On X (the site formerly known as Twitter), a Christian apologist named Daniel (last name unknown) claims that objective morality proves theism. On July 10, 2023, he posted a lengthy thread in which he introduces his argument, clarifies his terms, and answers objections. His argument, which is identical in form to William Lane Craig's most recent moral argument, is as follows:

(1) If God does not exist, objective moral values and duties could not exist.
(2) Objective moral values and duties do exist.

(3) Therefore, God exists.

The argument is valid: if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. But are the premises true?

Atheists themselves disagree on whether (2) is true. Among atheist philosophers, Nietzsche and J.L. Mackie are probably the two most famous atheists who have denied the existence of objective moral values and duties. But there have been countless atheist philosophers who affirm the existence of objective moral values and duties, including G.E. Moore, Erik Wielenberg, Quentin Smith, Wes Morriston, Michael Martin, David Brink, Michael Huemer, and many others. I count myself in the second group and join Daniel in affirming the truth of his second premise.[1]

What, then, about (1)? Contrary to Daniel (and channeling my inner William Lane Craig), I shall defend two basic contentions. First, Daniel has given no good reason to think that (1) is true. Second, there are good reasons to think that (1) is false.

1. No Good Reason to Think (1) Is True

1.1. The Inessential Objection

In Part 2.1 of Daniel's thread, he identifies six moral phenomena which he believes to be necessary conditions for the existence of objective morality: (a) objective values; (b) objective duties; (c) objective moral standard; (d) human dignity; (e) free will; (f) real purpose. I will defend the position that four of these (b, d, e, and f) are inessential for the existence of objective morality.

Let's consider each of these in turn.

(a) Objective Values: Daniel claims that objective values are necessary for objective morality. In his words, "values are what make an action or state of affairs GOOD or BAD." I agree. I'm not aware of any philosopher who has defended the idea that morality itself could be objective if there are no objective (moral) values.

(b) Objective Duties: Although I join Daniel in affirming objective duties, I do not think he adequately defends the claim that they are necessary for objective morality. This can be seen from his own stated definition of "objective morality" in part 4.1 of his thread, where he writes: "in order for morality to be objective, there must be something factually true about moral actions, regardless of opinion." I have no quarrel with his definition. Instead, I would simply point out that, on his own definition of objective morality, objective duties aren't necessary for morality as a whole to be objective. For example, it could be the case that moral values are objective and some version of virtue ethics is true, a version which doesn't involve moral duties at all. To avoid any potential misunderstandings, I'm not a virtue ethicist. Furthermore, I think objective moral duties exist. But the mere fact that such a view is even possible shows that objective duties are not a necessary precondition for objective morality.

An objective moral standard: Objective morality means that right and wrong exist FACTUALLY, without any importance of human opinion. Even if the ENTIRE WORLD decide rape is good and fine, it would still be wrong, end of story. Without the existence of God, where would an objective moral standard exist which we could hypothetically go to in order to know what actions are actually right or wrong?

-If God does exist then his perfect nature would be the standard, whatever God would do would be the correct answer, so there WOULD exist a perfect objective moral standard if a perfect God exists.

Unfortunately, this does not explain how a "moral standard" differs from moral values and duties. For my part, I interpret the expression "moral standard" to mean "the set of all objective moral values and duties." But that entails that a "moral standard" is not an independent necessary condition for objective morality.[2]

(d) Human Dignity: As with "moral standard," Daniel does not explicitly define what he means by "human dignity." As I interpret him, he seems to equate "human dignity" with the thesis that humans have objective (moral) value. Assuming that is indeed what he means, the next question is this: why should anyone believe that "human dignity" is a necessary precondition for "objective morality"? As with objective duties, I believe that Daniel's own stated definition of "objective morality" proves that human dignity isn't a necessary condition for "objective morality." Daniel has mixed up moral ontology (objective morality) with general systems of ethics (theories like deontology, consequentialism, etc.). It could be the case that objective morality (in Daniel's sense) exists and that there is no human dignity, either because humans exist without dignity or because humans don't exist at all. For example, suppose that God exists and that God created angels who existed for a million years before God created human beings. During that time, God issues commands to the angels. If one believes, as Daniel does, that some version of Divine Command Theory is true, then God's commands to the angels would constitute their moral duties. This situation would satisfy Daniel's definition of "objective morality" and so proves that human dignity is not necessary for objective morality.

(e) Free Will: Although he doesn't explicitly say this, I take it that by "free will" Daniel means libertarian freedom. Why does he claim that free will is necessary for objective morality? He writes:

If free will does not exist then all our choices would be pre-determined. ... For a being to be able to be “obligated,” that being must be able to be aware of the obligation AND be able to RESPOND, or not respond, to the obligation.

But this argument can be easily dispatched by noting that, at best, libertarian freedom is a prerequisite for certain moral concepts, such as moral duties, to be applicable; it is not a prerequisite for objective morality. Furthermore, Daniel evinces no awareness of compatibilism. That position is so named because its defenders believe that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility. In order to show that free will is necessary for objective moral duties, Daniel must first refute compatibilism. He has not done so. Indeed, he has not even tried to do so in his (lengthy) thread.[3]

(f) 'Real' Purpose: According to Daniel, 'real' purpose is necessary for 'real' values to exist. (I've put the word 'real' in scare quotes because the word "purpose" is polysemous and it is question-begging for Daniel to label his view in a way that presupposes it is correct.) He writes:

In order for objective morality to exist, real purpose must exist. For example, we know if our team scores a touchdown that’s good because we know the rules of football and the goal. However, if there are no rules, no purpose, then there can be no “good” thing. Purpose is required for real values like “good” and “bad” to exist.

The word “purpose” is polysemous: it has multiple related meanings. In the functional sense of the word, a biological entity has a purpose if it serves a function. In the agential sense of the word, however, the term “purpose” is used to refer to the goals of an agent. To have a purpose on this definition, it does not suffice to show that a thing serves a function. Instead, one must show that a thing aims or strives towards goals selected by an agent. Notice that atheism is compatible with functional purpose but not agential purpose (for humans or the universe as a whole). Charitably interpreted, then, it seems to me that Daniel wants to argue that agential purpose is a necessary condition of objective morality.

Once again, however, Daniel's ambition is betrayed by his own definition of "objective morality." Recall that Daniel defines "objective morality" as follows:

-in order for morality to be objective, there must be something factually true about moral actions, regardless of opinion. For example, it is true** that it is wrong to torture babies for fun. If morality is not objective then there would be no moral facts, just opinions and preferences.

I agree with Daniel that a deep connection between a purpose of human life and morality is possible, but I do not agree that it is necessary. To see this, consider Larry Arnhart’s secular version of Natural Law Theory, which he calls Darwinian Natural Right. According to Darwinian Natural Right, the good is the desirable; by "desirable," Arnhart means the (at least) twenty natural desires that are manifested in diverse ways in all human societies throughout history. As Arnhart explains, Darwinian Natural Right, like Natural Law Theory in general, is a system of hypothetical imperatives:

... natural moral judgment as based on hypothetical imperatives that have a "given/if/then" structure: Given what we know about the nature of human beings and the world in which they live, if we want to pursue happiness while living in society with each other, then we ought to adopt a social structure that conforms to human nature in promoting human happiness in society. So, for example, given what we know about human vulnerability and human propensities to violent aggression, if we want to pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity in our society, then we ought to have laws against murder, rape, assault, and theft. Consequently, the laws against murder, rape, assault, and theft are natural moral laws. I have elaborated this thought in some posts here, here, and here.

Furthermore, Darwinian Natural Right is not based upon a presupposition that human beings were created for a purpose, end, or goal. Therefore, Darwinian Natural Right is an example of an ethical theory which does not presuppose that human beings were created for a purpose. Thus, it is false that 'real' purpose (=objective, agential purpose) is necessary for objective morality. The fact that some things are good for human beings does not presuppose a purpose for the existence of human beings.[4]

Summary: Of Daniel's six moral phenomena, only one (objective moral value) is necessary for objective morality. One item (objective moral standard) is redundant, while the remaining items (objective moral duties, human dignity, free will, and real purpose) are not necessary in order for "objective morality," as he defines it, to exist.

1.2. The Underdetermination Objection

In this section, I will critically assess Daniel's claim that the first three of his moral phenomena (objective values, objective duties, objective moral standard) are better explained by theism than by atheism. I will argue that theism underdetermines the relationship between God and morality and so by itself theism is not a better explanation than atheism for those phenomena. I call this the underdetermination objection.

(a) Objective Values: As we saw in the last sub-section, Daniel is charitably interpreted as affirming an agential view of purpose. Similarly, he seems to presuppose this view when defending the idea that theism better accounts for objective values than atheism. He writes:

without God, how can one justify assigning objective values like “good” or “bad” to random actions or states of affairs in a cosmos that just happened to create life by accident? It simply can’t. If there is no God, there is no objective “good,” there is only what IS. It is… what it is. The fact that my grass IS green, says nothing about if it is *GOOD* that my grass happens to be green. Good* implies built in goals, intent, and a way things actually SHOULD be, and this simply cannot exist if there is no builder of everything. Furthermore, values like “goodness” cannot be founded on inanimate objects, but must be rooted in a personal being. An inanimate object like a tree can be neither good nor bad, only personal beings can be good or bad. (italics mine)

Daniel is absolutely correct that one cannot have agential purpose (in his words, "built-in goals, intent") in the absence of a mind assigning such goals and intent. But functional purpose does not require a mind who assigns goals or intent. Again, things can be bad for human beings even if there is no Creator who created human beings for a goal or intent. For example, it is an objective fact that having a Body Mass Index (BMI) of 50 is, in general, bad for human beings. (I use the hedge "in general" to allow for the possibility of outliers, such as competitive bodybuilders who have an extremely high BMI but very little body fat.) This fact ("A BMI of 50 is bad for human beings") is an objective value (or, more accurately, objective disvalue): it does not depend upon the stance or subjective states of any human being. Even if all adult human beings believed it is good to have the highest possible BMI, they would still be wrong. But let that pass.

The deeper problem with Daniel's argument is that theism underdetermines the relationship between God and values. Let's define "theism" as the view that there exists one mental entity ("God") who is all-powerful, all-knowing, morally perfect, and, if anything physical exists, the Creator of anything physical which exists. Because theism entails that, if God exists, God is not any sense dependent upon human beings, the words "morally perfect" imply that God's moral perfection is not in any sense dependent upon the stances or subjective states of any human beings. But what makes God morally perfect, according to theism? The correct answer is "undefined." By itself, theism says nothing about this. If theism is true, it could be the case that the Divine Nature Theory of Axiology (DNT-A) is true (and so moral values are grounded in God's nature). But it is also possible and no less likely that moral anti-reductionism is true (and so moral values are "a se" and exist as abstract objects which do not depend upon God). Daniel has confused theism by itself with theism conjoined with an auxiliary hypothesis (either DNT-A or something like it). But the fact, if it is a fact, that "Theism combined with DNT-A explains objective values" doesn't help his argument. Why? Because that argument compares the explanatory power of atheism to theism, not of atheism to theism combined with an auxiliary hypothesis like DNT-A. When we consider only theism itself, it is clear that theism underdetermines God's relationship to moral values. Therefore, theism by itself is not even a potential explanation for objective values. Because theism is not even a potential explanation for objective values, it follows that theism cannot be a "better" explanation for objective values than atheism.

(b) Objective Duties: Daniel's claim about objective duties suffers from essentially the same problem as his claim about objective values: theism underdetermines the relationship between God and moral duties. I agree with Daniel that if theism is true, it is possible that the Divine Command Theory (DCT) is true (and so our moral duties are constitutes by God's commands). Theism, however, does not the entail the truth of DCT. In plain English, if theism is true, it is also possible, and no less likely, that DCT is false and some other theory about moral duty is true. What might that theory be? One option is Natural Law Theory (NLT), which says that moral duties are ultimately grounded in facts about human nature and human flourishing. NLT is, in fact, the moral theory favored by the Catholic Church. Although NLT is compatible with theism, it does not require theism. Darwinian Natural Right, mentioned earlier, is a version of NLT and is entirely compatible with atheism.

(c) Objective Moral Standard: As explained earlier, I consider "moral standard" to be redundant with "moral value and duty." Accordingly, the underdetermination objection applies here as well.

Summary: Because theism by itself underdetermines the relationship between God and moral values and duties, theism by itself is not even a potential explanation for objective values. Because theism is not even a potential explanation for objective values, it follows that theism cannot be a "better" explanation for objective values than atheism.

1.3. The Prior Obligations Objection

In defense of his claim that moral obligation is better explained by theism than by atheism, Daniel argues that "there are four characteristics of moral obligations which show why atheism cannot account for them." In this section, I will focus solely on the first of those four characteristics; I will address the remaining three characteristics later. Daniel's first characteristic of moral obligations is that they are allegedly the result of authoritative commands. He writes, "Moral obligations are naturally expressed as authoritative commands: as a sovereign being, God is a legitimate authority over all creation." I agree with Daniel that it is possible that moral obligations might be communicated as commands from a legitimate commander, but I do not agree that moral obligations need a command. Moral obligations can also arise directly from moral value and from one's relationship to others. But let that pass.

Imagine a General Officer issuing a (lawful) order to a squadron of fighter pilots to attack an enemy air base. The General's order creates a duty for the fighter pilots because there exists a prior obligation, for all members of the military, to obey all lawful orders issued by a superior officer. Now assume that God exists and that God commands us to do some action A. "God commands us to do some action A" can make A our moral duty if and only if there exists a prior obligation to obey God's commands. But where did that obligation come from? The following passage from the late J.L. Mackie’s (1982, pp. 114-15) book, Miracle of Theism, makes this point well:

Philosophers from Plato onwards have repeatedly criticized the suggestion that moral obligations are created by God’s commands. The commands of a legitimate human ruler do not create obligations: if such a ruler tells you to do X, this makes it obligatory for you to do X only if it is already obligatory for you to do whatever the ruler tells you (within the sphere in which X lies). The same applies to God. He can make it obligatory for us to do Y by so commanding only because there is first a general obligation for us to obey him. His commands, therefore, cannot be the source of moral obligation in general: for any obligation that they introduce, there must be a more fundamental obligation that they presuppose. This criticism decisively excludes one way in which it might be thought that God could create morality.

