Tuesday, January 03, 2023

Atheism, Morality, and the Difference between Consistency and Entailment.... Again

Trigger words: rape, childhood sexual abuse

In this post, I want to respond a blog post by Christian apologist Wintery Knight (WK) regarding atheist morality.

1. Definitions

Before I discuss WK's blog post, I first need to define some terms. I will begin by making a distinction between "consistency" and "entailment.To say that X is "consistent" with Y is to say that X does not logically contradict Y or, in other words, X and Y can both be true at the same time. For example, suppose that X = "Barack Obama was the 44th President of the United States" and Y="The Earth is the third planet from the Sun." X and Y are logically consistent with one another. 

To say that X "entails" Y is to say that if X is true, then Y also has to be true. Using the examples in the previous paragraph, X does not entail Y. But now consider Y', "The United States has had an African-American President." X entails Y'. Sometimes one will see a claim that X entails Y using some other word than "entails." The words "implications" or "consequences" are sometimes used as rough synonyms for entailments, e.g., "Y' is an implication or consequence of X." Also, some writers use the proposition "on" to describe an entailment, e.g., "On X, Y." 

Next, I need to define "atheism." In this post I'm going to stipulate the dominant definition of atheism in academic philosophy, e.g., atheism is the proposition, "God does not exist." If you don't like that definition, you can do a "mental search and replace" on every instance of the word "atheism" in this post, by replacing "atheism" with "strong atheism," "positive atheism," or "gnostic atheism."

Finally, there is the word "morality." The theoretical or abstract definition of morality is controversial, even among philosophers, and I have neither the desire nor the need to "pick a side" in that debate. Instead, I will adopt a pluralistic viewpoint and work with either of the dominant definitions among ethicists. In his book, Morality and Self-Interest,[1] Paul Bloomfield provides a helpful overview of the two major, rival conceptions of "morality" at play among philosophers. According to the first conception, which he calls the “social conception,” morality is focused on answering the question, “How ought one behave towards others?” On this view, if the interests of others are not at issue, then morality is not relevant. According to the second conception, which he calls the “Socratic conception,” morality is focused on answering the question, “How ought I to live?” On this view, morality is relevant to every aspect of a person’s life, even in situations in which the interests of others are not at issue. These two conceptions of morality are useful because they help to differentiate moral values from other types of values. In this blog post, I will assume that "morality" means either or both concepts.

With these definitions in place, let's turn to WK's blog post.

2. Morality "On Atheism"

I can't remember the last time I had to critique even the title of an article or blog post, but in this case it's necessary. The title of WK's blog post is, "Atheist Philosopher Tells Atheists How to be Moral on Atheism." The expression "on atheism" is key because it suggests that WK is going to summarize what the philosopher (allegedly) described as the moral implications of atheism. But WK doesn't do that because the philosopher didn't do that. Why? Because with one exception, atheism has no moral implications. If the proposition "atheism" is true, there is only one moral implication, e.g., God-based morality is false. Full stop. But what does "God-based morality is false" mean? This turns out to be more complicated and less intuitive than one might think; see the footnote for details.[2] By itself, atheism says nothing about the existence or non-existence of moral values, duties, accountability, freedom, or significance. Those topics just are not what atheism is about, which is why both the existence and non-existence of those things are consistent with atheism.

3. Essential Features of a "Moral System"

Turning to the first portion of WK's post, he claims there are five things "you need in your worldview in order to have a rationally grounded system of morality." These are:

  1. Objective moral values
  2. Objective moral duties
  3. Moral accountability
  4. Free will 
  5. Ultimate Significance
One problem with this claim is that WK misstates the topic. The topic is not, as he claims, "a rationally grounded system of morality." I agree with him that grounding is an important feature, not just for a system of morality, but for many other types of claims, including historical, scientific, and mathematical claims (to name just a few). But there is more to a system of morality than grounding, and so the topic should be "a complete, rationally justified moral theory." Philosopher and ethicist Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has provided, in one of his books, a useful diagram which depicts all of the elements of a system of morality.[3]

