tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-203917372024-03-15T18:10:38.816-07:00Naturalistic AtheismNaturalistic atheism is a blog dedicated to the discussion of arguments, news, and other information relevant to naturalistic atheism, the view that no supernatural beings exist.Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.comBlogger197125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-6082890758628681942023-09-14T13:12:00.005-07:002023-09-14T14:45:50.184-07:00Index: The Evidential Argument from the Holocaust against Theism<p>This article will serve as a hub for organizing past and future responses to <a href="https://naturalisticatheism.blogspot.com/2022/01/the-holocaust-is-strong-evidence.html" target="_blank">my evidential argument from the Holocaust against theism</a>. </p><h2 style="text-align: left;">1: Logical Form of the Argument</h2><p>The first five steps are a cumulative case based on independent facts about the badness of the Holocaust. Step 1 is an application of Draper's argument from pain and pleasure to the Holocaust; it is defended in the <a href="https://naturalisticatheism.blogspot.com/2022/01/the-holocaust-is-strong-evidence.html" target="_blank">original article</a>.</p><div><div><span style="white-space: normal;"><span style="white-space: pre;"></span></span></div><blockquote><div><span style="white-space: normal;">(1) </span>Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the biologically gratuitous physical pain experienced by many, if not most, Holocaust victims, <i>i.e., </i><br />Pr(E1 | N) >! Pr(E1 |T).</div></blockquote></div><p>The next step appeals to the horrendous nature of the Holocaust. I think horrendous evils are much more probable on naturalism than on theism, but that is not the claim I am making here. Because I am making a cumulative case argument, I have to show that each additional item of evidence is more probable on naturalism than on theism, while in effect adding the previous item(s) of evidence into the background information. In probability notation, I need to show Pr(E2 | E1 & N) >! Pr(E2 | E1 & T), not Pr(E2 | N) >! Pr(E2 | T). I defend the former inequality in the <a href="https://naturalisticatheism.blogspot.com/2022/01/the-holocaust-is-strong-evidence.html" target="_blank">original article</a>. </p><blockquote><div>(2) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to Holocaust victims who experienced and/or witnessed events so horrific that the events constituted prima facie reasons for each victim to doubt whether the victim's life (given their inclusion in the Holocaust) was a great good to the victim on the whole, <i>i.e.,</i></div><div>Pr(E2 | E1 & N) >! Pr(E2 | E1 & T).</div></blockquote><p>The third step appeals to a specific aspect of the problem of divine hiddenness, the problem of divine silence during suffering, as it relates to Holocaust victims who experienced biologically gratuitous suffering and horrendous evil. Again, I defend the premise in the <a href="https://naturalisticatheism.blogspot.com/2022/01/the-holocaust-is-strong-evidence.html" target="_blank">original article</a>, but it may be restated in plain English as follows.</p><blockquote><div>(3) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the fact that so many victims of the Holocaust did not report feeling God's comforting presence, <i>i.e.,</i><br />Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & N) > Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & T). </div></blockquote><p>The fourth step appeals to another aspect of the problem of divine hiddenness, this time focusing on what John Schellenberg calls "former believers" and applying it to Holocaust survivors. Again, I defend the premise in the <a href="https://naturalisticatheism.blogspot.com/2022/01/the-holocaust-is-strong-evidence.html" target="_blank">original article</a>, but it may be restated in plain English as follows.</p><blockquote><div>(4) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the fact that so many devout Jewish survivors of the Holocaust became nonbelievers, <i>i.e.,</i></div><div>Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & E3 & N) > Pr(E3 | E1 & E2 & E3& T).</div></blockquote><div><span style="white-space: normal;"></span></div><div>From steps 1-4, it follows that:</div><p></p><blockquote><span style="white-space: normal;">(5) Naturalism has much more predictive power than Theism does with respect to the Holocaust, i.e., Pr(E | N) >! Pr(E | T).</span></blockquote><p></p><p>The next step of the argument is based upon Paul Draper's theory of intrinsic probability, which says that intrinsic probability is determined by modesty, coherence, and nothing else. Because naturalism is both more modest and more coherent than theism, it follows that the intrinsic probability of naturalism is greater than the intrinsic probability of theism. This premise is not defended in my article, but instead may be found in Draper's defense of the second premise in what he calls the "<a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atheism-agnosticism/#LowPrioArgu" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">low priors argument</a>." </p><p>Using the word "simplicity" as a more concise way to say "has greater intrinsic probability," we get:</p><p><span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>(6) Naturalism is much simpler than Theism. </p><p>The next step of the argument is designed to preempt objections that other items of evidence (such as the finite age of the universe, the life-permitting conditions of the universe, the contingency of the universe, objective moral values, etc.) favor theism and such items of evidence outweigh the evidence represented by E1-E4. The basic strategy is to show that known facts about good and evil, such as E1-E4, decisively outweigh the theistic evidence. This premise is not defended in my article, but instead may be found in Draper's defense of what he calls the "<a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atheism-agnosticism/#DeciEvidArgu" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">decisive evidence argument</a>." So the seventh step of the argument is:</p><p></p><blockquote><span style="white-space: normal;">(7) Any epistemic advantages that Theism has over Naturalism (i.e., any factors that raise the ratio of the probability of Theism to the probability of Naturalism) do not, even when combined, suffice to offset the epistemic advantages that Naturalism has over Theism if premises 5 and 6 are true. </span></blockquote><p></p><p><span style="white-space: normal;">From steps 5-7, it follows from Bayes' Theorem that:</span></p><p><span style="white-space: normal;"><span style="white-space: pre;"> </span>(8) Theism is probably false.</span> </p>The two inferences in this argument--the first from 1-4 to 5 and the second from 5-7 to 8--are deductively correct. Therefore, if there is something wrong with this argument, then there must be something with at least if not more of the six premises (1-4, 6-7).<br /><p></p><h2 style="text-align: left;">2: Non-Objections</h2><div>I classify a reply as a "non-objection" if it does not constitute a defeater to one or more premises of the argument; and if does not challenge the inference of the argument. What follows is a list of some of the non-objections I have seen.</div><h3 style="text-align: left;">2.1: Dismissive Replies</h3><div><ul style="text-align: left;"><li>"Why bad thing happen if God real?"</li></ul><div><br /></div></div><h3>2.2: Confused Replies</h3><div><ul><li>"You don't really have an argument. You made a statement. Actually just a subjective inference."</li><li>"No. It's merely evidence."</li></ul><div><br /></div></div><h3 style="text-align: left;">2.2: Irrelevant Replies</h3><div><h3 style="text-align: left;">2.2.1. The Concept of "God" </h3><ul style="text-align: left;"><li>Objection: "All this can show is an inconsistency between a particular concept of “God” and that “God” creating the world as you have conceived it."</li><li>Objection: "The argument is presupposed on a false attribution error, i.e., that God's existence is dependent on the absence of suffering. This premise presupposes that God is contingent, rather than necessary; therefore, God is not actually God; because, necessary (i.e., self caused) is an attribute of God. The absence of this attribute, reduces God to the caused, rather than the uncaused causer. Therefore, the argument does not refute the existence of God; instead, it refutes a subjective idea of God predicated on a different set of attributes to those present in God Himself. Argument rejected on the grounds of false attribution error."</li></ul><div><br /></div><div><h3>2.2.2. Other Replies</h3></div><ul style="text-align: left;"><li>"If God didn’t exist we wouldn’t know the difference between good and evil."</li><li>"Why single out the Holocaust? The "holocaust" could also describe the 10 million murdered under Stalin, or the 170 million murdered under Mao Tse-tung. Nazism was just one of the atrocities of man against man."</li></ul></div><div><br /></div><h2 style="text-align: left;">3: Objections</h2><h3>3.1: Objections to Multiple Premises</h3><div><h4>3.2.1: Flip Objections <br /></h4></div><div>In interscholastic and intercollegiate debate, to "flip" or "turn" argument is to take one of your opponent's arguments and to use it as an argument for your position and/or against theirs. </div><div><br /></div><div><b>Objection: The Holocaust argument presupposes objective (moral) good and evil, but objective (moral) good and evil require God.</b></div><div><b><br /></b></div><div>Reply: <a href="https://naturalisticatheism.blogspot.com/2023/08/can-we-show-there-is-no-inconsistency.html" target="_blank">LINK</a></div><div><br /></div><div><b>Objection: The Holocaust argument includes several items in our background information, such as the existence of the universe, conscious beings capable of experiencing pain, and so forth. These things are evidence favoring theism over naturalism.</b></div><div><br /></div><div>Reply: First, some items alleged to be theistic evidence, such as the existence of the universe, do not favor theism over naturalism. Second, I agree that at least one fact in our background information, consciousness, favors theism over naturalism. The fact that it favors theism over naturalism does not, by itself, negate the claim that the specific facts identified in the Holocaust argument favor naturalism. </div><h3 style="text-align: left;">3.2: Objections to Individual Premises</h3><h4 style="text-align: left;">3.2.1: Objections to (1)<br />3.2.2: Objections to (2)<br />3.2.3: Objections to (3)<br />3.2.4: Objections to (4)<br />3.2.5: Objections to (5)<br />3.2.6: Objections to (6)<br />3.2.7: Objections to (7)</h4>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-4923424790789990562023-09-07T22:33:00.029-07:002023-12-16T17:20:33.136-08:00Is It Impossible to Prove Atheism?<p><i>(Originally published on 1 September 2023; revised version published on 7 September 2023; revised again on 10 September 2023.)</i></p><div><h2>1: Introduction</h2></div><div><p>“Performative" or "pragmatic inconsistency arguments” attempt to show that some action with respect to some proposition is inconsistent with the proposition. You will sometimes hear people call such propositions “self-defeating,” but that isn’t technically accurate. It isn’t the proposition itself which is self-defeating; it is <i>taking some action</i> with respect to the proposition -- like asserting, believing, or defending it – which is self-defeating. For example, consider the proposition, “It is impossible to know anything.” It is logically possible that the proposition is true, but it is logically inconsistent to <i>know </i>that proposition is true. If you somehow knew that it was true, then you would know that it is false. That’s an example of a performative or pragmatic inconsistency argument.</p></div><div><p>Here are some other examples of propositions which lend themselves nicely to performative or pragmatic inconsistency arguments:</p></div><ul><li>"I do not exist."</li><li>"I am dead."</li><li>"I cannot assert or communicate anything."</li><li>"I cannot talk."</li><li>"I don't intend to be understood at all."</li></ul><div><p>All of the above examples involve a first-person ("I") statement, but I'm not sure if a performative or pragmatic inconsistency must be a first-person statement. I'll leave that aside.</p></div><h2>2: Exposition</h2><div><p>Does atheism involve a pragmatic inconsistency? Before I can discuss this, I first need to define my terms. The word "atheism" is polysemous: it has multiple legitimate meanings. By "metaphysical atheism," I mean the <i>proposition</i>, "God does not exist." By "psychological atheism," I mean the <i>psychological state</i> in which a person lacks the belief that God exists. This post is about metaphysical, not psychological, atheism. For brevity, in the remainder of the post, I will use "atheism" to mean only metaphysical atheism.</p></div><div><p>According to some thinkers, the action of asserting the truth of atheism is a pragmatic inconsistency. For example, the late Christian philosopher Greg Bahnsen once said:</p></div><div><blockquote><p>It's standard fare these days to point out that a universal negative cannot be proven in an <i>a posteriori </i>fashion. On the basis of experience, how could I prove universally there is no God? [...] God might be on the back side of the fourth moon of Jupiter. Since I haven't examined the back side of the fourth moon of Jupiter, it's at least possible that God exists and I haven't encountered him yet. So to say that there is no God is a very strong claim. Atheists usually get hammered about that, that they're claiming too much. In fact, in order to say 'there is no God,' ... you would have to be omniscient. But if you were omniscient, you would be God. Therefore, the only person who could say 'there is no God' is God. God would not deny Himself. So no one can say there is no God.[1]</p></blockquote></div><div><p>This suggests the following argument, which I call the "unprovability of universal negatives argument."</p></div><blockquote><p>(1) The only way to prove a universal negative in an <i>a posteriori </i>fashion is to exhaustively search for all possible sources of evidence of a thing and find no evidence.</p><p>(2) But it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to conduct such a search.</p></blockquote><p></p><blockquote><p>Therefore:</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>(3) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove a universal negative in an <i>a posteriori </i>fashion.</p></blockquote><div><p>Defenders of the "unprovability of atheism argument" add two additional steps:</p></div><blockquote><p>(4) The proposition, "God does not exist," is a universal negative.</p></blockquote><div><p>From (3) and (4), it follows that:</p></div><blockquote><p>(5) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove, "God does not exist," in an <i>a posteriori </i>fashion.</p></blockquote><div><p>In the passage quoted above, however, Bahnsen suggests another argument which adds onto the first five steps. Atheism entails that there is no God, but the action of claiming to know that atheism is true presupposes that the person making that assertion has God-like knowledge. So we have:</p></div><blockquote><p>(6) The action of claiming to know, "God does not exist," presupposes that the speaker is God. </p></blockquote><div><p>From (5) and (6), it follows that:</p><blockquote><p>(7) If a finite, moral being claims to know, "God does not exist," then it is true that <i>God does not exist</i> and it is false that <i>God does not exist.</i></p></blockquote><p>From (7) and the Law of Noncontradiction, it follows that: </p></div><blockquote><p>(8) Any claims made by a finite, mortal being to know, "God does not exist," on an <i>a posteriori</i> basis should not be accepted.</p></blockquote><div><p>I shall call the inference from (5) - (7) the "pragmatic inconsistency of knowing atheism" argument. </p></div><h2>3: Assessment</h2><div><p>I shall argue that both the unprovability of atheism argument and the related pragmatic inconsistency of atheism arguments are unsound.</p></div><h3>3.1: The Unprovability of Atheism Argument</h3><div><p>Here, again, is the unprovability of atheism argument.</p></div><div><blockquote><p>(3) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove a universal negative in an <i>a posteriori </i>fashion.</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>(4) The proposition, "God does not exist," is a universal negative.</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Therefore:</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>(5) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove, "God does not exist," in an <i>a posteriori </i>fashion.</p></blockquote><div><p>One immediate problem with this argument is its name. From the fact, if it is a fact, that it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove atheism in an <i>a posteriori </i>fashion, it does not follow that it is impossible for such beings to prove atheism in <i>a priori </i>fashion. One or more <a href="https://naturalisticatheism.blogspot.com/search/label/internal%20inconsistency%20arguments" target="_blank">internal inconsistency arguments against God's existence</a> might be sound. But let that pass.</p></div><div><p>Some philosophers deny the truth of the second premise, (4). For example, in his famous debate with Frank Zindler, William Lane Craig argued as follows.</p></div><blockquote><p>[...] the statement that God does not exist is not a universal negative; it’s a singular negative statement. Certainly you can prove negative singular statements such as there is no planet between Venus and the Earth. You could provide arguments to show that a singular negative statement is true [...].[2]</p></blockquote><div><p>Strictly speaking, the first quoted sentence is correct. Categorical propositions are propositions which assert or deny relationships between classes; universal negatives are categorical propositions which have the form, "No S are P." Atheism is not a universal negative in this strict sense. But the statement, "God does not exist," is the same as saying, "No (existing) thing is God." That restatement of atheism is a universal generalization; it is has the form, "There are no S's."[3] Therefore, a proponent of the unprovability of atheism argument might replace "universal negative" with "universal generalization" yielding the following revised version of the "unprovability of universal negatives argument," which gets renamed as the "unprovability of universal <i>generalizations </i>argument."</p></div><blockquote><p>(1') The only way to prove a universal generalization in an <i>a posteriori </i>fashion is to exhaustively search for all possible sources of evidence of a thing and find no evidence.</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>(2) But it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to conduct such a search.</p><p>Therefore:</p><p>(3') It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove a universal generalization in an <i>a posteriori </i>fashion.</p></blockquote><div><p>The "unprovability of atheism argument" would then become:</p></div><blockquote><p>(4') The proposition, "God does not exist," is a universal generalization.</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Therefore:</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>(5) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to prove, "God does not exist," in an <i>a posteriori </i>fashion.</p></blockquote><div><p>The meaning of the word "prove" is ambiguous, but the last two steps of the pragmatic inconsistency argument (steps 6 and 7) provide a clue. That argument targets not atheism, but what is sometimes called "gnostic atheism," the claim to <i>know </i>that God does not exist. This suggests that, at least for Bahnsen, to "prove" a universal generalization means to succeed in demonstrating that belief in the universal generalization can rise to the level of knowledge. So let's revise the first two arguments one more time.</p></div><div><p>The "unprovability of universal generalizations argument" gets renamed as the "unknowability of universal generalizations argument."</p></div><blockquote><p>(1'') The only way to reasonably believe a negative universal generalization on an <i>a posteriori </i>basis is to exhaustively search for all possible sources of evidence of a thing and find no evidence.</p><p>(2) But it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to conduct such a search.</p></blockquote><p></p><blockquote><p>Therefore:</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>(3'') It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe a negative universal generalization in an <i>a posteriori </i>fashion.</p></blockquote><div><p>Likewise, the "unprovability of atheism argument" becomes the "unknowability of atheism argument."</p></div><blockquote><p>(4') The proposition, "God does not exist," is a negative universal generalization.</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Therefore:</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>(5') It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe, "God does not exist," on an <i>a posteriori </i>basis.</p></blockquote><div><p>Now consider the first two premises (steps 1'' and 2) in light of this clarification of "prove." </p></div><div><p>The second premise (step 2) is false. Purely on the basis of experience, one can know that at least some negative universal generalizations are true. Some objects or beings are defined in such a way that, if they exist, they exist at a specific location and at a specific time. For example, consider the title, "Seattle Seahawks Superbowl 60 Most Valuable Player (MVP)." Let "NO SEAHAWKS MVP" refer to the negative universal generalization, "The Seattle Seahawks Superbowl 60 MVP does not exist." If the Seattle Seahawks do not advance to Superbowl 60 (or if they advance but do not win), then NO SEAHAWKS MVP is true: the person described by that title does not exist. In that case, an "exhaustive search" doesn't require superhuman or supernatural abilities. One could reasonably believe NO SEAHAWKS MVP by simply watching Superbowl 60 or reading about it after the fact.</p></div><p>One might object that, even in my highly specified example, the inference to NO SEAHAWKS MVP isn't deductively valid; it is at least possible that there is a global media conspiracy to spread misinformation about the outcome of Superbowl 60, one's sensory organs are defective, or one is literally delusional and imagining sense data not received by one's sensory organs. This objection fails because one does not need absolute certainty to be reasonable in holding a belief. Even if one did not know NO SEAHAWKS MVP, one would still be reasonable in believing NO SEAHAWKS MVP. Contrary to what Bahnsen implies, a person can reasonably believe something they don't claim to know. For the same reason, Bahnsen has not given us a good reason to believe that the first premise (step 1'') is true. </p><p>A proponent of the unknowability of atheism argument might grant the above objections and concede that humans can reasonably believe at least some negative universal generalizations, while at the same time insist that there is something special about God such that humans cannot reasonably believe atheism. Here I think it is useful to follow Jeanine Diller in making a distinction between global and local versions of atheism.[4] "Global atheism" is the proposition, "God does not exist," for <i>all </i>concepts of God, including concepts of God which no one has yet even considered. In contrast, "local atheism" is the proposition, "God does not exist," for a specific concept of God. This distinction suggests two further versions of the "unknowability of atheism" argument.</p><p>I will call the first of these two versions the "unknowability of global atheism" argument.