The Secular Outpost: Paul Draper, the Fallacy of Understated Evidence, Theism, and Naturalism

The Secular Outpost: Paul Draper, the Fallacy of Understated Evidence, Theism, and Naturalism

Richard Gale's Sovereignty-Benevolence Argument

Richard Gale presents the following argument to show that objective moral truths are not the sort of things that could be created.

(1) God determines the truth-values of ethical propositions.
(2) God is essentially benevolent.
(3) God is omnitemporal, i.e., his eternality involves beginningless and endless duration in time.
(4) God is benevolent prior to his decision as to what truth-values ethical propositions will have. [From (2) and (3)]
(5) Nothing is good or bad, right or wrong, prior to God's decision as to what truth-values ethical propositions will have. [From (1)]
(6) Therefore, it is impossible for God to exist. [From (1), (2), and (5)]

LINK: Michael Antony's Review of Reasonable Atheism by Aikin and Talisse

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on November 8, 2011. It was republished here on November 9, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date. The link has also been updated to reflect its current location as of November 8, 2011.]

An Argument for the Incoherence of the Trinity

The purpose of this post is to sketch a argument for the incoherence of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

The Doctrine of the Trinity Formulated

Let us begin by defining the doctrine of the Trinity as three theses:

(T1) There is exactly one God.
(T2) Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not identical to one another.
(T3) Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are consubstantial.

The Argument for the Incoherence of the Trinity (also known as the "Logical Problem of the Trinity")

(1) If the doctrine of the Trinity is true, there is exactly one God, the Father Almighty. [from T1]
(2) The Father is a god. [From (1)]
(3) If the doctrine of the Trinity is true, the Son is consubstantial with the Father but not identical to the Father. [From T2 and T3]
(4) If there are x and y such that x is a god, x is not identical to y, and y is consubstantial with x, then it is not the case that there is exactly one God. [Premise]
(5) Therefore, it is not the case that there is exactly one God. [From (2), (3), and (4)]
(6) Therefore, it is impossible that the doctrine of the Trinity is true. [From (1) and (5)]

Because I am aware that Christian scholars have written numerous clarifications and defenses of the doctrine of the Trinity against arguments such as this, I shall make no attempt to argue that the argument is sound; rather, I only claim that the argument is valid.

Source: with the exception of premise (6), this material was taken from Michael Cannon Rea, Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology: Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3-4.

Bede Rundle's Obituary; Why There is Something Rather Than Nothing

[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 19, 2011. It was republished here on November 9, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]

Philosopher Bede Rundle has died.

If you hadn't heard of him and you are reading this blog, then you will almost certainly want to read his book, Why There Is Something Rather Than Nothing (Oxford University Press, 2004). Here's a summary of Rundle's argument, taken from his obituary:

Since this universe is contingent, that is to say it might not have existed, at some point it did not exist, and at a later point it came into existence. Since something can only begin to exist in relation to something else already existing (for instance, a football match can only start if the players are on the field), a non-contingent, necessary thing, God, must have existed for this universe to begin to exist. Had there been no necessary thing, God, there would be nothing now.

Unlike most recent philosophers, Rundle found some truth in this argument. In his version, we must indeed claim that if nothing had existed, nothing would exist now, in other words that it is impossible that nothing at all should have existed. For to say that there might have been nothing "then" (before the Big Bang) or "now" presupposes a temporal framework of reference, and thus space, motion and objects.

However, this does not fully vindicate Aquinas, for "the only thing which would provide a setting into which our universe might make an entrée would be another universe". There is no necessary entity, God, but some physical thing or other must have always necessarily existed.

If correct, this argument has dramatic consequences for most humans and their religious or scientific beliefs about the origin of the world, for it undermines the idea of an absolutely first event of the world, whether Creation or Big Bang. Rundle also casts doubt on the notion of divine agency and indeed the coherence of the notion of God.

Rundle's obituary may be found here. (HT: Leiter Reports)

Secular Outpost contributor Stephen Law's review may be found on his blog here.