Reply to Daniel's Moral Argument for Theism

1. No Good Reason to Think (1) Is True

1.1. The Inessential Objection

1.2. The Underdetermination Objection

1.3. The Prior Obligations Objection

1.4. The Moral Axiology vs. Moral Deontology Objection

1.5. The Moral Ontology vs. Moral Psychology Objection

1.6. The Lack of a Comparative Argument Objection

1.7. The False Evidence Objection

2. There is Good Reason to Think (1) Is False

2.1. Values

2.2.1. Terminology

2.2.2. Arguments for a Theistic Grounding of Moral Values

Theistic Value Grounding Argument

2.2.3. Arguments for a Non-Theistic Grounding of Moral Values

The Non-Necessity of Mental Grounding

The Aseity of Abstract Objects

2.2. Duties

 2.2.1. Exposition

 2.2.2. Arguments for a Theistic Grounding of Moral Obligation

 "Laws Require a Lawgiver"

 "Humans are God's Property"

 2.2.3. Arguments for a Non-Theistic Grounding of Moral Obligation

The Prior Obligations Objection

The Epistemological Objection 

 2.3. Freedom

2.3.1. Terminology

2.3.2. Arguments for the Necessity of Free Will

The No Responsibility Argument 

The No Obligation Argument

2.3.3. Arguments against the Necessity of Free Will 

Moral Value without Free Will

Moral Obligation without Free Will

2.4. Purpose 

2.4.1. Exposition

2.4.2. Arguments for the Necessity of (Agential) Purpose

2.4.3. Arguments against the Necessity of (Agential) Purpose 

Value Simpliciter without Agential Purpose

Prudential Value without Agential Purpose

Subjective Purpose Cannot Ground Objective Value 

2.5. Standards

2.5.1. Exposition

2.5.1.1. General Systems of Ethics

2.5.1.2. "Thin" and "Thick" Moral Standards

2.5.2. Arguments for a Theistic Grounding of Moral Standards

2.5.3. Arguments for a Non-Theistic Grounding of Moral Standards

2.6. Human Dignity

2.6.1. Exposition

2.6.2. Arguments for the Necessity of Human Dignity 

2.6.3. Arguments against the Necessity of Dignified Beings

2.6.4. Arguments against Human Exceptionalism 

 

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