</p><blockquote><p>(1*) The only way to reasonably believe global atheism on an <i>a posteriori </i>basis is to exhaustively search for all possible sources of evidence of God, for every possible concept of God, and find no evidence.</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>(2) But it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to conduct such a search.</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Therefore: </p></blockquote><blockquote><p>(5*) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe global atheism on an <i>a posteriori </i>basis.</p></blockquote><div>The second version, of course, is the "unknowability of local atheism" argument.</div><div><blockquote><p>(1**) The only way to reasonably believe local atheism on an <i>a posteriori </i>basis is to exhaustively search for all possible sources of evidence of God, for a single concept of God, and find no evidence.</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>(2) But it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to conduct such a search.</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Therefore: </p></blockquote><blockquote><p>(5**) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe local atheism on an <i>a posteriori </i>basis.</p></blockquote></div><p></p><blockquote></blockquote><p>The first argument is, I believe, much more promising than the second. In light of the fact that there are surely legitimate concepts of "God" which no human has ever conceived, it is difficult to imagine how, on the basis of experience, one could be confident in the belief that <i>all </i>local theisms are false. In other words, in the context of global atheism, the second premise (step 2) seems to be true. Of course, the fact that I cannot conceive of such a justification does not rule out the possibility that one exists. But it seems unlikely that anyone in the year 2023 could reasonably believe global atheism is true. As John Schellenberg has persuasively argued, there are numerous signs of </p><blockquote><p>human intellectual immaturity at the macro level, and we've seen enough evidence of it to say that maturity--the realization (or near realization) of a deep and wide understanding of reality--may yet be a long way off.[5]</p></blockquote><p>Further support for Schellenberg's immaturity hypothesis comes from the work of Paul Draper. In a recent article, Draper explores the conjunction of "merotheism" (God is a proper part of nature) and "monopsychism" (there is exactly one mind or subject of consciousness). He calls this novel version of theism "panpsychotheism" (all-minds-[are]-God-ism).[6] The important point to notice here is that, although some of the greatest minds in history have thought about God, there is no indication that anyone else had thought of this view. All by itself, this single example is evidence that there are other conceptions of God which no one has previously conceived. </p><p>In contrast, I think the second argument fails and for essentially the same reason given earlier. At least some God concepts entail or make probable certain states of affairs which be confirmed or disconfirmed by experience. For example, suppose that, in honor of Richard Swinburne, we define a "Swinburne God" as</p><blockquote><p>a being with most of the following properties: being a person without a body (that is, a spirit), present everywhere (that is, omnipresent), the creator of the universe, perfectly free, able to do anything (that is, omnipotent), knowing all things (that is, omniscient), perfectly good, a source of moral obligation, eternal, a necessary being, holy, and worthy of worship. [7]</p></blockquote><p>Let "Swinburnian theism" be the proposition, "The Swinburne God exists." Swinburnian theism clearly entails other propositions; one does not need to <i>know </i>that one of those entailments is false in order to reasonably believe that one of those entailments (and, by extension, Swinburnian theism itself) is false.[8] This is why I think the second premise (step 2) of the "unknowability of local atheism" argument fails.</p></div><h3>3.2: The Pragmatic Inconsistency of Believing Atheism Argument</h3><p>In the last section, we saw that the unprovability of atheism argument is not successful, but can be at least partially repaired by transforming it into the unknowability of atheism argument. The conclusion of that argument is:</p><div><blockquote>(5') It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe, "God does not exist," on an <i>a posteriori </i>basis.</blockquote><div>Defenders of the pragmatic inconsistency argument should then revise the last three steps as follows.</div><blockquote><p>(6') The action of reasonably believing, "God does not exist," presupposes that the speaker is God. </p></blockquote><p>From (5') and (6'), it follows that: </p><blockquote><p>(7') If a finite, mortal being reasonably believes, "God does not exist," on an <i>a posteriori </i>basis then it is true that <i>God does not exist </i>and it is false that <i>God does not exist.</i></p></blockquote><div><p>From (7') and the Law of Noncontradiction, it follows that: </p></div><blockquote><p>(8') It is impossible for a finite, mortal being to reasonably believe, "God does not exist," on an <i>a posteriori </i>basis. </p></blockquote><p>This argument fails for two reasons. First, its second premise, (6'), is false. Even if it is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe atheism on an <i>a posteriori </i>basis, it does not follow that it is impossible for such beings to reasonably believe atheism on an <i>a priori</i> basis. One does not have to be omniscient in order to know, much less reasonably believe, that there is a successful <i>a priori </i>argument for local atheism.</p></div><div>For example, here is one schema for what I call an "internal inconsistency argument" for local atheism.</div><div><div></div><blockquote><div>(9) If God existed, then He would have property P1.</div><div>(10) If God existed, then He would have property P2.</div><div>(11) Any being with property P1 would have some further property P3.</div><div>(12) Any being with property P2 would not have property P3.</div><div>(13) Therefore, it is impossible for any being to have properties P1 and P2. (from 11 and 12)</div><div>(14) Hence, it is impossible for God to exist. (from 9, 10 and 13)</div></blockquote><div></div></div><div>The basic idea is to show that if God existed, then he would have two properties P1 and P2. The next step is to show that property P1 entails some third property P3, while property P2 entails the denial of property P3. Since it is impossible for any being both to have and not have P3, it follows that that being <i>cannot</i> exist. While it might or might not be the case that there are no successful arguments of this type for local atheism, it really doesn't matter one way or the other for the purpose of this post. The speaker does not need to be omniscient in order to know the truth of (9) - (12).</div><div><br /></div><div>Second, the argument's conclusion, (8'), does not follow from (5') - (7'). (6') refers to the action of claiming to reasonably believe, "God does not exist," but does not specify that that knowledge is based upon an <i>a posteriori </i>basis.</div><div><br /></div><div><div>As with the unknowability of atheism argument, let us now consider two versions of the pragmatic inconsistency argument based on the distinction between global and local atheism. The global version can be summarized as follows:</div><div><blockquote><p>(5*) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe global atheism on an <i>a posteriori </i>basis.</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>(6*) The action of reasonably believing global atheism presupposes that the speaker is God. </p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Therefore:</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>(7*) If a finite, mortal being reasonably believes global atheism on an <i>a posteriori </i>basis, then global atheism is true and global atheism is false<i>.</i></p></blockquote><div></div><blockquote><p>Therefore:</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>(8*) It is impossible for a finite, mortal being to reasonably believe global atheism on an <i>a posteriori </i>basis. </p></blockquote><p>There are two problems with this argument. The first is that it is invalid: (6*) refers to the action of claiming to reasonably believe global atheism but does not specify that that knowledge is based upon an <i>a posteriori </i>basis. It seems to me that this objection could be avoided by revising the argument again as follows:</p><div><blockquote><p>(5**) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe global atheism.</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>(6**) The action of reasonably believing global atheism presupposes that the speaker is God. </p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Therefore:</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>(7**) If a finite, mortal being reasonably believes global atheism, then global atheism is true and global atheism is false<i>.</i></p></blockquote><div></div><blockquote><p>Therefore:</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>(8**) It is impossible for a finite, mortal being to reasonably believe global atheism.</p></blockquote><p>That solves the problem identified by the first objection, but brings into sharper focus the second objection. Even if we assume that premise (5**) can be adequately defended, premise (6**) does not seem to be true. If premise (5**) is true, then it seems that the action of claiming to reasonably believe global atheism presupposes that the speaker has knowledge which greatly exceeds that of any human being in history. But "has knowledge which greatly exceeds that of any human being in history" is not a sufficient condition for being God. First, it's far from obvious that such knowledge requires omniscience, and many conceptions of God posit an omniscient being, not just a really smart being. Second, even if the speaker's actions did presuppose that the speaker is omniscient, being omniscient is not a sufficient condition for being God. It is at least conceivable that there exists an omniscient being which does not have any of the other attributes typically associated with God, such as omnipotence, moral perfection, eternity, aseity, sovereignty, immutability, necessity, etc. </p></div><div>I don't know how Bahnsen would respond to this objection. Perhaps Bahnsen could show that the speaker's actions require such a superhuman degree of knowledge that the speaker's actions presuppose that the speaker is not necessarily God, but at least a supernatural being. Since metaphysical naturalism rules out the existence of any supernatural beings, not just God, the argument could then be transformed into a pragmatic inconsistency argument against believing metaphysical naturalism. </div><div><br /></div><div>Now consider the local version of the pragmatic inconsistency argument, which can be summarized as follows:</div><div><blockquote><p>(5#) It is impossible for finite, mortal beings to reasonably believe local atheism on an <i>a posteriori </i>basis.</p></blockquote></div><p></p><blockquote></blockquote><blockquote><p>(6#) The action of reasonably believing local atheism presupposes that the speaker is God. </p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Therefore:</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>(7#) If a finite, mortal being reasonably believes global atheism on an <i>a posteriori </i>basis, then global atheism is true and global atheism is false<i>.</i></p></blockquote><blockquote><p>Therefore:</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>(8#) It is impossible for a finite, mortal being to reasonably believe local atheism on an <i>a posteriori </i>basis. </p></blockquote><p>This argument suffers from the same defects as its global counterpart. Unlike the global pragmatic inconsistency argument, however, I am doubtful that the second premise, in this case (6#), can be repaired by replacing "God" with "supernatural being." For ordinary human knowledge is all that is needed to reasonably believe that some local theisms are false. Thus, the action of claiming to reasonably believe local atheism does not appear to be a pragmatic inconsistency, at least not in any sense related to the issues discussed in this post. </p><h2>4: Conclusion</h2><p>In this post, I have considered two arguments: the unprovability of atheism argument and the pragmatic inconsistency of knowing atheism argument. The unprovability of atheism argument is best and most charitably understood as the unknowability of atheism argument, which has two versions. The unknowability of global atheism argument seems promising, but the unknowability of local atheism argument fails. For at least some concepts of "God," one can reasonably believe that local atheism is true. Finally, the pragmatic inconsistency argument fails because one does not need to be superhuman, much less omniscient, in order to reasonably believe the truth of the premises of an internal inconsistency argument. Perhaps there is a successful global pragmatic inconsistency argument (against the action of believing naturalism), but the local pragmatic inconsistency argument seems hopeless.[9]</p><h2>Notes</h2><p>[1] “Michael Martin Under the Microscope” audiocassette, tape 3.</p><div>[2] William Lane Craig, “Second Rebuttal Speech” <i>Atheism vs. Christianity</i> (January 1993), https://www.reasonablefaith.org/media/debates/atheism-vs.-christianity</div><div><br /></div><div>[3] Thanks to Paul Draper for helping me to see this clearly.</div><div><br /></div><div>[4] Diller, J. "Global and local atheisms." <i>Int J Philos Relig </i>79, 7–18 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-015-9550-1</div><div><br /></div><div>[5] J.L. Schellenberg, <i>Progressive Atheism: How Moral Evolution Changes the God Debate </i>(New York: Bloombsury, 2019), p. 50.</div><div><br /></div><div>[6] Paul Draper, "Panpsychotheism." In <i>Current Controversies in Philosophy of Religion</i> (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 160-177.</div><div><br /></div><div>[7] Richard Swinburne, <i>The Coherence of Theism </i>(2nd ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 1.</div><div><br /></div><div>[8] For an example of such an argument, see Paul Draper's formulation and defense of his "Decisive Evidence Argument" in Draper, Paul, "Atheism and Agnosticism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/atheism-agnosticism/>.</div><div><br /></div><div>[9] Thanks to Paul Draper for some very helpful conversations which significantly improved the quality of this post. Any errors are, of course, solely my responsibility.</div><div><br /></div></div></div>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-1136105527761082202023-08-19T12:11:00.002-07:002023-08-19T12:15:53.890-07:00The Columbine Mass Shooting and the Myth of Cassie Bernall's Martyrdom<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5aabf855e74940acdf26c34e/1521305382828-CC7ARU3IALSE4YU8TLOW/mark-linville.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="168" data-original-width="139" height="168" src="https://images.squarespace-cdn.com/content/v1/5aabf855e74940acdf26c34e/1521305382828-CC7ARU3IALSE4YU8TLOW/mark-linville.jpg" width="139" /></a></div></div><br />
<p><a href="https://www.moralapologetics.com/mark-linville" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Mark D. Linville</a> has published a short booklet with Ravi Zacharias International Ministries (RZIM) entitled, "Is Everything Permitted? Moral Values in a World Without God?" The booklet begins with the following statement by Linville:<br />
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Few news stories have had the profound effect on me as did the shooting rampage at Columbine High School.</blockquote>
<p>Can you guess where this is headed? Linville continues:<span></span></p><a name='more'></a><p></p>
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As with the assassination of John F. Kennedy and the Challenger disaster, I can recall the exact circumstances of where I was and what I was doing when I learned the news. Time magazine reported that, in a kind of reverse inquisition, one of the killers held a gun to the head of a young girl and queried, 'Do you believe in God?' Certainly knowing the consequences of her words, she replied, 'There is a God. And you need to follow along God's path.' <i>The gunman said, 'There is no God,' and squeezed the trigger.</i> For many, this scene presents us with a gruesome snapshot of the moral nihilism that follows in the wake of the denial of God. If there is no God, can anything <i>really</i> be right or wrong? If there is no God, then do we even have the grounds for saying that the Columbine shooting was immoral or wicked?</blockquote>
<p>There are, sadly, atheists who have killed theists just for being theists, but the Columbine gunman wasn't one of them. This is a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/She_Said_Yes:_The_Unlikely_Martyrdom_of_Cassie_Bernall" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">myth</a> <a href="https://www.vox.com/culture/2017/4/20/15369442/columbine-anniversary-cassie-bernall-rachel-scott-martyrdom" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">which</a> <a href="https://allthatsinteresting.com/cassie-bernall-valeen-schnurr" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">has</a> <a href="https://newrepublic.com/article/122832/why-does-columbine-myth-about-martyr-cassie-bernall-persist" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">been</a> <a href="https://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0446546925/ref=as_li_ss_tl?ots=1&slotNum=19&imprToken=70c50795-2e63-be22-97b&ascsubtag=___vx__p_15133483__t_w__r_google.com__d_D&ie=UTF8&camp=1789&creative=390957&creativeASIN=0446546925&linkCode=as2&tag=redletters-20" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">definitively</a> <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPcap/1999-10/14/026r-101499-idx.html" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">debunked</a> and yet there are even professional philosophers, like Linville, who are not immune to being duped by it. Many of the links in the prior sentence talk about how the myth has been refuted and yet it persists; multiple articles even excuse people who continue to believe the myth in spite of the evidence. For example, here is the <i>Washington Post:</i></p><blockquote><p>But the truth wasn't known, and now that it is, it barely reverberates. Even so, why does it matter? In questions of death and faith, it's the power of the story that counts, the tale that helps the mind grasp the unfathomable. Compared with that comfort, the truth is a trifle.</p></blockquote><p></p><p>Now imagine if the myth said that a Baptist or an orthodox Jew killed an atheist for being an atheist. There would have been intense motivation to discredit the story and no one would be offering excuses for believing the myth in spite of decisive evidence against it. When it comes to reinforcing beliefs about the danger of atheism and/or atheists, however, perpetuating falsehoods is viewed as excusable.</p><p></p>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-18217778063728606902023-08-18T07:54:00.001-07:002023-08-18T12:12:03.633-07:00More on Plantinga, Atheism, and Moral Obligation<p>Today I remembered Plantinga wrote a very interesting <a href="https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2158&context=faithandphilosophy" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">article</a> on naturalism and obligation back in 2010 in the journal <i>Faith and Philosophy. </i>I just checked my archives and made an interesting discovery. First, that article reinforces my belief that Plantinga believes atheism (and, indeed, naturalism) and moral obligation are incompatible. Second, in that article, Plantinga explicitly says he is not going to argue directly for that incompatibility claim; rather, he intends to "display" the failure of the most natural way of arguing that naturalism can accommodate moral obligation. In his own words:</p><blockquote><p>I propose to support the claim that naturalism cannot accommodate morality—not by showing directly that it can’t, but by displaying the failure of the most natural way of arguing that it can.</p></blockquote><div><div>Imagine how Plantinga would have reacted if Mackie said, "I'm not going to directly argue for the claim that God and evil are incompatible. Rather, I'm going to indirectly argue for it by displaying the failure of the most natural way of arguing that God and evil are compatible." Surely Plantinga would have replied: "Even if Mackie succeeds at that task, that still falls short of what he needs to defend his logical argument from evil: a rigorous defense of the claim that God and evil are incompatible." And Plantinga would have been right.</div></div><div><br /></div><div>By similar reasoning, then, it seems to me that the Autonomous Morality Defender ("Defender") would be just as correct to use a parallel reply to Plantinga. Even if Plantinga's article succeeds in showing that the "most natural way of arguing that" naturalism can "accommodate morality" fails, Plantinga would still fall short of what he needs to defend his 'logical' argument from morality for theism.</div>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-51986162658746978212023-08-16T19:28:00.002-07:002023-08-16T20:31:09.659-07:00Can We Show There is No Inconsistency between Atheism and Moral Obligation?<p>In a <a href="https://naturalisticatheism.blogspot.com/2023/08/is-combination-of-atheism-and-moral.html" target="_blank">prior post</a>, I showed that Plantinga has failed to demonstrate a contradiction between atheism and moral obligation in any of this three types of contradiction: explicit, formal, or implicit. I want to continue to my exploration of the alleged contradiction between atheism and moral obligation, this time by asking if we can <i>show </i>that there is no inconsistency between atheism and moral obligation. </p><p>In the spirit of maximal transparency, <b>what follows is mostly plagiarized material </b>from Plantinga's book, <i>God, Freedom, and Evil, </i>Part I, Section a, sub-section 3, with the obvious exception that I have edited the material referring to God and evil with my own material referring to atheism and moral obligation. </p>
