Naturalistic Atheism

Mike at "Foxhole Atheism" is Reviewing my Debate with Fernandes

2011-12-09T00:07:00.001-08:00

On his Foxhole Atheism blog, Mike says that he has started listening to my debate with Phil Fernandes and that I am "'winning' decisively." He then proceeds to comment on one of Fernandes' regarding the Goldilocks Zone.

LINK

The Secular Outpost: Atheistic Teleological Arguments: Index

2011-12-04T01:30:00.000-08:00

I just completed my series of articles on atheistic teleological arguments on The Secular Outpost

The Secular Outpost: Atheistic Teleological Arguments: Index

Enjoy!

The Secular Outpost: Paul Draper, the Fallacy of Understated Evidence, Theism, and Naturalism

2011-11-24T18:59:00.000-08:00

The Secular Outpost: Paul Draper, the Fallacy of Understated Evidence, Theism, and Naturalism

An Argument for the Incoherence of the Trinity

2011-11-06T23:29:00.000-08:00

The purpose of this post is to sketch a argument for the incoherence of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.

The Doctrine of the Trinity Formulated

Let us begin by defining the doctrine of the Trinity as three theses:

(T1) There is exactly one God.
(T2) Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not identical to one another.
(T3) Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are consubstantial.

The Argument for the Incoherence of the Trinity (also known as the "Logical Problem of the Trinity")

(1) If the doctrine of the Trinity is true, there is exactly one God, the Father Almighty. [from T1]
(2) The Father is a god. [From (1)]
(3) If the doctrine of the Trinity is true, the Son is consubstantial with the Father but not identical to the Father. [From T2 and T3]
(4) If there are x and y such that x is a god, x is not identical to y, and y is consubstantial with x, then it is not the case that there is exactly one God. [Premise]
(5) Therefore, it is not the case that there is exactly one God. [From (2), (3), and (4)]
(6) Therefore, it is impossible that the doctrine of the Trinity is true. [From (1) and (5)]

Because I am aware that Christian scholars have written numerous clarifications and defenses of the doctrine of the Trinity against arguments such as this, I shall make no attempt to argue that the argument is sound; rather, I only claim that the argument is valid.

Source: with the exception of premise (6), this material was taken from Michael Cannon Rea, Oxford Readings in Philosophical Theology: Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3-4.

Biological Evolution as Evidence against Theism

2011-10-28T20:21:00.000-07:00

Many conservative Christians and lay atheists alike claim that if biological evolution is true, then God does not exist. Ironically, while many conservative Christians have attacked evolution because it supposedly entails atheism, no contemporary atheist philosopher has used evolution as evidence for atheism. Indeed, the only philosopher who has formulated an argument for the claim that evolution is evidence against theism and for metaphysical naturalism is agnostic philosopher Paul Draper.

Draper defends an evidential argument from evolution for naturalism. In other words, Draper's argument does not claim that evolution is logically inconsistent with the existence of God. Rather, it claims that known facts about evolution that are consistent with theism nevertheless provide evidence against it.

This argument is focused on God in general, not necessarily the Christian God. Draper argues that, all other things held equal, known facts about the origin of complex life are prima facie evidence against theism.

Definitions

geneaological thesis: complex life evolved from simple life
genetic thesis: all evolutionary change in populations of complex organisms either is or is the result of trans-generational genetic change.
evolution: the geneaological thesis conjoined with the genetic thesis
Darwinism: the much more specific claim that natural selection operating on random genetic mutation is the principal mechanism driving the evolutionary change that results in increased complexity
supernatural person: a person that is neither a part nor a product of the physical universe
perfect person: perfect in power (omnipotent), perfect in knowledge (omniscient), and perfect in moral goodness (morally perfect).
God: a perfect supernatural person
theism: the hypothesis that God is the creator of the physical universe.
metaphysical naturalism: the hypothesis that the universe is a closed system, which means that nothing that is not part of the natural world affects it.

Note: Draper mentions Darwinism only to clarify that his argument is not an evidential argument for naturalism from Darwinism, which would be question-begging, but an evidential argument for naturalism from evolution (as defined above).

Draper's Evidential Argument from Evolution

Logical Form

(1) Evolution is antecedently much more probable on the assumption that naturalism is true than on the assumption that theism is true.
(2) The statement that pain and pleasure systematically connected to reproductive success is antecedently much more probable on the assumption that evolutionary naturalism is true than on the assumption that evolutionary theism is true.
(3) Therefore, evolution conjoined with this statement about pain and pleasure is antecedently very much more probable on the assumption that naturalism is true than on the assumption that theism is true. [From 1 and 2]
(4) Naturalism is at least as plausible as theism.
(5) Therefore, other evidence held equal, naturalism is very much more probable than theism. [From 3 and 4]
(6) Naturalism entails that theism is false.
(7) Therefore, other evidence held equal, it is highly probable that theism is false. [From 5 and 6]

Legend

Pr(x): the epistemic probability of any proposition x
Pr(x/y): the epistemic probability of any proposition x conditional upon y
">!": "is much more probable than"
">!!": "is very much more probable than"
E: evolution
T: theism
N: metaphysical naturalism
P: pain and pleasure are systematically connected to reproductive success (cf. Draper's argument from the biological role of pain and pleasure)

Draper's Evidential Argument from Evolution Restated

(1) Pr(E/N) >! Pr(E/T).
(2) Pr(P/E&N) >! Pr(P/E&T).
(3) Pr(E&P/N) >!! Pr(E&P/T). (From 1 and 2)
(4) Other evidence held equal, Pr(N) >= Pr(T).
(5) Therefore, other evidence held equal, Pr(N/E&P) >!! Pr(T/E&P). (From 3 and 4)
(6) Naturalism entails that theism is false.
(7) Therefore, other evidence held equal, Pr(T/E&P) <!! 1/2. (From 5 and 6)

Draper's Defense of His Premises

First Premise

Here, again, is Draper's first premise:

(1) Pr(E/N) >! Pr(E/T).

Let S ≡ special creationism. E entails ~S. Therefore, E is logically equivalent to ~S & E.

Pr(E/N) >! Pr(E/T) iff Pr(~S&*E/N) >! Pr(~S&E/T)

Using axioms of the probability calculus, this becomes:

Pr(E/N) >! Pr(E/T) iff Pr(~S/N) x Pr(E/~S & N) >! Pr(~S/T) x Pr(E/~S&T)

Therefore, Draper's strategy for showing that Pr(E/N) >! Pr(E/T) is to show that

A. Pr(~S/N) >! Pr(~S/T), and
B. Pr(E/~S&N) >= Pr(E/~S&T)

Draper's Defense of A

N entails that S is false. So Pr(~S/N) = 1.