To avoid a potential misunderstanding, notice that the Prior Obligations Objection does not deny that God's commands, if God exists and issues commands, cannot be the source of any moral obligations. Rather, the Prior Obligations Objection shows that God, if God exists and issues commands, cannot be the source of all moral obligations. If the moral obligation, "Obey God's commands" isn't the result of a divine command, then why do other moral obligations, such as "Don't torture newborn babies for fun," need to be the result of a divine command?

1.4. The Moral Axiology vs. Moral Deontology Objection

Daniel's second characteristic of moral obligation is objectivity. Why does Daniel think theism explains the objectivity of moral obligation? He writes, "God is unchanging and perfect, so what God is… is necessarily and objectively good." Daniel has not expressed himself very well. Daniel has confused moral value ("good") with moral obligation ("right"). The fact that God, if God exists, is good does not constitute an argument for believing that theism better explains the objectivity of moral obligation than atheism.

1.5. The Moral Ontology vs. Moral Psychology Objection

Daniel's third characteristic of moral obligation is overridingness. The thesis that moral obligations always override all other considerations is controversial. Kant famously believed that they do and posited the idea of a categorical imperative to explain this feature: one has to do what is morally required regardless of any other ends one might have. Daniel's claim (that theism better explains than atheism the existence of overriding moral obligations) is just that: a claim in need of support. I do not find such support in his thread. My own view is this: I cannot see how theism helps account for the mere existence of overriding moral obligations. At best, theism provides a superior sense of motivation to be moral. But motivation is in the domain of moral psychology, not moral ontology, and the existence of overriding moral obligations, not our attitudes towards them, is a question in moral ontology. So, again, I don't see how theism helps.

1.6. The Lack of a Comparative Argument Objection

Daniel's final characteristic of moral obligation is universality. What reason does he give for thinking that theism better explains the universal nature of moral obligation than atheism? He writes, "Moral obligations are universal: God, as a necessary being, is eternal and governs all of creation, so his will extends over all things, times, and places." I agree with this sentence, but I don't understand why Daniel thinks that supports the claim that theism explains the universal nature of moral obligation.

The deeper problem with his implied argument, however, is purely logical. Imagine two competing explanations (H1 and H2) for some some fact F. Now suppose a defender of H1 makes the following argument:

(4) H1 explains F.

Therefore, it is probable that:

(5) H1 explains F better than H2.

I think everyone would agree that such an argument fails because it has a defective logical structure. The conclusion makes a comparative claim: it says that H1 is better than H2. The argument, however, has only a single premise and that premise says nothing at all about H2's ability to explain F. Maybe H2 explains F just as well as H1. Or maybe H2 is an even better explanation than H1. Because the argument does not contain a premise which addresses these possibilities, the argument does not make the conclusion probable.

This is the problem with what Daniel has written regarding theism, atheism, and the universality of moral obligation. Even if it is (or were?) the case that theism explains the universality of moral obligation, Daniel has given no reason at all to think that theism offers a better explanation than atheism.

Furthermore, moral supervenience is an excellent reason to think that it is false that (theism offers a better explanation than atheism for the universality of moral obligation). To put the point somewhat crudely, by "moral supervenience" I mean the idea that there is no moral difference between two actions or states of affairs without a non-moral difference. Moral supervenience by itself does not favor theism or atheism.

1.7. The False Evidence Objection

In this section, I will argue that three of Daniel's moral phenomena (human dignity, free will, real purpose) do not exist, as he defines them. Since they do not exist, they are in a sense "false evidence."

Human Dignity: I interpret "dignity" to mean "having moral standing." To say that a person has moral standing is to say that a person can be the beneficiary of a moral duty. For example, a newborn baby has moral standing: I have a moral duty not to torture it for fun even though the baby is unable to understand moral concepts or even understand language.

My own view is that humans have dignity (=moral standing), but not in the way that Daniel seems (?) to think they do. Allow me to explain. I could be wrong, but I think Daniel's view is roughly the following:

(ALL HUMANS) All human beings, regardless of whether they are persons, have moral standing.
(NO NON-HUMAN ANIMALS) No non-human animals, regardless of whether they are persons, have moral standing.

My own view is that both (ALL HUMANS) and (NO NON-HUMAN ANIMALS) are false. What confers moral standing is not species membership, but personhood. Human embryos and humans in permanent vegetative states are not persons; in religious language, we might say "there is no soul attached to such bodies." Furthermore, some non-human animals, including whales, dolphins, elephants, and primates, can also qualify as persons. Like a newborn human baby, they do not understand abstract moral concepts, but they can be harmed from their own internal point of view.

Free Will: Compared to the amount of time I've spent thinking about metaethics, I've spent little time thinking about free will vs. determinism. In other words, I don't have a "studied view" on the matter. With that caveat out of the way, my own view can be summed up with the following two theses:

(POTENTIAL THEISTIC EVIDENCE) If humans have libertarian freedom, that does seem antecedently more likely on the assumption that theism is true than on the assumption that source physicalism (which entails atheism) is true, and so constitutes some evidence favoring theism over atheism.

(LIBERTARIAN INCOHERENCE) I have reluctantly come to believe that the concept of libertarian freedom is probably incoherent. If it is incoherent, then it isn't an item of evidence at all.

'Real' Purpose: My response to Daniel regarding purpose is essentially the same as my response regarding free will. If the kind of purpose he has in mind existed, that would be evidence favoring theism over atheism, but I deny that such a purpose exists and Daniel has given no independent evidence to think otherwise.

2. There Is Good Reason to Think (1) Is False

Many nonphilosophers criticize philosophy for the amount of time it spends on definitions. There is probably some truth to the idea that the focus on semantics has been excessive. At the same time, it would be a mistake to overcorrect and completely neglect rigorous definitions. Just as mathematicians and scientists often use real numbers, not integers, to express precise values for variables in their equations, philosophers often use rigorous definitions to express important distinctions between the various meanings which words may have. This is especially important in metaethics. Consider the following very incomplete list of key terms: morality, ethics, objective, subjective, knowledge, skepticism, value, moral value, duty, justification, and intrinsic. Each of these terms (and many more which could be listed) are polysemous: they have multiple legitimate meanings. If one wants to avoid the illusion of communication (whereby person A mistakenly thinks they have correctly understood person B because, unknown to each other, A and B use different definitions of the same polysemous term), it is crucial to use precise definitions.

In addition to explicitly stating and disambiguating the meaning of key terms, philosophers are also interested in the formal structure of arguments. Think of the old cartoon which shows a math professor in front of a chalkboard with a solution to a complex problem; the middle step of the solution is the words, "Then a miracle occurs." Pointing at those words on the chalkboard, the other professor says, "I think you should be more explicit here in step two." Just as it is easy to make a mistake while solving a math problem (by trying to do too many steps in your head at the same time), it is easy to make a mistake when constructing a philosophical argument (by trying to make too many inferences in your head at the same time). In both situations, the solution is the same: explicitly write out the steps of your solution (for math) or the premises and sub-conclusions (for philosophy).

In this section, I will present rebutting defeaters to Daniel's moral argument, viz., independent reasons to believe that its major premise, premise (1), is false. For each defeater, I will first provide a brief exposition to clarify key terms. I will then present the logical form of my counterarguments.

2.1. Values

2.1.1. Terminology

The word "value" is probably the poster child for a polysemous word in metaethics. I once spent an entire year creating a catalogue of how different philosophers use the word in the contemporary literature. I think Louis Pojman summed up the state of contemporary usage well.

The term value (from the Latin valere, meaning “to be of worth”) is highly elastic. Sometimes it is used narrowly as a synonym for good or valuable, and sometimes it is used broadly for the whole scope of evaluative terms, ranging from the highest good through the indifferent to the worst evil, comprising positive, neutral, as well as negative “values.” In the narrow sense the opposite of value is evil or disvalue, but in the broader sense its opposite is fact, that which suggests that values are not recognized in the same way as empirical facts are. … [5]

So much for the word "value." But then how should we understand the distinction between "objective" and "subjective" value? Nicholas Rescher provides a helpful dilemma, in the form of a question, for clarifying this distinction.

The controversy about the objectivity of value comes down to this: Is something valuable because it is valued (and so, solely because it is regarded by people in a certain way), or is something valued—properly and correctly valued—when it is valuable, that is when it is objectively possessed of certain value-endowing features?[6]

The first horn of the dilemma is the subjectivist horn: something is valuable because it is valued. "Values require a valuer," a subjectivist might say. If we ask, "Why is X (for any X) valuable?", a subjectivist would answer that someone (call them an "evaluator") values X. If value subjectivism is true, the truthmaker or grounding for a value statement is the evaluator's stance, attitude, desire, intention, motivation, preference, or other state. Thus, value subjectivism entails the following conditional: if no persons ever existed, nothing would be valuable.

The second horn of the dilemma is, of course, the objectivist horn: something is valued because it is valuable. Value objectivists reject the "Values require a valuer" slogan favored by subjectivists. They replace it with one of their own: "Values require value-endowing features." If we ask, "Why is X (for any X) valuable?", an objectivist would answer that X has certain value-endowing features, features which are not dependent on how anyone feels or thinks about them. For example, suppose X is the Pythagorean theorem: c² = a² + b². One of the features of this theorem is that it is a theorem in Euclidean geometry; another feature is that it is true. Value objectivists would say that one of the reasons the Pythagorean theorem is valuable is that it has the value-endowing feature of truth; in plain English, "The Pythagorean theorem is valuable because it is true." In contrast to subjectivism's view that the truthmaker or grounding for a value statement ultimately lies in some stance or attribute of an evaluator, value objectivism is the view that the truthmaker or grounding for a value statement is something we discover in our surroundings: either X itself, or some property or fact about X. Thus, value objectivism entails the following hypothetical: even if no persons had ever existed, some things would still be valuable. For example, even if no persons had ever existed, it would still be the case that, in Euclidean geometry, the Pythagorean theorem is true. Because it would still be true, it would still be valuable.

Having just explained the objectivism vs. subjectivism dilemma, I will now mention the possibility that it is a false dilemma. Some philosophers believe that values are neither strictly subjective or objective; rather, they are relational, where the word "relational" does not mean "an interpersonal relationship between two people," but a connection between an evaluator and an object. Tara Smith explains:

By saying that values are objective, then, I mean that “objects and actions are good to man and for the sake of reaching a specific goal.” Both aspects are crucial to objectivity: values reflect facts, but they reflect facts as evaluated by human beings, relative to the goal of living. The moral prescriptions derived from values—the beliefs that particular actions are right or wrong—are correspondingly objective.[7]

I predict that some philosophers (lumpers) would collapse relational under subjective; for them the objectivism vs. subjectivism dilemma remains a (true) dilemma. Other philosophers (splitters), however, probably consider relational to be distinct from subjective. Instead of a dilemma, they would say that we have a trilemma (objective, subjective, relational). I don't have a settled view on this; nothing I write below will hinge upon whether we have two or three options for the source of values. I mention it solely for the benefit of readers who find it of interest or, ahem, valuable. In what follows, I will use "X has objective value" to mean "X has value-endowing features, features which are not dependent on how anyone feels or thinks about them."

With a stipulated definition of "objective value" in place, the reader can be forgiven for thinking that it will be easy to define "objective moral value." Sadly, this would be easy only if one has a good working definition of "moral" which one can use to differentiate moral values from other types of values (such as epistemic, aesthetic, prudential, economic, etc.). Formulating such a definition is much harder than it looks, especially if one wants to at least try to avoid begging important questions. Consider, for example, the idea that what distinguishes moral values (such as fairness, kindness, or justice) from other values is that the former are valuable simpliciter. They are not valuable simpliciter because they are good for someone or something (even if they are also good in that way); rather, they have value in themselves. The problem with this idea is that it begs the question against those philosophers who recognize other types of value, such as attributable value (i.e., a particular backpack is good as a member of the kind backpack) or prudential value (i.e., stretching before exercise is good for preventing injury), but who doubt the existence of value simpliciter.

In his book, Morality and Self-Interest, Paul Bloomfield provides a helpful overview of the two major, rival conceptions of "morality" at play among philosophers.[8] According to the first conception, which he calls the “social conception,” morality is focused on answering the question, “How ought one behave towards others?” On this view, if the interests of others are not at issue, then morality is not relevant. According to the second conception, which he calls the “Socratic conception,” morality is focused on answering the question, “How ought I to live?” On this view, morality is relevant to every aspect of a person’s life, even in situations in which the interests of others are not at issue.

In my opinion, Bloomfield's two conceptions of morality are useful because they provide the most promising approach I've found to date to differentiate moral values from other types of values. On both the social and Socratic conceptions of morality, morality involves the behavior of moral agents. The social conception says moral values apply only when the interests of others are at issue, whereas the Socratic conception does not. Thus, we may say that moral values are related to the behavior of moral agents, values that are used determine whether a person or action is morally good or evil. Thus, I shall define an "objective moral value" as things which (a) have worth; (b) their worth is determined by their value-giving features; and (c) are related to the behavior of moral agents. Notice that (a) captures the meaning of "value"; (b) captures the meaning of "objective"; and (c) captures the meaning of "moral."

There is one final concept I need to review: grounding. According to one version of metaphysical grounding theory, “x makes proposition y true iff the fact that x exists grounds the fact that y is true.”[9] For example, if X represents my dog and Y represents the proposition, “My dog exists,” then X makes Y true because X grounds Y. There are three conceivable grounds for objective moral values: abstract, physical, and mental. Allow me to explain with a brief survey of the metaphysical landscape. Philosophers distinguish between concrete and abstract objects. Concrete objects include everyday things in the physical world and the mental world (such as minds), including any nonphysical supernatural beings (if they exist). Abstract objects, if they exist, include mathematical objects, sets, propositions, properties, possible worlds, states of affairs, etc. Because concrete objects can stand in causal relations while abstract objects cannot, I like to refer to "causal reality" as that part of reality which contains concrete objects and "acausal reality" to refer to that part of reality which, it exists, contains abstract objects. It follows that, if objective moral values are grounded, their ground is either abstract (such as propositions or properties), physical (such as facts about human biology or human nature), or mental (such as divine ideas).

2.1.2. Arguments for a Theistic Grounding of Moral Values

These concepts suggest the following argument, which I call the "Necessity of a Theistic Grounding of Objective Values Argument" (hereafter, the "Theistic Value Grounding Argument").