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<p>To summarize our conclusions so far: although many moral apologists claim that the atheistic moral realist is involved in contradiction when he asserts the members of set D, this set, obviously, is neither <i>explicitly </i>nor <i>formally </i>contradictory; the claim, presumably, <i>must </i>be that it is <i>implicitly </i>contradictory. To make good this claim the moral apologist must find some necessarily true proposition <i>p</i> (it could be a conjunction of several propositions) such that the addition of <i>p</i> to set D yields a set that is formally contradictory. No moral apologist has produced even a plausible candidate for this role, and it certainly is not easy to see what such a proposition might be. Now we might think we should simply declare set D implicitly consistent on the principle that a proposition (or set) is to be presumed consistent or possible until proven otherwise. This course, however, leads to trouble. The same principle would impel us to declare the moral apologist's claim--that set D is inconsistent--possible or consistent. But the claim that a given set of propositions is implicitly contradictory, is itself either necessarily true or necessarily false; so if such a claim is <i>possible,</i> it is not necessarily false and is, therefore, true (in fact, necessarily true). If we followed the suggested principle, therefore, we should be obliged to declare set D implicitly consistent (since it hasn't been shown to be otherwise), but we should have to say the same thing about the moral apologist's claim, since we haven't shown that claim to be inconsistent or impossible. The moral apologist's claim, furthermore, is necessarily true if it is possible. Accordingly, if we accept the above principle, we shall have to declare set D both implicitly consistent and implicitly inconsistent. So all we can say at this point is that set D has not been shown to be implicitly inconsistent.</p><p style="text-align: left;">Can we go any further? One way to go on would be to try to <i>show </i>that set D is implicitly consistent or possible in the broadly logical sense. But what is involved in showing such a thing? Although there are various ways to approach this matter, they all resemble one another in an important respect. They all amount to this: to show that a set S is consistent you think of a <i>possible state of affairs</i> (it needn't <i>actually obtain</i>) which is such that if it were actual, then all of the members of S would be true. This procedure is sometimes called <i>giving a model of S.</i> For example, you might construct an axiom set and then show that it is consistent by giving a model of it; this is how it was shown that the denial of Euclid's parallel postulate is formally consistent with the rest of his postulates.</p><p style="text-align: left;">There are various special cases of this procedure to fit special circumstances. Suppose, for example, you have a pair of propositions <i>p</i> and <i>q</i> and wish to show them consistent. And suppose we say that a proposition <i>p1</i> entails a proposition <i>p2</i> if it is impossible that <i>p1</i> be true and <i>p2</i> false-if the conjunctive proposition <i>p1</i> and not <i>p2</i> is necessarily false. Then one way to show that <i>p</i> is consistent with <i>q</i> is to find some proposition <i>r</i> whose conjunction with <i>p</i> is both possible. in the broadly logical sense, and entails <i>q.</i> </p><p style="text-align: left;">How does this apply to the case before us? As follows. Remember that (1) and (2) are:</p><blockquote><p>(1) God does not exist;</p></blockquote><p>and </p><blockquote><p>(2) Genuine moral obligation exists.</p></blockquote><p style="text-align: left;">The problem, then, is to show that (1) and (2) are consistent. This could be done, as we've seen, by finding a proposition <i>r</i> that is consistent with (1) and such that (1) and (r) together entail (2) . One proposition that might do the trick is </p><blockquote><p style="text-align: left;">(AUTONOMOUS MORALITY) Neither moral values nor the full set of genuine moral obligations of human beings are dependent upon the existence or properties of any non-human person.</p></blockquote>If (AUTONOMOUS MORALITY) is consistent with (1), then it follows that (1) and (AUTONOMOUS MORALITY) (and hence set D) are consistent. Accordingly, one thing some critics of moral apologists have tried is to show that (AUTONOMOUS MORALITY) and (1) are consistent.<p style="text-align: left;">One can attempt this in at least two ways. On the one hand, we could try to apply the same method again. Conceive of a possible state of affairs such that, if it obtained, genuine moral obligation existed but was not dependent on God's existence or properties. On the other hand, someone might try to show that such a state of affairs is not only conceivable, but actual. </p><p style="text-align: left;">Corresponding to these two methods of responding to theistic external inconsistency arguments from evil are two roles which critics of moral apologists can play. I will call the former "Autonomous Morality Defenders" (hereafter, "Defenders") and the latter "Autonomous Morality Atheodicists" (hereafter, "Atheodicists"). Atheodicists attempt to tell us how morality <i>actually</i> exists without being dependent upon God's existence or properties. In contrast, Defenders are not trying to say how morality without being dependent upon God's existence or properties; but at most how morality <i>might </i>exist. We could put the point another way. Both Defenders and Atheodicists are trying to show that (1) is consistent with (AUTONOMOUS MORALITY) and, of course if so, then set D is consistent. The Atheodicist tries to do this by finding some proposition <i>r</i> which in conjunction with (1) entails (2); he claims, furthermore, that this proposition is <i>true, </i>not just consistent with (1). He tries to give us a full theory of moral ontology and show that it is true. The Defender, on the other hand, though he also tries to find a proposition that is consistent with (1) and in conjunction with it entails (2), does <i>not </i>claim to know or even believe that <i>r</i> is true. And here, of course, he is perfectly within his rights. His aim is to show that (1) is consistent with (2); all he needs to do then is find an <i>r</i> that is consistent with (1) and such that (1) and <i>r</i> entail (2); whether <i>r </i>is true is quite beside the point.</p><p style="text-align: left;">In summary, we have seen that, using Plantinga's critique of Mackie's claim (that there exists an implicit contradiction between God and evil), we can use parallel reasoning to refute Plantinga's claim that there is an implicit contradiction between atheism and moral obligation. Furthermore, this reasoning does not even depend upon the metaphysical possibility of a world without God. Because the content of theism says so little about the relationship between God and morality, it is at least possible that God exists and (AUTONOMOUS MORALITY) is true. But that entails there is no implicit contradiction between atheism and moral obligation.</p><p></p><p></p>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-90442551004679917492023-08-16T14:22:00.016-07:002023-08-16T21:52:51.030-07:00Assessing the Resurrection Hypothesis: McCullagh, Craig, Cavin, and Colombetti<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEig0By7u_blYHU7ubN_NffRIDFmrKKW6jtnjRcw1jR_-_O6XPCETsN5SeWeDDJXveaPKh9z4tDhX5uzVV1-YWYCBBzLPw0Jkl8GAhzmRdTgXOfyYk3Hq6SRZNp9cVFQwafZyHpVPigM0hIfsSnA1BsfaiQmsjXCvZ9G2Gg0BdcoxVTeFyVlHzxC/s500/Behan.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="500" data-original-width="333" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEig0By7u_blYHU7ubN_NffRIDFmrKKW6jtnjRcw1jR_-_O6XPCETsN5SeWeDDJXveaPKh9z4tDhX5uzVV1-YWYCBBzLPw0Jkl8GAhzmRdTgXOfyYk3Hq6SRZNp9cVFQwafZyHpVPigM0hIfsSnA1BsfaiQmsjXCvZ9G2Gg0BdcoxVTeFyVlHzxC/s320/Behan.jpg" width="213" /></a></div></div><br />
<p>In this post, I want to consider the assessment of historical hypotheses such as the alleged resurrection of Jesus (<b>R</b>), using the writings of William Lane Craig as a foil. In doing so, I will rely heavily upon <a href="https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v11i2.2836" target="_blank">a recent article by philosophers Robert Greg Cavin and Carolos Colombetti</a>, but I want to be clear that I have not reviewed this post with them, so any mistakes in this post are entirely my responsibility.</p><p>While Craig's position regarding the use of Bayes' Theorem has evolved over the years, to my knowledge one thing which has not changed is his reliance upon the work of historian C. Behan McCullagh.[1] Following McCullagh, Craig argues for <b>R</b> using an argument pattern called "inference to the best explanation" (IBE).[2] In this post, I will argue the following three points <i>contra</i> Craig. First, Bayes' Theorem is the foundation for logically correct arguments for any historical hypotheses. Second, neither McCullagh's IBE criteria nor Craig's restatement of them are sufficiently clear to enable a rigorous assessment of historical hypotheses, whereas the Bayesian approach avoids these problems. Third, Craig's defense of <b>R</b> fails to establish that the alleged event is more probable than not.<span></span></p><a name='more'></a><p></p><h2 style="text-align: left;">1. Is Bayes' Theorem Even Relevant to History?</h2><p>In his 1995 debate with philosopher Robert Greg Cavin, Craig argued that Bayes' Theorem is not how historians justify historical hypotheses. What follows is a paraphrase of Craig, taken from notes I made while listening to the debate more than a decade ago.</p><blockquote><p>C. Behan McCullagh points out that few historians have adopted a Bayesian approach. First, the information needed to estimate the various probabilities is not available. This is the problem, for example, with estimating the (prior) probability of R, <i>i.e.,</i> the probability of R relative to our background information. Second, sometimes the results of using Bayes' Theorem are unacceptable, as McCullagh has documented. Virtually no historian has used Bayes' Theorem in justifying historical descriptions.[3]</p></blockquote><div>I am sure that McCullagh's claim,[4] regarding the relative frequency of historical descriptions justified by historians using Bayes' Theorem, is correct. But the <i>descriptive </i>fact that few historians use Bayes' Theorem to justify historical hypotheses does not negate the <i>normative </i>fact that Bayes' Theorem underlies the justification for logically correct arguments for historical hypotheses. </div><div><br /></div><div>Consider the McCullagh-Craig alternative: Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). In light of the fact that Craig vigorously defended IBE over and against Cavin's Bayesian approach, one would expect to find, on Craig's website if not in the debate itself, the logical form of IBE so that the two argument styles could be compared and contrasted. Indeed, one searches in vain the writings of both Craig and McCullagh for so much as the slightest acknowledgment that IBE even has a logical form! But since they (apparently) fail to do so, Cavin and Colombetti (C&C) have done so on their behalf. According to C&C, IBE arguments have the following logical form.</div><div><div></div><blockquote><div>(1) Hypothesis H1 of the set H1 , …, Hn is the best explanation of the evidence E in being superior to its rivals H2 , …, Hn in satisfying the criteria for justifying historical explanations.</div><div>Therefore:</div><div>(2) H1 is probably true.[5]</div></blockquote><div></div></div><p>The conclusion's use of the word "probably" gives away the entire game, set, and match. IBE is not a type of deductive argument; instead, it is an inductive argument which, at best, merely shows that the inferred explanation is probable.[6] The word "probably" in the conclusion refers to the inferred explanation's posterior or final probability. But as Bayes' Theorem correctly states, final probability is determined by prior probability, the so-called 'likelihood' (the probability of the evidence conditional upon the explanation), and nothing else. This mathematical fact creates a dilemma for partisans of the IBE approach (hereafter, "explanationists"): does a successful IBE show that the hypothesis to be inferred enjoys a greater balance of prior probability and explanatory power than rival hypotheses do collectively? If yes, IBE is not a rival approach to Bayesianism. The alleged obstacles to applying Bayes' Theorem to historical descriptions are not genuine obstacles. If no, then IBE is a rival approach to Bayesianism but a mathematically and logically incorrect one. </p><p>What, then, of Craig's objection to using a Bayesian approach to assess historical descriptions? Craig apparently thinks that, by using IBE, he can somehow avoid the need to estimate the various probabilities. But this is misguided. For example, Craig's preferred IBE approach includes the criterion of "plausibility." Although he will surely deny it, I submit that it should be clear to any informed, unbiased observer that what Craig calls "plausibility" just <i>is </i>prior probability, albeit prior probability under another name masquerading as an alternative to prior probability. Both prior probability and plausibility come in degrees and both are measured relative to background information. As C&C point out, any problems in assessing prior probability will apply equally to Craig's plausibility.[7] </p><p>Indeed, Craig himself implicitly admits that his earlier (1995) opposition to using Bayes' Theorem was misguided. In 2000, he wrote a response to Gary Habermas on apologetic methodology. As part of that response, Craig used Bayes' Theorem to assess the probability of the Resurrection. Furthermore, he specifically estimated the value of the prior probability of the Resurrection to be "not low," contrary to his earlier claim that we lack the necessary information.[8]</p><h2 style="text-align: left;">2. The Superiority of Bayesianism to McCullagh's IBE Framework</h2><p>My plan in this section is as follows. First, I will quote McCullagh at length so that the reader can read McCullagh's explanation of his IBE criteria in his own words. Second, following the recent C&C article, I will argue that McCullagh's IBE criteria are not sufficiently clear to make possible a rigorous assessment of the Resurrection hypothesis or rival explanations. Third, I will argue that a Bayesian framework succeeds precisely where an IBE framework fails. </p><h3 style="text-align: left;">2.1. McCullagh's IBE Criteria</h3><p>Because the details matter, I want to quote the entirety of McCullagh's seven IBE criteria.</p><p></p><blockquote><p>The theory is that one is rationally justified in believing a statement to be true if the following conditions obtain:</p><p>(1) The statement, together with other statements already held to be true, must imply yet other statements describing present, observable data. (We will henceforth call the first statement 'the hypothesis', and statements describing observable data, 'observation statements'.)</p><p>(2) The hypothesis must be <i>of greater explanatory scope</i> than any other incompatible hypothesis about the same subject; that is, it must imply a greater variety of observation statements.</p><p>(3) The hypothesis must be <i>of greater explanatory power</i> than any other incompatible hypothesis about the same subject; that is, it must make the observation statements it implies more probable than any other.</p><p>(4) The hypothesis must be <i>more plausible </i>than any other incompatible hypothesis about the same subject; that is, it must be implied to some degree by a greater variety of accepted truths than any other, and be implied more strongly than any other; and its probable negation must be implied by fewer beliefs, and implied less strongly than any other.</p><p>(5) The hypothesis must be <i>less ad hoc</i> than any other incompatible hypothesis about the same subject; that is, it must include fewer new suppositions about the past which are not already implied to some extent by existing beliefs.</p><p>(6) It must be <i>disconfirmed by fewer accepted beliefs</i> than any other incompatible hypothesis about the same subject; that is, when conjoined with accepted truths it must imply fewer observation statements and other statements which are believed to be false.</p><p>(7) It must exceed other incompatible hypotheses about the same subject by so much, in characteristics 2 to 6, that there is little chance of an incompatible hypothesis, after further investigation, soon exceeding it in these respects.[9]</p></blockquote><p>As I read him, Craig 2008 appears to endorse McCullagh's criteria pretty much as is.[10] </p><h3>2.2. The Obscurity of McCullagh's IBE Criteria</h3><div>In a recent article, C&C demonstrated there are multiple problems "regarding the meaning, justification, and ranking" of the proposed criteria. Since I find their argument convincing, I will merely summarize their main points and encourage interested readers to consult their article for details.</div><div><br /></div><div>(1) Regarding the meaning of the IBE criteria, C&C note the following problems: (1.1) it is unclear what the word "imply" means in the various criteria; (1.2) it is unclear how to interpret explanatory scope and explanatory power and how they differ from one another; (1.3) it is unclear what "plausibility" means and how to assess it; and (1.4) the provided definition of "<i>ad hoc</i>" is idiosyncratic and unjustified.[11]</div><div><br /></div><div>(2) C&C point out that, even among Christian scholars who appeal to McCullagh to defend the Resurrection hypothesis, there are differing opinions about the correct set of criteria. Whereas Craig has seven criteria, Licona has five. Not only do Craig and Licona use different sets of criteria, but "they each omit one or more widely accepted criteria--<i>e.g., </i>non-<i>ad hoc</i>-ness, simplicity, modesty, testability, and fruitfulness."[12]</div><div><br /></div><div>(3) C&C observe that it is unclear how to rank, weight, or prioritize the different IBE criteria. For example, should we prefer a highly plausible hypothesis with middling explanatory scope over a moderately plausible hypothesis with greater explanatory scope? Again, C&C observe that Craig's approach is "markedly" different from that of Licona, but neither justify their approach.[13]</div><div><br /></div><div>Because of these three sets of problems, it is difficult to rigorously assess the historicity of the Resurrection hypothesis and to compare it to rival hypotheses.</div><h3 style="text-align: left;">2.3. The Bayesian Framework Vindicated</h3><div>Let us now consider the Bayesian approach in light of the difficulties just reviewed.</div><div><br /></div><div>(1) Regarding meaning, all of the terms in Bayes' Theorem have rigorous definitions. Furthermore, as C&C argue, the Bayesian framework succeeds precisely where the IBE framework fails. </div><div><ul style="text-align: left;"><li>(1.1) A Bayesian framework does not rely upon the word "imply." </li><li>(1.2) In a Bayesian framework, explanatory scope and power are both represented by a single term, Pr(E | B & H), sometimes called the Bayesian "likelihood." This term is the epistemic probability of the evidence to be explained conditional upon the background information and the assumption that H is true. As C&C point out, the explanatory scope of H is "the range of facts contained in E," whereas the explanatory power of H is the "magnitude" of the term Pr(E B & H). </li><li>(1.3) As mentioned earlier, in the Bayesian framework, "plausibility" just is the prior probability of H. It is represented by the term Pr(H | B), which is the epistemic probability of H conditional upon background information B alone. </li><li>(1.4) C&C point out that that the usual definition of "ad hoc" preferred by logicians is an explanatory hypothesis which satisfies two conditions: "it is introduced just for the special purpose of accommodating some particular observation that otherwise would constitute counterevidence (e.g., failed predictions) to the hypothesis of interest, and there is no independent evidence for it. But Craig’s formulation deviates from this standard definition."[14] Although they do not spell this out in a Bayesian framework, this is arguably easy to do. Because "<i>ad hoc</i>" ("for this special purpose") is not synonymous with "<i>post hoc</i>" ("after this"), we should not assume that a hypothesis devised after the evidence is collected (<i>post hoc</i>) is also arbitrary or overly complex (<i>ad hoc</i>).[15] Thus, genuinely <i>ad hoc</i> hypotheses may be excluded on the basis of prior probability and likelihood (where the evidence statement E includes <i>all </i>available and relevant evidence).</li></ul><div>(2) Because the Bayesian approach bypasses IBE criteria in its entirety, Bayesianism does not have to justify a particular set of IBE criteria. </div><div><br /></div><div>(3) Likewise, the Bayesian does not have to justify a particular way to rank, prioritize, or weight IBE criteria.</div><div><br /></div><div>Therefore, it seems to me that the Bayesian approach succeeds where the IBE approach fails.</div><div><h2>3. The Failure of R as an Explanation</h2>In this section, following C&C, I will show that Craig's defense of R fails to establish that R is more probable than not. Let us now consider Craig's defense of <b>R</b> using McCullagh's IBE criteria.</div></div><div><p>(1) <i>Implication of other statements.</i></p><p>C&C agree that <b>R</b> satisfies this criterion, if "imply" is interpreted counterintuitively to mean "make probable."[16]</p><p>(2) <i>Explanatory scope.</i></p><p>C&C agree with Craig that, if "imply" in McCullagh's first criterion means "make probable," then <b>R</b> (when combined with the fact of Jesus' burial) 'implies' an empty tomb. But, they argue, Craig does not show that <b>R </b>'implies' the alleged postmortem appearances of Jesus. </p><p>First, this criterion is <i>comparative:</i> it requires that Craig show that <b>R</b> is superior to rival explanations in terms of explanatory scope, but Craig's argument is non-comparative. At best, Craig merely shows that some naturalistic explanations for the appearances are defective; he does not show that <b>R</b> is superior. [17]</p><p>Second, C&C point out that the scope of a proposed hypothesis like <b>R</b> is not determined only by the content of <b>R</b>, but also by the content of the evidence to be explained (E). Thus it is trivial to show that <b>R</b> is actually inferior to some of its naturalistic rivals because some of them entail some of the specific historical facts included in E, whereas <b>R</b> does not. To cite just one of the examples mentioned by C&C, the hallucination hypothesis claims that the women, the disciples, and Paul experienced hallucinations which they mistakenly took to be of the risen Jesus. The hallucination hypothesis <i>entails </i>the postmortem appearances of Jesus, whereas <b>R</b> does not for the simple reason that R "states nothing about the post-Resurrection activities of the risen Jesus."[18]</p><p>Third, C&C argue that it is impossible for Craig to repair his argument by combining <b>R</b> with various auxiliary hypotheses about the risen Jesus, due to Craig's definition of <b>R.</b> Their argument on this point is quite technical and I will not attempt to summarize it here.</p><p>(3) <i>Explanatory power.</i></p><div>As C&C observe, Craig fails to show that <b>R</b> is superior to its rivals regarding explanatory power. The reason why is essentially the same as C&C's first objection to explanatory scope: Craig needs a comparative argument for the superiority of <b>R</b>, but he only provides a non-comparative argument.[19]</div><div><br /></div><div>(4) <i>Plausibility</i></div><div><br /></div><div>C&C argue that <b>R </b>is maximally implausible for two reasons.</div><div><br /></div><div>1. <i>The Standard Model (SM) of physics.</i> Craig implicitly tries to avoid this issue by making a distinction between a natural and a supernatural revivification of Jesus. The natural revivification hypothesis is the view that Jesus rose naturally from the dead. In contrast, the supernatural revivification of Jesus, a/k/a the resurrection of Jesus (<b>R</b>), is the view that God raised Jesus from the dead. Craig agrees that the natural revivification of Jesus is "outrageously" implausible due to the laws of nature, but he argues that the content of the laws of nature are simply irrelevant to <b>R</b>.[20]</div><div><br /></div><div>As C&C argue, however, Craig's distinction between a natural and supernatural revivification of Jesus fails to defend the plausibility of <b>R</b>. As they explain, even if God exists and God is omnipotent, the laws of nature tell us "what God does not do -- not what He does." And, as a matter of empirical fact, the laws of nature--specifically, the Standard Model (SM)--entail that God, if He exists, does not raise Jesus (or anyone else) from the dead. Because SM is an exceptionally well-confirmed law of nature, it follows that <b>R </b>has a "very high degree of implausibility."[21]</div><div><br /></div><div><i>2. The alleged "religio-historical context" is not known to be true. </i>Here C&C make three points. First, because the facts regarding Jesus' self-understanding (<i>e.g.,</i> the "Son of Man" or "Son of God") are not known to be true, Craig cannot appeal to the "religio-historical context" of Jesus' life to show that <b>R</b> is not <i>ad hoc.