Given T, however, S might be true. So Pr(~S/T) <1. Therefore, Pr(~S/N) > Pr(~S/T). But, Draper observes, we can make a much more interesting claim than that, namely, that Pr(~S/T) <= 1/2. In other words, Pr(S/T) >= 1/2. The reasons for believing this are as follows:

"At first glance, it seems that the evidence for evolution is the only strong reason theists have for believing that God is not a special creator (which is to say that we don't have any strong antecedent reasons for believing this)."
"We know by past experience that God, if He exists, has at least latent deistic tendencies." Even independent of the evidence for evolution, the past success of naturalistic science does provide some reason for theists to believe that God is not a special creator.
Theists have a very strong antecedent reason for believing that God did create at least some complex life independently: the division between conscious and nonconscious life is enormously significant if theism is true.
"Before Darwin, many theists were special creationists."

Thus, Pr(~S/T) <= 1/2. But notice that this entails that "~S is at least twice as probable antecedently on naturalism as it is on theism, which implies that it at least doubles the ratio of the probability of naturalism to the probability of theism."

Draper's Defense of B

The probabilities in B are to be assessed relative to the background knowledge that various complex life forms exist.

N entails that S is false, so ~S&N is logically equivalent to just N. Given that complex life exists, what makes evolution so likely given N is the lack of plausible naturalistic alternatives to evolution.

Given T, however, alternatives to evolution are somewhat more likely, simply because there is less reason to assume the complex must arise from the simple.

Therefore, Pr(E/~S&N) >= Pr(E/~S & T).

Second Premise

Recall that P represents the statement, "pain and pleasure are systematically connected to reproductive success." Here, again, is Draper's second premise:

(2) Pr(P/E&N) >! Pr(P/E&T).

In order to see why, let's bring Darwinism (D) back into the conversation. Recall that D is the claim that natural selection operating on random genetic mutation is the principal mechanism driving the evolutionary change that results in increased complexity. D is much more probable given evolutionary naturalism than given theism.
Pr(D/E&N) !> Pr(D/E&T)

First, consider Pr(D/E&N).

D explains the increase in the complexity of life over time better than other potential naturalistic explanations;
D solves an explanatory problem for naturalism: the problem of explaining teleological order in organic systems;
Natural selection is just the sort of "blind" process one would expect to drive evolution if naturalism is true, since natural selection explains teleological order in organic systems without itself displaying such order

Second, consider Pr(D/E&T). Since evolutionary theism can explain teleological order in terms of God's conscious purposes, it would not be surprising at all if the principal mechanisms driving evolution were such that they themselves displayed teleological order.

For these reasons, then, Pr(D/E&N) !> Pr(D/E&T).

Let us now return to the second premise:

(2) Pr(P/E&N) !> Pr(E&T).

Here are the supporting arguments.

E&N&D provide an antecedent reason for believing that pain and pleasure, like anything else produced by natural selection, will be systematically connected to reproductive success, which is what P states.
Our background knowledge includes the fact many other parts of organic systems are systematically connected to reproductive success.
Given E&T, however, P would be true only if the biological goal of reproductive success and some unknown justifying moral goal happened to coincide in such a way that each could be simultaneously satisfied. That's a really big coincidence that E&N&D don't need.
In fact, evolutionary naturalism (E&N) entails nothing that would provide an antecedent reason for doubting that pain and pleasure will resemble other parts of organic systems by being systematically connected to reproductive success. On the assumption that E&N is true, it would be extremely surprising if pain and pleasure appeared to be anything but morally random, whereas on the assumption that theism is true, a discernible moral pattern would be less surprising.

References

See Paul Draper, "Evolution and the Problem of Evil" in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology (3rd ed., ed. Louis Pojman, Wadsworth, 1997), pp. 219-230; cf. Louis P. Pojman, Philosophy of Religion (Mayfield, 2001), chapter 6.

Related Posts

"Summary and Assessment of the Craig-Draper Debate on the Existence of God" (1998) by Jeffery Jay Lowder
"The Problem of Evil: Part One"
"Religious Experience and the Evidential Argument from Evil" by David Silver
"Natural Selection and the Problem of Evil: An Evolutionary Model with Application to Ancient Debate" (2011) by Robert K. Fleck
"The Problem of Evil" by William Lane Craig (search for "Draper" to find the relevant section)

Summary of Draper's Argument from Evolution by Meghan Ramsey (search for "Draper" to find the relevant section)
"A Dozen Arguments for Atheism" by Richard Spencer
Cf. "Darwin's Doubts and the Problem of Animal Pain" by Eric Russert Kraemer

Ted Drange's Anti-Creation Argument

2011-10-27T20:55:00.000-07:00

The following is an excerpt of a longer essay by Ted Drange.

Definitions of "God"

Before getting to the arguments, it is important to present the various definitions of "God" that they employ:

D1: God is the eternal, all-powerful, personal being who created and rules the universe. (Being eternal, God cannot come into or go out of existence. Being all-powerful, he can perform any action that is logically possible to perform. Being personal, he has some characteristics in common with humans, such as thinking, feeling emotions, and performing actions. The universe is understood to consist of all the space, time, matter, and energy that has ever existed.)

D2: God is the eternal, very powerful, personal being who rules the universe, loves humanity, and gave humanity its moral conscience.

D3: God is the eternal, very powerful, personal being who rules the universe, loves humanity, and strongly desires that that love be reciprocated.

D4: God is that being which is self-existent, that is, which contains the explanation for its own existence within itself.

D5: God is that being which is (objectively) perfect in every way. (The term "perfect" is here understood in an objective sense, as opposed to a subjective sense relative to individual values, so the term may be used in public reasoning.)

D6: God is the deity described in the Bible as interpreted by evangelical Christianity.

It will be indicated for each argument which of the above definitions of "God" it employs.

The Anti-Creation Argument (against D1, D6)
(1) If X creates Y, then X must exist temporally prior to Y.
(2) But nothing could possibly exist temporally prior to time itself (for that would involve existing at a time when there was no time, which is a contradiction).
(3) Thus, it is impossible for time to have been created.
(4) Time is an essential component of the universe.
(5) Therefore, it is impossible for the universe to have been created.
(6) It follows that God, as defined by D1 and D6, cannot exist.

Source: http://www.infidelguy.com/mobile/10_atheistic_arguments_7.php

Open-Minded Atheists?