(6) If atheism is true, then there is no grounding for objective moral values.

(7) If theism is true, then there is a grounding for objective moral values.

From (6) and (7) it follows that:

(8) Theism offer a better grounding for objective moral values than atheism.

Because the inference is solid, if there is something wrong with this argument, then one or both premises must be false.

Let's consider the premises in reverse order. Here is the second premise.

(7) If theism is true, then there is a grounding for objective moral values.

In light of the three possible sources of grounding for moral values, it seems to me that (7) is not only false, but obviously false. By itself, the existence of God doesn't tell us much about God's relationship to moral values or how moral values are grounded. (Again, see Section 1.2. The Undeterdetermination Objection.) That is why you can find theistic philosophers and philosophical theologians who have affirmed versions of all three options. William Lane Craig, for example, says that God's nature is the standard of moral goodness.[10] By "God's nature," Craig simply means God's essential attributes or properties, e.g., God's omnipotence, omniscience, moral perfection, and so forth. If someone were to ask Craig how he grounds his moral values (which include justice, love, kindness, and so forth), Craig's answer would be, "In God's nature." If someone were to then ask, "What grounds God's nature?", his answer would be, "Nothing. God's nature isn't grounded in anything external to God." This leads to an interesting observation. Craig's theory about the ontology of moral value entails that ultimately moral value is grounded on nothing. On Craig's view, some moral values are grounded in other moral values, but at bottom there exists at least one (if not more) moral value which is itself ungrounded. If there is at least one moral value which is itself ungrounded, then (7) is false.

Now consider the other premise.

(6) If atheism is true, then there is no grounding for objective moral values.

Why should anyone believe (6)? In order to defend it, Daniel would need to rule out both abstract and physical grounds for moral values. Consider properties. If moral values can be grounded in God's properties, then why not just remove the 'middleman' (God) and say that some moral values are grounded in other values, while some moral values are fundamental, abstract properties and not grounded in anything else? This is Erik Wielenberg's position; see his books Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe and Robust Ethics.[11] Sure, you can find materialists (and scientism-ists) like Alex Rosenberg who reject abstract objects out of hand, but atheism isn't materialism.[12] By itself, atheism is compatible with the existence of abstract objects, including properties. Or consider Natural Law Theory's (NLT) purely physical grounding of moral values. According to NLT, moral values are grounded in objective, biological facts about human nature.[13]

Daniel asserts that, necessarily, any possible grounding for objective moral values must be mental. He employs an argument from telos (purpose) to show that so-called "thin" values like good and bad imply an intent, which in turn presupposes a person. In his words, "Good* implies built-in goals, intent, and a way things SHOULD be, and this simply cannot exist if there is no builder of everything."

This argument strikes me as quite unconvincing. In section 1.1.f, I mentioned two distinct kinds of purpose: agential and functional. Again, I agree with Daniel that an agential purpose cannot exist in the absence of a mind with goals and intent. But I disagree with Daniel that objective values require agential purpose; functional purpose is sufficient for objective values. This can be seen from Daniel's own example. He writes:

The fact that my grass IS green, says nothing about if it is *GOOD* that my grass happens to be green.

I think Daniel is absolutely right about this, but it supports my position, not his. Consider the expression, "it is good that my grass happens to be green." What would that mean? The three senses of "value" I mentioned earlier (cf. sub-section 2.1.1) help identify some possibilities. First, there is the simpliciter interpretation (X just is good): green grass just is good, period. Second, there is the prudential interpretation (X is good for Y): green grass is good for some end (such as increasing the subjective beauty of a lawn). Third, there is the attributable interpretation (X is good as a member of a kind Y): this patch of green grass is good as a member of the kind green grass. In the green grass example, I myself am not even sure what the simpliciter interpretation could mean. As mentioned earlier, one way to think about goodness simpliciter is to think about value-endowing features or reasons. I know what that means in the context of moral values (which are about behavior) or aesthetic values (which are about beauty) or epistemic values (which are about rationality), but I am not sure what "value-endowing features" would mean in the context of grass (which is about neither behavior nor beauty nor rationality). The attributable interpretation seems like it might be more clear, but, at least in the case of green grass, it seems to only push the problem back a step: what would it even mean to be "good as a member of the kind green grass"? At least in this example, it seems to me that the only plausible way to answer that question is to adopt the prudential interpretation. There is a relationship between the valued object (green grass) and an end, such as a desire ("I subjectively like looking at green grass") or function ("being green is good for grass because it indicates photosynthesis"). Desires are inherently mental, while functions need not be: functionality might or might not be the result of a telos, purpose, intent, goal, or design.

Something can have a function even if that function was not designed. Although Darwin reminded us of this, we didn't need Darwin to teach us this. Imagine living in ancient Greece four thousand years ago in a city near a river. After several days of intense rain, the river begins to rise until is raging. Just as the river starts to flood your city, an earthquake occurs. From high up on a nearby mountain, a group of boulders come tumbling down the hillside, eventually settling in the riverbed and effectively redirecting the path of the river away from the city. Furthermore, neither God nor any other deity caused the boulders to land in the riverbed and protect the city. In this hypothetical scenario, the boulders function as a makeshift dam or levee by redirecting the water away from your city. Because your city does not flood, you say to your family, "Those boulders are sure good for protecting our city from the river!" In this case, there was no intention, goal, design, or plan to protect the city, but the boulders still protected the city anyway.

Moreover, why should we think that prudential goodness originating in a desire is objective, while prudential goodness originating in undesigned functionality is subjective, as Daniel supposes? It seems to me that he has things exactly backwards. As Daniel himself repeatedly emphasizes, intent is characteristic of the mental or, as he puts it, "personal." But the strongest sense of ontological objectivity is mind-independence, not just human mind-independence. In contrast, undesigned functionality just is mind-independent functionality. Values based on undesigned functionality are more objective than values based on desires or designed functionality.

2.1.3. Arguments for a Non-Theistic Grounding of Moral Values

1. The Non-Necessity of Mental Grounding. The above discussion of the "Theistic Value Grounding Argument" suggests an argument for the opposite conclusion, which I call the "Non-Mental Grounding of Moral Values Argument." As we saw above when considering the grounding of objective moral values, one possibility is that some objective moral values are grounded in other objective moral values, while the other objective moral values are ungrounded. We can represent this possibility with the following premise.

(9) If objective moral values exist, they are either grounded or ungrounded.

We also saw that the possible grounds for objective moral values are abstract, mental, or physical. This provides our next premise.

(10) If objective moral values are grounded, their grounding is either abstract, mental, or physical.

This, of course, implies that a mental grounding for objective moral values isn't necessary, which yields:

(11) If the grounding of objective moral values is abstract or physical, they do not require a mental grounding.

Now suppose the other option of (9) is true: there are ungrounded objective moral values. From the definition of ungrounded, it follows trivially that:

(12) If objective moral values are ungrounded, they do not require a mental grounding.

From steps 9-12, it follows that

(13) If objective moral values exist, they do not require a mental grounding.

We are now in a position to consider the possible relationship between God and sources of grounding. In both classical theism and what I have elsewhere called "omnitheism," by definition God is neither abstract nor physical and so cannot provide an abstract or physical grounding of anything. If God provides the grounding for anything, that grounding would be a mental grounding. How would that work? The slogan, "Values require a valuer," provides a clue. Valuation (and evaluation) are an activity in the mind or intellect. So the idea, "God grounds moral values by valuing them," is a mental grounding. But step 13 showed that a mental grounding of objective moral values isn't required. It follows that

(14) If objective moral values do not require a mental grounding, then they do not require grounding in the divine intellect.

In other words, objective moral values do not require God to think them.[14] For the same reason, objective moral values do not need to be grounded in a purpose created or designed by God. But what about the possibility that objective moral values are grounded in God's essential properties? Again, if moral values can be grounded in God's properties, then why not just remove the 'middleman' (God) and say that some moral values are grounded in other values, while some moral values are fundamental, abstract properties and not grounded in anything else? And if moral values are neither grounded in God's thoughts nor God's nature, then how else could they be grounded in God? This suggests the following premise.

(15) If objective moral values do not require a grounding in the divine intellect, then they do not need to be grounded in God.

Combined with 13 and 14, it follows that:

(16) If objective moral values exist, then they do not need to be grounded in God.

I conclude that the Theistic Value Grounding Argument fails, while the Non-Mental Grounding of Moral Values Argument succeeds. That entails that step 1 of Daniel's moral argument is false.

2. The Aseity of Abstract Objects. If they exist, abstract objects have several interesting properties. First, they are not physical: they are immaterial, spaceless, and timeless. If, for example, the number "2" exists as an abstract object, not just an idea in the mind of humans, it would be a category error to say, "Once upon a time, there was no number 2. Then, at a later time, the number 2 began to exist." Second, abstract objects are not mental. They are neither persons nor minds nor ideas in a mind. Third, they have what philosophers call "de dicto" necessity: necessarily, a requirement for being an abstract object is necessity. If an abstract object exists, it is metaphysically necessary: there is no possible world in which said abstract object does not exist. Fourth, abstract objects are uncreatable. Cause and effect relationships are temporal relationships: a cause is either before or simultaneous with its effect in time. Because abstract objects exist outside of time, they can neither cause anything nor be caused by anything. Because "being created" is a type of effect, it follows that abstract objects cannot be created by any thing, person, or being, including God.

If moral values exist as abstract objects, they exist as properties in the metaphysically heavy sense just described.[15] Consider the following list of moral values: fairness, kindness, and justice. These values may be properties of persons (e.g., "My professor is strict but fair"), actions (e.g., "The police officer's delivery of a speeding ticket was kind"), or states of affairs (e.g., "This entire situation is just"). If these values "exist as mind-independent realities and immaterial substances," then they are abstract objects.[16]

This suggests the following argument, which I will call the "abstract aseity" argument:

(17) If an abstract object exists, it is uncreatable.

(18) Abstract moral values, if they exist, are heavyweight properties.

From (17) and (18), it follows that:

(19) If abstract moral values exist, they are uncreatable.

From (19) and the definition of "uncreatable," it follows that:

(20) If abstract moral values exist, they are not grounded in God.

As before, this entails that step 1 of Daniel's moral argument is false.

2.2. Duties

2.2.1. Exposition

Suppose that values, including moral values, exist. It follows that some things are morally valuable (or good), others are morally neutral, while still others are morally disvaluable (or evil). One might ask, "What does that any of that have to do with me?" One possible, albeit overly simplistic, answer might be, "You should do all the good things and none of the bad things." That answer is overly simplistic for the same reason it is not realistic: there are simply too many good things to do. No one human being could do all of the individual good actions available to them. Moreover, it is easy to imagine things that are good and yet too demanding. For example, most people would say that it would be good for a person to donate a kidney to a complete stranger, but it would not be evil if that same person did not donate their kidney. This raises an interesting question: is there a way to differentiate actions such that performing some action A is good but not performing A is not evil?

The concept of a "duty" or "obligation" offers a solution. In the kidney donation example, we might say, "Donating a kidney to a complete stranger is a morally good thing to do, but you have no moral obligation to do so. The refusal to donate one's kidney to a complete stranger is morally neutral." What does it mean to say that some action, call it A, is an "obligation"? That we are required to perform A, presumably. But anyone who does not know what obligation means will be equally in the dark about what it means for an action to be "required."

In his book, A Theory of Legal Obligation, Stefano Bertea provides a nuanced conceptual analysis of obligation in general, which he treats as a genus concept, before identifying the distinguishing characteristics of the species of obligation known as legal obligation. In this section, I will follow Bertrea's lead by starting with a summary of Bertrea's conceptual analysis of obligation per se and then moving onto the moral species of obligation. Let us begin, then, with Bertrea own's summary of his analysis.

In this context, I engaged in a critical review of the literature concerning obligation and claimed that the features and properties essentially attached to obligation are practicality, normativity, requiredness, wrongness-relatedness, and linkage to accountability. On this basis, I concluded that obligation is best conceived as a practically normative (Section 3.1) requirement that makes a perceptible and yet empirically resistible claim on us (Section 3.2), who in turn do something presumptively wrong, for which we can be held accountable, insofar as we fail to abide by it (Section 3.3). This I regard to be the fundamental, or essential, and so minimal characterization of obligation.[17]

This requires some unpacking, so let's consider each of these minimal requirements or desiderata in turn. First, practicality indicates that obligation is "action-centered," i.e., "concerned with one's doing or acting."[18] Second, normativity means that obligations refer to norms or standards for guiding, appraising, justifying, and judging.[19] The combination of practicality and normativity yields a "practical norm," something that "indicates that which an agent ought to do."[20] Third, obligations are binding requirements, as opposed to "advisory standards." When someone fails to do what is merely advisable, then their action is merely foolish or insensible. In contrast, when someone fails to do what is required, then they have broken a constraint on their behavior. Bertrea notes that the English word "obligation" (from the Latin word ligare, meaning to tie or bind something together) describes the condition of being tied or bound. This constraint must be not only "perceptible" but significant. As Bertrea puts it, "it is widely recognized that we cannot be said to have an obligation if we are under no constraint, or similarly if we can effortlessly free ourselves of it."[21] Fourth, wrongness and "obligation essentially imply each other, to the effect that if an agent has a presumptive obligation to act in a certain way then it is prima facie wrong for that agent to act differently."[22] Finally, fifth, obligation is correlated with accountability. Someone who acts in breach of an obligation can be held accountable for that breach. But what does that mean? Unfortunately, Bertrea does not say. In the absence of any definitive suggestion from Bertrea, I suggest the following taken from Kraak, Swinburn, and Lawrence: "accountability demands a relationship between an actor and a forum, the actor is required to explain and justify one’s performance or conduct, the forum has power to pass judgment, and the actor may face consequences."[23]

Although these minimal features of obligation suggest that obligation is relational, Bertrea urges us against making too much of this fact, "especially when obligation is understood (as it is here) in a generic sense."[24] To help explain this point, Bertrea employs Gilberts' helpful distinction between "directed" and "imputed" obligation. Because I consider this distinction to be key, it is worth quoting Bertrea's explanation at length.