</i>[22]<i> </i>Second, the facts regarding Jesus' alleged sinlessness are equally of no use in establishing Craig's religio-historical context: "since the disposition of humans to sin is so particularly strong and the meager New Testament evidence for the moral perfection of Jesus (as opposed to his general goodness) is hardly representative, being limited to certain childhood incidents and the last few years of his life (e.g., Jn. 8:46)."[23] Third, "The same goes for fulfillment of prophecies since it remains an open question among New Testament scholars whether these are historical or evolved for apologetic reasons in the early church."[24]</div><div><br /></div><div><div>(5) Ad hoc<i>-ness</i></div><div><br /></div></div><div>C&C show that, even on Craig's definition of <i>ad hoc, </i><b>R </b>is <i>ad hoc. </i>First, our background information includes SM which entails ~R; furthermore, Craig's appeal to the religio-historical context fails. Second, while Craig is correct that rival theories do require many new suppositions, "these are trivial in comparison to the supernaturalist suppositions" required by <b>R</b>. Craig likes to claim that <b>R </b>requires only one additional supposition, namely, that God exists. But this is false. Even if God exists, <b>R</b> requires additional suppositions: (a) that SM is false; (b) that God would resurrect, not merely resuscitate, <a href="https://exapologist.blogspot.com/2007/10/one-of-main-reasons-why-i-think.html?fbclid=IwAR395ovOIkPUUJreRs0aDQNj3NoN_hYRn8EihnWK7JQ3sO9irMlPcmyP2n4&m=1" target="_blank">a failed apocalyptic prophet</a>; and (c) that Jesus was and is a <a href="https://www.amazon.com/Contradictory-Christ-Studies-Analytic-Theology-ebook/dp/B08SCH5YCV" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">contradictory being</a>, namely, <a href="https://naturalisticatheism.blogspot.com/2023/07/the-divine-vs-human-argument-against.html" target="_blank">fully human and fully divine</a>.[25] Third, <b>R</b> also requires suppositions that Jesus appeared in specific locations (the Emmaus road, in Galilee, etc.). Fourth, <b>R</b> also requires the supposition of Jesus' alleged Ascension. For all these reasons, then <b>R</b> is significantly more <i>ad hoc </i>than its rivals.[26]</div><div><br /></div><div><div><div>(6) <i>Disconfirmation</i></div><div><br /></div></div><div>As C&C argue, SM disconfirms <b>R.</b>[27]</div><div><br /></div><div><div>(7) <i>Exceedance</i></div><div><br /></div></div><div>Craig claims that, "There is certainly little chance of any of the rival hypotheses suggested to date ever exceeding the Resurrection Hypothesis in fulfilling the above conditions."[28] As C&C conclude, however, this claim lacks credibility. First, Craig simply claims that; he does not provide an argument. Second, in light of the points raised above regarding criteria (2) - (6), his claim is "mere apologetic <i>bravado."</i>[29]</div></div></div><div><h2>4. Conclusion</h2></div><div>In summary, we have seen that Craig's earlier rejection of Bayes' Theorem for the assessment of historical hypotheses is mistaken. Second, there are problems of clarity afflicting the IBE approach which do not apply to the Bayesian framework. Third, Craig has failed to show that <b>R</b> satisfies his own preferred IBE criteria. The upshot is that Craig's defense of <b>R</b> fails. Jesus is dead. </div><p></p><h2 style="text-align: left;">Notes</h2><p>[1] C. B. McCullagh, <i>Justifying Historical Descriptions</i> (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1984).</p><p>[2] <i>E.g.,</i> William L. Craig, <i>Assessing the New Testament Evidence for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus</i> (The Edwin Mellen Press, 1989); William L. Craig, <i>Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics</i> (Crossway Books, 2008).</p><p>[3] William Lane Craig, "Opening Statement" in <i>Dead or Alive? The Craig-Cavin Debate, </i>University of California at Irvine, 1995.</p><p>[4] McCullagh 1984, p. 57.</p><p>[5] Robert Greg Cavin and Carlos Colombetti, "Assessing the Resurrection Hypothesis: Problems with Craig's Inference to the Best Explanation" <i>European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion </i>11:2 (2019): 205-28. <a href="https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v11i2.2836">https://doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v11i2.2836</a>.</p><p>[6] If someone wishes to object to this sentence and insist that IBE is abductive, not inductive, my response is to shrug my shoulders. In this context, all that matters to me is that IBE is not a type of deductive argument. At best, the conclusion of an IBE is made <i>probable </i>by the evidence to be explained.</p><p>[7] Cavin and Colombetti 2019.</p><p>[8] William Lane Craig, "A Classical Apologist's Response" In Steven B. Cowan (Ed.), <i>Five Views on Apologetics </i>(Zondervan, 2000).</p><p>[9] McCullagh 1984, p. 19.</p><p>[10] William Lane Craig, <i>Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics </i>(3rd ed., Crossway, 2008), 232-33.</p><p>[11] Cavin and Colombetti 2019.</p><p>[12] Cavin and Colombetti 2019.</p><p>[13] Cavin and Colombetti 2019.</p><p>[14] Cavin and Colombetti 2019.</p><p>[15] Fairfield, Tasha, and Andrew Charman. "A Dialogue with the Data: The Bayesian Foundations of Iterative Research in Qualitative Social Science." <i>Perspectives on Politics</i> 17, no. 1 (2019): 154-67 at 164. doi:10.1017/S1537592718002177.</p><p>[16] Cavin and Colombetti 2019.</p><div><p>[17] Cavin and Colombetti 2019.</p></div><div><p>[18] Cavin and Colombetti 2019.</p></div><div><p>[19] Cavin and Colombetti 2019.</p><p></p><div style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: left; text-decoration-color: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px;"></div><p></p><div style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: left; text-decoration-color: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px;"><p>[20] Craig 2008.</p></div></div><div><p>[21] Cavin and Colombetti 2019.</p></div><div><p>[22] Cavin and Colombetti 2019.</p></div><div><p>[23] Cavin and Colombetti 2019.</p></div><div><p>[24] Cavin and Colombetti 2019.</p><p>[25] Points (b) and (c) are mine; they are not found in C&C's article.</p></div><div><p>[26] Cavin and Colombetti 2019.</p></div><div><p>[27] Cavin and Colombetti 2019.</p><p></p><div style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: left; text-decoration-color: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px;"></div><p></p><div style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: left; text-decoration-color: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px;"><div style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: left; text-decoration-color: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px;"><p>[28] Craig 2008.</p><p></p><p style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: left; text-decoration-color: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px;"></p><div style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: left; text-decoration-color: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px;"></div><p></p><div style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: left; text-decoration-color: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px;"><div style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: left; text-decoration-color: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px;"></div></div><p></p><p style="-webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; color: black; font-family: "Times New Roman"; font-size: medium; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; orphans: 2; text-align: left; text-decoration-color: initial; text-decoration-style: initial; text-decoration-thickness: initial; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; widows: 2; word-spacing: 0px;">[29] Cavin and Colombetti 2019.</p></div></div></div>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-5516242366325589002023-08-12T17:49:00.008-07:002023-08-16T15:52:03.691-07:00Divine Nature Theory vs. Abstract Objects<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/85/Plat%C3%B3n.JPG/336px-Plat%C3%B3n.JPG?20100808150810" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="800" data-original-width="300" height="320" src="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/85/Plat%C3%B3n.JPG/336px-Plat%C3%B3n.JPG?20100808150810" width="120" /></a></div></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">Plato holding his <i>Timaeus,</i> detail from the Vatican fresco The School of Athens</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">Source: <a href="http://www.wga.hu/art/r/raphael/4stanze/1segnatu/1/athens1.jpg" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Web Gallery of Art</a>; License: Public Domain</div>
<p><br /></p><p>According to what I call the "Divine Nature Theory" of axiology or value (hereafter, DNT-A), value is grounded in God's nature. In contrast, moral anti-reductionism (usually called "ethical non-naturalism") says that moral value is grounded in <i>sui generis,</i> non-natural properties.</p><p>What is the advantage of DNT-A over moral anti-reductionism? According to DNT-A, God’s nature, not God, is the source of moral value. But what is the distinction between God and His nature? God’s nature is simply the collection of God’s properties or attributes (e.g., omniscience, omnipotence, etc.). But if that is the case, then why do we need God in order for moral value to supervene on one or more of such properties? Or to put the point differently, why must those properties be instantiated in the person of God in order for the supervenience relationship to hold? Why can't they just exist as abstract properties? And if such properties do not need to be instantiated in the person of God, then what is the advantage of the divine nature theory over moral anti-reductionism?</p>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-10794068476809760212023-08-11T23:56:00.017-07:002023-12-03T21:35:58.215-08:00Is the Combination of Atheism and Moral Obligation a Contradiction?<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEinUK2NVRlwMJZ8r7WiL0vAxzHhb1XOmR4bg6NrgGpWVleMZnrxdACRN84Sbrh1uYvwE4pY7hKgwEpkZem8jGBeg1BmMlDYoyzyCAiWZMtaxaNbptiFYOcsQmmpeCG-VZCpJSEYoR6L-3odX8r5w3HGAn11BjPwk9eWpfDscj8n6Hlpve6hmJb3/s600/sivvus-impossible-triangle.png" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="600" data-original-width="600" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEinUK2NVRlwMJZ8r7WiL0vAxzHhb1XOmR4bg6NrgGpWVleMZnrxdACRN84Sbrh1uYvwE4pY7hKgwEpkZem8jGBeg1BmMlDYoyzyCAiWZMtaxaNbptiFYOcsQmmpeCG-VZCpJSEYoR6L-3odX8r5w3HGAn11BjPwk9eWpfDscj8n6Hlpve6hmJb3/s320/sivvus-impossible-triangle.png" width="320" /></a></div><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">An Impossible (or <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Penrose_triangle" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Penrose</a>) Triangle</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">Source: <a href="https://freesvg.org/clip-art-of-an-impossible-triangle-in-color" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">OpenClipArt</a>; License: <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/publicdomain/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">CC</a><span style="text-align: left;"> </span></div>
<h2 style="text-align: left;">Three Types of Contradictions</h2><p>Writing in 1955, the late Oxford don J.L. Mackie claimed that evil is logically inconsistent with God’s existence.</p><blockquote><p>In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these three propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third would be false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions: the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere and cannot consistently adhere to all three.[1]</p></blockquote><p>Consider the following set of propositions: {<i>God is omnipotent; God is wholly good; evil exists</i>}. Mackie claimed that the set is somehow contradictory. But how?<span></span></p><a name='more'></a><p></p><p>The Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga pointed out that there are three ways for a set of propositions to be inconsistent or contradictory.[2] </p><p>First, a set is <i>explicitly contradictory</i> if one of the members of the set is the denial or negation of another member of the set. For example, consider set A:{<i>God exists; God does not exist</i>}. Set A is explicitly contradictory. </p><p>Second, a set is <i>formally contradictory </i>if it is possible to deduce an explicit contradiction in its members by the laws of logic. Consider, for example, set B: {<i>If all men are mortal, then Socrates is mortal; All men are mortal; </i>and <i>Socrates is not mortal</i>}. Set B is not explicitly contradictory. But the first two members of that set entail <i>Socrates is mortal. </i>When we add <i>Socrates is mortal </i>to set B, we get an explicit contradiction. Because the proposition, "Socrates is mortal," follows from the first two members of the set by modus ponens, set B is formally contradictory.</p><p>Third, a set S is <i>implicitly contradictory </i>if there is a necessary proposition p such that the result of adding p to S is a formally contradictory set. Plantinga asks us to consider the following set, which I'll call set C: {<i>George is older than Paul; Paul is older than Nick; </i>and <i>George is not older than Nick</i>}. As Plantinga points out, set C is neither explicitly nor formally contradictory, but it is implicitly contradictory because it is not possible that all three members of set C are true. Why is it not possible? Because, as Plantinga says, the following proposition is necessarily true: "If George is older than Paul, and Paul is older than Nick, then George is older than Nick." If we add that proposition to set C, then we get an explicit contradiction.</p><p>To sum up: a set of propositions is either explicitly contradictory or it isn't. If it is, then one member of the set denies another member of the set. If it isn't explicitly contradictory but there is a contradiction, then one or more propositions must be added to the set. If the additional proposition(s) can be deduced from the members of the set by the laws of logic alone, then the set is formally contradictory. If the additional proposition(s) are instead necessary truths (or propositions deduced from necessary truths), then the set is implicitly contradictory. </p><p>Let's now turn to the question of whether there is a contradiction, in any of these three senses, between <i>atheism </i>and <i>moral obligation.</i></p>
<h2 style="text-align: left;">Does the Atheist Contradict Himself?</h2>
<div><div>According to Plantinga, the atheist who runs an argument from evil has contradicted himself by accepting a contradictory pair of propositions. This pair, of course, is:</div><div><br /></div><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;">(1) God does not exist;</blockquote><p>and </p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p>(2) Genuine moral obligation exists.</p></blockquote><div>Call this set D; the claim is that D is an inconsistent set. But how? </div></div>
<h3 style="text-align: left;">Is There an Explicit Contradiction?</h3>
<div style="text-align: left;">Plantinga's first type of contradiction is an explicit contradiction; for a set to be explicitly contradictory, one of its members must be the negation of another member. But the negations of (1) and (2) respectively are:</div><blockquote><div>(1') God exists.</div></blockquote><p>and </p><blockquote><p>(2') Genuine moral obligation does not exist. </p></blockquote><div>But neither (1') nor (2') are in set D, so set D is clearly not explicitly contradictory.</div><div>
<h3>Is There a Formal Contradiction?</h3>
</div><div>Remember that Plantinga's second type of contradiction, formal contradiction, requires that we use only the laws of logic to deduce a new proposition which, once added to the set, forms an explicit contradiction. But no laws of logic permit us to deduce the negation of one of the propositions in set D from the other member. So set D isn't formally contradictory either.</div><div><div>
<h3>Is There an Implicit Contradiction?</h3>
</div><div>This leaves Plantinga's third and final option, namely, that atheism and moral obligation are somehow implicitly contradictory. When Plantinga explains why he thinks set D is contradictory, I think we may reasonably interpret him as claiming that it is implicitly contradictory. In his words:</div></div><blockquote><div><i>A naturalistic way of looking at the world, so it seems to me, has no place for genuine moral obligation of any sort;</i> a fortiori, then, it has no place for such a category as horrifying wickedness. … There can be such a thing only if there is a way rational creatures are supposed to live, obliged to live; and the force of that normativity--its strength, so to speak--is such that the appalling and horrifying nature of genuine wickedness is its inverse. But naturalism cannot make room for that kind of normativity;<i> that requires a divine lawgiver</i>, one whose very nature it is to abhor wickedness.[3]</div></blockquote><div>This passage suggests that we add the following proposition to set D:</div><blockquote><div>(3) Genuine moral obligation requires a divine lawgiver.</div></blockquote><div>So if Plantinga thinks that set D is implicitly contradictory, then he must hold that (3) is not <i>merely </i>true, but <i>necessarily true. </i></div><div><i><br /></i></div><div>But is it? What does it mean to say that some action, call it X, is a "moral obligation"? That we are required to perform X, presumably. But anyone who does not know what moral obligation means will be equally in the dark about what it means for an action to be required. So let's start by considering what it means to have an obligation of any type. There are many types of obligations: moral, legal, religious, game, etiquette, and so forth. Depending on the type of obligation, an obligation's <i>source </i>might be rules or social roles.[4] So one idea might be that the source of moral obligations or requirements is moral rules, and the only suitable candidate for a moral rule is divine law. But "required by divine law" is not a necessary condition for X to be a moral obligation. To see this, consider how divine law could create moral obligations. <i>Divine law could create moral obligations if and only if there is a prior moral obligation to obey divine law. </i>But if there is a prior moral obligation to obey divine law, then that obligation itself must not be the result of a divine law. Furthermore, if the source of that prior moral obligation isn't divine law, then why can't there be additional moral obligations which are also not the result of divine law? Thus, "required by divine law" is not a necessary condition for moral obligation. But that entails that (3) is not necessarily true and so can't be used to show that set D is implicitly inconsistent. </div><div>
<h2 style="text-align: left;">Conclusion</h2>
</div><div>In summarizing his refutation of Mackie's logical argument from evil, Plantinga writes:</div><div><blockquote><div>... And our discussion thus far shows at the very least that it is no easy matter to find necessarily true propositions that yield a formally contradictory set when added to [... Mackie's set of propositions]. One wonders, therefore, why the many atheologians who confidently assert that this set is contradictory make no attempt whatever to show that it is. For the most part they are content just to assert that there is a contradiction here. Even Mackie, who sees that some "additional premises" or "quasi-logical rules" are needed, makes scarcely a beginning towards finding some additional premises that are necessarily true and that together with the members of set A formally entail an explicit contradiction.[5]</div></blockquote></div><div>What's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. One wonders, therefore, why Plantinga and so many other theistic philosophers and apologists who confidently assert that set D is contradictory make no attempt whatever to show that it is. For the most part they are content just to assert that there is a contradiction here. Even Plantinga, who brilliantly refuted Mackie's argument from evil, fails to apply the same standards to his "theistic argument from evil" as he applied to Mackie's argument from evil. In the case of Mackie's argument from evil, Plantinga argued that as long as it is even possible that God and evil may co-exist, there is no logical contradiction between God exists and evil exists. But he ignores the parallel objection to his theistic argument from evil: as long as it is even possible that moral obligation exists and God does not, there is no logical contradiction between atheism and moral obligation.</div><div><br /></div><div>I am confident that, if Plantinga were to read and reply to this post, he would deny that it is even <i>possible </i>that God does not exist, perhaps citing his modal ontological argument in support. In turn, allow me to respond as follows. First, I'm inclined to agree with Plantinga that God, at least as Plantinga defines "God," is the kind of being who either necessarily exists or necessarily doesn't exist. Thus, if theism is true, it's necessarily true; if theism is false, it's necessarily false. Second, the reader needs to keep in mind that when Plantinga, in the context of his modal ontological argument, refers to possibility, he's referring to what's known as "metaphysical possibility," not "strict logical possibility." This distinction matters because something could be strictly logically possible (in the sense of not being self-contradictory, like a 'round triangle' or a 'married bachelor') and, at the same time, not metaphysically possible. This leads to my third point. As Graham Oppy has argued, there is a parody of Plantinga's modal ontological argument which, if successful, shows that God necessarily does not exist.[6] It's <i>far </i>from obvious that Plantinga's argument is correct and the parody is incorrect. Thus, I don't think we know with certainty that theism is necessarily true or that theism is necessarily false. For this reason, I think we should assume that both God's existence and God's non-existence are <i>epistemically </i>possible. And so it is at least epistemically possible that moral obligation exists and God does not. Therefore, I have shown that Plantinga has given no good reason to think that set D is contradictory.</div><div><br /></div><h2 style="text-align: left;"><b>Notes</b></h2><p>[1] J.L. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence” <i>Mind </i>64 (1955): 200-212, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXIV.254.200.</p><p>[2] Alvin Plantinga, <i>God, Freedom and Evil</i> (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1974), pp. 13-16.</p><p>[3] Alvin Plantinga, “A Christian Life Partly Lived” in Kelly James Clark (ed.), <i>Philosophers Who Believe: The Spiritual Journeys of 11 Leading Thinkers</i> (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1997), 45-82. Italics are mine.</p><p>[4] Nicholas Wolterstorff, <i>Justice: Rights and Wrongs </i>(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 279.</p><p>[5] Plantinga 1974, pp. 23-24.</p><p>[6] Graham Oppy, <i>Ontological Arguments and Belief in God </i>(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 70-78.</p>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-11485230903532685432023-08-10T15:29:00.004-07:002023-08-10T15:29:35.332-07:00S.E. Cupp: Trump Has Broken American Evangelical Christianity<p><a href="https://www.cnn.com/videos/opinions/2023/08/10/se-cupp-unfiltered-trump-woke-christianity-evangelical-vpx.cnn" rel="nofollow" target="_blank"> LINK</a></p>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-34610544454209668282023-08-10T12:43:00.001-07:002023-08-10T12:51:19.941-07:00Pro-God Atheism<p>For many former theists-turned-atheists, the loss of belief in God is a source of sadness. Consider these words from Christian-turned-atheist philosopher <a href="http://www.jlschellenberg.com/" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">J.L. Schellenberg</a>, taken from the conclusion of his landmark book, <i><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Hiddenness-Cornell-Studies-Philosophy-Religion/dp/0801473462" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason</a></i> (Cornell University Press, 1993).</p><p></p><div style="text-align: center;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgauPtMDUxLH371yjT8gC6-oiZcm33kvt9raQf0z26vFrOq74STGTzDBxpdyVoeUDCzCZL2_Npns6HNpgev4mmcfpHbj5rOV70sdgGrgKd6oCpyexsK2vg5aFyfyuMCAZojOmEPtKeCzyviRIaz44beI9HKHfxiXU4pGkwSet2C_k0TJAKXiZ6l" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="721" data-original-width="500" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEgauPtMDUxLH371yjT8gC6-oiZcm33kvt9raQf0z26vFrOq74STGTzDBxpdyVoeUDCzCZL2_Npns6HNpgev4mmcfpHbj5rOV70sdgGrgKd6oCpyexsK2vg5aFyfyuMCAZojOmEPtKeCzyviRIaz44beI9HKHfxiXU4pGkwSet2C_k0TJAKXiZ6l" width="166" /></a></div><br /><br /></div><p></p><p>P.S. Now ask yourself: how often do you find atheist-turned-theist philosophers writing a book defending some argument for God's existence, such that the book's conclusion expresses the <i>hope</i> that other people will be able to refute his or her argument for God?</p><div><br /></div>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-81067650658554761262023-08-09T10:56:00.012-07:002023-08-18T13:39:17.233-07:00Atheism and the Laws of Logic<p>Daniel (@DarwinToJesus) recently tweeted the following:</p><blockquote class="twitter-tweet"><p dir="ltr" lang="en">#1. The laws of logic: There are three basic foundational laws of logic. <br />1. The law of identity (A* is A*) <br />2. The law of non contradiction (A* is not/cannot be B* in the same place and time) <br />3. The law of the excluded middle (every proposition is either true, or false)<br /><br />These…</p>— Daniel (@darwintojesus) <a href="https://twitter.com/darwintojesus/status/1649975032704057344?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">April 23, 2023</a></blockquote> <script async="" charset="utf-8" src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script>