WK list of essential features map to two of Sinnott-Armstrong's essential features. WK's moral accountability maps to "moral psychology." The existence of moral values and duties are part, but not all, of what Sinnott-Armstrong means by "moral metaphysics." But notice what is missing from WK's list of essential features. First, WK's list is entirely missing substantive ethics, including both a general system (such as Kantianism or utilitarianism) and answers to particular claims (such as "Is capital punishment permissible?"). Second, WK's list is missing the bulk of meta-ethics, including a definition of morality (such as the one I provided earlier by quoting Bloomfield), moral linguistics (which includes the meaning of the moral terms), most of moral psychology (specifically, the nature and sources of moral beliefs and emotions), and moral epistemology (whether, how, and when moral claims can be justified or known). The omission of moral epistemology is especially striking since it is such a pernicious problem for theistic ethics.

In addition to omitting necessary items, WK also included two unnecessary items: "free will" and "ultimate significance." "Free will" can be easily dispatched by noting that, at best, it is a prerequisite for certain moral concepts, such as moral duties, to be applicable; it is not a prerequisite for the grounding of moral duties and certainly not the grounding of all aspects of a moral system. Likewise, "ultimate significance" is not a necessary element of a moral system. WK explicitly defines ultimate significance as ultimate meaning, which is simply not a required feature of a complete moral theory.

Because WK uses the wrong list of essential features, WK's comparison of theistic and atheistic morality is also wrong. He writes, "Theism rationally grounds all 5 of these. Atheism cannot ground any of them." As we've seen, his list of 5 features is incorrect. Furthermore, even with his 5 features, he offers no positive arguments of his own and no interaction with the arguments of the numerous philosophers who disagree with him. But put that to the side. The bigger problem is that WK offers nothing to support to his sweeping claim. It seems rather ironic to claim that atheism cannot ground any essential features of moral theory, but then to leave that claim itself ungrounded.

4. Stephen Kershnar's Moral Views

WK then turns to his foil, atheist philosopher Stephen Kershnar. Based on the time WK spent introducing his list of essential features for a system of morality, one could be forgiven for expecting that WK would then quote statements made by Kershnar regarding each of those essential features. But WK doesn't do that. At all. Instead, WK simply summarizes Kershnar's disgusting, shocking, and false beliefs about particular moral claims. As reported by WK, who in turn quotes the Federalist, who in turn relies upon the Twitter account @LibsofTikTok, Kershnar apparently claims that child rape is "not obviously wrong." According to the Federalist, "Kershnar is open to the idea that pedophilia is deeply harmful to victims, but he just can’t put his finger on why."

There is a lot to discuss here. The relevant questions are these:
  • What are Kershnar's actual views about sex between children and adults (i.e., statutory rape or child rape)?
  • What do Kershnar's moral views tell us about morality "on atheism"?
  • What harm is caused by sexual offenses against children? 
  • What objective reasons, consistent with atheism, are available to atheists to condemn child rape?
  • Are those reasons grounded?

4.1. Kershnar's View on Child Rape

As quoted in an article on the Daily Nous, Kershnar summarizes his view as follows.
  • There are good reasons to think that adult-child sex should be illegal.
  • Consequentialist moral theories can provide an explanation for the wrongness of adult-child sex that is harmful, and while “when both participants are willing, the risk of long term harm is unclear,” at least “in some cases (for example, force, genital contact, and father figures) there is risk of significant harm.” “Child rape and incest both… are extremely harmful.”
  • On non-consequentialist moral theories, the moral status of adult-child sex is unclear.[4]
The Daily Nous later (2/4/2022) provided the following update after listening to the podcast quoted by @LibsofTikTok:
For one thing, the summary that Professor Kershnar provided (in update 2, above) of his views (which, based on excerpts of his work he also provided, seem to represent what he has written on the subject) may not function especially well as a summary of what he says in the podcast. What he says in the podcast appears to be that adult-child sexual activity is wrong either when it is against the will of the child or when it involves harm to the child. However, he says, it is not necessarily or always the case that such activity is against the will of the child and it it is not necessarily or always the case that it is harmful. His view, then, is that a blanket claim that adult-child sex is wrong is mistaken. If it turns out that most incidences of adult-child sex are against the will of the children or harmful to the children, then most incidences of adult-child sex would be wrong, but ultimately, according to Kershnar, this depends on at least partially empirical facts about willingness and harm, and these facts may vary across cases and across cultures. Child rape is always wrong, he says. What about the legality of adult-child sex? While in his book he says that the balance of reasons favors “the criminalization of willing adult-child sex,” this view does not come through clearly in the podcast. In the podcast, he says that in cases in which the reasonability of a legal prohibition of some act depends on certain facts, and there is uncertainty about those facts, then the act ought not be legally prohibited. Since Kershnar seems to voice some skepticism about some facts regarding the harmfulness of some instances of adult-child sex, it would not be unreasonable for a listener to think that he is suggesting that not all adult-child sex should be illegal. Is he suggesting that? In the podcast, it just isn’t clear.[5]