One can express the same idea by relying on the distinction between directed and imputed obligation. Obligation in the directed sense is a narrow notion of obligation that refers to the position of someone bound to do something for someone else, who in turn has a legitimate claim to that thing. A directed obligation is an obligation owed to a particular person and so is correlative to a claim or right that person has. From this it follows that a directed obligation is intrinsically relational by virtue of the specific bond it sets up between individuals. This notion of obligation can be contrasted with a broader notion: the idea of imputed obligation, understood as a requirement that is not necessarily owed to another person bound by a special relationship to those placed under the obligation but is rather owed to others generally. Thus, the counterparty in cases involving an imputed obligation needs to be neither specified nor specifiable. An obligation can be due simply because compliance with it is in the general interest, rather than being understood to satisfy the rightful claim of a specific individual accordingly entitled to exact compliance from those placed under the obligation. In imputed obligations, therefore, the relational aspect of obligation is only indirect and devoid of practical import. This, in turn, justifies the claim that a broad and tolerant concept of obligation should refrain from incorporating any reference to the relational structure of the bond constitutive of obligation.[25]

Having now clarified obligation as a genus, it is now time to clarify moral obligation as a species. In my exposition on value (see section 2.1.1), I defined "moral value" as value related to the behavior of moral agents. In the same vein, I say that a "moral obligation" is an obligation somehow related to moral value. I realize this definition is pretty vague, but that is by design. There are many ways moral value and moral obligation might be related: identity, grounding (full or partial), voluntarist (guided by moral value), and so forth. I see no reason to beg the question in favor or against any of these options while defining moral obligation.

2.2.2. Arguments for a Theistic Grounding of Moral Obligation

1. Laws Require a Lawgiver. Many theists appeal to the slogan, "All laws must be made be a lawgiver." Since moral laws are a type of law, the conclusion is drawn that moral laws must have a moral lawgiver. A conceptual analysis of the moral lawgiver reveals that this lawgiver must be God, not any human or group of humans. I call this argument the "Lawgiver Argument."

(21) Laws must be made by a lawgiver.

(22) A lawgiver must be either natural or divine.

(23) Moral laws cannot have a natural lawgiver.

Therefore:

(24) Moral laws must have a divine lawgiver. [From 21-23]

(25) If God does not exist, then there is no divine lawgiver.

Therefore:

(26) If there is no divine lawgiver, then there are no moral laws. [From 24-25]

Therefore:

(27) If God does not exist, then there are no moral laws. [From 25-26]

(28) If there are no moral laws, then there are no moral obligations.

Therefore:

(29) If God does not exist, then there are no moral obligations. [From 27-28]

But why should anyone believe (21)? Laws require a lawgiver only if they are, in fact, made. Government laws are the paradigm example of laws that require a lawgiver, but, to use one of William Lane Craig’s trademark expressions, government laws began to exist. Not all laws are made, however. The laws of nature, logic, and mathematics are three examples of laws that are discovered, not invented. Not only do these examples undercut the support for premise (21), they actually provide the basis of an argument against (21), based on the following negative analogy.

(30) The laws of nature, logic, mathematics, and (objective) morality did not begin to exist.

(31) The laws of nature, logic, and mathematics also do not have lawgivers.

(32) Therefore, the laws of (objective) morality do not have a lawgiver.

(32) entails, accordingly, that premise (26) is false. I conclude, therefore, that the Lawgiver Argument is not successful.

2. Humans are God’s Property. Here is Baruch Brody:

[I]f we are the property of God, then perhaps we just have an obligation to do whatever he says, and then perhaps we can … consider the possible claim that … actions are right (wrong) for us to do just in case and only because God, who has created and owns us and whom we therefore have an obligation to follow, wants us to do (refrain from doing) them.[26]

What, exactly, is the argument here? “If we are the property of God, then perhaps we just have an obligation to do whatever he says.” One premise of the argument, then, seems to be:

(33) If humans are God’s property, then humans have an obligation to do whatever God says.

“Perhaps,” Brody suggests, “actions are right (wrong) for us to do just in case and only because God … wants us to do (refrain from doing) them. ” This suggests the following conclusion:

(34) Actions are right (wrong) for us to do just in case and only because God wants us to do (refrain from doing) them.

But what, precisely, is the logical path that gets us from (33) to (34)? Many would object to the idea that it is even moral for God to possess human beings, but put that to the side. The main problem here is logical. Suppose we grant, even if only for the sake of argument, the idea that ownership is a sufficient condition for generating moral obligations. Why should anyone believe that it is a necessary condition? As Erik Wielenberg writes, “the claim that (1) Being X owns Being Y does not imply (2) the only moral obligations Y has are the ones imposed by X.”[27] What we need, then, is a reason to think that moral obligations may only be generated by property owners. If Brody has such a reason, however, he doesn’t tell us what it is. Instead, he writes, “we have, probably, to conclude that theological claims might make a difference to the truth or falsity” of various moral issues. I agree with Brody about that, but that is consistent with the objection that ownership is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition, for generating moral obligations.

2.2.2. Arguments for a Non-Theistic Grounding of Moral Obligation

1. The Prior Obligations Objection. See my discussion in section 1.3.

2. The Epistemological Objection. Daniel is a Divine Command Theorist (DCT-ist). According to Daniel, God's commands constitute moral obligations.

Moral obligations are naturally expressed as authoritative commands: When we talk about moral obligations, they appear as authoritative commands. Do this, don’t do that. Help that old woman with her groceries, don’t rob that bank, etc… If these obligations exist, where would these objective commands be coming from? If the issuer of these commands has no authority over us, then we have no obligation to obey them.

The supporting argument seems to be this.

(36) Moral obligations are expressed as authoritative commands.

(37) Only God has the kind of authority needed to create moral obligations.

Therefore:

(38) Moral obligations are God's commands.

If sound, this argument would show that DCT entails that "God commands X" is a necessary condition for X to be a moral duty. It would not, however, show that a divine command is a sufficient condition to create an obligation. To see this, imagine the Air Force General's order (mentioned in section 1.3) to attack an enemy airbase. It is not sufficient for the General to order the attack by speaking (or writing) the words, "Attack the airbase." If the General spoke those words in an empty office (or wrote them on a piece of paper which no one ever read), no one would have an obligation to obey. In order for that speech (or writing) act to create an obligation, the Airmen to be commanded must be aware of the order. Furthermore, they must be aware, not just of the order's existence, but of the authority of the one issuing the order. Imagine an Airman hearing a recording of a stern voice ordering the attack, but the Airman does not recognize the voice and neither the recording nor anything else provides clues of the speaker's identity. In such a case, the Airman would have no obligation to obey the order because they would not know it came from someone with the needed authority to order the attack.

This hypothetical example shows that DCT entails the existence of three conditions which are jointly both necessary and sufficient for moral obligations: (i) God issues a command; (ii) the person(s) to become obligated by the command are aware of the command; and (iii) the person(s) to become obligated by the command are aware that the command came from God.

The problem for DCT is that there are reasonable nontheists who don't believe there exists a God who has issued commands. Yet, as Wes Morriston points out, if someone reasonably (=nonculpably) doesn't believe that God exists, such a person could not both "hear" God's commands and know that the commands really are God's.[28] Thus, DCT conjoined with the existence of reasonable nontheists yields the remarkable conclusion that if God exists (and DCT is true), then reasonable nontheists have no moral obligations. But this is absurd. DCT is supposed to explain how all human beings, not just theists, have moral obligations. But, as we have just seen, DCT ends up denying the very fact it was supposed to explain. It denies that all human beings have obligations because DCT, when conjoined with the proposition "Reasonable nontheists exist," entails that reasonable nontheists do not have moral obligations.

How might a theistic defender of DCT respond to the Epistemological Objection? Here I will assess two main options: the "No Reasonable Nonbelief Objection" and the "Force of Conscience Objection." Let's consider each in turn.

One option is to deny that there are any reasonable non-believers whatsoever. The late Christian apologist Greg Bahnsen once said, "There are no atheists; there are only professed atheists." Bahnsen's view was that professed atheists and other non-believers are either lying (because they say that God does not exist despite knowing that He does) or self-deceived (they have somehow tricked themselves into believing what they once knew to be false). As philosopher J.L. Schellenberg argues, however, "it would take something like willful blindness to fail to affirm that not all nonbelief is the product of willful blindness (even if some of it is)."

Apart from the general fact of reasonable (=nonculpable, nonresistant) nonbelief, Schellenberg has usefully catalogued four more specific facts about reasonable nonbelief. These four specific facts about reasonable nonbelief are four types of reasonable nonbelief: (1) former believers; (2) lifelong seekers; (3) converts to nontheistic religions; and (4) isolated nontheists. Let's take a brief look at each of these. Regarding (1), as Schellenberg points out, from the perspective of theism, former believers were on the right path when they lost their belief in God. Turning to (2), these are people who are not only open to relationship with God, but seek God for their entire lives. They seek, but do not find. As for (3), other nonresistant nonbelievers seek God but instead convert to nontheistic religions like Buddhism. Finally, (4) includes members of cultures that lack the idea of God altogether (such as hunter-gatherers prior to recorded history, the Chinese cultures from the beginning of their history until the Christian Middle Ages, etc.).

The No Reasonable Nonbelief Objection entails that there has never been, is not now, and never will be a single reasonable nonbeliever. For the reasons just given, however, it is much more likely that reasonable nonbelievers exist.

The other main option to refute the Reasonable Non-Believers Objection is what I call the "Force of Conscience Objection." To put it somewhat crudely, the basic idea is that everyone, even reasonable nonbelievers (if they exist), has an awareness of their basic moral obligations. Following Hebrews 8:10, a Jew or Christian might say that all human beings (or at least those of a certain age) know "in their hearts" what God (morally) requires, even if some human beings (such as reasonable nonbelievers) don't recognize that the source of this knowledge is from divine commands. As Morriston points out, however,

the idea of a command that one can 'receive' without being aware of being addressed by anyone is extremely counterintuitive. Even if God is the ultimate cause of the non-believer's thinking in this matter, she does not seem to herself to be "interpreting" a "sign" or receiving a "command", and it is quite a stretch to insist on this way of characterizing what she is doing.[29]

Morriston then proceeds to offer additional points against (what I call) the Force of Conscience Objection, but they aren't necessary to rehearse here.[30] The idea, "God commands non-believers through signs (like conscience) which carry imperative force, while the non-believers are unaware that such commands are genuine commands or that their origin is divine", entails that a literal speech act of God is not necessary for moral obligation. This amounts to an abandonment of DCT, not a defense of it.

2.3. Freedom

2.3.1. Terminology

It is a commonplace to compare and contrast free will with determinism. But, as Stephen Maitzen points out, this pairing compares and contrasts a non-technical concept (free will) with a technical concept (determinism).[31] To be consistent, we should use the same level of technical rigor when describing both options. For a non-technical audience, the appropriate pairing is not “free will vs. determinism” but “free will vs. unfree will.” As Maitzen explains, in the non-technical sense used by competent English speakers, “free will is the capacity to make free choices.”[32] The fact that the expression “free choice” is not considered redundant suggests that the proper antonym, at least for a non-technical audience, is “unfree choice.” But what does that mean? I shall define an “unfree choice” as any choice that is not forced, coerced, compelled, manipulated, or pressured; a “free choice” is any choice that is not an unfree choice.

2.3.2. Arguments for the Necessity of Free Will

How might the free will vs. unfree will debate be related to morality? According to one school of thought, free will is necessary for moral responsibility. Proponents of this view defend some version of what Ishtiyaque Haji calls the “No Responsibility” Argument; Haji formulates the argument as follows.

(1R) If unfree will is true, then no one can do otherwise.
(2R) If no one can do otherwise, no one is ever morally responsible for anything.

Therefore:

(3R) If unfree will is true, no one is ever morally responsible for anything.[33]

Notice, however, that the conclusion (3R) is about moral responsibility, not moral obligation. Perhaps moral obligation can exist even if moral responsibility does not. In order to show that free will is a precondition of moral obligation, we need an additional or different argument, which Haji calls the “No Obligation” Argument.

(1O) If unfree will is true, then no one can do otherwise.

(2O) If no one can do otherwise, no one ever has a moral obligation to do anything.

Therefore:

(3O) If unfree will is true, no one ever has a moral obligation to do anything.[34]

Haji argues that the No Responsibility Argument is much more promising than the No Obligation Argument. Even if we grant that moral responsibility requires that we be the “ultimate” originator of our actions, moral obligation does not have that presupposition. Moral responsibility is a property of persons, while moral obligation is a property of actions (or, if you prefer, a property of a rule about actions). An action can have the property of being morally required (obligatory), permissible, or forbidden (prohibited), even if the person who performs that act does so “unfreely.”[35] This entails that premise (2O) is false and so free will is not necessary for moral obligation.

2.3.3. Arguments Against the Necessity of Free Will

1. Moral Value without Free Will. Recall from section 2.1 that “value objectivism” is the view that the truthmaker or grounding for a value statement is something we discover in our surroundings: either X itself, or some property or fact about X. It is trivial to demonstrate the compatibility of unfree will with objective values. Let “A” refer to the following pair of propositions.

(39) Free will does not exist;

and

(40) Objective moral value exists.

The problem, then, is to show that (39) and (40) are consistent. This could be done by finding a proposition r that is consistent with (39) and such that (39) and (r) together entail (40) . One proposition that might do the trick is

(VALUE-FEATURES) Objective moral value exists and is grounded in the value-endowing features of objects.

(VALUE-FEATURES) is consistent with (39): it neither explicitly nor formally nor implicitly contradicts (39). But notice that the combination of (39) and (VALUE-FEATURES) entails (40). It follows, then, that (39) and (40) (and hence set A) are consistent.

2. Moral Obligation without Free Will. We can prove the consistency of moral obligation and unfree will in effectively the same way. Let “B” refer to the following pair of propositions.

(39) Free will does not exist;

and

(41) Objective moral obligation exists.

This time our task is to show that (39) and (41) are consistent. This could be done, as we've seen, by finding a proposition r that is consistent with (39) and such that (39) and (r) together entail (41). One proposition that might do the trick is

(ACTION-PROPERTY) Moral value obligation exists, and is a property of actions.

(ACTION-PROPERTY) is consistent with (39): it neither explicitly nor formally nor implicitly contradicts (39). But notice that the combination of (39) and (ACTION-PROPERTY) entails (41). It follows, then, that (39) and (41) (and hence set B) are consistent.

In summary, then, these two arguments show that free will is neither a precondition of objective moral value nor of moral obligation.