<h3 style="text-align: left;"><span><a name='more'></a></span>Transcendental Arguments</h3><div><div>Philosophers trace transcendental arguments back to the philosopher Immanuel Kant. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant used the word “transcendental” to refer to our a priori knowledge of objects.</div></div><div><br /></div><blockquote><div><div>I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori.</div></div><div><div><i>Critique of Pure Reason,</i> Introduction, VII</div></div></blockquote>The late philosopher Anthony Brueckner explained reconstructs the ontological version of Kant’s argument as having two stages.<p></p><p></p><blockquote><p>Kant’s goal was to refute extreme Cartesian skepticism; he wanted to do that by showing that there are permanently existing objects located in space. His ontologically-oriented argument had two stages.</p><p>Stage 1: Knowledge of the objective time-order of one’s experiences (one’s subject time-order) only if one has knowledge of a permanent.</p><p>Stage 2: Nothing permanent is given in intuition if all we are given is <i>representations. </i></p><p>The reasoning behind Stage 1 is invalid. Given the supposition that P entails Q, it does not follow that one knows that P only if one knows that Q (that would follow, many would say, only if one knew that P entails Q).[1]</p><div></div></blockquote><div><div>The Christian philosopher James Anderson provides a helpful description of the link between Kant’s transcendental arguments and what contemporary Christian apologists like Bahnsen call the transcendental argument for God’s existence.</div></div><div><div></div><blockquote><div>Brought to prominence by Kant, transcendental arguments purport to uncover what must be the case (or alternatively, what we must <i>take </i>to be the case) in order for various kinds of intentional operation (e.g., individuating, predicating, perceiving, knowing) to be possible….. </div><div><br /></div><div>Transcendental arguments are commonly thought of as <i>anti-skeptical </i>arguments: the idea being to show that whatever it is that the skeptic doubts or denies turns out to be a necessary precondition of some other principle or experience that the skeptic takes for granted. In the case of a theistic transcendental argument, it is skepticism about the existence of God that comes under scrutiny.[2]</div></blockquote><div></div></div><div><div>As Dr. Anderson alludes to in the passage above, a key concept in transcendental arguments is a special kind of necessary condition, which contemporary proponents sometimes call a “precondition.” </div><div><br /></div><div>X is a precondition for the possibility of Y, in the sense that Y cannot obtain without X. But what we do mean by the word “cannot”? The claim, “X is a precondition for the possibility of Y,” is metaphysical and a priori, not natural and a posteriori. Why does this matter? As Stern points out, the basis for claiming, “X is a precondition for the possibility of Y” is </div><blockquote><div>not just because certain natural laws governing the actual world and discoverable by the empirical sciences make this impossible (in the way that, for example, life cannot exist without oxygen), but because certain metaphysical constraints that can be established by reflection make X a condition for Y in every possible world (for example, existence is a condition for thought, as the former is metaphysically required in order to do or be anything at all).[3]</div></blockquote><div><div>Commenting on that Stern quotation, Christian philosopher Sean Choi reconstructs the general form of Transcendental Arguments as follows:</div></div></div><div><div></div><blockquote><div>(TA1) q. </div><div>(TA2) It is necessary that: if not-p, then not-q. </div><div>(TA3) So, p.[4]</div></blockquote></div><div><h3>Exposition</h3><div></div></div><div>I personally happen to agree with the way Choi puts transcendental arguments in standard form, but philosophers are divided on the best way to do that. Since Daniel doesn't put his argument from logic in standard form, I'm going to steelman his argument and put it in the form given by Choi. This yields the following.</div><div><div></div><blockquote><div>(TA1') There is a rational justification for the laws of logic.</div><div>(TA2') It is necessary that: if Christian theism is false, then there is no rational justification for the laws of logic.</div><div>(TA3') So, Christian theism is true.[5]</div></blockquote><div></div></div><div><div>As written, this argument is valid: if (1) and (2) are true, then (3) must be true. But what is Daniel's supporting argument for (2)? Here, again, is what he wrote in his tweet.</div></div><div><blockquote><div>These laws are eternal, they are necessary, universal, immaterial, and conceptual* in nature. All concepts require a mind in order to exist, so because the laws of logic are CONCEPTUAL, they must exist in an eternal mind that is also universal. The mind of God if it exists makes this possible. Therefore God (an eternal all present mind) must exist for the laws of logic to exist. </div></blockquote></div><div>This suggests the following supporting argument:</div><blockquote><div>(1) All concepts require a mind in order to exist. </div></blockquote><blockquote><div>(2) The laws of logic are conceptual. </div></blockquote><blockquote><div>(3) Therefore, the laws of logic must exist in an eternal mind that is also universal.</div></blockquote><h3>Assessment </h3><div>Daniel doesn't explicitly define what he means by "conceptual," so my definition might be different than his. Depending on how he defines it, I might reject (1), (2), or both. In any case, this argument implicitly raises what we might call the "ontology of logic." He believes, as I do, that the laws of logic are discovered, not invented, by humans. Where we disagree is God's relationship to logic, if God exists. Daniel appears to hold the view known as "divine conceptualism," which says that the laws of logic are ideas in the divine mind. But another view is what I will call "logical aseity": the laws of logic are <i>propositions </i>which exist as ontologically independent abstract objects. If logical aseity is true, then the laws of logic do not require a divine mind to think them. </div><div><br /></div><div>Why prefer divine conceptualism over and against logical aseity? I think I understand the theological motivation, but I think it is ultimately misguided. Even if I were a Christian, I would reject it. On divine conceptualism, there is no deeper reason why God is the way He is. More to the point, there is no deeper reason why God thinks logical laws at all or the logical laws he thinks; <i>God's thoughts about logical laws are a brute fact.</i> If God's thoughts about logical laws are a brute fact, rather than based on reasons, then God's thoughts are literally unreasonable. But surely reasonableness is a great-making property (albeit one not typically identified as such in the literature on perfect being theology). Thus, it would seem that divine conceptualism preserves one great-making property, divine aseity, only by sacrificing another apparent great-making property, divine reasonableness. When the point is put this way, the "greatest possible being" of perfect being theology no longer sounds as great. If I were a theist (<i>and </i>a proponent of perfect being theology), I would say that a God whose reasons are logical (by reasoning in accordance with ontologically independent, <i>a se</i> laws of logic) is greater than a God whose reasons are brute facts.</div><div><br /></div><div>Of course, if logical aseity is true, then it also the case that the laws of logic are a brute fact, albeit a necessarily true brute fact or set of facts. The atheistic Platonist rejects the divine conceptualist's claim that a divine mind is required to think logical laws (or any other necessarily true propositions).</div><div> </div><h3 style="text-align: left;">Notes</h3><div>[1] Anthony Brueckner, <i>Essays on Skepticism</i> (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 57 n. 22.</div><div><br /></div><div>[2] James Anderson, “If Knowledge Then God: The Epistemological Theistic Arguments of Plantinga and Van Til” <i>Calvin Theological Journal</i> (April 2005). </div><div><br /></div><div>[3] Robert Stern, <i>Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects </i>(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 3.</div><div><br /></div><div>[4] Sean Choi, “The Transcendental Argument.” In <i>Reasons for Faith: Making a Case for the Christian Faith: Essays in Honor of Bob Passantino and Gretchen Passantino</i> (ed. Norman L. Geisler, Chad V. Meister, Coburn-Crossway, 2007).</div><div><br /></div><div>[5] Choi 2007.</div><div><br /></div>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-69409630883166835722023-08-07T15:09:00.020-07:002023-08-18T13:34:29.049-07:00Theistic vs. Naturalistic Grounding of Moral Value<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjT-tJYW9sFUvBk-ROmRZze6TC2d1Nz1X3zohdU_c2ioyEYV0Ka-OGwsqy0l3ivdNVjTog_ZTClwHNHcw_EPdjbkYiFSAf7flIop_Oa3lXeN16n9fImqgt3nGlnfJtbWmaRXHTXy0C4Bwfc-x3QWnOSZ5pLAetsl3Vt4DvuWtNqwinKTDq0rT-F/s294/Seth_Dillon_(51329320531)_(cropped).jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="294" data-original-width="220" height="294" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjT-tJYW9sFUvBk-ROmRZze6TC2d1Nz1X3zohdU_c2ioyEYV0Ka-OGwsqy0l3ivdNVjTog_ZTClwHNHcw_EPdjbkYiFSAf7flIop_Oa3lXeN16n9fImqgt3nGlnfJtbWmaRXHTXy0C4Bwfc-x3QWnOSZ5pLAetsl3Vt4DvuWtNqwinKTDq0rT-F/s1600/Seth_Dillon_(51329320531)_(cropped).jpg" width="220" /></a></div><br /></div><br /><div><p>Seth Dillon, the CEO of <i>The Babylon Bee, </i>recently tweeted the following:</p>
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet"><p dir="ltr" lang="en">Sure, atheists have moral values — they just can't ground them in anything. Read Alex Rosenberg's "The Atheist's Guide to Reality." He acknowledges that in God's absence, morality is nothing but a useful fiction. He argues that if atheism is true, the moral feelings we've… <a href="https://t.co/HSufKX5ay5">https://t.co/HSufKX5ay5</a></p>— Seth Dillon (@SethDillon) <a href="https://twitter.com/SethDillon/status/1688340432550293504?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">August 7, 2023</a></blockquote> <script async="" charset="utf-8" src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script>
<p><span></span></p><a name='more'></a>I refuted Rosenberg's argument for nihilism about a decade ago (see <a href="https://secularfrontier.infidels.org/2013/02/alex-rosenbergs-2012-argument-for-nihilism/" target="_blank">here</a>), so I'm not going to rehash that argument in this post. Instead, I want to respond to Seth's first sentence, which we can represent as follows:<p></p><blockquote><p>(1) If God does not exist, then there is no grounding for moral values.</p></blockquote><p>In another tweet, Dillon then links to William Lane Craig's 1996 essay, "The Indispensability of Theological Meta-Ethical Foundations for Morality." </p>
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet"><p dir="ltr" lang="en">The Indispensability of Theological Meta-Ethical Foundations for Morality<a href="https://t.co/Gr5lo4NZev">https://t.co/Gr5lo4NZev</a></p>— Seth Dillon (@SethDillon) <a href="https://twitter.com/SethDillon/status/1688381264129077248?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">August 7, 2023</a></blockquote> <script async="" charset="utf-8" src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script>
<p>On that basis, I am reasonably confident that Dillon would endorse the following:</p><blockquote><p>(2) If God exists, then there is a grounding for moral values.</p></blockquote><p>From (1) and (2) it follows that:</p><blockquote><p>(3) Theism offers a better grounding for moral values than atheism.</p></blockquote><p>Because the inference is solid, if there is something wrong with this argument, then one or both premises must be false.<span></span></p><!--more--><p></p><h3 style="text-align: left;">Clarifying the Issue </h3><p>Before I explain why I reject this argument, I first want to explicitly state what I think Dillon means because many of the words in his tweet are polysemous: they have multiple legitimate meanings. Here is what I think Dillon means.</p><p></p><ul style="text-align: left;"><li><b>values</b>: "things which support practical reasoning from a first-person perspective (“What am I to do?”), a second-person perspective (“What are you to do?”), or a third-person perspective (“What are the reasons for or against what X is doing or has done?”)."[1]</li><li><b>moral values:</b> values used to determine whether a person or action is <i>morally good </i>or <i>evil; required, forbidden, </i>or <i>permitted; </i>or <i>virtuous </i>or <i>vicious.</i> Moral values can be divided into two types: “thin” and “thick.” “Thin” moral values are moral values which are not substantially descriptive; examples include (moral) <i>goodness </i>and <i>evil.</i> “Thick” moral values (and disvalues) are values (and disvalues) which combine description and evaluation. For example, to say that “courage” is a thick moral value is to say that the willingness to act despite one’s fear (description) is morally good (prescription). Examples of thick moral values include <i>love, generosity, self-sacrifice, equality, </i>and <i>brotherhood;</i> examples of thick moral disvalues include <i>selfishness, hatred, abuse, discrimination, </i>and <i>oppression.</i></li><li><b>grounding:</b> According to one version of metaphysical grounding theory, “x makes proposition y true iff the fact that x exists grounds the fact that y is true.”[2] For example, if X represents my dog and Y represents the proposition, “My dog exists,” then X makes Y true because X grounds Y. </li></ul>Notice that everything I've written so far is compatible with <i>subjectively </i>grounded values. Someone who believes that moral values are dependent upon the attitudes or desires of the individual could affirm that moral values are grounded in those attitudes or desires. To exclude that kind of possibility, I'm going to assume that Dillon has "objective" moral values in mind. But, like the other words we've defined so far, the word "objective" is notoriously polysemous. How should we define it here? I propose the following definition.<br /><ul style="text-align: left;"><li><b>objective-1:</b> To say “objective-1 moral value exists” is to say that what <i>makes </i>an action, state of affairs, or person have that moral value is independent of the subjective states of human beings, such as their beliefs or desires. If objective-1 moral values exist, they are grounded by something which is discovered, not invented, by humans.[3]</li></ul><div>There are three conceivable grounds for objective-1 moral values: abstract, physical, and mental. Allow me to explain with a brief survey of the metaphysical landscape. Philosophers distinguish between concrete and abstract objects. Concrete objects include everyday things in the physical world and the mental, including any nonphysical supernatural beings (if they exist). Abstract objects, if they exist, include mathematical objects, sets, propositions, properties, possible worlds, etc. Because concrete objects can stand in causal relations while abstract objects cannot, I like to refer to "causal reality" as that part of reality which contains concrete objects and "acausal reality" to refer to that part of reality which, it exists, contains abstract objects. It follows that, if objective-1 moral values are grounded, their ground is either <i>abstract </i>(such as propositions or properties), <i>physical </i>(such as facts about human biology or human nature), or <i>mental </i>(such as divine ideas). </div><div><br /></div><div>So I will slightly revise the argument as follows:</div><div><blockquote><p>(1') If God does not exist, then there is no grounding for objective-1 moral values.</p></blockquote><blockquote><p>(2') If God exists, then there is a grounding for objective-1 moral values.</p></blockquote><p>From (1') and (2') it follows that: </p><blockquote><p>(3) Theism offers a better grounding for objective-1 moral values than atheism.</p></blockquote></div><h3 style="text-align: left;">Assessment</h3><div><div>In light of the three possible sources of grounding for moral values, it seems to me that Dillon's tweet is not only false, but obviously false. Let's consider the premises in reverse order. Here is the second premise.</div><div><blockquote><p>(2') If God exists, then there is a grounding for objective-1 moral values.</p></blockquote><p>By itself, the existence of God doesn't tell us much about God's relationship to moral values or how moral values are grounded. That is why you can find theistic philosophers and philosophical theologians who have affirmed versions of all three options. William Lane Craig, for example, says that <i>God's nature </i>is the standard of moral goodness. By "God's nature," Craig simply means God's essential attributes or properties, e.g., God's omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, aseity, sovereignty, justice, lovingness, kindness, and so forth. If someone were to ask Craig how he grounds his moral values (which include justice, love, kindness, and so forth), Craig's answer would be, "In God's nature." If someone were to then ask, "What grounds God's nature?", his answer would be, "Nothing. God's nature isn't grounded in anything external to God." This leads to an interesting observation. <i><b>Craig's theory about the ontology of moral value entails that ultimately moral value is grounded on nothing.</b></i> On Craig's view, some moral values are grounded in other moral values, but at bottom there exists at least one (if not more) moral value which is itself ungrounded.</p><p>Now consider the other premise.</p><blockquote><p>(1') If God does not exist, then there is no grounding for objective-1 moral values.</p></blockquote><p>Why should anyone believe (1)? In order to defend it, Dillon would need to rule out both <i>abstract </i>and <i>physical </i>grounds for moral values. Consider abstract objects. If moral values can be grounded in God's properties, then why not just remove the 'middleman' (God) and say that some moral values are grounded in other values, while some moral values are fundamental, abstract properties and not grounded in anything else? This is Erik Wielenberg's position; see his books <i>Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe</i> and <i>Robust Ethics.</i>[4] Sure, you can find materialists (and scientism-ists) like Rosenberg who reject abstract objects out of hand, but atheism isn't materialism.[5] By itself, atheism is compatible with the existence of abstract objects. Or consider Natural Law Theory's (NLT) purely physical grounding of moral values. According to NLT, moral values are grounded in objective facts about human nature.[6]</p><p>Therefore, it seems to me that both (1) and (2) are doubtful. It is far from obvious that theism offers a better grounding for moral values than atheism.</p></div></div><h3 style="text-align: left;">Notes</h3><p>[1] Nicholas Rescher, <i>Introduction to Value Theory</i> (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1969), pp. 11-12.</p><p>[2] Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schneider, eds., <i>Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality</i> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 26.</p><p>[3] See my earlier post, "<a href="http://naturalisticatheism.blogspot.com/2022/05/my-reply-to-there-is-no-such-thing-as.html" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">My Reply to the 'There is No Such Thing as Evil if God Doesn't Exist' Objection</a>" for the distinction between <i>objective-1</i> and <i>objective-2.</i></p><p>[4] <i>Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe</i> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and <i>Robust Ethics </i>(New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).</p><p>[5] For an advanced introduction to atheistic Platonism, see Erik Steinhart, <i>Atheistic Platonism: A Manifesto</i> (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).</p><p>[6] For a secular version of Natural Law Theory, see Larry Arnhart, <i>Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological Ethics of Human Nature</i> (SUNY Press, 1998).</p></div>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-44995434948131795642023-08-06T21:10:00.001-07:002023-08-06T21:10:24.348-07:00New Paper Refuting Anscombe's "Modern Moral Philosophy"<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><br /><table align="center" border="1">
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<td><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj3uYZ2X109lyK0QN4LUc-lEM9I2-aRXWcKCWmpKm4MD_J7sPDckcVXFXiEFapunc1Yy3MhbkYZIfCed_iGe-dHwtk7JAVwwSodOrCwa3p2-cE7KcegjorX1jz8SCoZ6dqrZAeKaQoGnNaivQmSWxtfiospfCGsggbPHouK76Lqqyczz3vrcSJr/s360/terry-irwin.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="360" data-original-width="360" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj3uYZ2X109lyK0QN4LUc-lEM9I2-aRXWcKCWmpKm4MD_J7sPDckcVXFXiEFapunc1Yy3MhbkYZIfCed_iGe-dHwtk7JAVwwSodOrCwa3p2-cE7KcegjorX1jz8SCoZ6dqrZAeKaQoGnNaivQmSWxtfiospfCGsggbPHouK76Lqqyczz3vrcSJr/w200-h200/terry-irwin.jpg" width="200" /></a></div><br /></td>