Thus, WK, the Federalist, and @LibsofTikTok have all misrepresented (and possibly libeled) Kershnar. 

4.2. The Irrelevance of Kershnar's Views to "Morality on Atheism"

Atheism is neither moral nor immoral; it is amoral. This is just a pithy way of making the same point I made in section 2: atheism says nothing about the existence or non-existence of moral values, duties, accountability, freedom, or significance. That's just not what atheism is about. Compare atheism to geocentrism, the belief that the earth is at the center of the solar system. Geocentrism also says nothing about the existence or non-existence of moral values, duties, accountability, freedom, or significance. That's just not what geocentrism is about. So why do people talk about the alleged moral implications of atheism, but not the alleged moral implications of other amoral views like geocentrism (or plate tectonics or any thousands of other beliefs I could list)?

The answer is that, unlike geocentrism and the thousands of other amoral beliefs I could list, atheism is the denial of theism and many people think theism is somehow necessary for morality. What these people overlook is the fact that, just because one possible grounding for morality (theism) is rejected, it doesn't follow that another source of grounding for morality is impossible. Atheism may not entail a complete moral theory, where "complete moral theory" includes all of the items shown in the Sinnott-Armstrong diagram earlier, but it is consistent with one.

Turning to the connection between Kershnar's views and atheism, the proposition:

(1) God does not exist.

does not entail the obviously false proposition:
(2) Child rape is morally permissible.

Not only is it obvious that (1) does not entail (2), I think it is reasonable to conclude that even Kershnar would agree that (1) does not entail (2). 

In fact, we can show that (1) is consistent with the falsity of (2), by using a third proposition:

(3) God does not exist, and child rape is evil.

So how, precisely, are the views of Kershnar supposed to discredit atheism? Although he doesn't use these exact words, WK suggests that Kershnar's views are representative of atheists. In his own words, WK writes:
Do you think this is unusual for atheists? We just had a case where Democrats in Virginia were covering up the rape of a child and having the child’s father arrested. The same things happen in Canada. Last November, another LGBT activist professor was trying to normalize pedophilia.
Put aside the fact that neither "Democrat" nor "LGBT activist" mean, entail, or imply "atheist." If WK wants to argue Kershnar is somehow representative of the views of atheists, allow me to introduce him to the argument form known as the "statistical generalization." Here are four versions:
Statistical Generalization (SG): 
n% of all Fs observed are G
Therefore, m% of all Fs are G.

Statistical Generalization II: 
n% of the Fs in observed sample S are G
S is of size m and was randomly selected without replacement from the entire population of Fs
Therefore, n% of all Fs are G.

Statistical Generalization III: 
n% of the Fs in observed sample S are G
S is of size m and was randomly selected without replacement from the entire population of Fs
Therefore, n±k% of all Fs are G.

Statistical Generalization IV: 
n% of the Fs in observed sample S are G
S is of size m and was randomly selected without replacement from the entire population of Fs
Therefore, at the r% confidence level, n±k% of all Fs are G.
Therefore, n±k% of all Fs are G.[6]
Because SG doesn't involve random sampling, it should be rejected in favor of SG-II, SG-III, or SG-IV. Unless and until WK defends an argument in of those three forms, his smear against atheists should be rejected.