2.3.4. Clarification of My Own Views

I am tentatively and somewhat unenthusiastically a determinist. Allow me to explain. I say that I am “tentatively” a determinist because, compared to the time I’ve spent studying metaethics, I have spent relatively little time studying the free will debate. Nevertheless, based on what I have read, it is hard for me to see how libertarian freedom is possible. Depending on the day of the week, it seems to me that LFW is either unintelligible or, if it is intelligible, impossible. (I won’t attempt to argue for that view here; my intent is merely to describe my current view.) This view has nothing whatsoever to do with with my atheism. First, by itself, atheism says nothing about whether dualism is true. Why do I mention dualism? In one sense (more on this in a moment), it is easier to make sense of LFW if dualism is true. So one possibility is that God does not exist, dualism is true, and LFW exists. The statement, "Free will doesn't really make sense on atheism," is false. Second, by itself, theism says nothing about whether LFW is true. As any Calvinist will be happy to tell you, theism is consistent with determinism.

Free will seems like a problem for atheism because so many atheists are physicalists and physicalism is incompatible with dualism. If materialism is true, then there are no souls and everything humans do is subject to the laws of physics. In contrast, if we have a soul, then it is at least possible, in some important sense of “possible,” that the immaterial soul can do things which physical objects cannot. In particular, the actions taken by immaterial souls need not be limited to those determined by physical laws combined with antecedent physical causes. So far, so good. But notice that “actions taken by an immaterial source are not in any way determined” does not follow from “actions taken by an immaterial soul are not physically determined.” It may be the case that immaterial souls exist, but their actions are entirely predetermined by pre-existing immaterial causes combined with the “laws of supernature.” In fact, if I were a theist, that is precisely what I would believe.

I also said that I am “unenthusiastically” a determinist. Why? I’m not entirely sure. My attitude towards determinism does not seem to be related to the (alleged) implications of determinism for moral responsibility; it might be that I wish determinism were false simply because if determinism is true, then there is a certain kind of ability which neither I nor anyone else has, and I wish that ability existed. Nothing of importance follows from my lack of enthusiasm or wishing, of course. I mention this just to underscore the point that I think I think determinism is true, I do not find myself hoping that is true. In other words, my bias seems to be against determinism.

2.4. Purpose

2.4.1. Exposition

There are various general systems of ethics such as Kantianism, utilitarianism, ethical egoism, Natural Law Theory, etc. According to deontological (from Greek deon, “duty”, and logos, “science”) systems, an action’s relationship with a moral norm or standard, not the action’s consequences, is what determines whether an action is good, obligatory, or virtuous. Examples of deontological systems include Kantianism and normative divine command theory. In contrast, teleological (from Greek telos, “end”) systems entail that the consequences or outcomes of an action determine moral concepts like goodness, duty, and virtue. Examples of teleological systems include utilitarianism, Aristotelian ethics, ethical egoism, and ethical altruism.

Let’s take a closer look at Aristotelian ethics. Aristotle famously held that there are four types of causes: material, formal, efficient, and final. Interestingly, Aristotle used the word telos to refer to a thing’s final cause, i.e., the end or goal or towards which a thing naturally points.[36] Aristotle argued that that the highest good—the ultimate goal or end of human life—is eudaimonia. Because there is no universally agreed upon English translation of eudaimonia, it may be useful to consider its etymology. The prefix “eu-“ means good or well and “daimon” means “spirit”, so the literal translation of eudaimonia is something like “good spirit.” Many scholars, however, believe that there is no single English word which is an adequate translation of eudaimonia. In lieu of a single word, many scholars will use expressions such as “human flourishing” or “the best sort of life.”

While some readers might see the word “goal” and think of a goal-setting intelligence, that is not what Aristotle intended. Aristotle believed that final causes do not imply intentions or even intelligence. As Edward Feser explains:

Aristotelian teleological realism holds that teleology or final causality is intrinsic to natural substances, and does not derive from any divine source. Aristotle did of course believe in a divine Unmoved Mover. But he thought that the existence of the Unmoved Mover followed from the fact of motion or change, not from the existence of final causes, which he regarded instead as simply a basic fact about the world. The acorn points beyond itself to the oak—not because it was made that way, but because it just is that way by nature, simply by virtue of being an acorn. It does not do this consciously, of course, since acorns are totally unconscious. The whole point of the Aristotelian view is to insist that goal-directedness does not require a mind which consciously intends the goal. Hence, pace many adherents of the Platonic approach to teleology, there is on the Aristotelian view no necessary connection between teleology and theism.[37]

In contrast to an Aristotelian telos, end, or final cause, some writers use the word “purpose” to refer to goals or intentions chosen by an intelligent being. Here is Robert Solokowski.

An end, telos, belongs to a thing in itself, while a purpose arises only when there are human beings. Purposes are intentions, something we wish for and are deliberating about or acting to achieve. Ends, in contrast, are there apart from any human wishes and deliberations. They are what the thing is when it has reached its best state, its perfection and completion in and for itself. Ends and purposes are both goods, but goods of different ontological orders.

Purposes come into existence when human beings set out thoughtfully to do something. Purposes are wished-for satisfactions in view of which an agent deliberates and acts. A man might set various purposes for himself, such as becoming a lawyer, supporting his family, going on vacation, or giving someone a gift, and he will do various things toward achieving this purpose: he will apply to law schools, get a job, buy tickets, or go shopping. … Thus, purposes exist "in the mind" and not in things, and they exist only because there are human beings. …

Ends, in contrast, do not spring into being through human foresight. They do not spring into being at all; they come about concomitantly with the things they belong to. Things might spring into being when they are generated or made or occur by accident, but ends do not arise without the thing. An end is the finished, perfected state of a thing, the thing when it is acting well as what it is.[38]

Thus, Solokowski uses the words “end” and “purpose” to refer to what I called in section 2.1 “functional purpose” and “agential purpose,” respectively. Notice also that, for any given entity, object, or being, we have four possibilities: (i) both a telos and a purpose; (ii) a telos but no purpose; (iii) a purpose but no telos; and (iv) neither a purpose nor a telos.

We are now in a position to consider the relationship between morality, telos, and purpose. Teleological ethics are closely related to prudential value. Remember from section 2.1.1 that prudential value is “value for.” A telos is a sufficient condition for prudential value. Aristotelian ethics is the view that human flourishing is good for human beings, but notice that this does not require human beings were created for a purpose. In other words, even if something was not created for a purpose, that thing can still have value if it has value-endowing features; a telos is one way to think about such features. In other words, an (agential) purpose is not a necessary condition for value or morality.

2.4.2. Arguments for the Necessity of (Agential) Purpose

1. Evaluations Presuppose Purpose. Noting how purpose can inform evaluations, Daniel gives an example of a car:

A car is created with the purpose of transporting humans and objects from place to place. A car that does not run and cannot fulfill its intended purpose is thought to be a “bad” car. The better a car accomplishes its purpose, the better a car is thought to be. (LINK)

Notice the key features of this example. First, our background knowledge includes the fact that cars have an agential purpose: they are designed by humans for a purpose (transportation). Second, Daniel’s evaluation does not appeal to value simpliciter or value as such, but prudential value. For example, “a car that does not run ” is bad for transportation.

What, then, is the argument?

(36) Values entail a goal or purpose.

(37) Moral values are values.

Therefore:

(38) Moral values entail a goal or purpose.

We may agree with Daniel that agential purpose can provide a sufficient basis for prudential value, but that does not mean that it is necessary. The problem here is two-fold. First, Daniel provides no reason to deny that functional purpose can provide a sufficient basis for prudential value. More to the point, Daniel provides no argument against Aristotelian teleological realism. Second, even if agential purpose were a necessary condition for prudential value, that would not entail the necessity of agential purpose for value simpliciter. Value simpliciter could be abstract properties; abstract properties are mind-independent. For both reasons, then, (36) is false.

2.4.3. Arguments against the Necessity of (Agential) Purpose

1. Value Simpliciter without Agential Purpose. It is trivial to demonstrate the compatibility of objective moral value with the nonexistence of an agential purpose for human beings. Let “C” refer to the following pair of propositions.

(39) An agential purpose for human beings does not exist;

and

(34) Objective moral value exists.

The problem, then, is to show that (39) and (34) are consistent. Once again this can be done by finding a proposition r that is consistent with (39) and such that (39) and (r) together entail (34) . One proposition that might do the trick is

(PURPOSELESS VALUE PER SE) An agential purpose for human beings does not exist, objective moral value exists; and objective moral value is grounded in the value-endowing features of objects.

(PURPOSELESS VALUE PER SE) is consistent with (39): it neither explicitly nor formally nor implicitly contradicts (39). But notice that the combination of (39) and (PURPOSELESS VALUE PER SE) entails (34). It follows, then, that (39) and (34) (and hence set C) are consistent.

2. Prudential Value without Agential Purpose. The previous example appealed to abstract properties (Platonism); let us now consider an Aristotelian example. For proposition r, let’s replace (PURPOSELESS VALUE PER SE) with:

(PURPOSELESS VALUE FOR) An agential purpose for human beings does not exist, objective moral value exists; and objective moral value is grounded in biological facts about human flourishing.

Notice that (PURPOSELESS VALUE FOR) is also consistent with (39): it neither explicitly nor formally nor implicitly contradicts (39). But notice that the combination of (39) and (PURPOSELESS VALUE FOR) entails (34). It follows, then, once again that (39) and (34) (and hence set C) are consistent.

3. Subjective Purpose Cannot Ground Objective Values. A third argument against the necessity of agential purpose is based upon the incoherence of grounding supposedly 'objective' values and duties in a subjective purpose.

The conjunction "moral values are objective" and "moral values are determined by fit to God's purpose(s)" entails that "moral values are objective." That, in turn, entails that moral values are mind-independent abstract properties. So the first premise is:

(40) If moral values are objective and determined by fit to God's purpose(s), then they are mind-independent abstract properties. [Premise]

The next step is to explore the implications of "moral values are determined by fit to God's purpose(s)." God's purpose(s) just are God's intentions, desires, or goals. So the next premise is:

(41) If moral values are objective and determined by fit to God's purpose(s), then they are dependent upon God's intentions, desires, or goals. [Premise]

By definition, mind-independent abstract properties are not mental properties.

(42) If moral values are mind-independent abstract properties, then they are not mental properties.

Likewise, by definition, God's intentions, desires, or goals are mental properties.

(43) If moral values are dependent upon God's intentions, desires, or goals, then they are mental properties.

Taken together, (42) and (43) entail:

(44) If moral values are objective and determined by fit to God's purpose(s), it would be true that moral values are mental properties and it would be false that moral values are mental properties.

(44) violates the law of noncontradiction and so represents an impossibility. Combined with (40) and (41), we get:

(45) It is not the case that moral values are objective and determined by fit to God's purpose(s).

Daniel denies (40) by redefining the word "objective" to mean, in effect, independent of human mental states. He writes:

Firstly, when we say morality is objective, we mean that it transcends and is above/outside HUMANS. So “objective” means not “subjective” to HUMAN* preferences.

I acknowledge that when apologists like Daniel use the word "objective," they adopt the definition found in the Moral Apologetics Dictionary. Atheistic Platonists do not use the Moral Apologetics Dictionary.[39] Nor do the majority of philosophers working in metaethics. The word "objective" is polysemous, but when philosophers use it in an ontological sense, the dominant definition is mind-independence, not merely independence of human minds.

Daniel continues:

Secondly, if nothing objective can come from a subject as this argument implies, then the argument is self defeating… the argument “nothing objective can come from a subject,” is ITSELF coming FROM a subject. So if this argument is true, then it is not true, because truth by definition is OBJECTIVE, not subjective.

This reply is based upon a misunderstanding of the objection. Consider the following proposition:

(46) Nothing objective can come from a subject.

Properly understood, (46) is really about the grounding for a proposition or property, the thing in virtue of which the proposition is true or the property obtains. (46) may be restated as:

(46') Mind-independent propositions or properties cannot be grounded in mind-dependent propositions or properties.

Contrary to what Daniel claims, (46) is not self-defeating and (46') shows why. The grounding of (46') is mind-independent; it is true by definition. Daniel has confused the act of asserting a proposition (which is what he means when he writes "the argument 'nothing objective can come from a subject' is ITSELF coming FROM a subject") with the proposition's grounding.

2.5. Standards

2.5.1. Exposition

Note: This essay was published in stages. The first stage included only Section 1 of this essay. Section 1.1 presents the Inessential Objection. Part of that objection included the claim that a “moral standard” is redundant moral values and duties. Daniel posted his response to Section 1 before Section 2 had even been started. In his reply, he clarifies how he distinguishes a moral standard from moral values and duties. When I first read his reply, I believed that the Inessential Objection does not apply to what he calls a "moral standard." Upon further review, however, I believe that the Inessential Objection does apply. As Daniel defines his terms, moral obligations are duties to God to obey God's rules. In other words, his view entails that a moral standard is a necessary condition for a moral obligation. In any case, in this section I discuss in detail the relationship between theism, atheism, and moral standards. Even if I am wrong and the Inessential Objection does not apply to moral standards, I argue that Daniel has given no good reason to think that a theistic grounding of a moral standard is needed.

2.5.1.1. General Systems of Ethics

As mentioned in Section 2.4.1, there are various general systems of ethics such as Aristotelian ethics, ethical altruism, ethical egoism, Kantianism, Natural Law Theory, normative divine command theory, utilitarianism, virtue ethics, etc. Ethicists group these systems into three main categories: consequentialist (or teleological) ethics, deontological ethics, and virtue ethics. Let’s take a look at each.

Consequentialist (or Teleological) Ethics

Consequentialism (or moral teleology) argues that only the consequences of an action determine its moral status. The best known example of consequentialism is utilitarianism. Utilitarianism may be divided into two types:

1. Act utilitarianism: the view that only the consequences of individual actions determine the moral status of an action.

