Naturalistic Atheism

Interesting Discussion about My Article on the Possibility of Theistic Freethinkers

2009-01-02T01:17:00.000-08:00

Open Letter to Theists about Abusing Atheists

2007-07-13T20:49:00.000-07:00

In his contribution to Philosophers Without God (ed. Louise Antony, Oxford University Press, 2007), Walter Sinnott Armstrong describes the sort of bigotry he encountered after his debate book God (co-authored with William Lane Craig) was published. One theist sent him an email calling Sinnott-Armstrong

a "small minded" "egotist," "an arrogant fool," and a "pompous PhD," then added "it is pathetic that the College allows you in a classroom," and "That you don't [believe in God], I am sorry to have to inform you, calls into question your intelligence." Then it concluded, "Please be assured that this theist will impartially consider any persuasive response you can offer and, as such, I look forward to continuing this dialogue with you."

Commenting on this email, Sinnott-Armstrong writes:

This exchange indicates a larger problem: Many theists feel perfectly justified in abusing atheists. I would never consider writing such a diatribe against a theist who argued for belief in God. I would remain calm even if a theist misrepresented atheism. Most atheists I know let ridiculous religious views go unchallenged.

I'd like to pose the following question to all theists, especially evangelical Christians:
What are your thoughts about the email sent to Sinnott-Armstrong? Do you condone the email? Do you condemn it? Or are you indifferent? Do you agree with Sinnott-Armstrong that "Many theists feel perfectly justified in abusing atheists"? Why?

In raising this issue, I recognize that there have been atheists who have been guilty of committing the same kind of abuse against theists. Nevertheless, I'd like to focus the discussion on the treatment of atheists by theists. Please share your thoughts with me.

Companion Website for THE EMPTY TOMB Launched

2007-05-23T23:15:00.000-07:00

I have just launched the official companion website for our book, The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave. The site may be accessed at the following URL:

http://theemptytomb.googlepages.com/

Can a Theist be a Freethinker?

2006-12-02T19:59:00.000-08:00

The following link goes to a featured editorial I wrote several years ago for the Secular Web. I argue that (1) a theist can be a freethinker, and (2) not all nontheists are freethinker.

LINK

New Blog: "The Consolations" by James Lazarus

2006-11-12T10:03:00.000-08:00

James Lazarus is a former (?) producer of "The Infidel Guy" Internet radio show. He recently started his own blog.

LINK

Interesting Article on Debating Presuppositionalists

2006-11-12T09:42:00.000-08:00

Gene Witmer is a philosopher at the University of Florida who has recently written a paper critiquing presuppositionalism. It appears that the paper is not a formal paper intended for publication in its current form, but rather is a preprint prepared for a "talk" to the Atheist, Agnostic and Freethinking Student Association at the University of Florida.

I have always had mixed feelings about taking presuppositionalism seriously. On the one hand, it appears that presuppositionalism is not taken seriously by the majority of Christian philosophers, as evidenced by the conspicuous absence of any articles defending the transcendental argument for God's existence in respected journals like Faith and Philosophy. On the other hand, there are many Christian apologists who use a presuppositionalist approach in debates with atheists, so a hard-hitting critique of presuppositionalism is a useful resource for atheist debaters.

While I think the overall quality of the essay is good, I did notice at least two problems.

1) Witmer quotes Paul Copan on the relationship between atheism and morality, in a way that implies that Copan is a presuppositionalist. I'm 95% confident that Copan is not a presuppositionalist, so in that sense the article is a bit misleading. On the other hand, it would not be too difficult to find similar quotations from bona fide presuppositionalists, so Witmer's general points still stand.

2) Witmer lambasts Barker's debate performance against Manata as "terrible," but he never really gave specific reasons to justify that rating of Barker's performance. In fact, he didn't discuss Barker's arguments at all! I haven't seen or heard that debate, so it is possible that Barker's performance was "terrible." Since Witmer doesn't give details, however, it is impossible assess Witmer's reasons for that assessment.

Theism vs. Naturalism Debates: An Apples to Oranges Comparison?