2011-10-24T21:31:00.000-07:00

(This is another item from the backlog in my Drafts folder. I think I wrote it in 2005 or 2006. This all seems moot since Flew has now passed away, but I'm posting it here for what it is worth.)

I was recently made aware of the following article:

Douglas LeBlanc, "Atheists and Theists Analyze Antony Flew’s Newfound Deism" Christian Research Journal, volume 28, number 3 (2005), http://www.equip.org/free/JAF175.htm

What I find interesting about this article is not the opinions expressed regarding Flew's conversion from agnosticism to Deism, but what appear to be implied pot shots by Gary Habermas and Douglas Geivett against (some?) atheists.

For example, in commenting on Flew conversion, Habermas stated, "“Here’s a guy who may be more open-minded than I thought,” Habermas said. “I think over the years we haven’t taken him at his word when he says he goes where the evidence leads.” It is unclear why Habermas did not take previously take Flew at his word. One potential explanation worries me. Habermas's remark reminds me of a belief held by many theists (not necessarily Habermas), that nonbelief is never rational but instead the result of a willful choice to suppress the truth of theism in order to justify an immoral lifestyle.

Turning to Doug Geivett, Geivett quoted Richard Carrier's article on Flew's conversion from nontheism to Deism, in which Carrier wrote:

This would appear to be his excuse for everything: he won’t investigate the evidence because it’s too hard. Yet he will declare beliefs in the absence of proper inquiry. Theists would do well to drop the example of Flew. Because his willfully sloppy scholarship can only help to make belief look ridiculous.

Before I comment on Geivett's remarks, I first need to mention a potential area of disagreement between Carrier and I: I don't necessarily agree with the last sentence in the above quotation. If Flew's scholarship was "willfully sloppy," at most that damages Flew's credibility, not the credibility of supernatural belief in general. Turning to Geivett, Geivett said that Carrier seemed concerned that Flew’s new beliefs “would disturb people’s faith that God does not exist.” Also, in another apparent (?) reference to Carrier, Geivett wrote, "I regret the churlish attitude of some who are scandalized by his intellectual honesty and his cautiously nuanced position.”

While I do not speak for Carrier, I highly doubt that he was "scandalized" by Flew's change in position. Just as Geivett correctly notes that the evidential strength of the case for Christianity "does not depend on the conversion of a notable" nontheist, the evidential strength of the case for naturalism is not undermined by the conversion of a nontheist, even a notable nontheist.

Also, LeBlanc's article does not contain any discussion about Flew's own admissions that he failed to research specific pieces of evidence. For example, regarding the origin of life, Carrier quoted Flew as stating:

I now realize that I have made a fool of myself by believing that there were no presentable theories of the development of inanimate matter up to the first living creature capable of reproduction.

There is also no reference to Flew's admission that he was "mistaught by Gerald Schroeder," regarding the alleged theistic implications of physics. In terms of the reported reasons for Flew's newfound Deism, these seem to be significant reversals. After all, according to the transcript of Habermas's interview of Flew, Flew summarized his following reasons for embracing Deism.

"The biblical account might be scientifically accurate raises the possibility that it is revelation," based upon the writings of Gerald Schroeder.
Flew also thinks "the argument to Intelligent Design is enormously stronger than it was when I first met it. " He has "never been much impressed by the kalam cosmological argument," and he doesn't "think it has gotten any stronger recently." But he is apparently impressed with other arguments for intelligent design, based upon big bang cosmology and fine tuning.
It's not clear to me if Flew considers this evidence for Deism or just evidence favoring the existence of disembodied minds, but Flew has become convinced that evidence of near death experiences "certainly constitute impressive evidence for the possibility of the occurrence of human consciousness independent of any occurrences in the human brain."

So it appears Flew has come to reject two of his three stated reasons for embracing Deism.

In conclusion: Habermas admission that he did not previously take Flew at his word is troubling. Geivett's (apparent?) comments about Carrier go too far. And LeBlanc's article does not acknowledge Flew's reversal on his two of his major reasons for switching from nontheism to Deism. Nevertheless, I do agree with Geivett that Flew should be "given the space he needs to draw his own conclusions and report them on his own terms.”

Also, to repeat what I wrote in a related article about Flew, nothing I have written is any way meant to deny the fact that Flew apparently moved from naturalism to supernaturalism (i.e., deism). All I have claimed is that it appears that, as of 2005 or 2006, Flew apparently came to reject two of his three stated reasons for embracing Deism.

Is Antony Flew a Former Agnostic or Former Atheist?

2011-10-19T16:00:00.000-07:00

(This is another item from my drafts folder that was never published. I think I wrote this in early 2006. I have fixed/added some links and made some edits.)

The journal Philosophia Christi and perhaps, by extension, Biola University, have made a big deal of Antony Flew's conversion from atheism to theism in the article, "Atheist Becomes Theist." See:

http://www.biola.edu/antonyflew/

When Flew did call himself an atheist, he made it very clear that he always considered himself a so-called 'negative' atheist. In his terminology, he lacked belief in God, but he never held the positive belief that God does not exist. In this sense, Flew's "presumption of atheism" could be renamed the "presumption of agnosticism" (as at least one Christian apologist has pointed out). Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, Flew never accepted any of the arguments for the nonexistence of God. (If anyone knows of any evidence to the contrary, please let me know and I will accordingly issue an update to this post.)

Why does this matter? Because many theists, including several of the Christian philosophers associated with Philosophia Christi (Craig [see here], Moreland, Geivett, Copan [see here], et al) have always criticized this definition of atheism as revisionist. Whenever someone would say in a debate that atheism is merely the lack of theistic belief, the Philosophia Christi philosophers would say that atheism is properly defined as what Flew called 'positive' atheism, viz, the belief that God does not exist. According to these philosophers, individuals who are merely 'negative' atheists are not atheists at all.

So it seems there is tension here, if not an outright contradiction, between what some Christian philosophers have typically said about the definition of atheism, and their attribution of atheism to Antony Flew.
Either Flew was an atheist and so-called 'negative' atheism is a form of atheism after all, or atheism must be defined as the positive belief that there is no God and hence Flew was never an atheist (in that sense) and hence theists should not refer to Flew as a former atheist.

In order to avoid any misunderstandings, I want to emphasize a couple of points. First, I am not objecting to the Philosophia Christi philosophers' insistence that atheism be defined as the positive belief there is no God. In fact, I pretty much agree with them. Second, regardless of how we label Flew's pre-Deism position (e.g., 'atheist', 'negative atheist', or agnostic), nothing I have written is any way meant to deny the fact that Flew apparently moved from naturalism to supernaturalism (i.e., deism). All I have claimed is that there seems to be a tension between how certain Christian philosophers have defined atheism, on the one hand, and how they have labeled Flew's beliefs prior to his conversion to deism.