2. Rule utilitarianism: the view that the consequences of a rule of conduct determine the moral status of actions.

Deontological Ethics

Deontologists believe that “conformity with a moral norm” is what determines whether an action is required, permitted, or forbidden. Ethicists typically divide deontological theories into two types:

1. Agent-Centered Theories: Here is the SEP:

According to agent-centered theories, we each have both permissions and obligations that give us agent-relative reasons for action. An agent-relative reason is an objective reason, just as are agent neutral reasons; neither is to be confused with either the relativistic reasons of a relativist meta-ethics, nor with the subjective reasons that form the nerve of psychological explanations of human action (Nagel 1986). An agent-relative reason is so-called because it is a reason relative to the agent whose reason it is; it need not (although it may) constitute a reason for anyone else. Thus, an agent-relative obligation is an obligation for a particular agent to take or refrain from taking some action; and because it is agent-relative, the obligation does not necessarily give anyone else a reason to support that action. Each parent, for example, is commonly thought to have such special obligations to his/her child, obligations not shared by anyone else. Likewise, an agent-relative permission is a permission for some agent to do some act even though others may not be permitted to aid that agent in the doing of his permitted action. Each parent, to revert to the same example, is commonly thought to be permitted (at the least) to save his own child even at the cost of not saving two other children to whom he has no special relation. Agent-centered theories and the agent-relative reasons on which they are based not only enjoin each of us to do or not to do certain things; they also instruct me to treat my friends, my family, my promisees in certain ways because they are mine, even if by neglecting them I could do more for others’ friends, families, and promisees.

2. Patient-Centered Theories: Again, I am going to quote the SEP:

A second group of deontological moral theories can be classified, as patient-centered, as distinguished from the agent-centered version of deontology just considered. These theories are rights-based rather than duty-based; and some versions purport to be quite agent-neutral in the reasons they give moral agents.

Virtue Ethics

In contrast to both consequentialism and deontological ethics, virtue ethics emphasizes moral character. Again, I will list the main types of virtue ethical theories as listed in the SEP; furthermore, all quotations below are taken from the SEP.

1. Eudaimonist Virtue Ethics: defines “virtues in terms of their relationship to eudaimonia”

2. Agent-Based and Exemplarist Virtue Ethics: “other forms of normativity—including the value of eudaimonia—are traced back to and ultimately explained in terms of the motivational and dispositional qualities of agents.”

3. Target-Centered Virtue Ethics: “begins where most ethics students find themselves, namely, with the idea that generosity, courage, self-discipline, compassion, and the like get a tick of approval. It then examines what these traits involve.”

4. Platonistic Virtue Ethics: One version, championed by Timothy Chappell, says that “Good agency in the truest and fullest sense presupposes the contemplation of the Form of the Good.” Another version, defended by Robert Adams, is the view that “God is both the exemplification and the source of all goodness. Other things are good, he suggests, to the extent that they resemble God. … Virtues come into the account as one of the ways in which some things (namely, persons) could resemble God.”

Summary

This completes our survey of general systems of ethics. Let us now turn to the relationship between general systems and standards.

2.5.1.2. “Thin” and “Thick” Moral Standards

What does it mean for something to be a “moral standard”? As a first step towards answering that question, take a look at how David Copp distinguishes between “moral propositions” and “moral standards.”

The standard-based account rests on a distinction between moral propositions – such as the proposition that lying is wrong – and moral standards – such as the standard prohibiting lying that would be expressed by the imperative, “Do not lie!” Most of us subscribe to the standard that prohibits lying in that, among other things, we are inhibited from lying and would feel guilty to lie, but it makes no sense to suppose that someone believes a standard (given what I mean by a standard). Standards (I stipulate) are the semantic contents expressed by imperatives, and so they are not believed, nor do they represent the world as being one way or another.[40]

This is a notable passage. Remember that propositions are sentences which are truth apt, i.e., sentences which can be true or false. While moral propositions are a type of proposition (and so can be true or false), Copp holds that moral standards are not propositions (and so cannot be true or false). This seems to follow from a straightforward analysis of the surface grammar and semantics of moral sentences. The proposition, <Lying is morally wrong>, is expressed by the English declarative sentence, “Lying is morally wrong.” In contrast, the sentence, “Do not lie!”, is an imperative sentence in English. Whereas the function of a declarative sentence is to assert, imperative sentences serve a variety of functions: to order, command, warn, prohibit, wish, request, advise, curse, permit, or concede.[41] For example, imagine the following conversation between a parent and a child at bedtime:

PARENT: Go to bed now!
CHILD: That’s not true.

Probably most competent English speakers would regard the child’s response as committing a category error: a command cannot be true or false.[42] Nevertheless, there’s a proposition lurking nearby. If the parent expresses what we may call the “household standard” (using the imperative “Go to bed!”), the corresponding “household proposition” is <Going to bed now is required>. Likewise, what Copp calls the “standards-based account” makes the parallel distinction between moral propositions and moral standards.

Just as philosophers nowadays distinguish “thin” moral values (like goodness and and badness) from “thick” moral values (such as justice and charity), I propose we make a similar distinction between “thin” and “thick” moral standards. By “thin” moral standards, I mean general systems of ethics, as surveyed in section 2.5.1.1. For example, consider the following moral standard and moral proposition based upon act utilitarianism.

(MS-AU): Moral Standard – Act Utilitarianism: :”Do the action (or, if applicable, one of the actions) which would bring about at least as great a balance of utility over disutility as any other available alternative!”

(MP-AU): Moral Proposition – Act Utilitarianism: <Moral Standard – Act Utilitarianism is the correct moral standard.> [43]

Or consider the following theistic example:

(MS-DNT): Moral Standard – Divine Nature Theory: “Do what is consistent with God’s nature! Do not do what is inconsistent with God’s nature!”
(MP-DNT): Moral Proposition – Divine Nature Theory: <Moral Standard – Divine Nature Theory is the correct moral standard.>

In contrast, “thick” moral standards would be specific moral rules, including but not limited to the kind of moral rules associated with applied ethics. For example:

(MS-DNM): Moral Standard – Do Not Murder: “Do not murder!”
(MS-DNM): Moral Proposition – Do Not Murder: <Moral Standard – Do Not Murder is a true moral standard.>

With the distinction between thin and thick moral standards in hand, let us now consider arguments for and against a theistic grounding of a moral standard.

2.5.2. Arguments for a Theistic Grounding of Moral Standards

1. God’s Nature as the Moral Standard. I want to again quote Daniel's exposition of this point in its entirety. He writes:

An objective moral standard: Objective morality means that right and wrong exist FACTUALLY, without any importance of human opinion. Even if the ENTIRE WORLD decide rape is good and fine, it would still be wrong, end of story. Without the existence of God, where would an objective moral standard exist which we could hypothetically go to in order to know what actions are actually right or wrong?

-If God does exist then his perfect nature would be the standard, whatever God would do would be the correct answer, so there WOULD exist a perfect objective moral standard if a perfect God exists.

What, precisely, is the argument here? It isn’t clear and Daniel doesn’t put it in its logical form. In a spirit of charity, here is my attempt to ‘steelman’ his argument. “If God does exist then his perfect nature would be the standard.” So one premise of the argument seems to be:

(47) If theism is true, God’s perfect nature is the objective moral standard.

“Without the existence of God, where would an objective moral standard exist which we could hypothetically go to in order to know what actions are actually right or wrong?” This question suggests the following premise:

(48) If atheism is true, there is no possible suitable candidate for an objective moral standard.

From (47) and (48) it follows that:

(49) Theism entails, while atheism denies, an objective moral standard.

Both premises are dubious. Consider the first premise. While it is true by definition that God, if God exists, is perfectly morally good, it doesn’t follow that God’s nature is the standard of moral goodness. To see this, consider the property of being a meter in length. From 1889 to 1960, the standard for determining the length of a meter was the International Prototype Metre bar kept in Paris: to say that something was one meter long was to say that it had the same length as that bar. Imagine that, through some amazing feat of manufacturing, the French managed to create a literally perfect copy of this bar, with exactly the same length (down to the number of atoms!), which they sent to London. Both bars were functionally equivalent, in the sense that either bar could define the length of a meter.

Similarly, God’s nature may be analogous to the London bar: God’s nature may be functionally equivalent to an autonomous or a se moral standard. Just as it would have been incorrect, during the years 1889 to 1960, to conclude that the London bar was the standard meter bar (and no other standard meter bars existed), it is equally premature to conclude that God’s nature is the standard for moral goodness (and no autonomous moral standard exists). This leaves open the very real possibility that an autonomous moral standard exists. In other words, if theism is true, it is possible that God’s perfect nature is the moral standard, but it is also possible and no less likely that God’s perfect nature is a perfect copy of an autonomous moral standard. This much is certain: nothing Daniel has written so far shows otherwise.

Turning to the second premise (48), Daniel offers no reason to believe it to be true. Indeed, in his reply to me, he comes close to acknowledging the possibility of an objective moral standard without God. When he employs his house analogy and describes a house that has no owner, he mentions the possibility of “a list of rules posted on the wall.” Likewise, when he describes what he takes to be the implications of atheism, he refers at least hypothetically to “some form of Platonic standards or values floating through space.” (As an aside: Platonism does not posit globs of ectoplasm floating through space called "standards" or "values." Recall from section 2.1 that abstract objects, if they exist, cannot stand in causal relations; they are best thought of as immaterial objects.)

I conclude, therefore, that Daniel has not adequately defended his claim that theism entails, while atheism denies, an objective moral standard.

2.5.3. Arguments for a Non-Theistic Grounding of Moral Standards

1. MDCT provides an inadequate grounding for moral standards. I want to begin by considering an example from astronomy, not morality.

(HELIOCENTRISM) The earth orbits the sun.

I take the scientific evidence for (HELIOCENTRISM) to be overwhelming—so overwhelming that it can legitimately be taken to be a fact. What I want to focus on is the following question: what is the ground of (HELIOCENTRISM)? In other words, in virtue of what is (HELIOCENTRISM) true? One option is that God grounds (HELIOCENTRISM). But how? To simplify things, here I will consider just one possibility for a theistic grounding:

(DIVINE UTTERANCE): God utters the words, “The Earth orbits the sun.”

Another option, of course, is that (HELIOCENTRISM) has a nontheistic grounding. Again, I will present just one possibility for a nontheistic grounding:

(ASTRONOMICAL FACTS): Facts about the location and movement of the Earth and the sun.

The fact that non-moral facts, such as (HELIOCENTRISM), are grounded in non-divine-utterance facts provides some reason to expect that moral facts are similarly grounded in non-divine-utterance facts. Let’s now consider a moral example. Consider the following triple:

(BABY TORTURE) Action: The act of torturing a human baby for fun.

(DON’T TORTURE BABIES): Moral Standard – Do Not Torture Torture Babies for Fun: “Do not torture babies for fun!”

(BABY TORTURE WRONG): Moral Proposition – Do Not Torture Torture Babies for Fun <Moral Standard – Do Not Torture Torture Babies for Fun is a true moral standard.>

Now ask yourself the following question: what grounds (BABY TORTURE WRONG)? For simplicity, let’s consider just two possible answers. Modified Divine Command Theorists (MDCT-ists) would offer the following answer.

(DIVINE COMMAND FACTS): Facts about the commands of an essentially loving God ground the fact that (BABY TORTURE WRONG).[44]

In contrast, while Kantians, utilitarians, Natural Law Theorists, etc. would disagree on the details, they would be united in offering a different answer.

(NON- DIVINE COMMAND FACTS): Facts about the action (BABY TORTURE) or the moral standard (DON’T TORTURE BABIES) ground the fact that (BABY TORTURE WRONG).

MDCT entails that the only relevant consideration when grounding moral propositions is (DIVINE COMMAND FACTS); the fact that (BABY TORTURE) inflicts unnecessary suffering for the would-be torturer’s enjoyment plays no role whatsoever in grounding (BABY TORTURE WRONG). In other words, MDCT denies that (NON-DIVINE COMMAND FACTS) provide even a partial ground of (BABY TORTURE WRONG).[45] In contrast, the vast majority of rivals to MDCT—e.g., the general systems of ethics described in section 2.5.1.1—entail that (NON- DIVINE COMMAND FACTS) are what grounds the fact that (BABY TORTURE WRONG).

To avoid a potential misunderstanding, note that I am not suggesting that God could have commanded (BABY TORTURE). That is ruled out by MDCT, which refers to an essentially loving God. Rather, my suggestion is this. If God exists and commands us in a way which explicitly or implicitly forbids (BABY TORTURE), as an omniscient and rational being, God would have one or more reasons for His commands, reason(s) included in (NON-DIVINE COMMAND FACTS). It would be more parsimonious to assume that (NON-DIVINE COMMAND FACTS), not (DIVINE COMMAND FACTS), ground (BABY TORTURE WRONG).

To sum up so far: the fact that non-moral facts, such as (HELIOCENTRISM), are directly grounded in non-divine-utterance facts provides some reason to expect that moral facts, such as (BABY TORTURE WRONG), are similarly directly grounded in non-divine-utterance facts.

One might object that, even if everything I’ve written above is correct, it may still be the case that moral facts are indirectly grounded in (DIVINE COMMAND FACTS). Support for this objection comes from the fact that grounding can be transitive, i.e., there can be chains of ground. For example, some fact A could indirectly ground fact C when there is some intermediate fact B in a chain of grounds between them (A grounds B which grounds C). And the preceding argument merely justifies a presumption that non-divine-utterance facts are the direct or first-order ground of the things to be grounded; it does not rule out the possibility that, all things considered, the ultimate ground of (BABY TORTURE WRONG) is God or some fact about God. Again, consider my astronomy example. Assume that (UNIVERSE DESIGNED) is true: God somehow designed the universe in such a way that guaranteed the Earth would orbit the Sun. In this scenario, the chain of grounding would look like this: (UNIVERSE DESIGNED) grounds (ASTRONOMICAL FACTS) which in turn grounds (HELIOCENTRISM). If asked to defend (UNIVERSE DESIGNED), theists could appeal to various arguments from natural theology in support.

Now consider the parallel chain of grounding for (BABY TORTURE WRONG). It is plausible to believe that (BABY TORTURE WRONG) is grounded in some general normative ethical principle, such as:

(GOLDEN RULE) Do to others what you want them to do to you.

But notice there is a disanalogy between:

(THEISTIC ASTRONOMY GROUNDING CLAIM): (UNIVERSE DESIGNED) grounds (ASTRONOMICAL FACTS)

and

(DIVINE COMMAND FACTS): Facts about the commands of an essentially loving God ground (GOLDEN RULE).