2006-09-16T11:24:00.000-07:00

I received an email from a nontheist that is somewhat critical of the idea of "naturalism vs. theism" as a debate topic because (1) not all non-naturalistic views are theistic, and (2) the topic involves a comparison of a general hypothesis (metaphysical naturalism) with an incompatible but very specific hypothesis (theism). In his opinion, the debate topic should be either "naturalism vs. supernaturalism" or "nontheism (or atheism) vs. theism."

I don't find these objections convincing in the least. (1) is, of course, true. From the fact that not all non-naturalistic views are theistic, however, it isn't clear why "naturalism vs. theism" debates should be avoided in favor of "naturalism vs. supernaturalism" or "atheism vs. theism" debates. A significant number of supernaturalists are theists. In the West, the majority of supernaturalists are theists. For that reason alone, I think "naturalism vs. theism" is a valuable topic. (I am well aware, of course, that there are parts of the world where traditional theism is not the dominant supernatural belief. That is no reason, however, for not having debates on "naturalism vs. theism" in parts of the world where traditional theism is the dominant supernatural belief.)

Moreover, I think there are additional points from a Bayesian perspective that make "naturalism vs. theism" as a debate topic particularly compelling. First, I won't attempt to defend this claim here, but I believe that theism has a much higher prior probability than supernatural alternatives to theism. Second, it is a commonplace in confirmation theory to measure the ratio of one explanatory hypothesis to another logically incompatible explanatory hypothesis, even if those two explanatory hypotheses are not jointly exhaustive. Again, even if the two explanatory hypotheses are not jointly exhaustive, demonstrating that the ratio of the probability of one hypothesis to the probability of another is greater than one can be used as part of a larger argument to show that the former hypothesis has a high final probability.

Turning to objection (2), it is true that naturalism is a general hypothesis whereas theism is a specific hypothesis. Again, however, it is not clear why (2) is supposed to be a reason for avoiding "naturalism vs. theism" debates in favor of "naturalism vs. supernaturalism" or "atheism vs. theism" debates. Outside of the philosophy of religion, we probably compare general hypotheses to specific hypotheses on a regular basis. It isn't obvious why we should avoid doing so, either in general or in the specific case of "naturalism vs. theism."

Gary Habermas's Critique of G.A. Wells

2006-07-04T11:28:00.000-07:00

In 1985, Antony Flew debated Gary Habermas on the resurrection of Jesus; that debate was later published as a book in 1987. G.A. Wells felt that Flew did so poorly in the debate, on a topic outside of Flew's area of expertise, that Wells felt compelled to write a commentary on the debate on the Habermas-Flew debate. I have just discovered that Habermas has, in turn, written a response to Wells's case for the nonexistence of Jesus, which includes a very brief reference to Wells's commentary on the Habermas-Flew debate.

It has been so long since I skimmed the books by Wells in question I can't really comment on the legitimacy of Habermas's specific criticisms, but it wouldn't surprise (or offend) me if those criticisms were correct. What I do remember, however, is thinking the following. If someone were going to argue for the non-historicity of Jesus, one would expect a detailed, almost comprehensive discussion of the extrabiblical sources, but that isn't what one finds in his earliest books. After reading Wells' earlier books (such as Did Jesus Exist? and The Historical Evidence for Jesus), I thought to myself, "There doesn't seem to be a lot of 'meat' to his discussion of the extra-biblical evidence for Jesus' existence." And then, when I read his later books (such as The Jesus Legend and The Jesus Myth), I remember reading his rebuttal to responses to his earlier discussions the extrabiblical evidence for Jesus, asking myself, "Why didn't he just discuss all of these objections the first time?"

I have consistently granted that the Jesus described in the gospels is based upon a real, historical individual, so I am living proof that one does not need to deny the historicity of Jesus in order to reject the resurrection of Jesus. Thus, despite the huge philosophical differences between Habermas and I, I have no problem accepting the conclusions of Habermas's article. (Of course, to be fair to Jesus mythers, it is also possible that there is a better case against the historicity of Jesus than the one made by Wells.) In any case, I encourage readers interested in arguments for and against the historicity of Jesus to read Habermas's critique of Wells.