Christian Critique of Certain Arguments for God's Existence based on Science

2011-10-19T00:13:00.000-07:00

(Another backlog item)

I think this book review is interesting because it criticizes common theistic tactics for using science as evidence for God:

http://www.asa3.org/ASA/BookReviews2000-present/9-01.html#Colson

Silver's Defense of Draper's Argument from the Biological Role of Pain and Pleasure

2011-10-19T00:09:00.000-07:00

(Another item from my drafts folder.)

David Silver has written this interesting paper on the problem of evil, "Religious Experience and the Evidential Argument from Evil," Religious Studies 38(3):339-353.

http://philpapers.org/rec/SILREA-3

The paper argues that "if the experiential theist does accept Draper's formulation of the problem and ... is apprised of the arguments in this paper, then she is threatened by a defeater for her theistic belief; that is, absent further evidence for the existence of God the problem of evil makes it irrational for her to continue to be a theist."

Wanchick's Reply to Baggini

2011-10-18T23:18:00.000-07:00

(Again, this is another article in my Drafts folder that was never posted before I stopped blogging. I think I wrote this in 2005 or 2006. In the spirit of clearing out the backlog, I am posting it now.)

Tom Wanchick has written a reply to or review of Julian Baggini's, Atheism: A Very Short Introduction:

http://christianfighter.blogspot.com/2005/07/reply-to-baginni-i.html
http://christianfighter.blogspot.com/2005/07/reply-to-baggini-ii.html
http://christianfighter.blogspot.com/2005/07/reply-to-baggini-iii.html

First, Tom Wanchick seems to have missed the point that Baggini's book on atheism is, as the title makes clear, "A Very Short Introduction." As a result, Baggini's book is not as detailed or as comprehensive as other books. One important consequence of this is that Baggini does not discuss arguments for atheism and arguments for theism that many people on both sides consider important. Wanchick, however, focuses only on those theistic arguments he deems important. He complains that Baggini ignores arguments for God's existence based on facts about consciousness, intelligent design, the origin of life, but he says nothing about Baggini's silence on important arguments for atheism, such as reasonable nonbelief (i.e., divine hiddenness).

Second, Wanchick's assertion, "theistic models of personhood easily explain and in fact predict this same correlation," is just that: a mere assertion offered without an argument in support. It seems to me that Wanchick's "seed and soil" analogy is nothing more than a demonstration of the logical compatibility of theism and mind-brain dependence; Wanchick has not refuted Baggini's claim that mind-brain dependence is antecedently more probable given atheism than given theism.

Third, I find Wanchick's statement, "simpler hypotheses are preferred only if they are as good as their complex rivals," to be poorly worded. I think I know what he means by "good," but this sentence should be reworded to make that meaning clear. More important,Wanchick's reference to "theism's explanatory success" is obviously question-begging. And the fact that "Many philosophers find that it [naturalism] cannot" match theism's alleged explanatory success is evidentially worthless: there many, if not more, equally well-qualified philosophers who hold the opposite conclusion. So Wanchick's appeal to authority does not increase the probability that theism does, in fact, enjoy explanatory success.

Fourth, I think it is far from obvious that Baggini considers moral values, mental events, beauty, etc. to be "immaterial things." Just because Wanchick understands those concepts in an immaterial way, it does not follow that Baggini follows suit. This is also relevant toWanchick's later accusation that "naturalism lacks" a coherence that "theism enjoys." Given what Alvin Plantinga has taught us about the difficulty in establishing a a logical contradiction between theism and evil, I think it's pretty clear that the same difficulty applies to an alleged logical contradiction between naturalism and moral values, mental events, beauty, etc. I was hoping that Wanchick would avoid even the appearance (suggested by using the word "coherence") of claiming there is a logical contradiction. It is one thing thing to claim that phenoma like moral values, mental events, beauty are evidence for theism and against naturalism. It is quote another to claim that those phenomena are logically incompatible with naturalism. I do not find an argument for such a sweeping claim in Wanchick's review.

Fifth, Wanchick's discussion of "Atheism and Morality" is highly selective. Wanchick is entirely silent about the following significant points:

* The analogy in the "moral laws require a lawgiver" argument doesn't work, since "morality is separate from law" (p. 38)

* Virtually anything on pages 40-56.

Sixth, in response to Baggini's statement of the Euthyphro dilemma,Wanchick (correctly) says that many theists attempt to "circumvent the dilemma" by adopting a third position: God's nature, not His will, is the foundation of moral goodness. Baggini addresses this objection on p. 39, where he notes that "the Euthyphro dilemma can be restated in another way to challenge this reply." As Baggini notes, if God existed and if his nature were different, then morality could have been different and evil acts could have been good. But this is absurd. Hence, Baggini concludes, morality does not depend upon God.

Wanchick objects that God's nature cannot possibly be different. Notice, however, that Wanchick's reply is not strictly relevant to the Euthyphro dilemma or Baggini's modified version of it. For the original dilemma and Baggini's restatement of it are concerned with the moral status of a divine command given the truth of the divine command theory, not with the moral status of a divine command given the truth of the divine command theory conjoined with an auxiliary hypothesis about God's unalterable nature.

A simple example should make this point clear. It is the case that Tom Wanchick would never rape anyone, but we can still ask, "If Wanchick were to commit rape, would it be wrong?" And the answer is "Yes." Similarly, even if God would not approve of rape or muder, it is still true, according to the divine command theory of ethics, that if He were to approve of rape and murder, then rape and murder would be morally right.

Seventh, I agree with Wanchick that Baggini's statement of the cosmological argument misses the distinction made by the kalam argument between "everything has a cause" and "everything that begins to exist has a cause." (For the record, I consider that error to be a strike against Baggini's otherwise outstanding book.) Along the same lines, however, Wanchick seems to have missed the distinction between "beginning to exist in space and time" and "the beginning of space and time itself." It is this latter distinction that renders irrelevant Wanchick's appeal to the repeated verification of the fact that "things do not pop into existence out of nothing" in space and time. At least, Wanchick has provided us with no reason in his review to to think this repeated verification of events in space and time is relevant to the beginning of space and time itself.

