[This post was originally published on The Secular Outpost on October 21, 2011. It was republished here on November 8, 2021 with the date manually adjusted to reflect its original publication date.]
Just discovered this and sharing the link without taking a position on its arguments.
Wielenberg claims that moral properties are transcendental unanalyzable ‘ought’ properties that cannot bear any relationship to the ‘is’ universe even though they are supposed to govern and be applied to actions that can only occur in the ‘is’ universe.
Any mention of transcendental properties causes me to hesitate unless one can prove that they are absolutely necessary. When comparing two theories – one of which argues for transcendental properties that are incompatible with the ‘is’ universe, and one which does not need such properties, there are good reasons to go with the latter theory, which is where my arguments go.
Weisenberg [sic] can give us very little (no) information on what these properties are. He can tell us what they are not (they are not ‘is’ properties) – which makes no sense, as I explain in the book. He tells good stories that suggest that certain things could not possibly be wrong – but he tells us nothing about what they are and why they cannot be wrong. Indeed, Weisenberg’s [sic] transcendental moral properties are at least as mysterious as any God concept.
LINK -- Fyfe's comments are located near the bottom of the page (HT: Luke Muelhauser)
