most how morality might exist. We could put the point another way. Both Defenders and Atheodicists are trying to show that (17) is consistent with (AUTONOMOUS MORALITY) and, of course if so, then set D is consistent. The Atheodicist tries to do this by finding some proposition r which in conjunction with (17) entails (18); he claims, furthermore, that this proposition is true, not just consistent with (17). He tries to give us a full theory of moral ontology and show that it is true. The Defender, on the other hand, though he also tries to find a proposition that is consistent with (17) and in conjunction with it entails (18), does not claim to know or even believe that r is true. And here, of course, he is perfectly within his rights. His aim is to show that (17) is consistent with (18); all he needs to do then is find an r that is consistent with (17) and such that (17) and r entail (18); whether r is true is quite beside the point.
In summary, we have seen that, using Plantinga's critique of Mackie's claim (that there exists an implicit contradiction between God and evil), we can use parallel reasoning to refute Plantinga's and Daniel's claim that there is an implicit contradiction between atheism and moral obligation. Furthermore, this reasoning does not even depend upon the metaphysical possibility of a world without God. Because the content of theism says so little about the relationship between God and morality, it is at least possible that God exists and (AUTONOMOUS MORALITY) is true. But that entails there is no implicit contradiction between atheism and moral obligation.
2.3. The Epistemological Objection
2.3.1. Exposition
Moral obligations are naturally expressed as authoritative commands: When we talk about moral obligations, they appear as authoritative commands. Do this, don’t do that. Help that old woman with her groceries, don’t rob that bank, etc… If these obligations exist, where would these objective commands be coming from? If the issuer of these commands has no authority over us, then we have no obligation to obey them.
2.3.2. Assessment
How might a theistic defender of DCT respond to the Epistemological Objection? Here I will assess two main options: the "No Reasonable Nonbelief Objection" and the "Force of Conscience Objection." Let's consider each in turn.
2.3.2.1. The No Reasonable Nonbelief Objection
One option is to deny that there are any reasonable non-believers whatsoever. The late Christian apologist Greg Bahnsen once said, "There are no atheists; there are only professed atheists." Bahnsen's view was that professed atheists and other non-believers are either lying (because they say that God does not exist despite knowing that He does) or self-deceived (they have somehow tricked themselves into believing what they once knew to be false). As philosopher J.L. Schellenberg argues, however, "it would take something like willful blindness to fail to affirm that not all nonbelief is the product of willful blindness (even if some of it is)."
Apart from the general fact of reasonable (=nonculpable, nonresistant) nonbelief, Schellenberg has usefully catalogued four more specific facts about reasonable nonbelief. These four specific facts about reasonable nonbelief are four types of reasonable nonbelief: (1) former believers; (2) lifelong seekers; (3) converts to nontheistic religions; and (4) isolated nontheists. Let's take a brief look at each of these. Regarding (1), as Schellenberg points out, from the perspective of theism, former believers were on the right path when they lost their belief in God. Turning to (2), these are people who are not only open to relationship with God, but seek God for their entire lives. They seek, but do not find. As for (3), other nonresistant nonbelievers seek God but instead convert to nontheistic religions like Buddhism. Finally, (4) includes members of cultures that lack the idea of God altogether (such as hunter-gatherers prior to recorded history, the Chinese cultures from the beginning of their history until the Christian Middle Ages, etc.).
The No Reasonable Nonbelief Objection entails that there has never been, is not now, and never will be a single reasonable nonbeliever. For the reasons just given, however, it is much more likely that reasonable nonbelievers exist.
2.3.2.2. The Force of Conscience Objection
the idea of a command that one can 'receive' without being aware of being addressed by anyone is extremely counterintuitive. Even if God is the ultimate cause of the non-believer's thinking in this matter, she does not seem to herself to be "interpreting" a "sign" or receiving a "command", and it is quite a stretch to insist on this way of characterizing what she is doing.[21]
Morriston then proceeds to offer additional points against (what I call) the Force of Conscience Objection, but they aren't necessary to rehearse here.[22] The idea, "God commands non-believers through signs (like conscience) which carry imperative force, while the non-believers are unaware that such commands are genuine commands or that their origin is divine", entails that a literal speech act of God is not necessary for moral obligation. This amounts to an abandonment of DCT, not a defense of it.
(to be continued...)
Notes
[1] On June 22, 2023, I replied to a post from Daniel by pointing out that he confuses "atheism" with nihilism. See https://x.com/SecularOutpost/status/1672019076078551041?s=20. On that same date, in reply to a post (albeit one not about his moral argument), I pointed out to Daniel that his memes don't touch atheist philosophers of religion. See https://x.com/SecularOutpost/status/1672018746607558661?s=20
[2] On December 30, 2023, I replied to a post from Daniel which asked how it is even possible (my emphasis) for an objective moral standard to exist without God. See https://x.com/SecularOutpost/status/1741263290003800237?s=20 and the ensuing back and forth discussion with Daniel.
[3] Indeed, on April 3, 2024, a search on X for posts by Daniel containing the word "compatibilism" turned up no results.
[4] The reply cited in endnote 2 also refuted Daniel's claim that an objective moral standard is impossible without God.
[5] Louis P. Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, p. 84.
[6] Nicholas Rescher, Introduction to Value Theory, p. 56.
[7] Tara Smith, Viable Values, p. 77.
[8] Paul Bloomfield, Morality and Self-Interest (2008), 3-4.
[9] Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schneider, eds., Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 26.
[10] (PROVIDE CRAIG CITATION)
[11] Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Robust Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
[12] For an advanced introduction to atheistic Platonism, see Erik Steinhart, Atheistic Platonism: A Manifesto (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).
[13] For a secular version of Natural Law Theory, see Larry Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological Ethics of Human Nature (SUNY Press, 1998).
[15] Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1974), pp. 13-16.
[16] Alvin Plantinga, “A Christian Life Partly Lived” in Kelly James Clark (ed.), Philosophers Who Believe: The Spiritual Journeys of 11 Leading Thinkers (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1997), 45-82. Italics are mine.
[17] Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 279.
[18] Plantinga 1974, pp. 23-24.
[19] Graham Oppy, Ontological Arguments and Belief in God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 70-78.
[20] Wes Morriston, "The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers" International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion 65 (2009): 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-008-9173-x
[21] Morriston 2009: 7.
[22] Morriston 2009: 6-9.
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