Eighth, Wanchick's appeal to authority regarding the status of intelligent design is evidentially worthless, since the scholars he cites are not as well qualified as the scientists (theists and nontheists alike) who recognize the truth of evolutionary theory. This isn't an ad hominem against creationists, including intelligent design theorists. It is simply a recognition of the fact that the scholars cited by Wanchick--William Dembski and J.P. Moreland--are not biologists (nor, so far as I am aware, do they claim to be).

Ninth, I think Wanchick's review is incomplete, insofar as it neglects Baggini's chapters 4-6. Indeed, it is significant that Wanchick discusses "Atheism and Morality" but not Baggini's chapter 4.

The Argument from the Biological Role of Pain and Pleasure

2011-10-18T21:56:00.000-07:00

Here is a formal statement of the "argument from the biological role of pain and pleasure," as formulated by agnostic philosopher Paul Draper.

Let ">!" to mean "is much greater than"

HT = hypothesis of theism

HI = hypothesis of indifference: neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings on earth results from benevolent or malevolent actions performed by supernatural persons.

-- Note that HI is consistent with both metaphysical naturalism and supernaturalism

-- Note that HI and HT are mutually exclusive

Let O = observations of humans and animals experiencing pain and pleasure. O can be broken down into three specific observations:

O1 = moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure we know to be biologically useful

O2 = sentient beings that are not moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure that we know to be biologically useful

O3 = sentient beings experiencing pain or pleasure that we do not know to be biologically useful

O is equivalent to O1 & O2 & O3.

Let h refer to any generic hypothesis.

Pr(O/h) = Pr(O1 & O2 & O3/h)= Pr(O1/h) x Pr(O2/O1 & h) x Pr(O3/O1 & O2 & h)

So, it follows that:

Pr(O/HI) = Pr(O1/HI) x Pr(O2/O1 & HI) x Pr(O3/O1 & O2 & HI)
Pr(O/HT) = Pr(O1/HT) x Pr(O2/O1 & HT) x Pr(O3/O1 & O2 & HT)

In order to show that Pr(O/HI) >! Pr(O/HT), we can show that each of the terms on the right hand side of equation A is greater or even much greater than each of the corresponding terms on the right hand side of equation B.

(1) Pr(O1/HI) >! Pr(O1/HT)
(2) Pr(O2/HI & O1) > Pr(O2/HT & O1)
(3) Pr(O3/HI & O1 & O2) >! Pr(O3/HT & O1 & O2)
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(4) Therefore, Pr(O/HI) >! Pr(O/HT). (from 1, 2, and 3)
(5) O is known to be true.
(6) HT is not much more probably intrinsically than HI.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
(7) Therefore, other evidence held equal, HT is probably false.

Note that while the above argument implies that we have a good prima facie reason to believe that HT is probably false (since HT and HI are incompatible), it does not imply that we have a good prima facie reason to believe that HI is true (since HT and HI are not jointly exhaustive and so could both be improbable). So the argument from the biological role of pain and pleasure could be more accurately described as an argument against HT than as an argument for HI, though of course in some sense it is both.

An Argument from Moral Realism to Atheism

2011-10-18T14:41:00.000-07:00

In a recent article, Quentin Smith formulates a creative argument for atheism based on the combination of moral realism and infinite spacetime. Smith formulates his argument as follows:

1. Moral realism is true.
2. The universe in which we live is infinite.
3. At least one relevant version of an aggregative theory of values is true.
4. Therefore, God does not exist.

Commenting on the structure of this argument, Smith writes, "Despite appearances, this argument is valid, since the seemingly 'suppressed premises' are implied by the stated premises and thus do not need to be added as separate premises. Even if there is no gratuitous evil, the moral situation of our universe implies that God does not exist."

See Quentin Smith, "Moral Realism and Infinite Spacetime Imply Moral Nihilism", in Dyke, Heather (ed.), 2003, Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 43-54.

The Scale of the Universe as Evidence for Naturalism?

2011-10-18T14:28:00.000-07:00

In his book, The Non-Existence of God, philosopher Nicholas Everitt provides the first detailed analysis and defense of the argument from scale for God's nonexistence. Everitt formulates his argument as follows:

(1) If the God of classical theism existed, with the purposes traditionally ascribed to him, then he would create a universe on a human scale, i.e. one that is not unimaginably large, unimaginably old, and in which human beings form an unimaginably tiny part of it, temporally and spatially.
(2) The world does not display a human scale.
(3) Therefore, there is evidence against the hypothesis that the God of classical theism exists with the purposes traditionally ascribed to him.

Everitt does not claim that the scale of the universe proves God does not exist. Rather, he concludes, "the claim is only that the findings of modern science significantly reduce the probability that theism is true." See Nicholas Everitt, The Non-Existence of God (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 213-226.
What should we make of this argument? Premise (2) is uncontroversial. Premise (1), however, is likely to be controversial. What defense does Everitt offer on behalf of (1)? According to Everitt, "For reasons that are not entirely clear, God decides to create a universe in which human beings will be the jewel." Because humans are the jewel of the universe, the rest of the universe will be at least not unremittingly hostile or even indifferent to human flourishing. Indeed, given theism, you would expect the universe will make such flourishing at least accessible in principal to human beings.

Furthermore, Everitt argues, given theism, we have some reason to expect a scenario like Genesis. Traditional theism would lead us to expect human beings to appear fairly soon after the start of the universe. Given theism, you would not expect humans to arrive very long after after the animals; you would expect the earth to be in a significant location within the universe (perhaps the center); you would expect the total size of the universe to be not many orders of magnitude greater than the size of the earth; and you would expect the greater part of the universe to be accessible to human exploration.

When I spoke with philosopher Paul Draper about this argument many years ago, he said that he believes the scale of the universe is only slightly more probable on metaphysical naturalism than on theism; the argument does not significantly raise the ratio of the probability of naturalism to the probability of theism. As Draper points out, if you think, given theism, God's goal is to create humans, you'd have an antecedent reason for expecting the universe to be on a human scale. But it is far from obvious, given theism, that the goal is humans. An omnipotent being is not short on space or time. Maybe God created multiple universes. If there's only one universe and if God is in time, then it would be a little bit of evidence favoring naturalism.

I'm inclined to agree with Draper. It seems to me that the evidence of the "scale of the universe" is, at best, weak inductive evidence against theism.