In the former, both the ground, (UNIVERSE DESIGNED), and the grounded, (ASTRONOMICAL FACTS), refer to the same ontological category: physical objects. In the case of (DIVINE COMMAND FACTS), the ground, facts about the commands of an essentially loving God, is descriptive, while the grounded (GOLDEN RULE) is prescriptive. The problem here, at least for me, is not the alleged impossibility of purely descriptive facts grounding prescriptive facts. Rather, the problem is that there should be a defeasible presumption that, if (GOLDEN RULE) is grounded, then the grounds of (GOLDEN RULE), a prescriptive fact, is also prescriptive. But (DIVINE COMMAND FACTS) are metaethical, not prescriptive.

It is widely believed by grounding theorists that there are ungrounded truths or facts, truths or facts which are the “stopping point” for any grounding chain which includes them.[46] It is plausible to believe that ungrounded truths or facts include moral facts. Furthermore, as Erik Wielenberg argues, both theistic and atheistic moral realists are committed to ungrounded moral facts.

The ethical shopping list of Adams, Craig, and Moreland contains items like this: (a) there is a being that is worthy of worship; (b) if the Good commands you to do something, then you are morally obligated to do it; and (c) the better the character of the commander, the more reason there is to obey his or her commands. My ethical shopping list contains items like this: (d) pain is intrinsically bad; (e) inflicting pain just for fun is morally wrong; and (f) it is just to give people what they deserve. None of us can provide an external foundation for every item on our list; each of our lists contains some brute ethical facts.[47]

The question then becomes: what is the best (in some sense of “best”) stopping point when determining which moral facts are ungrounded? We have already two seen two reasons to believe the answer is (NON-DIVINE COMMAND FACTS): (i) the defeasible assumption that non-divine-utterance facts are the direct or first-order ground of the things to be grounded; and (ii) the defeasible presumption that the grounds of grounded prescriptive facts are themselves prescriptive. Here is a third: (iii) (NON-DIVINE COMMAND FACTS) is more modest than (DIVINE COMMAND FACTS) because the former asserts less than the latter. (DIVINE COMMAND FACTS) asks us to posit not just that God exists but that God relates to moral facts and properties in a very special way. In contrast, while (NON-DIVINE COMMAND FACTS) is compatible with the existence of God, it doesn’t require the unique relationship between God and moral facts demanded by (DIVINE COMMAND FACTS).

Indeed, for the type of theism known as “neotheism,” “theistic personalism,” or “perfect agent theism,” we can make this argument stronger. Regardless of the label, a key feature of this type of theism is that it denies the doctrine of divine simplicity, which denies that God is composed of parts in any sense, e.g., material parts (like bodily organs) or metaphysical parts (like properties). Why is neotheism's denial of divine simplicity important? To the extent that an object is composed of parts (in any sense), the parts of that object are more fundamental than the object itself. To see this, consider the relationship between a human being and a human being’s parts, such as organs. Individual organs like a brain, heart, etc. are partial grounds of a human being. Likewise, by analogy, the God of neotheism “has” metaphysical parts or attributes like omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, etc. Thus, for that conception of God, goodness is more fundamental than God and so is a partial ground of God.

2.6. Human Dignity

2.6.1. Exposition

Suppose that moral values and duties exist. It is conceivable that they exist but not apply to human beings. This raises the question: why think moral values and duties apply to human beings? One way to answer this question is to employ the thesis of “human dignity.” This raises several questions. Just what is that thesis, anyway? Why should we think it is true? And why should we think that it is necessary for objective morality? I will answer the first question in this sub-section; and the other questions in the following sub-sections.

My plan for this sub-section is as follows. First, I will introduce the concept of “moral standing.” Second, I will provide an overview of human dignity. Let us look at each of these concepts.

2.6.1.1. Moral Standing

Christopher W. Morris wrote a nuanced, extremely helpful conceptual analysis of moral standing in his chapter, “The Idea of Moral Standing,” in The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics.[48] I cannot improve on Morris’s chapter, so here I want to summarize what I take to be the salient points as they relate to this essay.

Morris begins by noting that there is no standardized terminology in the ethical literature: some writers refer to “moral status,” others refer to “moral standing,” and some use the two interchangeably. On Morris’s terminology, which he admits is different from that of other philosophers, moral status is a genus concept while moral standing is a species concept. He views “moral status” as “whatever status something might have morally.”[49] Something might have moral status in Morris’s sense, but in the final analysis that might not amount to much. He thinks the much more important concept is “moral standing,” which is a type of moral status but goes much further than moral status.

How does Morris define “moral standing”? Before he answers that question, he first makes the distinction between duties and duties to. Consider, for example, a work of art. Among those of us who believe there are moral duties, few, if anyone, believe that we have moral duties to artwork. At the same time, we may still have moral duties regarding artwork. We might a duty to the artwork’s owner not to damage, destroy, or steal the artwork. With this distinction in mind, Morris defines moral standing as a property something has if moral agents can have duties to it.

Morris next considers the question, “What Has Moral Standing?” As he writes:

A basic criterion of moral standing looks something like this:

Something has moral standing if (and only if?) it _____.

Two things distinguish different theories and their criteria: what is placed in the blank space (e.g., is sentient; is rational; knows a language; is an agent), and whether possession of the attribute is sufficient for moral standing or both necessary and sufficient.[50]

Different thinkers have proposed various criteria. As Morris states, three widely invoked are criteria are sentience, rationality, and agency. [51] This yields the following six combinations.

Criteria	Necessary?	Sufficient?
Sentience (Weak)	Yes	undefined
Sentience (Strong)	Yes	Yes
Rationality (Weak)	Yes	undefined
Rationality (Strong)	Yes	Yes
Agency (Weak)	Yes	undefined
Agency (Strong)	Yes	Yes

But this is not the end of the story, for there are various hybrid views possible.

Criteria	Necessary?	Sufficient?
Sentience, Rationality, and Agency	Yes	Yes
Personhood (Weak)	Yes	undefined
Personhood (Strong)	Yes	Yes
Humanity (Weak)	Yes	undefined
Humanity (Strong)	Yes	Yes

There is one final distinction Morris introduces which is relevant to our investigation: what he calls the “juridical” interpretation of moral standing and a second, unnamed interpretation which I will call the “charity or benevolence” interpretation.[52] The juridical interpretation “privileges the virtue of justice,” in the sense that its focus is on duties of justice. In contrast, the charity or benevolence interpretation focuses on duties of charity or benevolence. As Morris rightly points out, this distinction is important because there may be situations where a duty of justice does not apply, but a duty of charity or benevolence does. For example, it may be the case that entience (in either the weak or strong senses) is the correct criterion of moral standing and that non-human animals have moral standing, in a charity or benevolence sense. But this raises questions about whether all humans have moral standing and whether only humans have moral standing, to which I now turn.

2.6.1.2. The Concept of Human Dignity

Let’s begin by making a distinction between two related but separate claims about the moral standing of humans. One view is that all human beings have moral standing in virtue of being human:

(STANDING: ALL HUMANS - WEAK) Something has moral standing if it is a human being.

(STANDING: ALL HUMANS – EQUAL DEGREE) All human beings, regardless of their capacities, have an equal amount of moral standing.

Human dignity is the conjunction of these two views. In his history of the concept of dignity, philosopher Remy Debes notes that the contemporary meaning of “human dignity” would surprise our ancestors.

Until about 1830– 1850, neither the English term “dignity,” nor its Latin root dignitas, nor the French counterpart dignité, had any currency as meaning the “inherent or unearned worth of all persons.” Instead, in everything from Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651) to Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary (1755) to Webster’s Compendious Dictionary (1806), “dignity” had a conventional merit connotation, something like the “rank of elevation” that Johnson officially gave it. In other words, until a little over a century ago, dignity connoted social status of the kind associated with nobility, power, gentlemanly comportment, or preferment within the church— not some fundamental, unearned, equally shared moral status among humans. [53]

Debes then considers the relationship between human dignity and various legal documents. Written in 1776, the U.S. Declaration of Independence famously claims that humans enjoy certain “unalienable rights.” Although neither the Declaration nor the U.S. Constitution explicitly use the word “dignity,” Debes argues that the Declaration implictly suggests that human dignity grounds those rights. It was not until the Mexican constitution of 1917 and the Weimar constitution of 1919 that one can find dignity explicitly mentioned in a constitution. But, Debes observes, it was not until the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights that one finds the word “dignity” used in a moral sense.[54]

Debes notes that there are two kinds of claims one can make about dignity. The first, which he calls “substantive” claims, is about the human trait or feature that grounds human dignity. Examples of grounds which have been offered include our autonomy, our rationality, our capacity to form caring relationships, our soul, or being made in the image of God. The second, which he calls “formal” claims, involves the identification of “the general conceptual features or conditions that we think apply to any suitable substantive claim.” For example, if the ground of human dignity is being made in the image of God, then this entails that human dignity is not something that humans have to earn. On this view, “being unearned” is a “formal” feature of human dignity.[55]

I need to make one more distinction of my own: the human dignity versus human exceptionalism distinction. Recall from section 1.7 that I defined “moral standing” as the property of being the beneficiary of moral obligations. For example, although newborn (human) babies have no moral obligations, they can be the beneficiary of moral obligations, such as our obligation not to murder. Therefore, newborn babies have moral standing despite not being moral agents themselves. The thesis of human exceptionalism goes beyond the theisis of human dignity. By “human exceptionalism,” I mean the combination of two theses.

(HUMAN DIGNITY) All human beings, regardless of their capacities, have an equal amount of moral standing in virtue of being human.

Some thinkers believe that moral standing comes in degrees. People who believe human dignity make the following additional claim:

(STANDING: NO NON-HUMAN ANIMALS) No non-human animals have moral standing.

Notice that human exceptionalism entails, but is not itself entailed by, human dignity. Human dignity could be true at the same time that human exceptionalism is false, but if human exceptionalism is true than human dignity must also be true.

Let us now turn to arguments regarding the relationships between objective morality, human dignity, theism, and atheism.

2.6.2. Arguments for the Necessity of Human Dignity

1. God as the necessary ground of human dignity. Daniel writes:

Why do humans have actual, objective moral value? Why is it fine if I walk down the sidewalk and kick a rock into the bushes, but not at all acceptable for me to kick a human child into the bushes? In order for objective morality to exist, human beings must have real, intrinsic moral value. Without God, it’s very difficult to see why this would be the case as there would be no reason for the universe to even exist, and a human being is objectively no more interesting or meaningful than a rock, a plant, or anything else that just happens to exists. In order to account for the existence of human dignity, an unbeliever would need to justify and account for real, non arbitrary moral value that humans have and that other animals and other beings do not have. In other words, if there is no God and humans somehow have real objective value, it would necessarily be due to some trait that humans have which other beings do not have, like intelligence… or being hairless, etc. Someone arguing for human dignity under secularism needs to “name the trait” and explain why this trait gives real and objective/actual moral value to humans, and not to other animals or objects.

With the existence of a perfect God it’s easy to see why humans would have real value, as we would be created for a special purpose by God. Our value would come from the purpose God intended for us, a creature made for a special purpose could have a special value. One example of how this might come about comes from Christianity. In Christianity humans are made in the image of God, to glorify God by being his image bearers. This is something in Christianity that sets humans apart from all other animals and accounts for human dignity.

This passage suggests three arguments: (i) an argument to human dignity, which states that humans have dignity; (ii) an argument against atheism from human dignity, which states that human dignity is much more surprising on the assumption that atheism is true than on the assumption that theism is true; and (iii) an argument from the indispensability of human dignity, which states that human dignity is a precondition of objective moral values and duties.

The argument to human dignity runs as follows.

(50) Human beings have moral standing.

(51) Human beings have moral standing only if they have dignity.

It follows from 50 and 51 that:

(52) Humans have dignity.

The argument from human dignity runs:

(53) Human dignity is very surprising on the assumption that atheism is true.

(54) Human dignity is not surprising on the assumption that theism is true.

It follows from 53 and 54 that:

(55) Human dignity is much more probable on theism than on atheism.

The argument from the indispensability of human dignity runs:

(56) Human dignity is a precondition of objective moral values and duties.

It follows from (55) and (56) that:
(57) Objective moral values and duties are much more probable on theism than on atheism.

In the passage quoted above, Daniel defends the argument to human dignity. It is important to be clear, however, on exactly how Daniel defends it. First, he endorses the thesis of human dignity. Second, he endorses the (STANDING: NO NON-HUMAN ANIMALS) thesis: he claims that humans do not have moral obligations to non-human animals. This inequality in moral standing is why Daniel defends not just human dignity, but human exceptionalism.

I agree that human exceptionalism would be necessary to account for the moral inequality described above, but that doesn’t justify the second step, (51), of his argument to human dignity. For the proposition, “Objective moral values and duties exist,” is a metaphysical or ontological claim. It says nothing about which things or beings have moral standing. Daniel has mixed up moral ontology (i.e., the metaphysical thesis that objective morality exists) with general systems of ethics (e.g., theories like deontology, consequentialism, etc.) and descriptive facts (i.e., statements about the traits of objects and animals which exist). It could be the case that objective morality exists and that there is no human dignity, either because humans exist without dignity or because humans don't exist at all. For example, suppose that God exists and that God created angels who existed for a million years before God created human beings. During that time, God issues commands to the angels. If one believes, as Daniel does, that some version of Divine Command Theory is true, then God's commands to the angels would constitute their moral duties. This situation would satisfy Daniel's definition of "objective morality" and so proves that human dignity is not necessary for objective morality.

In his reply to the first section of this essay, Daniel concedes this point. He admits, “human dignity is not necessary for objective morality to exist.” Instead, he now claims, “beings with moral value must exist for objective morality to exist.” Therefore, someone sympathetic to the two arguments sketched above might replace "human beings" with "beings with moral value" and “human dignity” with “moral standing,” where the latter is short for “beings with moral standing exist.” This yields the followed revised version of the argument to human dignity, which gets renamed as the “argument to moral standing.”

(50') Beings with moral value have moral standing.
(51’) Beings with moral value have moral standing only if they have dignity.

It follows from 50 and 51’ that:
(52) Beings with moral value have dignity. (Call this statement "dignified beings.")

The argument from human dignity would then get renamed the “argument from moral standing” and becomes:

(53’) Dignified beings are very surprising on the assumption that atheism is true.
(54’) Dignified beings are not surprising on the assumption that theism is true.

It follows from 53’ and 54’ that:
(55’) Dignified beings are much more probable on theism than on atheism.

The argument from the indispensability of human dignity would then then get renamed the “argument from the indispensability of dignified beings”.