<td><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjfCU3Z4R5ndL21IgD7TnqAqHjMR_DNnsmF4GBJRmeOLsXOi6cJ6kDT93awgjb4G98CynZQHPrO1s8P0b2TRy5lDgheGI5uZA6UHo2xyXv1NyK4WGjnqbBU6hOwCZpB81UUt0xJYrAslo__0z3ctwRt1779yTbVq3_2eDx4zZx2sBGsvMSCLVIr/s261/Younganscombe.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center;"><img border="0" data-original-height="261" data-original-width="145" height="261" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjfCU3Z4R5ndL21IgD7TnqAqHjMR_DNnsmF4GBJRmeOLsXOi6cJ6kDT93awgjb4G98CynZQHPrO1s8P0b2TRy5lDgheGI5uZA6UHo2xyXv1NyK4WGjnqbBU6hOwCZpB81UUt0xJYrAslo__0z3ctwRt1779yTbVq3_2eDx4zZx2sBGsvMSCLVIr/s1600/Younganscombe.jpg" width="145" /></a><br /><br /></td>
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<td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/people/terence-irwin" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Terence Irwin</a></td>
<td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G._E._M._Anscombe" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Elizabeth Anscombe</a></td>
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<p><br /></p><p>Irwin, T. <a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10677-023-10398-w" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">The Philosophy and History of the Moral ‘Ought’: Some of Anscombe’s Objections</a>. <i>Ethic Theory Moral Prac</i> (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-023-10398-w</p><p>Abstract: According to G.E.M Anscombe’s paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, modern moral philosophy has introduced a spurious concept of moral obligation, and has therefore made a mistake that the Greeks, and Aristotle in particular, avoided. Anscombe argues that the modern concepts of obligation, duty, and the moral ‘ought’ are the remnants of an earlier, but post-Aristotelian conception of ethics, and that they ought to be abandoned. An examination of Anscombe’s historical and philosophical claims shows that we have no reason to take them seriously. In particular, they rest on a misinterpretation of Scholastic views on ‘ought’ and obligation.</p>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-71578457186291815852023-08-01T06:30:00.006-07:002023-08-18T13:43:07.951-07:00The Pragmatic Inconsistency of Responding to Nihilism with Despair<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEju9dr7LcqwzNhIB-rBFNoETQOq3-URr4eSnfyXhug94wR2wXHtOuusLksTyZLaR7W3j8o1Zji4Z1FBf_zPq3qbOEkaZqYx10KliS6NjdBsV6UaOvU1eGDuDKOpG3e31LVJJsyqeCannRhysOdgumP35U652WH6auz-DRWNqqyPNwPRghbhTfPI" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="2547" data-original-width="3652" height="223" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEju9dr7LcqwzNhIB-rBFNoETQOq3-URr4eSnfyXhug94wR2wXHtOuusLksTyZLaR7W3j8o1Zji4Z1FBf_zPq3qbOEkaZqYx10KliS6NjdBsV6UaOvU1eGDuDKOpG3e31LVJJsyqeCannRhysOdgumP35U652WH6auz-DRWNqqyPNwPRghbhTfPI" width="320" /></a></div><br />(1) Necessarily, if metaethical nihilism is true, then nothing matters.<p></p><p>(2) Responding with despair to the (supposed) truth of metaethical nihilism presupposes the falsity of metaethical nihilism.</p><p>Therefore:</p><p>(3) If one responds with despair to the (supposed) truth of metaethical nihilism, then it is true that <i>nothing matters </i>and it is false that <i>nothing matters.</i> [From 1-2]</p><p>Therefore:</p><p>(4) It is impossible to consistently respond with despair to metaethical nihilism. [From 3 and LNC]</p><p><br /></p><p>They key insight of this argument is that if metaethical nihilism is true, then literally nothing, <i>including metaethical nihilism itself, </i>matters.</p>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-31163556730241182652023-07-27T13:11:00.003-07:002023-07-28T22:59:23.832-07:00Draft Essay: Naturalism, Theism, Badness, and Moral Law: A Critique of Ravi Zacharias<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiJBAnABvlTWYW2ovmB0PfCuymHtNufBeegxVA4GRgvOrmJ1ZJZPhxUF5_QImOKCVbzJ6NGDiaSMDTkLRFay0oOhMXj3IMqIhCKefjOBRSRvilk02KvfUWnTSi9-4N6kybvE7P_DFy8peP6fFOntJWNvcgJYAc-qima3CPVI0jYs4BgO3-SRFoP" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="275" data-original-width="183" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEiJBAnABvlTWYW2ovmB0PfCuymHtNufBeegxVA4GRgvOrmJ1ZJZPhxUF5_QImOKCVbzJ6NGDiaSMDTkLRFay0oOhMXj3IMqIhCKefjOBRSRvilk02KvfUWnTSi9-4N6kybvE7P_DFy8peP6fFOntJWNvcgJYAc-qima3CPVI0jYs4BgO3-SRFoP" width="160" /></a></div><br /> <div><b>Overview:</b></div><div><b>1: Introduction</b></div><div><b>2: Logical Arguments from Evil</b></div><div>(a) Historical Context </div><div>(b) Zacharias's Framing of the Problem of Evil</div><div><b>3: Zacharias's "Work of God" Theodicy</b></div><div><b>4: Changing the Subject: Morality Without God</b></div><div>(a) Do Atheists Who Run An Argument from 'Evil' Contradict Themselves?</div><div>(b) Quote-Mining Atheists Who Reject Objective Morality</div><div>(c) Bogus Appeals to Authority Aside, Do Russell, Mackie, and Dawkins Have Good Arguments?</div><div><br /><p></p><p><a href="https://www.academia.edu/104993066/Naturalism_Theism_Badness_and_Moral_Law_A_Critique_of_Ravi_Zacharias" target="_blank">LINK</a></p></div>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-51881228832506573942023-07-19T11:31:00.009-07:002023-08-16T21:54:35.576-07:00Empathy and Apathy: An Evidential Problem for Theists<h2 style="text-align: left;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhDlubjvzgltCl2vVS_PHeV--13YmYVUp-PgTPvKzeqJVvUtrfC5e8_LbHCxbryZqQn3rc_vOvVcrdDjgDfvWsOaUxDMtVLsdVfBLvBEWm_XZPm2sz2rua3pEkDQ-EWomdCy1tMNGp0bgVWgQLixC5eeDhdpIXml6dbVTEysijvFkbn5kySPAgo" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="640" data-original-width="460" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhDlubjvzgltCl2vVS_PHeV--13YmYVUp-PgTPvKzeqJVvUtrfC5e8_LbHCxbryZqQn3rc_vOvVcrdDjgDfvWsOaUxDMtVLsdVfBLvBEWm_XZPm2sz2rua3pEkDQ-EWomdCy1tMNGp0bgVWgQLixC5eeDhdpIXml6dbVTEysijvFkbn5kySPAgo" width="173" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-weight: normal;"><i>Serial killer <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ted_Bundy" target="_blank">Ted Bundy</a></i></span></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: small; font-weight: normal;">Image Source: <a href="https://www.floridamemory.com/items/show/144977" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Florida Memory Project</a>; License: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_domain" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Public Domain</a></span></div><br /><br /></h2><h2 style="text-align: left;">1. Definitions</h2><p>Following Paul Draper, I'm going to define my terms as follows.[1]</p><p>By "naturalism," I mean the view that the physical exists and, if the mental exists, the physical explains why the mental exists. If naturalism is true, then there are no purely mental beings which can exist apart from a physical body and so there is no God or any person or being much like God.</p><p>By "supernaturalism," I mean the view that the mental exists and, if the physical exists, the mental explains why anything physical exists. If supernaturalism is true, then there is no purely physical matter which can exist without some sort of ultimate mental creator. "Personal supernaturalism" is a type of supernaturalism; it <i>adds on </i>the claims that one or more personal mental entities exist and, if a physical world exists, it or they produced the physical world for a purpose. "Theism" is a type of personal supernaturalism; it <i>adds on</i> the claim that there is just one mental entity, God, who is all-powerful, all-knowing, and morally perfect. </p><p>"Otherism" is a catch-all category. It says that both naturalism and supernaturalism are false. <span></span></p><a name='more'></a><p></p><h2 style="text-align: left;">2. Exposition</h2><div>Intrinsic probability is determined by modesty, coherence, and nothing else. By "modesty," I mean a measure of how much the hypothesis asserts. The more a hypothesis claims, the more ways there are for it to be false and so, before we start looking at evidence, the less likely it is to be true. By “coherence,” I mean a measure of how well the parts of a hypothesis fit together. If the different parts count against each other, the hypothesis is less coherent and less likely to be true.[2]</div><div><br /></div><div>Now consider naturalism and supernaturalism. They are symmetrical claims: naturalism claims that the physical explains the mental, while supernaturalism claims that the mental explains the physical. Both claims are equally modest and equally coherent. <i>Before examining the evidence,</i> both positions are equally likely to be true.[3]</div><div><br /></div><div>Theism is a type of supernaturalism but could be false even if supernaturalism is true. Furthermore, theism is less modest than either supernaturalism or naturalism. Therefore, before we look at evidence, it is less likely to be true than supernaturalism or naturalism. But that entails that naturalism is intrinsically more probable than theism. So we have:</div><div><blockquote><div>(1) Naturalism is much more probable intrinsically than theism, i.e., Pr(|N|) is much greater than Pr(|T|).</div></blockquote><div>In many cases, our ability to choose do morally good actions depends upon our having properly functioning emotional capacities, especially <i>empathy,</i> i.e., our ability to identify what someone else is thinking or feeling and to respond to their thoughts and feelings with an appropriate emotion.[4]</div></div><div><br /></div><div><div>We now know, thanks to the relatively new discipline of neuroscience, that certain brain abnormalities cause people to experience less or even no empathy.[5] According to Simon Baron-Cohen of Cambridge University, "There is a consensus in neuroscience that at least ten interconnected brain regions are involved in empathy."[6] For example, violent psychopaths may know in some abstract sense that their behavior is morally wrong, but utterly lack empathy.[7] This yields our next premise:</div><blockquote><div>(2) "Empathy and apathy, including some moral handicaps, have a neurological basis" is known to be true.</div></blockquote><div>While theism is compatible with a neurological basis for moral handicaps, the fact that at least some moral handicaps can be explained neurologically is much more probable on naturalism than on theism. If theism is true, then that means both</div><blockquote><div>(a) God creates some human beings with moral handicaps that are not the result of the freely chosen actions of any human being;</div></blockquote><p>and</p><blockquote><p>(b) These moral handicaps make it <i>more </i>likely that they will harm others. </p></blockquote><div>What moral justification would God have for allowing both (a) and (b) to obtain? This seems utterly surprising and completely random from a theistic, moral point of view, but precisely what we would expect on naturalism (and blind nature is indifferent to the moral consequences of brain abnormalities).[8] So we now have our third premise:</div></div><blockquote><div>(3) The neurobiological basis of empathy and apathy is very much more likely on the assumption that the naturalism is true than it is on the assumption that theism is true, i.e., Pr(E | N) >! Pr(E | T).</div></blockquote><div>Mathematicians have a formula called Bayes’ Theorem, which can be used to specify the relationship between intrinsic probability, accuracy, and the overall or final probability of a hypothesis. It follows from Bayes’ Theorem that a hypothesis is probably true, just in case it has a greater overall balance of intrinsic probability and explanatory power than do its alternatives <i>collectively. </i>Thus, if we abstract away all other evidence for and against God's existence, the neurobiological basis of empathy and apathy is a strong evidential challenge to theism.</div><blockquote><div>(4) So, other evidence held equal, theism is probably false, i.e., Pr(T | E) < 0.5. </div></blockquote><div>The words "other evidence held equal" are key. Because theism doesn't entail the non-existence of a neurological basis for moral handicaps, it is possible that some moral handicaps have a neurological basis <i>and </i>theism is true. Because that is possible, the neurological basis of some moral handicaps by itself does not justify the unqualified conclusion that theism is false, just as, say, the (alleged) evidence of cosmic 'fine-tuning' does not justify the unqualified conclusion that theism is true. In order to justify the conclusion that theism is false, one would need to somehow show that the total relevant evidence doesn't tip the scales in favor of theism. One way to do that would be to survey all of the other evidential arguments for theism and naturalism. That would be a monumental project. Happily, that task can be avoided by using what Draper calls the Decisive Evidence Argument.[9] </div><div><br /></div><div>To do that, we need to add more premises. First, facts about empathy and apathy hardly exhaust what we know about good and evil. Known facts about good and evil also include facts about pain and pleasure,[10] flourishing and languishing,[11] virtue and vice,[12] triumph and tragedy,[13] and autonomy and heteronomy[14]. All of these facts favor naturalism over theism. This justifies our next premise.</div><blockquote><div>(5) The data of good and evil strongly favors naturalism over theism.</div></blockquote><p>But theists will argue that various other lines of evidence, not part of the data of good and evil, strongly favor theism over naturalism, by pointing to such data as the finite age of the universe, the contingency of the universe, the life-permitting conditions of the universe, the existence of consciousness, etc. Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that all of those things favor theism over naturalism. What now?</p><p>Draper suggests we compare and contrast theism ("omni-theism" in the quotation below) with "aesthetic deism."</p><blockquote><p>Thus, it may be stipulated that, like omni-theism, aesthetic deism implies that an eternal, non-physical, omnipotent, and omniscient being created the physical world. The only difference, then, between the God of omni-theism and the deity of aesthetic deism is what motivates them. An omni-theistic God would be morally perfect and so strongly motivated by considerations of the well-being of sentient creatures. An aesthetic deistic God, on the other hand, would prioritize aesthetic goods over moral ones. While such a being would want a beautiful universe, perhaps the best metaphor here is not that of a cosmic artist, but instead that of a cosmic playwright: an author of nature who wants above all to write an interesting story.[15]</p></blockquote><div>But, as Draper points out, aesthetic deism accounts for the relevant evidence at least as well as theism does:</div><div><blockquote><div>... at least when it comes to the usual evidence taken to favor theism over competing hypotheses like naturalism, aesthetic deism accounts for that evidence at least as well as omni-theism does. For example, a deity interested in good narrative would want a world that is complex and yet ordered, that contains beauty, consciousness, intelligence, and moral agency.[16]</div></blockquote><div>Thus, we now have another premise:</div></div><div><blockquote><div>(6) The total evidence excluding “the data of good and evil” does not favor theism over aesthetic deism.</div></blockquote></div><div>Interested readers may read Draper's article for the justification, but the remainder of the argument is as follows.</div><div><blockquote><div>(7) Aesthetic deism is at least as probable intrinsically as theism.</div></blockquote></div><div><blockquote><div>(8) Given the total evidence excluding the data of good and evil, the data of good and evil strongly favor aesthetic deism over theism.</div></blockquote></div><div><div>It follows from (6), (7), and (8) that:</div><blockquote><div>(9) Aesthetic deism is many times more probable than omni-theism.</div></blockquote></div><div><div>It follows from (9) that:</div><blockquote><div>(10) Theism is very probably false.</div></blockquote></div><div><br /></div><div>In summary, it seems to me that we have here a powerful argument against theism. By itself, the neurological basis for moral handicaps like psychopathy is much more surprising on the assumption that theism is true than on the assumption it is false. When combined with other known facts about good and evil, the evidence against theism is overwhelming. Theistic attempts to show that the total evidence favors theism over naturalism, even if successful, are impotent against the rival hypothesis of aesthetic deism. Even if naturalism is false, aesthetic deism is at least as intrinsically probable as theism and is more accurate than theism. Therefore, theism is very probably false.</div><div><br /></div><h2 style="text-align: left;">Notes</h2><div>[1] Draper, "God and the Mystery of Evil," paper delivered at the Society of Christian Philosophers conference, September 26, 2015.</div><div><br /></div><div>[2] Draper 2015.</div><div><br /></div><div>[3] Paul Draper, “God and the Burden of Proof,” <i>Secular Outpost </i>(July 21, 2014), http://www.patheos.com/blogs/secularoutpost/2014/07/21/new-by-paul-draper-god-and-the-burden-of-proof/, site discontinued.</div><div><br /></div><div>[4] Simon Baron-Cohen, <i>The Science of Evil: On Empathy and the Origins of Cruelty</i> (New York: Basic Books, 2012), 16.</div><div><br /></div><div>[5] Baron-Cohen 2012, 39.</div><div><br /></div><div>[6] Baron-Cohen 2012, 28.</div><div><br /></div><div>[7] As Baron-Cohen points out, the neurological basis for moral handicaps challenges traditional views about moral responsibility. "If zero degrees of empathy is really a form of neurological disability, to what extent can such an individual who commits a crime be held responsible for what they have done? This gets tangled up with the free will debate, for if zero degrees of empathy leaves an individual to some extent 'blind' to the impact of their actions on others’ feelings, then surely they deserve our sympathy rather than punishment." See Baron-Cohen 2012, 160.</div><div><br /></div><div>[8] Some theists have pointed out that moral evil, such as fallen angels or demons choosing to do evil, might explain so-called “natural evils.” This argument makes the inverse point: certain natural evils explain at least some moral evil.</div><div><br /></div><div>[9] Paul Draper, "Atheism and Agnosticism" <i>Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy </i>(2022a), <a href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atheism-agnosticism/#DeciEvidArgu">https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/atheism-agnosticism/#DeciEvidArgu</a></div><div><br /></div><div>[10] Paul Draper. "Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists" <i>Noûs </i>23:3 (June 1989): 331-350. <a href="https://doi.org/10.2307/2215486">https://doi.org/10.2307/2215486</a>.</div><div><br /></div><div>[11] Paul Draper, "Christian Theism and Life on Earth" in <i>The Blackwell Companion to Science and Christianity</i> ed. J. B. Stump and Alan G. Padgett (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2012): 306-315; Paul Draper, "Humean Arguments from Evil" in <i>The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil</i> ed. Justin P. McBrayer and Daniel Howard-Snyder (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2013): 67-74, 72.</div><div><br /></div><div>[12] Draper 2013, 73; Draper 2015, 29-34.</div><div><br /></div><div>[13] Draper 2013, 73.</div><div><br /></div><div>[14] Draper 2015, 18-19, 26-29; Paul Draper, "Evil and the God of Abraham, Anselm, and Murphy" <i>Religious Studies </i>53:4 (2022b): 562-572, <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412517000373">https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412517000373</a>.</div><div><br /></div><div>[15] Draper, 2022a.</div><div><br /></div><div>[16] Draper, 2022a.</div>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-55376724262830421852023-07-17T22:44:00.001-07:002023-08-03T10:24:17.344-07:00The Divine-vs.-Human Argument against Christianity<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgkUGoyqi0-F21n2JM3jCLz5laJ17zILLENk7oMx4Hj1JySv-n8a2gs05jgb_erKAU2prPlLJidMmKapQLZa8g4rrno_zqtEyIiqNl2S-8rFewIs7yQlszvyksFEyCP0Wf6qcrByAHFFOvBy_PgA5e7U9gkgb7c2xTrp1wi9i7XKirdQl8lbyjO/s1080/1004px-Composite_christ_pantocrator.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1080" data-original-width="1004" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgkUGoyqi0-F21n2JM3jCLz5laJ17zILLENk7oMx4Hj1JySv-n8a2gs05jgb_erKAU2prPlLJidMmKapQLZa8g4rrno_zqtEyIiqNl2S-8rFewIs7yQlszvyksFEyCP0Wf6qcrByAHFFOvBy_PgA5e7U9gkgb7c2xTrp1wi9i7XKirdQl8lbyjO/s320/1004px-Composite_christ_pantocrator.png" width="297" /></a></div><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><p></p><p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><br /><p></p><p>1. If Christianity were true, then Christ is divine. [Given]</p><p>2. If Christianity were true, then Christ is human. [Given]</p><p>3. If Christ is divine, then Christ is immutable. [1: divine nature entails immutability]</p><p>4. If Christ is human, then Christ is mutable. [2: human nature entails mutability]</p><p>Therefore:</p><p>5. If Christianity were true, then it would be true that <i>Christ is immutable </i>and it would be false that <i>Christ is immutable. </i>[From 1-4]</p><p>Therefore:</p><p>6. It is impossible for Christianity to be true. [From 5 by the law of noncontradiction]</p><div><br /></div>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-5125850051299212782023-07-16T18:14:00.027-07:002023-08-16T21:54:59.755-07:00Assessing the Transcendence-vs.-Personhood Argument for the Impossibility of God<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhdfTrUqOLGFs2s6Vn0cwC2qWkq17bbcA8pHN8sD5Acighh4oHls-9CMbKRe2sQ-U8U_c27YYJuycPuH8QHw0BMzE2h3o_FBLQgJqbQYJO22-dPQuhW-lBTDlYjnN5yN32XRUcvPqhbB-bed4Jqv0eFNfYBMcl37lMhiX67jMQDEOZHDSlfC1NV/s750/theodore-drange-868a55ca-184a-4ed3-87c4-14afa4a86d3-resize-750.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="642" data-original-width="750" height="274" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhdfTrUqOLGFs2s6Vn0cwC2qWkq17bbcA8pHN8sD5Acighh4oHls-9CMbKRe2sQ-U8U_c27YYJuycPuH8QHw0BMzE2h3o_FBLQgJqbQYJO22-dPQuhW-lBTDlYjnN5yN32XRUcvPqhbB-bed4Jqv0eFNfYBMcl37lMhiX67jMQDEOZHDSlfC1NV/s320/theodore-drange-868a55ca-184a-4ed3-87c4-14afa4a86d3-resize-750.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br /><p style="text-align: center;">Source: <a href="https://alchetron.com/Theodore-Drange#theodore-drange-868a55ca-184a-4ed3-87c4-14afa4a86d3-resize-750.jpg" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Alchetron</a></p><p>In this post, I want to assess an argument for atheism called the Transcendence-vs.-Personhood Argument (hereafter, "TvP Argument"). The first section is an exposition of the argument as formulated by <a href="https://infidels.org/author/theodore-m-drange/" target="_blank">Theodore Drange</a>. The second section is a partial assessment of the argument. The work of William Lane Craig appears prominently in this section. Craig is a highly regarded philosopher of time and philosopher of religion who has written extensively on the relationship between God and time. He is also, of course, a theist. Thus, his work on divine eternity provides a useful "test case" for the TvP Argument. <span></span></p><a name='more'></a><p></p><h2 style="text-align: left;">1. Exposition</h2><div><br /></div><div style="text-align: left;"><div>In his 1998 article, "<a href="https://infidels.org/library/modern/theodore-drange-incompatible/" target="_blank">Incompatible-Properties Arguments: A Survey</a>," <a href="https://infidels.org/author/theodore-m-drange/" target="_blank">Drange</a> surveys ten arguments which attempt to demonstrate that particular concepts of God are incoherent because they entail two or more divine attributes which contradict one another.[1] The TvP Argument is one of those arguments.</div><div><br /></div></div><div>As William Lane Craig reports, all theists believe that God is <i>eternal,</i> in the minimalist sense that "God exists without beginning or end. He never comes into or goes out of existence; rather His existence is permanent."