The Holocaust is Strong Evidence Against Theism

(Revised 27 April 2022)

(Revised 1 March 2022)

(Revised 14 February 2022)

(Revised 7 February 2022)

The following tweet recently appeared on my Twitter feed: 

Primo Levi Auschwitz survivor
"The notions that our world comes from God and is governed by God are hard to sustain if one looks seriously at evil. What egocentric presumption to think that God listens for our repentance and acts accordingly!" pic.twitter.com/J2gNxTEdNt

— Dave of Letters (@liverational22) August 6, 2021

In this blog post, I intend to defend a weaker version of Primo Levi's claim. I do not claim that Auschwitz makes God's existence impossible. Rather, I intend to argue that the Holocaust is extremely strong evidence against theism and, other evidence held equal, makes God's existence improbable.

Baggett's and Wall's Proposed IBE Criteria

In an earlier post, I attempted to steelman the abductive moral argument set forth by David Baggett and Jerry Walls (hereafter, "B&W") in their book God and Cosmos. In this post, I want to pick up where that post left off and turn to my second question for evaluating the schema of B&W's schema for their abductive moral argument. Recall that my second question was as follows:

Are the proposed criteria for explanation candidates meaningful, unambiguous, and justified?

Baggett and Walls on 'The' Moral Argument vs. 'The' Argument from Evil

David Baggett	Jerry Walls

The idea that there is some sort of connection between moral arguments for theism, on the one hand and arguments from evil against theism, on the other hand, is not new. In this blog post, I want to comment on a very cryptic statement made by Baggett and Walls about this connection. In their book God and Cosmos, they write:

... Second, it should be said in such a case that the probability of theism has increased (by much or a little) relative to morality; in theory the probability of atheism could increase or decrease relative to other phenomena. (However, the success of the moral argument would decisively undercut the problem of evil, which tends to be counted as the best evidence against theism.) (20, boldface mine)

Steelmanning the Abductive Moral Argument of David Baggett and Jerry Walls

Chad of the blog "Truthbomb Apologetics" recently tweeted about the abductive, cumulative moral argument for God's existence set forth by Christian philosophers David Baggett and Jerry Walls in their book God and Cosmos.

Baggett/Walls: A Four-Fold Abductive Cumulative Argument

1. Moral facts, moral knowledge, moral transformation, and moral rationality require robust explanation.

2. The best explanation of these phenomena is God.

3. Therefore, God (probably) exists. @moralapologetic

— Chad (@TBapologetics) January 21, 2022

As someone with great interest in metaethics and moral arguments for theism, this book had been on my "to buy" list for sometime. I decided to pick up a copy on Kindle. 

With the disclaimer that I haven't finished reading the book yet, the first thing I did after downloading the Kindle version of the book was to scan the book for a schema or other formal representation of the logical structure of their argument in premise and conclusion form. I didn't find one. So I decided to try to "reverse engineer" the schema for their argument as I read through the book.

Does Robert Adams Reject Craig's Moral Argument?

 

It is no secret that W.L. Craig relies upon the work of Robert Adams regarding metaethics, to defend his moral argument. It's therefore surprising no one has pointed out that Adams appears to reject a key premise of Craig's moral argument:

"What is true about goodness if God does not exist, or is not in fact a suitable candidate for the role of the Good? This is a conditional question about the actual world, not about other possible worlds; and I am confident of my answer to it. If there is no God, or if God is in fact not a suitable candidate for the role of the Good, then my theory is false, but there may be same other salient, suitable candidate and so some other theory of the nature of the good."

Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 46.

Adams' book is very dense and so I openly admit I may be misinterpreting him, but I don't think that I am. Adams seems to be saying, "I think the Good = God, but if I am wrong about that, then good (or even the Good?) can still exist even if God does not."

Now consider William Lane Craig's moral argument for God's existence:

1. If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.
2. Objective moral values do exist.
3. Therefore, God exists.

If I am interpreting Adams correctly, then it would seem to follow that Adams rejects premise (1).

Introducing the Divine Independence Success Theory

Divine Independence Success Theory of Moral Value (DIST-A):

At least one state of affairs is morally good and, if God exists, neither God nor God’s nature nor any state of God (such as his attitudes, intentions, emotions, desires, will, commands, etc.) are what makes all instances of moral value morally valuable.

Comments:

1. I prefer this label to other labels which suggest that this position is somehow inherently “godless” or “atheistic.” DIST-A is entirely neutral on whether theism is true and so is logically consistent with theism.
2. DIST-A is logically consistent with the proposition that a loving God (or God’s nature) can be the source or grounding of certain morally valuable things (such as holiness, reverence, etc.). DIST-A denies, however, that if God exists, all moral value is dependent upon God’s nature.
3. The 'A' in the acronym DIST-A is for axiology.

Divine Independence Success Theory of Moral Obligation (DIST-D):

At least one action is morally obligatory and, if God exists, neither God nor any state of God (such as his attitudes, intentions, emotions, desires, will, commands, etc.) are what makes all morally obligatory actions morally obligatory.

Comments:

1. I prefer this label to other labels which suggest that this position is somehow inherently “godless” or “atheistic.” DIST-D is entirely neutral on whether theism is true and so is logically consistent with theism.
2. DIST-D is logically consistent with the proposition that a loving God can make acts morally required or prohibited by issuing commands. DIST-D denies, however, that if God exists, all moral obligations are dependent upon God’s commands.
3. Replacing “loving God” with “God” makes no difference to DIST-D.
4. The 'D' in the acronym DIST-D is for deontology.