4.3. The Harm Caused by Child Sex Abuse

According to an article published by the American Counseling Association, the long-term effects of childhood sexual abuse are as follows:

Childhood sexual abuse has been correlated with higher levels of depression, guilt, shame, self-blame, eating disorders, somatic concerns, anxiety, dissociative patterns, repression, denial, sexual problems, and relationship problems.[7]

In an article about the consequences of rape, not specifically childhood sexual abuse, Cowling identified a myriad harmful effects of rape, not just on individual victims, but also on women in general.[8] Blending (and paraphrasing) these two articles together, we can summarize the harm caused by child sex abuse as follows.

  • Consequences for Individual Victims
    • Childhood sexual abuse violates the autonomy of the child. The child is treated as a mere means for the rapist or molester.
    • Childhood sexual abuse violates a person's sexual self-determination. Sexual self-determination, at an appropriate age, is an important area in the formation of an individual's personality.
    • Childhood sexual abuse causes profound, often lifelong, unhappiness to the victim and others for no justifiable reason. It has been correlated with higher levels of depression, guilt, shame, self-blame, eating disorders, somatic concerns, anxiety, dissociative patterns, repression, denial, sexual problems, and relationship problems.
  • Consequences for Children and Families in General
    • Children have to be taught, in age-appropriate ways, about appropriate and inappropriate forms of touching. This reduces their innocence and exposes them to concepts they shouldn't have to think about.
    • Childhood sexual abuse is very widely feared by responsible parents. One of the evils of childhood sexual abuse is thus the generation of fear in parents who are afraid their children might become victims.
    • A closely related evil is the restrictions which fear of childhood sexual abuse place on childhood activities. There are a whole series of issues to do with preventing the risk of childhood sexual abuse from certain institutions and individuals, ranging from restricting 1-on-1 access between children and adults, to skepticism or even outright distrust of supposedly "trusted" institutions, such as teachers, religious leaders, activity leaders (such as Scoutmasters in the Boy Scouts of America), and coaches of youth sports teams.

4.4. Atheism-Consistent Reasons for Condemning Child Rape

Atheism is consistent with a variety of general systems of substantive ethics. In this section I will summarize what some of the major options imply about child rape.

One "family" of general systems about substantive ethics is known as "consequentialism." According to consequentialism, "whether our acts are right or wrong depends only on facts about how it would be best for things to go."[9] Some consequentialists are "Rule Utilitarians," who believe that "a) a specific action is morally justified if it conforms to a justified moral rule; and b) a moral rule is justified if its inclusion into our moral code would create more utility than other possible rules (or no rule at all)."[10] Based on the enormity of the consequences listed in section 4.3, an act utilitarian would say that the act of child rape does not conform to a justified moral rule (as defined).

In contrast to consequentalism, "deontological" ethics focuses on the features of an act or the rule which would justify the effect. One type of deontolgical system is Kant's rule-deontological system, famous for its "categorical imperative." Kant offered three formulations of the categorical imperative. According to the second formulation, the "principle of ends," "So act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end and never as merely a means."[11] A Kantian would say that the act of child rape violates the second formulation of the categorical imperative precisely because it treats the child as a means to an end.

Another general system, which I have seen classified by some philosophers as consequentialist and by other philosophers as deontological, is natural law theory. One prominent version of natural law theory is Larry Arnhart's (secular) Darwinian Natural Right. According to Darwinian Natural Right, the good is the desirable; by "desirable," Arnhart means the (at least) twenty natural desires that are manifested in diverse ways in all human societies throughout history. On his blog, Arnhart explains:
... natural moral judgment as based on hypothetical imperatives that have a "given/if/then" structure: Given what we know about the nature of human beings and the world in which they live, if we want to pursue happiness while living in society with each other, then we ought to adopt a social structure that conforms to human nature in promoting human happiness in society.  So, for example, given what we know about human vulnerability and human propensities to violent aggression, if we want to pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity in our society, then we ought to have laws against murder, rape, assault, and theft.  Consequently, the laws against murder, rape, assault, and theft are natural moral laws.  I have elaborated this thought in some posts here, here, and here.[12]
I have shown that, on three major general systems of substantive ethics consistent with atheism, child rape is objectively wrong, where "objective" means discovered, not invented, by human beings.