[2] If we think of divine eternity as a genus concept, then that genus has exactly two species: <i>timeless </i>and <i>temporal.</i> These two species are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. In other words, an entity must be timeless or temporal but cannot be both. An entity is temporal just in case the entity exists in time; an entity is timeless if and only if it is not temporal. The combination of divine eternity and temporality yields the 'derived' divine attribute of <i>omnitemporality.</i> Craig explains: </div><div><blockquote><div>I mean that if God is omnitemporal, He existed at every past moment, He exists at the present moment, and He will exist at every future moment. No matter what moment in time you pick, the assertion "God exists now" would be literally true at that time.[3]</div></blockquote></div><div>Just as philosophical theology has two rival species of divine eternity, the philosophy of time has two rival theories of time. According to <i>A-theory</i> (also known as the <i>tensed </i>or <i>dynamic </i>theory of time), there is an objective difference between past, present, and future moments of time. In contrast, <i>B-theory</i> (also known as the <i>tenseless </i>or <i>static </i>theory of time) is the view that the distinction between past, present, and future is merely a subjective feature of consciousness. </div><div><br /></div><div>Turning from <i>God's relationship to time</i> to <i>God's relationship to space,</i> all theists believe that God is immaterial. The combination of immateriality and spirit yields the derived attribute of <i>incorporeality:</i> God is somehow a 'living' being without a body. When incorporeality is combined with certain Biblical passages (such as Ps. 139:7-10), theists like Craig derive yet another divine attribute: <i>omnipresence.</i> As Craig explains, to say that God is omnipresent is to say that God is somehow "everywhere present in his creation."[4] Craig's preferred interpretation of omnipresence is divine <i>spacelessness,</i> viz., "that God is not spatially located in the universe but is causally active at every point in it."[5]</div><div><br /></div><div>To say that God is "transcendent" is to say that God is somehow <i>beyond </i>the world. But what does that mean? There are many options, but perhaps the easiest to understand is that transcendence just is the combination of timelessness and spacelessness. On this view, God is transcendent because He is timeless and spaceless. We can represent this understanding with the following premise.</div><blockquote style="border: medium; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p>(1) If God exists, then He is transcendent, i.e., spaceless and timeless.</p></blockquote><div>But if God is outside of time, then it is utterly mysterious how God can perform actions within time. Imagine an event which occurs at 3:01 p.m., an event which God caused by willing the event. Whether we say that God's action occurred just before 3:01 pm. or at exactly 3:01 p.m., the cause stands in a temporal relation with its effect. This suggests our next premise.</div><blockquote style="border: medium; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p>(2) If something is timeless, then it cannot exist within time and perform actions within time.</p></blockquote><p>In metaphysics, philosophers ordinarily distinguish between <i>concrete </i>and <i>abstract </i>objects. Concrete objects are things like meteors, bowling balls, and rivers. Concrete objects can be causes, effects, or both. For example, a river can be the the effect of precipitation (rain or snow); it can also be the cause of erosion. In contrast, abstract objects, if they exist, include things like numbers, properties, propositions, and so forth. Abstract objects are spaceless, timeless, and unable to stand in causal relations. If all we knew about "God" was that God is transcendent, then it would be tempting to classify God as a 'mere' abstract object, like the number 2. But, of course, the number 2 cannot cause anything, whereas God, if God exists, is able to stand in causal relations. Thus, theists have always affirmed that God is concrete, not abstract. Despite being transcendent, God is somehow able to perform actions within time. Theists have also believed that God is a person, a personal being, or in some analogical sense similar to a person or a personal being. This belief can be encapsulated in the next premise.</p><blockquote style="border: medium; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p>(3) If God exists, then He is a person (or a personal being).</p></blockquote><div><blockquote style="border: medium; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"></blockquote></div><div><p>All non-question-begging examples of personhood involve persons who exist in time and consequently who perform actions in time. This suggests:</p><blockquote style="border: medium; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p>(4) But a person (or personal being) must exist and perform actions within time.</p></blockquote><p>But now we have two pairs of contradictories: timelessness and temporality, and the inability or ability to perform actions within time. Therefore:</p><blockquote style="border: medium; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p>(5) Therefore, something that is transcendent cannot be a person (or personal being). [From 2 and 4]</p></blockquote><p>The concept of God presupposed by steps 1 and 3, however, imply that God is both transcendent and personal. Combined with 5, it follows that</p><blockquote style="border: medium; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p>(6) It is impossible for God to exist.</p></blockquote><p>This six-step compound argument contains four premises (steps 1-4) and two inferences. Because both inferences are clearly correct, the only question to consider is whether the premises of the argument are true. </p><h2 style="text-align: left;">2. Assessment</h2><div><br /></div><div>Let's consider steps 1-4 in turn. </div><h3 style="text-align: left;"><br /></h3><h3 style="text-align: left;">2.1. Premise (1)</h3><div><br /></div><div>As is the case with all multiple attribute disproofs, one way to avoid this argument is to deny that one (or more) of the purported divine attributes is not essential. Some theists might do this by denying that God is timeless, personal, or both. Here I will consider premise (1); I will consider premise (3) later on. As Drange points out in another essay,[6] "the word 'God' has many different meanings" and so it is useful to specify <i>which </i>concept or sense of "God" one is talking about. Thus, in order to be maximally charitable, in the rest of this essay I will assume that, by "God," Drange means, at a minimum, a transcendent person (or personal being). By stipulating this definition of "God," Drange may avoid objections that theism does not entail that God is both transcendent and personal. At the same time, however, some theists may (correctly) complain that, even if the TvP argument is successful, it is not relevant to the concept of "God" in which they believe. Nevertheless, I think there are theists who affirm that God is, in some sense, both transcendent and personal. For example, William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland, in their book <i>Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview, </i>define "God" as having the following attributes: necessity, aseity, incorporeality, omnipresence, eternity, omniscience, immutability, omnipotence, and goodness.[7] Craig and Moreland explain that their preferred interpretation of omnipresence is the view that God "is not spatially located in the universe at all but cognizant of and causally active at every point in it."[8] Furthermore, their preferred interpretation of eternity, assuming a dynamic or A-theory of time, is the view that "God is atemporal without creation and temporal since creation."[9] Thus, in Drange's terminology, Craig's and Moreland's view seems to entail that God is transcendent without creation and at least partially transcendent (non-spatial) since creation.</div></div><div><br /></div><div>If the interpretation of the previous paragraph is correct, then premise (1) is at least partially applicable to the Craig-Moreland definition of "God," and so I think it can be instructive to pit Drange's argument against the Craig-Moreland definition. Doing so immediately raises an important question: are the divine attributes in Drange's argument <i>essential</i> attributes or not? The very fact that Drange does not consider this distinction suggests that Drange is, at least implicitly, treating them as essential attributes. But the Craig-Moreland interpretation of divine eternity is the view that God is neither necessarily timeless nor necessarily temporal. Rather, on their view, God is contingently temporal and so, using Drange's terminology, God is contingently transcendent (despite God, on their view, being necessarily non-spatial). Nevertheless, on their view, God had a "timeless phase" of His existence without creation. So I think it will be useful to consider Drange's argument regarding God <i>qua </i>timeless being.</div><div><br /></div><div><h3 style="text-align: left;">2.2. Premise (2)</h3></div><div><br /></div><div>This brings us to premise (2). The first half of the consequent is true by definition: if something is timeless, it does not exist in time. But what about the possibility of a timeless object or being acting <i>within </i>time? Some might be tempted to appeal to God’s omnipotence, but it's far from clear that omnipotence includes the ability to actualize a metaphysically impossible world, and the metaphysical possibility of <i>a timeless being acting within time </i>is precisely the point at issue. </div><div><div><div><br /></div><div>Consider the following dilemma. Either God is essentially timeless or He is not. If God is essentially timeless, then it is hard to see how God could act within time. All non-question-begging examples of causal relations involve temporal relations such as <i>earlier than, simultaneous with,</i> or <i>later than. </i>But the problem is worse than that. Unless the theistic proponent of essential timelessness wants to grant that time itself is self-existent, it is hard to understand how "God is essentially timeless" can be reconciled with "God caused time itself to exist." As Craig himself points out:</div><blockquote>Can God remain untouched by the world's temporality? It seems not. For at the first moment of time, God stands in a new relation in which He did not stand before (since there was no "before"). Even if in creating the world God undergoes no <i>intrinsic </i>change, He at least undergoes an <i>extrinsic </i>change. For at the moment of creation, God comes into the relation of <i>sustaining </i>the universe or, at the very least, of <i>co-existing</i> with the universe, relations in which He did not stand before. Since He is free to refrain from creation, God could have never stood in those relations, had He so willed. But in virtue of His creating a temporal world, God comes into a relation with that world the moment it springs into being. Thus, even if it is not the case that God is temporal prior to His creation of the world, He nonetheless undergoes an extrinsic change at the moment of creation which draws Him into time in virtue of His real relation to the world. So even if God is timeless without creation, His free decision to create a temporal world also constitutes a free decision on His part to exist temporally.[10]</blockquote><div>Consider, then, the second horn of the dilemma: God is <i>contingently </i>timeless. This is the view Craig describes in the above passage. As I have argued <a href="https://naturalisticatheism.blogspot.com/2023/06/two-impossibility-arguments-against.html" target="_blank">elsewhere</a>, however, this view is incoherent. Craig's model of divine eternity requires that a <i>timeless </i>cause ("God's act of causing the universe") is <i>simultaneous with </i>a <i>temporal </i>effect ("the universe beginning to exist at t0"). But it is necessarily true that a timeless cause cannot be simultaneous with a temporal effect. Thus, Craig's model of divine eternity is logically incoherent. </div></div></div><div><br /></div><div><h3 style="text-align: left;">2.3. Premise (3)</h3></div><div><br /></div><div>A classical theist might try to evade the TvP argument by denying divine personhood and thus premise (3). According to this objection, whatever force the TvP Argument might have against neo-theism or theistic personalism, the argument is not applicable to classical theism. Classical theists deny that God is literally a person; instead, when they say that they believe God is personal, they are using the word "personal" in an analogical sense. As Edward Feser explains, on classical theism,</div><div><blockquote>God is personal in the sense of having the key personal attributes of intellect and will. However, classical theists would <i>deny </i>that God stands alongside us in the genus “person.” He is not “a person” alongside other persons any more than he is “a being” alongside other beings. He is not an <i>instance </i>of any kind, the way we are instances of a kind. He does not “have” intellect and will, as we do, but rather just <i>is </i>infinite intellect and will. He is not “a person,” not because he is <i>less </i>than a person but because he is <i>more </i>than merely a person.[11]</blockquote><div>Thus, one objection might be that if classical theism is true, then premise (3) is false. However, it seems to me that (3) does not depend upon interpreting "personhood" literally. Whether God "has" intellect and will or somehow "rather just <i>is </i>infinite intellect and will" makes no difference to the present argument. The relevant questions are (i) whether a timeless "person" (in any sense) can exist at all; and (ii) if so, whether a timeless "person" (again, in any sense) can act within time. This brings us to premise (4).</div><div><br /></div><div><h3 style="text-align: left;">2.4. Premise (4)</h3></div><div><br /></div><h4 style="text-align: left;">2.4.1.On the Possibility of a Timeless Person</h4><div><br /></div><div>Let us first consider question (i): <i>is a timeless person possible? </i>In his book, <i>Time and Eternity: Exploring God's Relationship to Time</i>, William Lane Craig summarizes Daniel Dennett's work on personhood. As summarized by Craig, Dennett identifies six necessary conditions for any individual P's being a person:</div><blockquote>P is a person only if:<br /><br />i. P is a rational being.<br />ii. P is a being to which states of consciousness can be attributed.<br />iii. Others regard (or can regard) P as a being to which states of consciousness can be attributed.<br />iv. P is capable of regarding others as beings to which states of consciousness can be attributed.<br />v. P is capable of verbal communication.<br />vi. P is self-conscious; that is, P is capable of regarding him/her/itself as a subject of states of consciousness.[12]</blockquote><div>As Craig writes, "All of these criteria depend in some way on P's having or being said to have consciousness. So, as an initial step in assessing the present argument, we may ask whether the concept of a conscious, timeless being is possible."[13] In what follows, I will <i>very </i>briefly summarize what Craig writes about (i)-(vi), as applied to the possibility of a timeless person. Craig discusses (ii) - (vi) first, saving (i) for last. I will follow his order of discussion.</div><div><p>(ii) Craig considers and rejects an argument by Richard Gale against the possibility of atemporal or timeless personal consciousness. According to Gale, "A mind is conscious, and consciousness is a temporally elongated process."[14] Craig replies, however, "he fails to show that being temporally extended is an <i>essential </i>property of consciousness, rather than just a <i>common </i>property of consciousness." Furthermore, "There is no reason to think that God cannot know 2+2=4 without having a disposition to engage in temporal activities."[15]</p></div><div><p>(iii) For basically the same reason, Craig argues that condition (iii) can be satisfied by a timeless mind. </p><p>(iv) Craig doesn't use these words, but the essence of his proposal seems to be as follows. Temporal persons are clearly possible and can satisfy condition (iv); God, <i>qua </i>timeless person, can somehow 'become' a temporal person and so, in that sense, can indirectly satisfy condition (iv), even if God, again <i>qua </i>timeless person, cannot directly satisfy condition (iv) 'while remaining' time timeless. How is this possible, according to Craig? God's being timeless or temporal is a contingent, not essential, property of God. If God 'were initially' contingently timeless, 'then' God could 'later become' temporal.[16]</p><p>(v) For essentially the same reasons, Craig argues that a contingently timeless person could satisfy condition (v). Even if God, <i>qua </i>timeless being, were incapable of regarding others as conscious beings, if God is contingently timeless, then God, as a <i>contingently </i>timeless being, could somehow create conscious beings, becoming temporal in the process, and then, <i>qua </i>temporal person, be capable of regarding his creatures as conscious beings.[17]</p><p>(vi) As applied to God conceived as a timeless being, this condition requires that God knows truths about Himself from a first-person perspective, such as "I believe that 2+2=4." But, as Craig points out, "it takes no more time to believe truly that 'I have no human company,' for example, than it does to believe that 'No human beings exist.'" Thus, condition (vi) is met.</p></div><div><p>Finally, turning to (i), Craig argues "God's being timeless impairs neither God's noetic structure (His system of beliefs) nor His ability to discharge any intellectual duties He might be thought to have."[18] </p></div><div><p>I find Craig's application of (ii), (iii), and (vi) convincing. I am not, however, so sure about (i), (iv), and (v). Regarding (i), in part of his attempt to show that a timeless person can satisfy condition (i), Craig appeals to divine omniscience. It seems to me, however, that, in order to determine if that move is successful, one would also need to determine if a timeless, omniscient being can somehow have knowledge of tensed facts. Craig is extremely aware of this problem and has written extensively on it.[19] I have not, however, studied his writings on this topic. So I consider (i) an open question and will leave it to the side.</p></div><div><div><p>As for (iv) and (v), the success of Craig's argument here depends upon whether one believes that God's being timeless or temporal can be contingent and, if so, whether a timeless God could somehow 'change' into a temporal God. Again, Craig is extremely aware of this problem. He argues that there are possible worlds in which God alone exists.[20] From that fact and the fact that our (temporal) world exists, plus the supposition that God exists, it follows that God is contingently temporal. If one is willing to regard God's existence as metaphysically possible,[21] it seems to me that Craig's argument here is exactly right: God's temporality (in the actual world) would be a contingent fact about God. What remains to be seen, however, is whether it is metaphysically possible for a timeless being, even God, to somehow 'change' from timeless to temporal. If is possible, then Craig's assessment of (iv) and (v) would seem to go through. If not, then not.</p><h4>2.4.2. On the Possibility of a Timeless Person Acting <i>In</i> Time</h4></div></div><div><br /></div><div>But suppose, for the sake of argument, that a timeless person is at least coherent. Let's turn to question (ii): <i>can a timeless person act within time? </i>This question presents us with a dilemma: either this timeless person is contingently timeless or necessarily (essentially) timeless. Craig chooses the first alternative. He argues that God, <i>qua </i>timeless person, chooses to create the world and, in so doing, 'becomes' temporal. </div><blockquote><div>Can God remain untouched by the world's temporality? It seems not. For at the first moment of time, God stands in a new relation in which He did not stand before (since there was no "before"). Even if in creating the world God undergoes no <i>intrinsic </i>change, He at least undergoes an <i>extrinsic </i>change. For at the moment of creation, God comes into the relation of <i>sustaining </i>the universe or, at the very least, of <i>co-existing with </i>the universe, relations in which He did not stand before. Since He is free to refrain from creation, God could have never stood in those relations, had He so willed, But in virtue of His creating a temporal world, God comes into a relation with that world the moment it springs into being. Thus, even if it is not the case that God is temporal prior to His creation of the world, He nonetheless undergoes an extrinsic change at the moment of creation which draws Him into time in virtue of His real relation to the world. So even if God is timeless without creation, His free decision to create a temporal world also constitutes a free decision on His part to exist temporally.[22]</div></blockquote><div>Let us call this model of a timeless person acting in time the "indirect model." God, <i>qua </i>timeless person, indirectly acts in time by creating the world and thereby becomes temporal. I have already argued in section 2.2 that Craig's view is incoherent. </div></div><div><br /></div><div>But what about the "direct model," <i>viz.,</i> the possibility that God, <i>qua </i>timeless person, acts in time and <i>remains </i>timeless? This is the view favored by Eleonore Stump, Norman Kretzmann, and others. A proper assessment of their view would require a blog post at least as long as this one, but time constraints do not allow me to write that assessment now. I will save that ask for another day.</div><div><br /></div><div><h2>3. Conclusion</h2><div><br /></div><div></div></div><div>In this post, I have assessed the TvP Argument against one particular theory of divine eternity, Craig's. I have argued that Craig's theory of divine eternity is incoherent. Furthermore, I have argued that incoherence prevents Craig's concept of God from satisfying two of the six necessary conditions for personhood. Thus, Craig's concept of God evades the TvP argument, but only by virtue of (i) denying that God is essentially timeless; and (ii) not being able to coherently affirm divine personhood.</div><div><br /></div><div>Of course, Craig's work on the divine attributes is not the only game in town. I recognize the literature on divine eternity is vast and I have barely scratched the surface. A complete defense of the TvP Argument would require engagement with the full set of theories of divine transcendence (including divine eternity) and divine personhood, especially the theory (or theories?) affirmed by classical theists. The purpose of this blog post was to determine if the TvP argument is worthy of further inquiry based on its ability to overcome the objections one might expect Craig to offer. I have argued that the TvP argument can overcome those objections. Whether the argument is ultimately sound remans to be seen.</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div><h2 style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-size: 18.72px; font-weight: 700;">Notes</span></h2><div><span style="font-size: 18.72px; font-weight: 700;"><br /></span></div><div><br /></div><div>[1] Theodore M. Drange, "Incompatible-Properties Arguments: A Survey" <i>Philo</i> 2 (1998): 49-60. Republished electronically at <i>The Secular Web</i> (1998), <a href="https://infidels.org/library/modern/theodore-drange-incompatible/">https://infidels.org/library/modern/theodore-drange-incompatible/</a>. I have switched the order of premises (2) and (3) to enhance readability. I have also replaced "outside space and time" with "spaceless and timeless."