Podcast Interview with Justin Schieber of Real Atheology

Justin Schieber

A few weeks ago, Justin Schieber interviewed me for an episode of the Real Atheology podcast. That episode just dropped. 

RA040: Jeffery Jay Lowder on Philosophy of Religion

"In this episode, Justin Schieber sits down with Jeffery Jay Lowder for a wide-ranging interview. Fans of the show will no doubt be familiar with Jeff's work. From founding Infidels.org and the Secular Outpost to his contributions to The Empty Tomb and his several public debates, Jeff has earned his reputation as a fair-minded and philosophically informed atheist. We discuss the origin of infidels.org, Paul Draper's famous argument from Pain and Pleasure and everything in between."

LINK

Two Arguments for the Impossibility of an Omniscient Being

An Impossible (or Penrose) Triangle

Source: OpenClipArt; License: CC 

Version #1

1. Either God can know what it is like not to know that p or God cannot know what it is like not to know that p. 
2. If God can know what it is like not to know that p, then God is not omniscient (since to know what it is like not to know that p, there must be some p that God does not know). 
3. If God cannot know what it is like not to know that p, then God is not omniscient (since there is some p—i.e., (L) or (L*)—that God cannot know). 
4. (Therefore) Either way, God is not omniscient. 

Version #2

1. Either God can know what it is like to be finite or God cannot know what it is like to be finite. 
2. If God can know what it is like to be finite, then God is not omniscient (since to know what it is like to be finite, God must be finite). 
3. If God cannot know what it is like to be finite, then God is not omniscient (since there is something that God cannot know, namely, what it is like to be finite). 
4. (Therefore) Either way, God is not omniscient.

Both versions of this argument belong to Moti Mizrahi. See:

Mizrahi, Moti (2013). "New Puzzles About Divine Attributes." European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (2):147-157.

Another "Impossibility" Argument Against Theism: The Aseity-vs-Temporal Argument

An Impossible (or Penrose) Triangle

Source: OpenClipArt; License: CC 

The Aseity-vs-Temporal Argument

temporal theism =df. theism conjoined with the proposition, "God is necessarily temporal"

(1) If temporal theism is true, then God is a se. [Premise]

(2) If temporal theism is true, then God is temporal. [Premise]

(3) If God is a se, then God is self-existent, independent, and underived. [From the definition of a se]

(4) If God is timeless sans creation and temporal with creation, then God is not necessarily temporal. 

(5) Therefore, it is impossible for God to be both a se and necessarily temporal. (from 3 and 4)

(6) Hence, it is impossible for temporal theism to be true. (from 1, 2, and 5)

To avoid any misunderstandings, I am merely sketching an argument, not defending it. I claim only that it is valid, not that it is sound.

The Argument from the Psychological Relevance of Logical Laws

Introduction

In his book C.S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea: In Defense of the Argument from Reason, Victor Reppert lists nine presuppositions of rational inference.

1. States of mind have a relation to the world we call intentionality, or about-ness.

2. Thoughts and beliefs can be either true or false.

3. Human beings can be in the condition of accepting, rejecting or suspending belief about propositions.

4. Logical laws exist.

5. Human beings are capable of apprehending logical laws.

6. The state of accepting the truth of a proposition plays a crucial causal role in the production of other beliefs, and the propositional content of mental states is relevant to the playing of this causal role.

7. The apprehension of logical laws plays a causal role in the acceptance of the conclusion of the argument as true.

8. The same individual entertains thoughts of the premises and then draws the conclusion.

9. Our processes of reasoning provide us with a systematically reliable way of understanding the world around us.[1]

Commenting on this list of presuppositions, Reppert writes, "It seems to me that all of these elements of reasoning are prima facie difficult to fit within the framework of philosophical naturalism."[2] Here I want to quickly sketch how I would assess one of Reppert's supporting arguments for that claim.

Two "Impossibility" Arguments against (Craigean) Christianity

An Impossible (or Penrose) Triangle

Source: OpenClipArt; License: CC 

Introduction

In my recent video assessment of the late Dr. Gordon Stein's opening statement in his debate with Greg Bahnsen on, "Does God Exist?", I described two possible ways of defending the non-existence of something. First, I said that one way to defend a universal negative is to use what I call an "impossibility argument." Second, I said that one way to defend a particular negative is to use what I call an "improbability argument." 

As I explained in the video, there are two caveats. First, I do not claim that these two types of arguments are an exhaustive list of the various argument patterns which might be used to support universal or particular negatives. Second, my names for these argument patterns are not standard. For example, a standard name for one type of improbability argument is "evidential argument." The standard name for one type of impossibility argument is "logical argument." For example, J.L. Mackie's famous "logical argument from evil" argues that God is impossible because theism is logically inconsistent with evil. I don't like that name because it sounds funny to outsiders. Imagine an atheist saying, "I'm going to defend a logical argument for atheism." That invites the question, "As opposed to what? An illogical argument for atheism?" While my names are nonstandard, I think they are more intuitive than the standard argument names and so I prefer my names for that reason.

In this article, I will quickly sketch two impossibility arguments for a particular negative: the proposition, "Craigean Christianity is false," where "Craigean Christianity" means the version of Christianity defended by William Lane Craig.