Interesting Discussion about My Article on the Possibility of Theistic Freethinkers

2009-01-02T01:17:00.000-08:00

LINK: click here

Open Letter to Theists about Abusing Atheists

2007-07-13T20:49:00.000-07:00

In his contribution to Philosophers Without God (ed. Louise Antony, Oxford University Press, 2007), Walter Sinnott Armstrong describes the sort of bigotry he encountered after his debate book God (co-authored with William Lane Craig) was published. One theist sent him an email calling Sinnott-Armstrong

a "small minded" "egotist," "an arrogant fool," and a "pompous PhD," then added "it is pathetic that the College allows you in a classroom," and "That you don't [believe in God], I am sorry to have to inform you, calls into question your intelligence." Then it concluded, "Please be assured that this theist will impartially consider any persuasive response you can offer and, as such, I look forward to continuing this dialogue with you."

Commenting on this email, Sinnott-Armstrong writes:

This exchange indicates a larger problem: Many theists feel perfectly justified in abusing atheists. I would never consider writing such a diatribe against a theist who argued for belief in God. I would remain calm even if a theist misrepresented atheism. Most atheists I know let ridiculous religious views go unchallenged.

I'd like to pose the following question to all theists, especially evangelical Christians:

In raising this issue, I recognize that there have been atheists who have been guilty of committing the same kind of abuse against theists. Nevertheless, I'd like to focus the discussion on the treatment of atheists by theists. Please share your thoughts with me.

What are your thoughts about the email sent to Sinnott-Armstrong? Do you condone the email? Do you condemn it? Or are you indifferent? Do you agree with Sinnott-Armstrong that "Many theists feel perfectly justified in abusing atheists"? Why?

Companion Website for THE EMPTY TOMB Launched

2007-05-23T23:15:00.000-07:00

I have just launched the official companion website for our book, The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave. The site may be accessed at the following URL:

http://theemptytomb.googlepages.com/

Can a Theist be a Freethinker?

2006-12-02T19:59:00.000-08:00

The following link goes to a featured editorial I wrote several years ago for the Secular Web. I argue that (1) a theist can be a freethinker, and (2) not all nontheists are freethinker.

LINK

New Blog: "The Consolations" by James Lazarus

2006-11-12T10:03:00.000-08:00

James Lazarus is a former (?) producer of "The Infidel Guy" Internet radio show. He recently started his own blog.

LINK

Interesting Article on Debating Presuppositionalists

2006-11-12T09:42:00.000-08:00

Gene Witmer is a philosopher at the University of Florida who has recently written a paper critiquing presuppositionalism. It appears that the paper is not a formal paper intended for publication in its current form, but rather is a preprint prepared for a "talk" to the Atheist, Agnostic and Freethinking Student Association at the University of Florida.

I have always had mixed feelings about taking presuppositionalism seriously. On the one hand, it appears that presuppositionalism is not taken seriously by the majority of Christian philosophers, as evidenced by the conspicuous absence of any articles defending the transcendental argument for God's existence in respected journals like Faith and Philosophy. On the other hand, there are many Christian apologists who use a presuppositionalist approach in debates with atheists, so a hard-hitting critique of presuppositionalism is a useful resource for atheist debaters.

While I think the overall quality of the essay is good, I did notice at least two problems.

1) Witmer quotes Paul Copan on the relationship between atheism and morality, in a way that implies that Copan is a presuppositionalist. I'm 95% confident that Copan is not a presuppositionalist, so in that sense the article is a bit misleading. On the other hand, it would not be too difficult to find similar quotations from bona fide presuppositionalists, so Witmer's general points still stand.

2) Witmer lambasts Barker's debate performance against Manata as "terrible," but he never really gave specific reasons to justify that rating of Barker's performance. In fact, he didn't discuss Barker's arguments at all! I haven't seen or heard that debate, so it is possible that Barker's performance was "terrible." Since Witmer doesn't give details, however, it is impossible assess Witmer's reasons for that assessment.

Theism vs. Naturalism Debates: An Apples to Oranges Comparison?

2006-09-16T11:24:00.000-07:00

I received an email from a nontheist that is somewhat critical of the idea of "naturalism vs. theism" as a debate topic because (1) not all non-naturalistic views are theistic, and (2) the topic involves a comparison of a general hypothesis (metaphysical naturalism) with an incompatible but very specific hypothesis (theism). In his opinion, the debate topic should be either "naturalism vs. supernaturalism" or "nontheism (or atheism) vs. theism."

I don't find these objections convincing in the least. (1) is, of course, true. From the fact that not all non-naturalistic views are theistic, however, it isn't clear why "naturalism vs. theism" debates should be avoided in favor of "naturalism vs. supernaturalism" or "atheism vs. theism" debates. A significant number of supernaturalists are theists. In the West, the majority of supernaturalists are theists. For that reason alone, I think "naturalism vs. theism" is a valuable topic. (I am well aware, of course, that there are parts of the world where traditional theism is not the dominant supernatural belief. That is no reason, however, for not having debates on "naturalism vs. theism" in parts of the world where traditional theism is the dominant supernatural belief.)

Moreover, I think there are additional points from a Bayesian perspective that make "naturalism vs. theism" as a debate topic particularly compelling. First, I won't attempt to defend this claim here, but I believe that theism has a much higher prior probability than supernatural alternatives to theism. Second, it is a commonplace in confirmation theory to measure the ratio of one explanatory hypothesis to another logically incompatible explanatory hypothesis, even if those two explanatory hypotheses are not jointly exhaustive. Again, even if the two explanatory hypotheses are not jointly exhaustive, demonstrating that the ratio of the probability of one hypothesis to the probability of another is greater than one can be used as part of a larger argument to show that the former hypothesis has a high final probability.

Turning to objection (2), it is true that naturalism is a general hypothesis whereas theism is a specific hypothesis. Again, however, it is not clear why (2) is supposed to be a reason for avoiding "naturalism vs. theism" debates in favor of "naturalism vs. supernaturalism" or "atheism vs. theism" debates. Outside of the philosophy of religion, we probably compare general hypotheses to specific hypotheses on a regular basis. It isn't obvious why we should avoid doing so, either in general or in the specific case of "naturalism vs. theism."

Gary Habermas's Critique of G.A. Wells

2006-07-04T11:28:00.000-07:00

In 1985, Antony Flew debated Gary Habermas on the resurrection of Jesus; that debate was later published as a book in 1987. G.A. Wells felt that Flew did so poorly in the debate, on a topic outside of Flew's area of expertise, that Wells felt compelled to write a commentary on the debate on the Habermas-Flew debate. I have just discovered that Habermas has, in turn, written a response to Wells's case for the nonexistence of Jesus, which includes a very brief reference to Wells's commentary on the Habermas-Flew debate.

