Sometimes theists will ask atheists the following question.
(1) If you don't believe in God, then by what standard can you label actions (morally) right, wrong, or indifferent / neutral / permitted?
Before you think about how an atheist might answer (1), I want you to first think about what (1) means. I recently asked people on Twitter what they think the question means.
Imagine a theist and an atheist are talking about morality. The theist asks, “By what standard can you label certain actions right, other actions wrong, and still other actions as neutral / indifferent / permitted?” What does the theist’s question mean? If you’re not sure, guess!
— @SecularOutpost@mstdn.party 🇺🇸🇺🇦 (@SecularOutpost) December 31, 2022
As expected, I received a variety of answers, even from theists.
In my opinion, the most charitable interpretation of (1) is this:
(1') Which ethical framework are you using to make judgments about the morally right, wrong, and permitted?
By "ethical framework," I mean what Walter Sinnott-Armstrong calls a "general system" of "substantive ethics,"[1] as usually covered in an introductory undergraduate course on ethics. Typical answers would include consequentialist theories (like egoism or utilitarianism) and non-consequentialist theories (like Kantianism - categorical imperative, social contract theory, normative divine command theory, natural law theory, virtue ethics).
Some of the replies to my original tweet aren't normative or substantive theories at all, and so the answers they contain represent a sort of category mistake. For example, the theist's question presupposes that moral realism is true. If someone thinks moral sentences are not the type of sentences which can be true or false, the question wouldn't apply to them. Likewise, if someone is an error theorist -- they think moral sentences can be true or false, but all moral sentences are false -- then the question won't apply to them. Still other answers address neither the topic of substantive ethics nor even the presuppositions of substantive ethics. For example, sometimes people will answer (1) by providing an evolutionary explanation for the origin of certain behaviors assumed to be relevant to morality. Such an explanation may very well be true, but a theory about the origin of moral behavior is not a theory about substantive ethics. Still others will respond, not by identifying a general system of substantive ethics, but by identifying what Sinnott-Armstrong what calls "particular claims" of substantive ethics. For example, some will say, "Don't harm other people."
But other replies to my tweet really do represent theories of normative or substantive ethics, albeit ones not typically covered in intro to ethics classes. For example, @HPsiEqualsEPsi replied "empathy" which actually represents a neglected theory. I take it to be close, but not identical, to the theory which the late philosopher Louis Pojman called "act agapism," "the theory that one has a duty to act out of love and never to act against what is the loving thing to do."
Suppose you agree with me that (1') is the best interpretation of (1). While some theists use it as a "gotcha" question, it doesn't need to be and, from the perspective of the theist, should not be a gotcha question. If there is any gotcha question at all, it is the implied follow-up question:
(2) What grounds the atheist's normative or substantive ethical theory?
That's a legitimate question which deserves an answer, just like the parallel question for the theist:
(3) What grounds the theist's normative or substantive ethical theory?
In discussing (2) and (3), the discussion should then naturally progress to yet another, related question:
(4) Can the theist offer a better grounding for his theory than the atheist can offer for hers?
How a well-informed atheist might answer (2) or a well-informed theist might answer (3) requires another blog post, if not an entire essay.
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