4.5. Grounding Atheism-Consistent Reasons for Condemning Child Rape

My research on meta-ethical grounding is incomplete. Here I want to summarize how a proponent of Arnhart's Darwinian Natural Right theory would ground the objective wrongness of child rape. Define P and Q as follows:
p = "There are at least twenty natural desires that are manifested in diverse ways in all human societies throughout history"
q = "Satisfying these desires is good for human beings"
We can then express Arnhart's view of the grounding of his theory in different ways, such as :

(1) The fact that p grounds the fact that q
(2) Its being the case that p makes it the case that q.[13]

Please remember that I am not claiming to have shown that Arnhart's theory is true or even that I think it is true. Rather the key point is that the grounding for a biologically-based system of hypothetical imperatives based on Darwinian Natural Right is consistent with atheism. 

Notes

[1] Paul Bloomfield, Morality and Self-Interest (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 3-4.

[2] By "God-based morality is false," I mean the denial of the conjunction of the following three conditions: (i) cognitivism is true; (ii) the truth-conditions for propositions with moral content explicitly includes God or some fact about God (such as God's nature, will, commands, etc.); and (iii) at least one moral proposition is true. An atheist could consistently affirm conditions (i) and (ii), but deny (iii). That was, in fact, precisely J.L. Mackie's position. He thought God was a necessary truth-condition for the truth of any moral proposition. Since he denied God's existence, he denied the truth of all moral propositions. He called his position "error theory" because it granted (i) and (ii), but then said all moral propositions were in error. In contrast, someone like Robert Adams, who defends a version of divine command theory, would affirm "success theory" precisely because he thinks condition (iii) is satisfied. For a helpful introduction to cognitivism, truth-conditions, success theory, and error theory, see Geoffrey Sayre McCord, "Introduction: The Many Moral Realisms," Essays on Moral Realism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 1-23.

[3] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Moral Skepticisms (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 6.

[4] Justin Weinberg, "Kershnar Cycle Reactivated (several updates)", Daily Nous (February 3, 2022), https://dailynous.com/2022/02/03/kershnar-cycle-reactivated/. The words inside quotation marks are taken directly from his book; the rest is from an email from Kershnar to Weinberg.

[5] Ibid. Italics are mine.

[6] William Gustason, Reasoning from Evidence: Inductive Logic (New York: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 48-57. 

[7] Hall, M., & Hall, J. (2011). "The long-term effects of childhood sexual abuse:
Counseling implications." Retrieved from http://counselingoutfitters.com/vistas/vistas11/Article_19.pdf

[8] Cowling, Mark (2001) "Rape, and Other Sexual Assaults: Towards a Philosophical Analysis," Essays in Philosophy: Vol. 2: Iss. 2, Article 11. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/48857134.pdf

[9] Parfit, Derek. On What Matters: 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 373, Kindle Edition. 

[10] Nathanson, Stephen. "Act and Rule Utilitarianism," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://iep.utm.edu/util-a-r/

[11] Immanuel Kant, as quoted (or paraphrased) in Louis Pojman, Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong, 3rd ed., p. 146.

[12] Larry Arnhart, "Jefferson's Biological Science of Equality, Race, and Slavery," Darwinian Conservativism (June 27, 2018), https://darwinianconservatism.blogspot.com/2018/06/jeffersons-biological-science-of.html

[13] Larry Arnhart, "Nihilism as Disappointed Platonism," Darwinian Conservativism (April 5, 2013), https://darwinianconservatism.blogspot.com/2013/04/nihilism-as-disappointed-platonism.html

1 comment:

Anonymous said...

1. How do you account for satisfying these desires directly leading to immoral behaviour, and things we would not consider to be good for human beings?

2. How solid is the grounding if the 'desire for sexual mating' as an example, is not inherently moral? So how do we get there without presupposition that it is, or post hoc rationalization?