It has been so long since I skimmed the books by Wells in question I can't really comment on the legitimacy of Habermas's specific criticisms, but it wouldn't surprise (or offend) me if those criticisms were correct. What I do remember, however, is thinking the following. If someone were going to argue for the non-historicity of Jesus, one would expect a detailed, almost comprehensive discussion of the extrabiblical sources, but that isn't what one finds in his earliest books. After reading Wells' earlier books (such as Did Jesus Exist? and The Historical Evidence for Jesus), I thought to myself, "There doesn't seem to be a lot of 'meat' to his discussion of the extra-biblical evidence for Jesus' existence." And then, when I read his later books (such as The Jesus Legend and The Jesus Myth), I remember reading his rebuttal to responses to his earlier discussions the extrabiblical evidence for Jesus, asking myself, "Why didn't he just discuss all of these objections the first time?"

I have consistently granted that the Jesus described in the gospels is based upon a real, historical individual, so I am living proof that one does not need to deny the historicity of Jesus in order to reject the resurrection of Jesus. Thus, despite the huge philosophical differences between Habermas and I, I have no problem accepting the conclusions of Habermas's article. (Of course, to be fair to Jesus mythers, it is also possible that there is a better case against the historicity of Jesus than the one made by Wells.) In any case, I encourage readers interested in arguments for and against the historicity of Jesus to read Habermas's critique of Wells.

Daniel Howard-Snyder's Critique of the Trilemma Argument

2006-04-30T10:29:00.000-07:00

Christian philosopher Daniel Howard-Snyder has published a critique of the trilemma argument. LINK (PDF)

Are Atheists Angry or Threatened by God?

2006-04-30T09:44:00.000-07:00

I just posted an article on this topic at the Secular Outpost. LINK

Do Writers Have an Obligation to Present Both Sides of an Issue?

2006-01-21T18:38:00.000-08:00

I wrote a review of Lee Strobel's Case for Christ that was published in 1999 in the peer-reviewed journal, Philo, the official journal of the Society of Humanist Philosophers. In that review, I concluded:

Strobel did not interview any critics of Evangelical apologetics. He sometimes refutes at great length objections not made by the critics (e.g., the claim that Jesus was mentally insane); more often, he doesn't address objections the critics do make (e.g., the unreliability of human memory, that non-Christian historians do not provide any independent confirmation for the deity of Jesus, etc.) Perhaps this will be a welcome feature to people who already believe Christianity but have no idea why they believe it. For those of us who are primarily interested in the truth, however, we want to hear both sides of the story.

Because I criticized Strobel for failing to interviewing any critics of Evangelical apologetics, I have been asked whether I believe that all Christian apologists (or, more broadly, whether all advocates for any given viewpoint about any subject) must present both sides.

For the record, I have never believed and do not presently believe that advocates for a particular position on a controversial issue must present both sides. If someone wants to write a book for, say, a particular position on abortion, I don't think they are under any obligation to present the arguments against their position in their book. Of course, they may choose to address such arguments, but they are under no obligation to do so.

So why, then, did I criticize Lee Strobel for failing to interviewing critics of Evangelical apologetics? After all, isn't the title of Strobel's book The Case for Christ, not The Case against Christ? As I explained very clearly in a follow-up article on the Secular Web, "Strobel's book is promoted as the work of a professional journalist."If The Case for Christ had not been promoted as the work of a professional journalist, I never would have expected Strobel to meet minimum journalistic standards and I never would have criticized him for failing to interview critics of his position.

So, again, I don't expect Christian apologists (or any advocates for any controversial position) to include the case against their position. With that said, I can think of two cases where I think it is appropriate to criticize a writer for failing to include the other side. First, if the writer claims to have presented both sides and fails to do so, then I think it is appropriate to point that out. Although Strobel does consider objections to the arguments for Christianity he discusses, those objections are not representative of the best objections that critics of those arguments have presented. Again, Strobel sometimes refutes at great length objections not made by the critics; more often, he doesn't address objections the critics do make. For that reason, I place Strobel into this first category where it is appropriate to criticize a writer for failing to include the other side (in the sense just described).

Second, if the writer makes an inductive argument for a conclusion but the premises of the argument do not embody all available relevant evidence, it is equally appropriate to point that out. Remember that the conclusion of an inductive argument does not have a 100% probability conditional upon the premises of the argument. (In other words, inductive arguments are invalid.) Rather, the premises of a logically correct inductive argument make the conclusion highly probable. Inductive arguments that fail to embody all of the available evidence relevant to their conclusion are not logically correct arguments. Again, I think it is always legitimate to criticize logically incorrect arguments.

That I do not expect Christian apologists to present the case against their positions can be clearly seen from the other reviews I've written of other Christian apologetics books:

In my 1999 review of Ravi Zacharias's book, Can Man Live Without God?, I did not accuse Zacharias of failing to meet some mythical requirement that all authors at all times must present both sides. I did point out that Zacharias makes things easy for himself by, for example, suggesting there is a vast secular conspiracy to discredit theism because it smacks of "moral constraint" but neglecting the possibility that atheists are atheists because of good arguments for atheism, arguments Zacharias never discusses. (In other words, there is available evidence that is relevant to the conclusion of Zacharias's inductive argument about a secular conspiracy, evidence not included within the premises of Zacharias's argument.) But, again, I never criticized Zacharias for failing to present both sides as such.
A very similar observation could be made regarding my 2001 review of Josh McDowell's New Evidence That Demands a Verdict, where I wrote, "McDowell has no obligation whatsoever to communicate with me or to answer our critique. But he cannot claim that his book has been "fully updated" when he ignores a direct and comprehensive rebuttal to it." The criticism here is not that McDowell failed to include our critique. Rather, the criticism is that McDowell claimed his book was "fully updated" when it ignored a critique. Not only I did not criticize McDowell in that review for failing to present both sides as such, but I explicitly stated that he has "no obligation whatsoever" to present both sides as such.

I hope that this post sufficiently clarifies my position regarding whether advocates for a position have an obligation to present both sides.

Moreland: Christians are biased, but less biased than naturalists

2006-01-14T22:45:00.000-08:00

I've posted an entry on the Secular Outpost here.

New Blog: The Secular Outpost

2006-01-12T23:07:00.000-08:00

I am a contributor to a new blog representing the Internet Infidels' Secular Web. The new blog is called "the Secular Outpost."

LINK

EMPTY TOMB: JESUS BEYOND THE GRAVE

2006-01-06T23:34:00.000-08:00

Robert M. Price and I co-edited an anthology on the alleged resurrection of Jesus, entitled The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave. The book is a reader of 15 essays on the alleged historicity of Jesus’ resurrection, with a topical bibliography totaling 25 pages. Contributors include Richard Carrier, Robert Greg Cavin, J. Duncan M. Derrett, Theodore Drange, Evan Fales, Peter Kirby, Michael Martin, Keith Parsons, and Robert M. Price.

