[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 26, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]
I've only skimmed this article, but I'm linking to it for others who might be interested. (Thanks to Charles Echelbarger for tipping me off to this.)
[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 26, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]
In my response to Victor Reppert's anti-naturalistic argument from pain, I stated that a more specific fact (consciousness is dependent upon the physical brain) about consciousness is antecedently more likely on naturalism than on theism. Bilbo provided several feedback messages in response to this claim. As I read him, he thinks the argument is no threat to Christian theists. It is apparently his view that mind-brain dependence is at least as probable on Christian theism as on naturalism, since Christian theists believe in specific, sectarian doctrines that raise the probability of mind-brain dependence. Since I think Bilbo is wrong about this, I'll explain why.
First, here is the logical form of my evidential argument.
Let D = the mind is dependent upon the physical brain.
Let T = classical theism
Let N = metaphysical naturalism
(1) D is known to be true.
(2) T is not much more probable intrinsically than N.
(3) Pr(D/N) > Pr(D/T).
(4) Other evidence held equal, T is probably false.
Note the modest nature of this argument. It doesn't claim that theism is probably false; it merely claims that evidence (D), by itself, favors N over T. This distinction is crucial since it allows for the possibility that there could be other evidence that both favors T and outweighs the evidence for N provided by D. Thus, D should be understood as a prime facie reason for rejecting T.
Let me now turn to some of Bilbo's specific comments.
Bilbo: "My first problem is that it seems more accurate to say that minds *are* the physical brain on Naturalism (not merely dependent on them). And since this has not been demonstrated, it would beg the question to assert that the postulate that "minds are the physical brain" provides evidence for Naturalism."
That would indeed beg the question, which is why I never said that! My argument is an inductive argument. It would be illegitimate to state the evidence in such a way that entails the hypothesis to be proved. Therefore, I'll stick with my original formulation of the premise ("the mind is dependent upon the physical brain").
Bilbo: "But the Christian views I mentioned also make it antecedently probable that minds will be dependent on the brain. Let's use the structure of your argument with Christian non-reductive physicalism (hereafter NRP)..."
If theism is improbable given D, then so is Christian theism (or any other more specific belief system that entails theism). Christian theism entails theism; therefore it cannot be more probable than theism. Premise (4) entails that, other evidence held equal, Christian theism is probably false.
I don't deny the potential relevance of sectarian doctrines to the issue of whether my argument is sound. They could raise Pr(D/T) or lower Pr(D/N). In order to assess the evidential significance of such doctrines, we would need to apply a principle that Draper calls the "weighted average principle" (WAP). Let H represent some Christian doctrine. Then WAP can be represented as follows.
Pr(D/T) = Pr(H/T) x Pr(D/T&H;) + Pr(~H/T) x Pr(D/T&~H)
This formula is an average because Pr(H/T) + Pr(~H/T) = 1. It is not a simple straight average, however, since those two values may not equal 1/2.
Let us consider, then, Christian non-reductive physicalism (CNRP), which Bilbo proposes as a specific doctrine that he believes raises the probability of D given (Christian) theism. Bilbo defines CNRP as "the non-existence of all supernatural beings, except for those that are or were at some point divine (angels, demons, God, etc.)." Bilbo claims that CNRP "entails the nonexistence of disembodied human minds." Using WAP, we obtain the following.
Pr(D/T) = Pr(CNRP/T) x Pr(D/T&CNRP;) + Pr(~CNRP/T) x Pr(D/T&~CNRP)
In order to reject my evidential argument, therefore, Bilbo would need to show that CNRP raises Pr(D/T) so that it is greater than or equal to Pr(D/N) by using the above formula. Does CNRP do that? I shall leave the question as an exercise for the reader.
(Note: I have borrowed heavily from ideas in another paper by Paul Draper, "More Pain and Pleasure: A Reply to Otte." I am, of course, responsible for any errors in my post.)
[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 25, 2006 and then republished on February 11, 2016. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]
There are a variety of approaches to formulating an argument from evil against theism. Two of the most influential versions of the evidential argument from evil were developed by atheist William Rowe and agnostic Paul Draper. Both involve appeals to pain. In a recent entry on his blog, Victor Reppert tries to turn the tables on proponents of arguments from evil (pain) by arguing that pain is a problem for atheists. Reppert formulates his argument against naturalism as follows.
1. If naturalism is true, then consciousness does not emerge.
2. If consciousness does not emerge, then pain does not exist.
3. Therefore, if naturalism is true, then pain does not exist.
4. Pain exists.
5. Therefore, naturalism is false.
Notice that premise (1) of the above argument entails that naturalism and consciousness are logically incompatible. Reppert's argument may be reasonably characterized, then, as a very specific example of a logical argument from consciousness against naturalism (as opposed to an evidential argument from consciousness as defended by Richard Swinburne). I believe this characterization is further supported by Reppert's statement, "the actual internally experienced state of pain is a huge, hard problem for atheistic naturalism, a problem that I personally consider to be logically impossible to solve."