Daniel Howard-Snyder's Critique of the Trilemma Argument

2006-04-30T10:29:00.000-07:00

Christian philosopher Daniel Howard-Snyder has published a critique of the trilemma argument. LINK (PDF)

Are Atheists Angry or Threatened by God?

2006-04-30T09:44:00.000-07:00

I just posted an article on this topic at the Secular Outpost. LINK

Do Writers Have an Obligation to Present Both Sides of an Issue?

2006-01-21T18:38:00.000-08:00

I wrote a review of Lee Strobel's Case for Christ that was published in 1999 in the peer-reviewed journal, Philo, the official journal of the Society of Humanist Philosophers. In that review, I concluded:

Strobel did not interview any critics of Evangelical apologetics. He sometimes refutes at great length objections not made by the critics (e.g., the claim that Jesus was mentally insane); more often, he doesn't address objections the critics do make (e.g., the unreliability of human memory, that non-Christian historians do not provide any independent confirmation for the deity of Jesus, etc.) Perhaps this will be a welcome feature to people who already believe Christianity but have no idea why they believe it. For those of us who are primarily interested in the truth, however, we want to hear both sides of the story.

Because I criticized Strobel for failing to interviewing any critics of Evangelical apologetics, I have been asked whether I believe that all Christian apologists (or, more broadly, whether all advocates for any given viewpoint about any subject) must present both sides.

For the record, I have never believed and do not presently believe that advocates for a particular position on a controversial issue must present both sides. If someone wants to write a book for, say, a particular position on abortion, I don't think they are under any obligation to present the arguments against their position in their book. Of course, they may choose to address such arguments, but they are under no obligation to do so.

So why, then, did I criticize Lee Strobel for failing to interviewing critics of Evangelical apologetics? After all, isn't the title of Strobel's book The Case for Christ, not The Case against Christ? As I explained very clearly in a follow-up article on the Secular Web, "Strobel's book is promoted as the work of a professional journalist."If The Case for Christ had not been promoted as the work of a professional journalist, I never would have expected Strobel to meet minimum journalistic standards and I never would have criticized him for failing to interview critics of his position.

So, again, I don't expect Christian apologists (or any advocates for any controversial position) to include the case against their position. With that said, I can think of two cases where I think it is appropriate to criticize a writer for failing to include the other side. First, if the writer claims to have presented both sides and fails to do so, then I think it is appropriate to point that out. Although Strobel does consider objections to the arguments for Christianity he discusses, those objections are not representative of the best objections that critics of those arguments have presented. Again, Strobel sometimes refutes at great length objections not made by the critics; more often, he doesn't address objections the critics do make. For that reason, I place Strobel into this first category where it is appropriate to criticize a writer for failing to include the other side (in the sense just described).

Second, if the writer makes an inductive argument for a conclusion but the premises of the argument do not embody all available relevant evidence, it is equally appropriate to point that out. Remember that the conclusion of an inductive argument does not have a 100% probability conditional upon the premises of the argument. (In other words, inductive arguments are invalid.) Rather, the premises of a logically correct inductive argument make the conclusion highly probable. Inductive arguments that fail to embody all of the available evidence relevant to their conclusion are not logically correct arguments. Again, I think it is always legitimate to criticize logically incorrect arguments.

That I do not expect Christian apologists to present the case against their positions can be clearly seen from the other reviews I've written of other Christian apologetics books:

In my 1999 review of Ravi Zacharias's book, Can Man Live Without God?, I did not accuse Zacharias of failing to meet some mythical requirement that all authors at all times must present both sides. I did point out that Zacharias makes things easy for himself by, for example, suggesting there is a vast secular conspiracy to discredit theism because it smacks of "moral constraint" but neglecting the possibility that atheists are atheists because of good arguments for atheism, arguments Zacharias never discusses. (In other words, there is available evidence that is relevant to the conclusion of Zacharias's inductive argument about a secular conspiracy, evidence not included within the premises of Zacharias's argument.) But, again, I never criticized Zacharias for failing to present both sides as such.
A very similar observation could be made regarding my 2001 review of Josh McDowell's New Evidence That Demands a Verdict, where I wrote, "McDowell has no obligation whatsoever to communicate with me or to answer our critique. But he cannot claim that his book has been "fully updated" when he ignores a direct and comprehensive rebuttal to it." The criticism here is not that McDowell failed to include our critique. Rather, the criticism is that McDowell claimed his book was "fully updated" when it ignored a critique. Not only I did not criticize McDowell in that review for failing to present both sides as such, but I explicitly stated that he has "no obligation whatsoever" to present both sides as such.

I hope that this post sufficiently clarifies my position regarding whether advocates for a position have an obligation to present both sides.

Moreland: Christians are biased, but less biased than naturalists

2006-01-14T22:45:00.000-08:00

I've posted an entry on the Secular Outpost here.

New Blog: The Secular Outpost

2006-01-12T23:07:00.000-08:00

I am a contributor to a new blog representing the Internet Infidels' Secular Web. The new blog is called "the Secular Outpost."

LINK

EMPTY TOMB: JESUS BEYOND THE GRAVE

2006-01-06T23:34:00.000-08:00

Robert M. Price and I co-edited an anthology on the alleged resurrection of Jesus, entitled The Empty Tomb: Jesus Beyond the Grave. The book is a reader of 15 essays on the alleged historicity of Jesus’ resurrection, with a topical bibliography totaling 25 pages. Contributors include Richard Carrier, Robert Greg Cavin, J. Duncan M. Derrett, Theodore Drange, Evan Fales, Peter Kirby, Michael Martin, Keith Parsons, and Robert M. Price.

Is Atheism a Worldview?

2006-01-06T00:13:00.000-08:00

In the comments on a posting to another blog, one reader argued that atheism is a worldview because it "answers the big questions in life."

The issue of whether atheism is a worldview seems to come up from time to time. And that issue depends upon two cans of worms: the definition of "atheism" and the definition of "worldview." I commented on the meaning of "atheism" in a previous post. I'm not sure there is widespread agreement regarding the meaning of "worldview." In a book review of David Noebel's Understanding the Times, I quoted Christian philosopher Ronald Nash who defined it this way, "A well-rounded world-view includes what a person believes in at least five major topics: God, reality, knowledge, morality, and humankind." David Noebel defines the concept in an even more expansive way. Probably the most noncontroversial statement that can be made about the idea of a "worldview" is that it includes a belief about ethics or morality.

On that basis, atheism alone is not enough to construct a worldview. Atheism does not entail any particular ethical theory; all that atheism entails is a rejection of theological ethical systems, such as divine command theory. Atheism is an important building block for various secular worldviews, however. For example, secular humanism is an atheist worldview, but it is not the only atheist worldview.

Ramblings on the State of Modern Atheism

2006-01-05T09:30:00.000-08:00

I discovered this link on the blog of a Christian philosopher, who introduced it as "terrific post on the current state of atheism."

Disagreement Among Self-Described Atheists about the Meaning of "Atheism"

2006-01-04T22:20:00.000-08:00

The "atheist" movement keeps shooting itself in the foot by failing to reach a consensus regarding the meaning of "atheism." Allow me to explain.

Individuals who label themselves an "atheist" can be somewhat simplistically[1] divided into (at least) two groups: (1) those who define "atheism" as the mere lack of belief in God, and (2) those who hold the positive belief that God does not exist. Individuals in group 1 include Antony Flew, George Smith, and Michael Martin. Individuals in group 2 include Theodore Drange, Quentin Smith, J.L. Schellenberg, and perhaps William Rowe and Michael Tooley.

"Group 1 atheists" could consistently say that "atheism" means the absence of god-belief and hold the positive belief that God does not exist. Michael Martin is an example of an atheist who does precisely this. On the other hand, "Group 1 atheists" could also consistently define "atheism" the way that they do and lack a belief in the non-existence of God. In other words, an individual in "group 1" might call herself an atheist, but not embrace any arguments for the non-existence of God, including the arguments from evil, reasonable nonbelief, physical minds, and so forth.