Is Atheism a Worldview?

2006-01-06T00:13:00.000-08:00

In the comments on a posting to another blog, one reader argued that atheism is a worldview because it "answers the big questions in life."

The issue of whether atheism is a worldview seems to come up from time to time. And that issue depends upon two cans of worms: the definition of "atheism" and the definition of "worldview." I commented on the meaning of "atheism" in a previous post. I'm not sure there is widespread agreement regarding the meaning of "worldview." In a book review of David Noebel's Understanding the Times, I quoted Christian philosopher Ronald Nash who defined it this way, "A well-rounded world-view includes what a person believes in at least five major topics: God, reality, knowledge, morality, and humankind." David Noebel defines the concept in an even more expansive way. Probably the most noncontroversial statement that can be made about the idea of a "worldview" is that it includes a belief about ethics or morality.

On that basis, atheism alone is not enough to construct a worldview. Atheism does not entail any particular ethical theory; all that atheism entails is a rejection of theological ethical systems, such as divine command theory. Atheism is an important building block for various secular worldviews, however. For example, secular humanism is an atheist worldview, but it is not the only atheist worldview.

Ramblings on the State of Modern Atheism

2006-01-05T09:30:00.000-08:00

I discovered this link on the blog of a Christian philosopher, who introduced it as "terrific post on the current state of atheism."

Disagreement Among Self-Described Atheists about the Meaning of "Atheism"

2006-01-04T22:20:00.000-08:00

The "atheist" movement keeps shooting itself in the foot by failing to reach a consensus regarding the meaning of "atheism." Allow me to explain.

Individuals who label themselves an "atheist" can be somewhat simplistically[1] divided into (at least) two groups: (1) those who define "atheism" as the mere lack of belief in God, and (2) those who hold the positive belief that God does not exist. Individuals in group 1 include Antony Flew, George Smith, and Michael Martin. Individuals in group 2 include Theodore Drange, Quentin Smith, J.L. Schellenberg, and perhaps William Rowe and Michael Tooley.

"Group 1 atheists" could consistently say that "atheism" means the absence of god-belief and hold the positive belief that God does not exist. Michael Martin is an example of an atheist who does precisely this. On the other hand, "Group 1 atheists" could also consistently define "atheism" the way that they do and lack a belief in the non-existence of God. In other words, an individual in "group 1" might call herself an atheist, but not embrace any arguments for the non-existence of God, including the arguments from evil, reasonable nonbelief, physical minds, and so forth.

Group 1 atheists generally recognize members of group 2 as fellow atheists. Group 2 atheists, on the other hand, tend to say that being in group 1 doesn't automatically make someone an "atheist" (in the group 2 sense). On group 2's view, someone in group 1 could be an "atheist" (in the group 2 sense) but they also might not be an "atheist." It depends.

These distinctions matter because group 2 atheists may not feel represented by a group 1 atheist at all. From the perspective of a group 2 atheist, there is a big difference between someone who says, "I believe God does not exist on the basis of good/strong/conclusive evidence for God's nonexistence," and "I lack belief in both the existence and nonexistence of God." More to the point: this is the problem with Antony Flew, Kai Nielsen, and other group 1 atheists who have purported to represent "atheism" in public debates over God's existence. They are portrayed as defenders of "atheism" (in the group 2 sense, which is how the general public defines "atheism") even though they are not "atheists" in the group 2 sense and, most important, even though they do not defend any arguments for God's nonexistence. (This is not surprising to those who specialize in the philosophy of religion, since these individuals never claimed to hold the positive belief that God does not exist.)

Note

[1] For an approach to defining atheism that is both more sophisticated and I think ultimately correct, see Ted Drange's "Atheism, Agnosticism, and Noncognitivism." I have deliberately simplified the issue here in order to make a point.

Religious Discrimination Continues in the U.S. Armed Forces

2006-01-03T23:52:00.000-08:00

As a veteran, I find myself in complete agreement with the description provided by Wayne Adkins of anti-atheist discrimination in the U.S. Armed Forces.

Getting Atheists to Take Atheism Seriously

2006-01-01T23:53:00.000-08:00

In a recent post to his own blog, philosopher William Vallicella states, "It is exceedingly difficult to get atheists to take theism seriously." I agree, but I would take the point a step further and argue that it is exceedingly difficult to get atheists to take their own atheism seriously. An interesting case in point is atheist philosopher Julian Baggini, author of the excellent book, Atheism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press). Despite the fact that he has written a book on atheism, he wrote the following statement in a review of Michael Martin's and Ricki Monnier's book, The Impossibility of God:

... Over the course of 33 tightly argued articles, leading atheologians and atheist philosophers such as Anthony Kenny, Hugh LaFollette, J. L. Mackie, Michael Martin and James Rachels take it in turns to show that God, as defined by many theists, simply cannot exist, on pain of contradiction. Targets are invariably hit, if not always right on the bull's-eye. To have these articles together in one volume for the first time is an invaluable service to anyone interested in understanding why the very concept of God is a nonsense.

That said, I still found the book faintly dispiriting, futile even. Rather than finding myself standing on the metaphorical touchline cheering my team as it chalked up point after point, it seemed to me that everyone on the pitch was engaged in a useless game that no-one was ever going to win. ...
I just don't believe that detailed and sophisticated arguments make any significant difference to the beliefs of the religious or atheists.
For few people of faith would claim that, at the end of the day, the arguments they offer form the basis of their convictions anyway. They would happily admit that they are engaged in apologetics. They know, through faith, that their God exists. ....

(As an aside, I would be interested in understanding Baggini's thoughts about the futility of arguing for atheism as it relates to his own book on atheism, but that's another topic.)
There is obviously a difference between taking seriously the task of providing sophisticated arguments for atheism and taking seriously one's atheism. Those are not identical issues. At the same time, however, it seems to me they are related issues. Probably for many people, the same sort of issue mentioned by Baggini--the perception that theists will never change their mind--is one of the motivations that causes many atheists to be apathetic about their atheism.
For links to a variety of articles on this topic written from an atheist perspective, see the Atheistic Outreach page on the Secular Web.

Daniel Howard-Snyder on the Trilemma Argument

2006-01-01T20:03:00.000-08:00

http://www.cc.wwu.edu/~howardd/mbgfp5web.pdf