Does Reppert literally mean what he says? As a so-called logical argument against naturalism, it isn't clear to me why this argument is in any way an improvement over logical arguments from evil against theism. In particular, Reppert has not yet presented a defense of (1) in its current form (i.e., lacking some sort of probabilistic hedge).
Perhaps, however, Reppert did not intend for his argument to be worded so strongly. Instead, he might say, we should understand his argument as an evidential argument against naturalism. If so, it seems to me that Reppert's argument from pain violates the Rule of Total Evidence. Allow me to explain. Let us assume, for the sake of argument that Reppert is correct that consciousness is antecedently more likely on theism than on naturalism. Furthermore, as Reppert points out, pain presupposes consciousness. It doesn't follow from these two assumptions, however, that the statement, "The kinds and distribution of pain we find in the world is epistemically more probable on naturalism than on theism," is false.
Here's why. Reppert has committed the fallacy of understated evidence. In general terms, we could say that Reppert has identified some general fact F (consciousness exists) about a topic X (consciousness) that is antecedently more likely on theism than on naturalism. It could still be the case that a more specific fact (S) about X is antecedently more likely on naturalism than on theism. As Paul Draper writes, "we know a lot more about phenomenal consciousness than just that it exists" ("Partisanship and Inquiry in the Philosophy of Religion," unpublished paper). Draper then gives an example of a more specific fact about consciousness, a fact that, given consciousness exists, is more probable on naturalism than on theism. As Draper explains, we also know from neuroscience that the mind is dependent upon the physical brain, a fact that is more likely on naturalism and consciousness than on theism and consciousness. Thus, as Draper concludes, "when the available evidence about consciousness is fully stated, it is far from clear that it significantly favors theism."
[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 25, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. Unfortunately, the link has mysteriously disappeared from Patheos and I wasn't able to quickly find it when searching on YouTube.]
Here is the description of the video as provided at YouTube:
"Jon Stewart analyzes the latest gay surprise as the evangelical, gay-bashing preacher, Pastor Ted, gets caught with his three-year gay lover and supplier of crystal meth. What else is new? For an added bit of spice, there is an earlier clip of Haggard lecturing Richard Dawkins on arrogance. Just too beautiful."
While Haggard's behavior (buying crystal meth and a "massage" from a gay prostitute) are clearly hugely embarrassing to evangelical Christians, what is not so clear is whether anything of philosophical significance follows from his behavior. For example, I've heard many people refer to Haggard as a "hypocrite," but the fact is that Haggard never tried to marry a man and he never claimed that homosexuality is morally acceptable. On the contrary, Haggard made it very clear that he considered his behavior morally wrong -- and he seemed pretty sincere to me when condemned himself. I conclude that Haggard sincerely believes homosexuality is wrong, but he obviously has some sort of internal struggle with his sexual orientation that prevents him from consistently behaving in accordance with that belief.
What I find much more interesting is the portion of video where Dawkins gets into a somewhat heated exchange with Haggard over science. Haggard actually has the audacity to lecture Dawkins on "intellectual arrogance." Why? Because Dawkins pointed out the absurdity of Haggard's claim that evolution is the view that things like eyes and ears came about by "accident." As Dawkins correctly points out, no evolutionary biologist believes such a thing. That Haggard would make such a statement reveals his utter ignorance of contemporary science. It's okay if evangelicals like Haggard want to reject evolution (and even urge others to do so), but the least they can do is to actually reject evolution and not some Sunday school strawman version of it.
[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 25, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]
This blog is described as being "Dedicated to fair exposition and critique of Christianity and Christian apologetics." The anonymous author provides the following profile: "I'm currently in the late stages of a PhD program in Philosophy. I was a Christian and an "apologetics nerd" for 15 years, but deconverted at the end of 2005. " Topics of previous posts include the fine-tuning argument, empirical case for the accuracy of the New Testament, Divine Command Theories, Free Will Defense, kalam cosmological argument, and more!
[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 25, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]
I recently mentioned Gene Witmer's critique of presuppositionalism in an earlier post. Presuppositional apologist Gene Cook has also taken notice of Witmer's critique. The two discussed the issues on Cook's podcast.
[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 12, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link was also updated to its current location.]
[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 4, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. I have also updated the link to the blog's current address.]
[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 4, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]
[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 4, 2006. It was republished here on November 7, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]
'Dr. Dino' guilty on all counts: Couple could get more than 200 years
Hard to believe a man with a Ph.D didn't know of a basic tax law
(Hat tip to Doug Krueger.)