Group 1 atheists generally recognize members of group 2 as fellow atheists. Group 2 atheists, on the other hand, tend to say that being in group 1 doesn't automatically make someone an "atheist" (in the group 2 sense). On group 2's view, someone in group 1 could be an "atheist" (in the group 2 sense) but they also might not be an "atheist." It depends.

These distinctions matter because group 2 atheists may not feel represented by a group 1 atheist at all. From the perspective of a group 2 atheist, there is a big difference between someone who says, "I believe God does not exist on the basis of good/strong/conclusive evidence for God's nonexistence," and "I lack belief in both the existence and nonexistence of God." More to the point: this is the problem with Antony Flew, Kai Nielsen, and other group 1 atheists who have purported to represent "atheism" in public debates over God's existence. They are portrayed as defenders of "atheism" (in the group 2 sense, which is how the general public defines "atheism") even though they are not "atheists" in the group 2 sense and, most important, even though they do not defend any arguments for God's nonexistence. (This is not surprising to those who specialize in the philosophy of religion, since these individuals never claimed to hold the positive belief that God does not exist.)

Note

[1] For an approach to defining atheism that is both more sophisticated and I think ultimately correct, see Ted Drange's "Atheism, Agnosticism, and Noncognitivism." I have deliberately simplified the issue here in order to make a point.

Religious Discrimination Continues in the U.S. Armed Forces

2006-01-03T23:52:00.000-08:00

As a veteran, I find myself in complete agreement with the description provided by Wayne Adkins of anti-atheist discrimination in the U.S. Armed Forces.

Getting Atheists to Take Atheism Seriously

2006-01-01T23:53:00.000-08:00

In a recent post to his own blog, philosopher William Vallicella states, "It is exceedingly difficult to get atheists to take theism seriously." I agree, but I would take the point a step further and argue that it is exceedingly difficult to get atheists to take their own atheism seriously. An interesting case in point is atheist philosopher Julian Baggini, author of the excellent book, Atheism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press). Despite the fact that he has written a book on atheism, he wrote the following statement in a review of Michael Martin's and Ricki Monnier's book, The Impossibility of God:

... Over the course of 33 tightly argued articles, leading atheologians and atheist philosophers such as Anthony Kenny, Hugh LaFollette, J. L. Mackie, Michael Martin and James Rachels take it in turns to show that God, as defined by many theists, simply cannot exist, on pain of contradiction. Targets are invariably hit, if not always right on the bull's-eye. To have these articles together in one volume for the first time is an invaluable service to anyone interested in understanding why the very concept of God is a nonsense.

That said, I still found the book faintly dispiriting, futile even. Rather than finding myself standing on the metaphorical touchline cheering my team as it chalked up point after point, it seemed to me that everyone on the pitch was engaged in a useless game that no-one was ever going to win. ...
I just don't believe that detailed and sophisticated arguments make any significant difference to the beliefs of the religious or atheists.
For few people of faith would claim that, at the end of the day, the arguments they offer form the basis of their convictions anyway. They would happily admit that they are engaged in apologetics. They know, through faith, that their God exists. ....

(As an aside, I would be interested in understanding Baggini's thoughts about the futility of arguing for atheism as it relates to his own book on atheism, but that's another topic.)

There is obviously a difference between taking seriously the task of providing sophisticated arguments for atheism and taking seriously one's atheism. Those are not identical issues. At the same time, however, it seems to me they are related issues. Probably for many people, the same sort of issue mentioned by Baggini--the perception that theists will never change their mind--is one of the motivations that causes many atheists to be apathetic about their atheism.

For links to a variety of articles on this topic written from an atheist perspective, see the Atheistic Outreach page on the Secular Web.

Daniel Howard-Snyder on the Trilemma Argument

2006-01-01T20:03:00.000-08:00

http://www.cc.wwu.edu/~howardd/mbgfp5web.pdf