(56’) Dignified beings are a precondition of objective moral values and duties.

It follows from (55’) and (56) that:

(57) Objective moral values and duties are much more probable on theism than on atheism.

Now consider these three revised arguments in light of these changes from "human beings" to "beings with moral value" and from “human dignity” to “moral standing.” The second argument is, I believe, much more promising than the first and the third. The content of theism (“God exists”) provides at least some reason to expect beings with moral standing. This is so for two interrelated reasons. First, we have at least some reason on theism to expect the existence of conscious beings, for the simple fact that theism entails the existence of at least one conscious being (God). Second, consciousness is a prerequisite for moral standing. In contrast, the content of metaphysical atheism (“God does not exst”) provides no antecedent reason to expect the existence at all to expect the existence of conscious beings of any type. With that said, it is important to be clear on the nature of the metaphysical “prediction” being made. Neither the original argument, the argument from human dignity, nor the revised argument, the argument from moral standing, even attempt to show why anything at all is morally valuable or obligatory. Rather, both arguments presuppose that moral values and duties exist. Instead, they argue that, given that moral values and duties exist, the fact that they are applicable to contingent beings favors theism over atheism. Of course, given that contingent beings with moral value exist, it may be the case – and I think is the case – that more specific facts about those contingent beings favor naturalism, which entails atheism, over theism.) This is why both arguments are perhaps better described as arguments from consciousness than moral arguments, but of course in some sense they are both.

In contrast, I think the first revised argument, the argument to moral standing, fails because its second step, 51’, is false. Having dignity is sufficient, but unnecessary, for having moral standing. In other words, having dignity is one way, but not the only way, for a being to have moral standing. The only requirement for a being to have moral standing is that it be can be the beneficiary of moral obligations; the concept of moral standing does not presuppose or entail that all beings with moral standing have an equal amount of moral value. To avoid a potential misunderstanding, I’m not defending the idea that different moral patients have different amounts of moral value. Rather, the objection is purely logical, based upon the definition of moral standing.

Likewise, the third revised argument, the argument from the indispensability of dignified beings, fails because its second step, 56', does not follow from Daniel’s own definition of objective morality. Remember that he explicitly defines objective morality as follows: “in order for morality to be objective, there must be something factually true about moral actions, regardless of opinion.” There can be “something factually true about moral actions, regardless of opinion,” even if no beings with moral value ever existed. How can this be? Here is Christian philosopher Keith Yandell:

There are certain ways in which, for most theisms, God and morality are related. One is that only if God creates moral agents has ethics any application to creatures. Suppose that the basic principles of ethics are necessary truths. Still, they are all conditional—as are "if there are persons, then they ought to be respected" and "if there are sentient creatures, then they ought not to be tortured for pleasure." Even if these are necessary truths, they apply to a world only if there are persons or sentient creatures in it. Otherwise, they are axioms of an irrelevant system. The theist holds that if there are moral agents, then God created them, and so ethics has purchase on the world only if God not only creates but creates certain sorts of beings.[56]

Yandell is a Christian Platonist. He believes moral propositions are abstract objects. Thus, although in the above passage he describes God’s relationship to abstract moral propositions, his point about them being conditional statements applies equally to atheistic Platonism. Conditional statements don’t require the existence of dignified beings. Daniel has confused the preconditions for the existence of objective morality with the preconditions for the applicability of objective morality.

2.6.3. Arguments against the Necessity of Dignified Beings

I was originally going to title this section. “Arguments against the Necessity of Human Dignity,” but that was no longer necessary after Daniel admitted that “human dignity is not necessary for objective morality to exist.” Again, he now claims, “beings with moral value must exist for objective morality to exist.” Again, however, that is false. As we saw above, Daniel has confused the preconditions for the existence of objective morality with the preconditions for the applicability of objective morality.

2.6.4. Arguments against Human Exceptionalism

1. The Moral Poverty of Human Exceptionalism. Recall from section 2.6.1.2 that human exceptionalism is the conjunction of two theses:

(HUMAN DIGNITY) All human beings, regardless of their capacities, have an equal amount of moral standing in virtue of being human.

(STANDING: NO NON-HUMAN ANIMALS) No non-human animals have moral standing.

In defense of this remarkable position, Daniel appeals to the Christian doctrine of the imago Dei.

… Someone arguing for human dignity under secularism needs to “name the trait” and explain why this trait gives real and objective/actual moral value to humans, and not to other animals or objects.

With the existence of a perfect God it’s easy to see why humans would have real value, as we would be created for a special purpose by God. Our value would come from the purpose God intended for us, a creature made for a special purpose could have a special value. One example of how this might come about comes from Christianity. In Christianity humans are made in the image of God, to glorify God by being his image bearers. This is something in Christianity that sets humans apart from all other animals and accounts for human dignity.

This passage suggests the following argument to human exceptionalism:

(58) Something has moral standing if and only if it is created in the image of God.

(59) No non-human animals are created in the image of God.

From (58) and (59), it follows that:

(60) Humans are the only animals with moral standing.

My own view is that (58) is false. What is necessary for moral standing is neither species membership (e.g., being a member of Homo sapiens) nor being created in the image of God, but sentience. Rocks and plants are not conscious and so cannot be harmed from their own internal point of view. But humans are not the only conscious animal species: various non-human animals—including whales, dolphins, elephants, and primates—are also conscious. Like a newborn human baby, they do not understand abstract moral concepts, but they can be harmed from their own internal point of view. That is why we can have duties to sentient animals and not merely duties regarding them.[57] In other words, they have moral standing. But this entails that human exceptionalism is false. If, as Daniel suggests, Christianity predicts human exceptionalism, then the moral standing of non-human animals constitutes a predictive failure for Christianity and so is another reason to reject Christianity.

Notes

[1] On June 22, 2023, I replied to a post from Daniel by pointing out that he confuses "atheism" with nihilism. See https://x.com/SecularOutpost/status/1672019076078551041?s=20. On that same date, in reply to a post (albeit one not about his moral argument), I pointed out to Daniel that his memes don't touch atheist philosophers of religion. See https://x.com/SecularOutpost/status/1672018746607558661?s=20

[2] On December 30, 2023, I replied to a post from Daniel which asked how it is even possible (my emphasis) for an objective moral standard to exist without God. See https://x.com/SecularOutpost/status/1741263290003800237?s=20 and the ensuing back and forth discussion with Daniel.

[3] Indeed, on April 3, 2024, a search on X for posts by Daniel containing the word "compatibilism" turned up no results.

[4] The reply cited in endnote 2 also refuted Daniel's claim that an objective moral standard is impossible without God.

[5] Louis P. Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong (Wadsworth), p. 84.

[6] Nicholas Rescher, Introduction to Value Theory (Prentice Hall, 1969), p. 56.

[7] Tara Smith, Viable Values: A Study of Life as the Root and Reward of Morality (Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), p. 77.

[8] Paul Bloomfield, Morality and Self-Interest (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 3-4.

[9] Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schneider, eds., Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 26.

[10] Here is a recent and representative statement:

Moral values have to do with what is good or evil. On the theistic view objective moral values are grounded in God. As St. Anselm saw, God is by definition the greatest conceivable being and therefore perfectly good. Indeed, He is not merely perfectly good; He is the paradigm of moral value. God's own holy and loving character supplies the absolute standard against which all things are measured. He is by nature loving, generous, faithful, kind, and so forth.

See, e.g., William Lane Craig, "William Lane Craig's Opening Speech" in A Debate on God and Morality: What is the Best Account of Objective Moral Values and Duties? (ed. Adam Lloyd Johnson, Routledge, 2021), pp. 31-38 at p. 31.

[11] Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and Robust Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

[12] For an advanced introduction to atheistic Platonism, see Erik Steinhart, Atheistic Platonism: A Manifesto (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).

[13] For a secular version of Natural Law Theory, see Larry Arnhart, Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological Ethics of Human Nature (SUNY Press, 1998).

[14] Cf. my reply to Daniel's transcendental argument from logic against atheism, where I make a similar point regarding the laws of logic.

[15] Cf. the helpful discussion of the metaphysically lightweight and heavyweight senses of properties in William Lane Craig, God and Abstract Objects: The Coherence of Theism: Aseity (Springer, 2017), pp. 26-27. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-55384-9_1

[16] Craig 2017, p. 29.

[17] Stefano Bertrea, A Theory of Legal Obligation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), p. 41.

[18] Bertrea 2019, p. 30.

[19] Bertrea 2019, p. 30.

[20] Bertrea 2019, p. 30.

[21] Bertrea 2019, pp. 30-31.

[22] Bertrea 2019, p. 37.

[23] Kraak VI, Swinburn B, Lawrence M. "Distinguishing accountability from responsibility: an accountability framework." Am J Public Health. 2014 Jun;104(6):e2-3. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2014.301899

[24] Bertrea 2019, p. 39.

[25] Bertrea 2019, pp. 39-40. Bertrea cites M. Gilbert, On Social Facts (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 35–42.

[26] Baruch Brody, “Morality and Religion Reconsidered,” in Divine Commands and Morality (ed. Paul Helm, New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 141-53 at 150; originally published in Readings in the Philosophy of Religion: An Analytic Approach (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974), 592-603.

[27] Erik Wielenberg, Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 54.

[28] Wes Morriston, "The Moral Obligations of Reasonable Non-Believers" International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion 65 (2009): 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-008-9173-x

[29] Morriston 2009: 7.

[30] Morriston 2009: 6-9.

[31] Maitzen, Stephen. Determinism, Death, and Meaning (Routledge Studies in Metaphysics) (p. 73). Taylor & Francis. Kindle Edition.

[32] Maitzen.

[33] Ishtiyaque Haji, "Obligation and Moral Responsibility" in A Companion to Free Will (ed. Joseph Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson, and V. Alan White, Wiley Blackwell, 2023), pp. 95-107 at 98.

[34] Haji 2023, p. 98.

[35] Haji 2023, p. 101-103.

[36] Edward Feser, “Teleology: A Shopper’s Guide” Philosophia Christi 12 (2010): 142-159.

[37] Edward Feser, “Teleology: A Shopper’s Guide” Philosophia Christi 12 (2010): 142-159 at 148.

[38] Robert Solokowski, “What is Natural Law?: Human Purposes and Natural Ends” The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review 68 (October 2004): 507-529 at 508-09. https://doi.org/10.1353/tho.2004.0000

[39] Cf. Erik Steinhart, Atheistic Platonism: A Manifesto (Palgrave Macmillan, 2023), p. 14.

[40] David Copp, Morality in a Natural World: Selected Essays on Metaethics (Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 14.

[41] Magdalena Kaufmann, Interpreting Imperatives (Springer, 2011), pp. 15-16.

[42] Kaufmann herself argues that imperatives are propositions. Since nothing in this essay depends on whether imperatives are propositions, I shall not comment on this possibility further. See Kaufmann 2011.

[43] I owe this example to Jonas Olson, Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defense (Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 130. I have changed what he calls the “utilitarian claim” to “Moral Proposition – Act Utilitarianism” to be consistent with Copp’s terminology (and to refer to the type of utilitarianism).

[44] Here is Robert Adams: "when I say that an action's being morally obligatory consists in its being commanded by God, and that an action's being wrong consists in its being contrary to a divine command, I assume that character and commands of God satisfy certain conditions. ... It is only the commands of a definitively good God, who, for example, is not cruel but loving, that are a good candidate for the role of defining moral obligation." See Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 250.

[45] By "partial ground," I mean something which helps ground something else. See Michael J. Raven, "Introduction" The Routledge Handbook of Metaphysical Grounding (ed. Michael J. Raven, Routledge, 2020), p. 8.

[46] Stefan Roski, “Bolzano” in Raven 2020, p. 84.

[47] Erik J. Wielenberg, Robust Ethics: The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Godless Normative Realism (Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 55.

[48] Christopher W. Morris, “The Idea of Moral Standing” in The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics (ed. Tom L. Beauchamp and R.G. Frey, Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 255-75.

[49] Morris 2011, p. 256.

[50] Morris 2011, p. 263.

[51] Morris 2011, p. 263.

[52] Morris 2011, pp. 267-68.

[53] Remy Debes, Dignity: A History (Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 1-2.

[54] Debes 2017, pp. 2-3.

[55] Debes 2017, pp. 4-5.

[56] Keith E. Yandell, “Moral Essentialism” in God & Morality: Four Views (ed. R. Keith Loftin, IVP Academic, 2012, Kindle Edition), Kindle Locations 1152-1156).

[57] Paul Draper, “Craig’s Case against God’s Existence” in Does God Exist? The Craig-Flew Debate (ed. Stan W. Wallace, Ashgate, 2003), p. 147. Cf. James Rachels, Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism (Oxford University Press, 1990), especially chapters 4 and 5.

Naturalistic Atheism

Pages

Wednesday, April 03, 2024

Reply to Daniel's Moral Argument for Theism

1. No Good Reason to Think (1) Is True

1.1. The Inessential Objection

1.2. The Underdetermination Objection

1.3. The Prior Obligations Objection

1.4. The Moral Axiology vs. Moral Deontology Objection

1.5. The Moral Ontology vs. Moral Psychology Objection

1.6. The Lack of a Comparative Argument Objection

1.7. The False Evidence Objection

2. There Is Good Reason to Think (1) Is False

2.1. Values

2.1.1. Terminology

2.1.2. Arguments for a Theistic Grounding of Moral Values

2.1.3. Arguments for a Non-Theistic Grounding of Moral Values

2.2. Duties

2.2.1. Exposition

2.2.2. Arguments for a Theistic Grounding of Moral Obligation

2.3. Freedom

2.3.1. Terminology

2.3.2. Arguments for the Necessity of Free Will

2.3.3. Arguments Against the Necessity of Free Will

2.3.4. Clarification of My Own Views

2.4. Purpose

2.4.1. Exposition

2.4.2. Arguments for the Necessity of (Agential) Purpose

2.4.3. Arguments against the Necessity of (Agential) Purpose

2.5. Standards

2.5.1. Exposition

2.5.2. Arguments for a Theistic Grounding of Moral Standards

2.5.3. Arguments for a Non-Theistic Grounding of Moral Standards

2.6. Human Dignity

2.6.1. Exposition

2.6.2. Arguments for the Necessity of Human Dignity

2.6.3. Arguments against the Necessity of Dignified Beings

2.6.4. Arguments against Human Exceptionalism

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