</div><div><br /></div><div>[2] William Lane Craig, <i>Time and Eternity: Exploring God's Relationship to Time </i>(Crossway, 2001), 13. <i>N.B.:</i> Here and throughout this post, I use the word "theism" as a shorthand for monotheism. Since Mormonism is a type of polytheism, I consider Mormonism to be inconsistent with theism. Furthermore, by "theism," I intend to exclude deism, pantheism, and panentheism. </div><div><br /></div><div>[3] Craig 2001, 13. </div><div><br /></div><div>[4] J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, <i>Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview </i>(Baker, 2003), 509.</div><div><br /></div><div>[5] Moreland and Craig 2001, 510.</div><div><p>[6] Theodore M. Drange, "Atheism, Agnosticism, Noncognitivism" <i>The Secular Web</i> (1998), <a href="https://infidels.org/library/modern/theodore-drange-definition/">https://infidels.org/library/modern/theodore-drange-definition/</a></p><p>[7] Moreland and Craig 2003, 482-535.</p><p>[8] Moreland and Craig 2003, 515.</p><p>[9] Moreland and Craig 2003, 515.</p></div><div>[10] Craig 2001, 87.</div><div><br /></div><div><div>[11] Edward Feser, "Craig on Theistic Personalism" (April 12, 2013), <a href="http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2013/04/craig-on-theistic-personalism.html">http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2013/04/craig-on-theistic-personalism.html</a>. <i>N.B.:</i> The objection I describe here is not necessarily one which Feser would endorse.</div><div><br /></div></div><div>[12] Daniel Dennett, "Conditions of Personhood," in <i>The Identities of Persons,</i> ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 175-196. Cited in Craig 2001, 79-80.</div><div><p>[13] Craig 2001, 80.</p></div><div><p>[14] Richard M. Gale, <i>On the Nature and Existence of God</i> (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 52.</p><p>[15] Craig, 2001. 80.</p><p>[16] In this paragraph only, all expressions inside of 'scare quotes' are my words, not Craig's. </p></div><div><p>[17] Craig 2001, 83.</p></div><div><p>[18] Craig 2001, 83.</p></div><div><p>[19] E.g., Craig 2001, 97-109; <i>God, Time, and Eternity: The Coherence of Theism II: Eternity </i>(Springer, 2001), 112-133.</p></div><div>[20] Craig 2001, 89-92.</div><div><br /></div><div>[21] But see Carl Brownson, "Evil and the Ontological Disproof," Ph.D. dissertation, September 2017, City University of New York, <a href="https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3182&context=gc_etds">https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3182&context=gc_etds</a>. Cf. <a href="https://naturalisticatheism.blogspot.com/2023/07/a-surprisingly-persuasive-disproof-of.html">https://naturalisticatheism.blogspot.com/2023/07/a-surprisingly-persuasive-disproof-of.html</a></div><p>[22] Craig 2001, 87.</p>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-34570867688429767252023-07-13T20:27:00.007-07:002023-08-16T21:55:33.274-07:00Paul Davies' Compound Argument against Timeless and Temporal Concepts of God<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjXK63TKwfM9ueMDzX-1WDvfFTwQpNz5yOOMvWiABP7VfzW26W_nW62QjHevqgU3_52I5dn0vCnwgFLbis-kpZXrS5j95jPzDRbFa_pTqr5uvjoxsw_EREeqrqPa4PDbpHBNtlnbMD5RZxeH7wh_C3z-9l1rdowsfC61BnrCVh8CJ-u8Ydiuzzq/s3992/Paul_Davies_2016.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="3992" data-original-width="2661" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjXK63TKwfM9ueMDzX-1WDvfFTwQpNz5yOOMvWiABP7VfzW26W_nW62QjHevqgU3_52I5dn0vCnwgFLbis-kpZXrS5j95jPzDRbFa_pTqr5uvjoxsw_EREeqrqPa4PDbpHBNtlnbMD5RZxeH7wh_C3z-9l1rdowsfC61BnrCVh8CJ-u8Ydiuzzq/s320/Paul_Davies_2016.jpg" width="213" /></a></div><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">Credit: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Davies#/media/File:Paul_Davies_2016.jpg" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Christopher Michel</a>; License: <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/" target="_blank">CC BY-SA 4.0</a></div><p></p>
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<p>In his 1983 book, <i>God and the New Physics,</i> Paul Davies writes:</p><p></p><blockquote><p>Christians believe that God is eternal. The word ‘eternal’ has, however, been used to mean two rather different things. In the simpler version, eternal means everlasting, or existing without beginning or end for an infinite duration. There are grave objections to such an idea of God, however. A God who is in time is subject to change. But what causes that change? If God is the cause of all existing things (as the cosmological argument of Chapter 3 suggests), then does it make sense to talk about that ultimate cause itself changing?</p><p>In the earlier chapters we have seen how time is not simply there, but is itself part of the physical universe. It is ‘elastic’ and can stretch or shrink according to well-defined mathematical laws which depend on the behaviour of matter. Also, time is closely linked to space, and space and time together express the operation of the gravitational field. In short, time is involved in all the grubby details of physical processes just as much as matter. Time is not a divine quality, but can be altered, physically, even by human manipulation. A God who is in time is, therefore, in some sense caught up in the operation of the physical universe. Indeed, it is quite likely that time will cease to exist at some stage in the future (as we shall see in Chapter 15). In that case God's own position is obviously insecure. Clearly, God cannot be omnipotent if he is subject to the physics of time, nor can he be considered the creator of the universe if he did not create time. In fact, because time and space are inseparable, a God who did not create time, created space neither. But as we have seen, once spacetime existed, the appearance of matter and order in the universe could have occurred automatically as the result of perfectly natural activity. Thus, many would argue that God is not really needed as a creator at all <i>except </i>to create time (strictly, spacetime). </p><p>So we are led to the other meaning of the word eternal — ‘timeless’....</p><p>A timeless God is free of the problems mentioned above, but suffers from the shortcomings already discussed on page 38. He cannot be a personal God who thinks, converses, feels, plans, and so on for these are all temporal activities. It is hard to see how a timeless God can act at all in time (although it has been claimed that this is not impossible). We have also seen how the sense of the existence of the self is intimately associated with the experience of a time-flow. A timeless God could not be considered a ‘person’ or individual in any sense that we know. Misgivings of this score have led a number of modern theologians to reject this view of an eternal God. Paul Tillich writes: ‘If we call God a living God, we affirm that he includes temporality and with this a relation to the modes of time.’ 3 The same sentiment is echoed by Karl Barth: ‘Without God's complete temporality the content of the Christian message has no shape.’</p><p>There is thus a grave and fundamental difficulty in reconciling all the traditional attributes of God. Modern physics, with its discovery of the mutability of time, drives a wedge between God's omnipotence and the existence of his personality. It is difficult to argue that God can have both these qualities.[1]</p></blockquote><p></p><p><span></span></p><a name='more'></a>I want to be clear that I do not claim that Davies is an atheist or even that he would endorse what I am about to write. For all I know, later in the book, Davies might provide a way to avoid his dilemma. Nevertheless, the above passage suggests a compound argument for atheism. Let's take it step by step. Consider the following excerpts of the above quotation.<p></p><blockquote><p>Christians believe that God is eternal. The word ‘eternal’ has, however, been used to mean two rather different things. In the simpler version, eternal means everlasting, or existing without beginning or end for an infinite duration. ...</p></blockquote><blockquote><p> So we are led to the other meaning of the word eternal — ‘timeless’.</p></blockquote><p>Thus, Davies argues, "God is eternal" means either that God is timeless or that God is temporal and exists for an infinite amount of time. This yields the first premise which is a simple dilemma.</p><blockquote><p>(1) Either God is timeless or temporal.</p></blockquote><p>Let's move on and consider what Davies says about the timeless horn of the dilemma.</p><blockquote><p>A timeless God is free of the problems mentioned above, but suffers from the shortcomings already discussed on page 38. He cannot be a personal God who thinks, converses, feels, plans, and so on for these are all temporal activities. It is hard to see how a timeless God can act at all in time (although it has been claimed that this is not impossible). We have also seen how the sense of the existence of the self is intimately associated with the experience of a time-flow. A timeless God could not be considered a ‘person’ or individual in any sense that we know.</p></blockquote><p>"It is hard to see how a timeless God can act at all in time" and "A timeless God could not be considered a 'person' ... in any sense that we know" is the next premise.</p><blockquote><p>(2) If God is timelesss, then God cannot act in time nor be considered a person. </p></blockquote><p>"Misgivings of this score have led a number of modern theologians to reject this view of an eternal God" supplies our next premise.</p><blockquote><p>(3) But God is personal.</p></blockquote><p>Taken together, (2) and (3) entail:</p><blockquote><p>(4) Therefore, God is not timeless.</p></blockquote><p>That completes the timeless horn of Davies' dilemma. But what of divine temporality? Here is Davies:</p><blockquote><p>In the earlier chapters we have seen how time is not simply there, but is itself part of the physical universe. It is ‘elastic’ and can stretch or shrink according to well-defined mathematical laws which depend on the behaviour of matter. Also, time is closely linked to space, and space and time together express the operation of the gravitational field. In short, time is involved in all the grubby details of physical processes just as much as matter. Time is not a divine quality, but can be altered, physically, even by human manipulation. A God who is in time is, therefore, in some sense caught up in the operation of the physical universe.</p></blockquote><p>This passage suggests the following:</p><blockquote><p>(5) If God is temporal, then God would be subject to the laws of Relativity Theory.</p></blockquote><div>Davies continues:</div><blockquote><div>Indeed, it is quite likely that time will cease to exist at some stage in the future (as we shall see in Chapter 15). In that case God's own position is obviously insecure. Clearly, God cannot be omnipotent if he is subject to the physics of time, nor can he be considered the creator of the universe if he did not create time.</div></blockquote><p>This suggests another premise: </p><blockquote><p> (6) If God is subject to the laws of relativity theory, then God is not omnipotent.</p></blockquote><p>I take the following to be a suppressed or implied premise:</p><blockquote><p>(7) But God is omnipotent.</p></blockquote><p> From (5)-(7), it follows that:</p><blockquote><p>(8) Therefore, God is not temporal.</p></blockquote><p>(4) and (8) together yield an explicit contradiction:</p><blockquote><p> (9) Therefore, God is neither timeless not temporal.</p></blockquote><p>But (1) and (9) entail:</p><blockquote><p>(10) Therefore, God does not exist.</p></blockquote><h3 style="text-align: left;">Discussion</h3><div>As formulated, the argument is valid, but is it sound? Classical theists would reject premise (3) on the grounds that God is not a person. But what about so-called neo-theists or theistic personalists? It seems to me that premise (5) is false. Certainly, time as we know it (really, spacetime) in our universe is subject to the laws of relativity theory. But it isn't obvious why a neo-theist could not simply postulate some different metric of time, call it "metaphysical time," such that God could be temporal without being subject to the laws of relativity theory. To be sure, the concept of "metaphysical time" will seem absurd to naturalists. The question, however, is whether such a metric can be independently motivated--i.e., whether there are reasons to posit metaphysical time independent of a desire to avoid the conclusion of the above argument--or whether such a metric is ad hoc. Perhaps Davies considers this possibility elsewhere.</div><div><br /></div><div>I suppose another option is that preferred by William Lane Craig, namely, that "God is timeless without creation and temporal with creation." <a href="https://naturalisticatheism.blogspot.com/2023/06/two-impossibility-arguments-against.html" target="_blank">As I have argued elsewhere, however, I think Craig's theory of God's relationship to time is incoherent</a>.</div><h3 style="text-align: left;">Notes</h3><p>[1] Paul C.W. Davies, <i>God and the New Physics </i>(Penguin Books, 1983), 133-34; cf. 38-39.</p>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-52771605825217495862023-07-11T18:33:00.000-07:002023-07-11T18:33:01.948-07:00Two Types of Weak Arguments for Theism: "God of the Gaps" vs. "Weak Naturalistic Explanations"<h2 style="text-align: left;">1. God of the Gaps Arguments</h2><div>On my old team blog (<i>Secular Outpost</i>, which was migrated from <i>Patheos </i>and renamed as <i>Secular Frontier</i>), I proposed the following <a href="https://secularfrontier.infidels.org/2016/02/when-are-theistic-arguments-god-of-the-gaps-arguments/" target="_blank">schema for God of the Gaps Arguments</a> (hereafter, "Gap Arguments").</div><div><br /></div><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><div><div>(1) There is some puzzling phenomenon P which science cannot at present explain.</div></div><div><div>(2) Theism does explain P.</div></div><div><div>Therefore:</div></div><div><div>(3) P is more likely on the assumption that God exists than on the assumption God does not exist.</div></div></blockquote><div><br /></div><div>Possible values for P may certainly include, but are not limited to, the origin of the universe, the life-permitting conditions of the universe, the origin of life itself (i.e., not evolution), the origin of consciousness, near-death experiences, and so forth. What is important to note here is that merely referring to alleged "hard" cases for naturalism is not a sufficient condition to make a theistic argument a Gap Argument. Rather, the following are necessary and sufficient conditions for a theistic argument to qualify as a Gap Argument: (a) the argument must refer to scientific ignorance; and (b) the argument must not include a premise about current knowledge (scientific or otherwise) which allegedly favors theism over naturalism. To see this, consider two versions of an argument from consciousness for theism.</div><div><br /></div><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><div style="text-align: left;"><i>Version 1: The Argument from Consciousness (Gap Version)</i></div></blockquote><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><p style="text-align: left;">(1) Science cannot explain consciousness.<br />(2) Theism does explain consciousness.<br />Therefore:<br />(3) Consciousness is more likely on the assumption that God exists than on the assumption God does not exist. </p></blockquote><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="text-align: left;"><i>Version 2: The Argument from Consciousness (Non-Gap Version)</i> </p></blockquote><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><div style="text-align: left;"><div>(1) E ("Human consciousness exists") is known to be true, i.e., Pr(E) is close to 1.<br />(2) Source physicalism is not hopelessly intrinsically much more probable than theism, i.e., Pr(|N|) is not much greater than Pr(|T|).<br />(3) Human consciousness is antecedently more probable on the assumption that source physicalism is true than on the assumption that theism is true i.e., Pr(E | T & B) =1 > Pr(E | N & B).<br />Therefore:<br />(4) Other evidence held equal, N is probably false, i.e., Pr(N | B & E) < 1/2.</div></div></blockquote><p>In version 2, premise (3) would then be supported by one or more arguments based on what we <i>do</i> know, rather than appealing to scientific ignorance.</p><h2 style="text-align: left;">2. Weak Naturalistic Explanations Arguments </h2><div>Weak Naturalism Explanation Arguments (hereafter, "Weak Explanation Arguments") are related to Gap Arguments, but represent a distinct type of argument. While the exact details differ, they have the following basic form.</div><div><br /></div><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><div>(1) The evidence (E) regarding some known topic T is known to be true.</div><div>(2) Naturalistic explanations 1...n are weak explanations because they are <i>ad hoc,</i> have weak explanatory power, or both.<br />(3) Theism has great explanatory power. </div></blockquote><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><div>Therefore:</div><div>(4) Theism is true. </div></blockquote><div><br /></div><div><div>Possible values for T may certainly include, but are not limited to, the origin of the universe, the life-permitting conditions of the universe, the origin of life itself (i.e., not evolution), the origin of consciousness, near-death experiences, the historicity of Jesus' resurrection, and so forth. What is important to note here is that merely referring to alleged "weak" naturalistic explanations is not a sufficient condition to make a theistic argument a Weak Explanation Argument. Rather, the following are necessary and sufficient conditions for a theistic argument to qualify as a Weak Explanation Argument: (a) the argument must refer to the weakness of naturalistic explanations; and (b) the argument must not include a premise about the (alleged) strength of the theistic explanation. To see this, consider two versions of an argument for the historicity of the Resurrection.</div><div><br /></div></div><div>Again, let's compare and contrast two versions of an argument for the historicity of the Resurrection. </div><div><br /></div><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><div style="text-align: left;"><i>Version 1: The Argument for the Resurrection (Weak Explanation Version)</i><br /><br />(1) The evidence (E) relevant to the alleged Resurrection of Jesus is known to be true.<br />(2) Each of the traditional naturalistic explanations 1...n for E are weak explanations because they are <i>ad hoc,</i> have weak explanatory power, or both.<br />(3) The Resurrection theory is a strong explanation of the evidence.<br />Therefore:<br />(4) [probable] Jesus rose from the dead.<br /><br /><i>Version 2: The Argument for the Resurrection (Non-Weak Explanation Version)</i><br /><br />(1) The evidence (E) relevant to the alleged Resurrection of Jesus is known to be true.<br />(2) Each of the traditional naturalistic explanations 1...n for E are weak explanations because they are <i>ad hoc,</i> have weak explanatory power, or both.<br />(3) The Resurrection theory is a strong explanation of the evidence because it is neither <i>ad hoc </i>nor has weak explanatory power.<br />Therefore:<br />(4) [probable] Jesus rose from the dead.</div></blockquote><p>In version 1, the argument assesses traditional naturalistic explanations by considering their background probability and explanatory power, but does not consider the background probability of the Resurrection theory. In contrast, version 2 considers background probability and explanatory power of all explanations. <i>N.B. I think even version 2 fails, but version 2 is better than version 1. Why does version 2 fail? I'll save that for another time.</i></p>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-65527319901870361042023-07-10T22:26:00.003-07:002023-08-03T11:10:55.247-07:00Divine Simplicity vs Trinity<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg8RLnpmMDrZqRTFfYhf_JWuXeRomOM-XEfPjIcKM9Nhd9gWpnKDVv-q4OgDVWBiJgDLXBzwWCFCgtlhS5JnkOLFGjVN8XkZD_UEY09RBtZxw99wtmgU3GhROpc6JZjX-1i0D6oSQlsOiXBrcbRBDgR3G-Z-NDeAMe02kmBYKZkyuFqdLI9swEV/s780/Shield-Trinity-Scutum-Fidei-English.svg.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="702" data-original-width="780" height="288" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg8RLnpmMDrZqRTFfYhf_JWuXeRomOM-XEfPjIcKM9Nhd9gWpnKDVv-q4OgDVWBiJgDLXBzwWCFCgtlhS5JnkOLFGjVN8XkZD_UEY09RBtZxw99wtmgU3GhROpc6JZjX-1i0D6oSQlsOiXBrcbRBDgR3G-Z-NDeAMe02kmBYKZkyuFqdLI9swEV/s320/Shield-Trinity-Scutum-Fidei-English.svg.png" width="320" /></a></div><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">Source: <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Shield-Trinity-Scutum-Fidei-English.svg" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">AnonMoos</a>; License: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_domain" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Public Domain</a></div><br /><br /><p></p><p>I know that Thomists have had about centuries to come up with responses, but it just occurred to me that it is far from obvious that divine simplicity is logically consistent with the Trinity. Not making an argument; rather, just a note for future research.</p><p><br /></p><div><br /></div>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-26167070157955032812023-07-10T22:15:00.003-07:002023-08-03T11:07:25.099-07:00Atheism and Self-Deception<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgQWtaVi8VbDjZxVaYwRJ81TFWvy4tgLrSGku-7_h5JmPJxJKqOjNi16eIp-MA_xVUPZP-dZ4OQt8b-sJ9TitCJveYTzcJP1jMTFTVfZIQgRhrq7IoQWl_kwTkltXZaUsqoJmYUXjl5mnZW67i0N2BlhRCiXtdbq2k0pZytHF54pP32YMmhrxbq/s2496/self-deception.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="1665" data-original-width="2496" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgQWtaVi8VbDjZxVaYwRJ81TFWvy4tgLrSGku-7_h5JmPJxJKqOjNi16eIp-MA_xVUPZP-dZ4OQt8b-sJ9TitCJveYTzcJP1jMTFTVfZIQgRhrq7IoQWl_kwTkltXZaUsqoJmYUXjl5mnZW67i0N2BlhRCiXtdbq2k0pZytHF54pP32YMmhrxbq/s320/self-deception.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br /><p style="text-align: center;">Source: <a href="https://www.wallpaperflare.com/person-holding-turned-on-smartphone-near-man-s-face-youth-wallpaper-zwzmr/download/2496x1665" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">WallPaper Flare</a></p><p><br /></p><p>I’m sure I’m not the first person to notice this, but, in light of the frequent accusation that atheists are self-deceived, it is striking how common it is for atheists to be told to behave in ways that are self-deception (or what we might call "self-deception adjacent") to cultivate theistic belief.</p><p><br /></p><p><br /></p><div><br /></div>
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet"><p dir="ltr" lang="en">I’m sure I’m not the first person to notice this, but, in light of the frequent accusation that atheists are self-deceived, it is striking how common it is for atheists to be told to behave in ways that are self-deception or self-deception adjacent.m, to cultivate theistic belief</p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><br /></div><br />— Secular Outpost (@SecularOutpost) <a href="https://twitter.com/SecularOutpost/status/1678327835998711808?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">July 10, 2023</a></blockquote> <script async="" charset="utf-8" src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-84387169315724316872023-07-09T15:08:00.015-07:002023-08-16T21:57:29.073-07:00A Surprisingly Persuasive Disproof of God's Existence: Brownson's Ontological Problem of Evil<p></p><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhqg6BslU16z5c5EvC_qZb3v2PtqLxIZKxmAwOzAXrfGtwymKWcgo5bcQGhyoE3iejQ_WkEwsGhpeWe3wNAmhRP0EeyEmhipdpjCL8I4TRrGW3Bq8Des4OM4xVpoo2ypa1OrMS3xWsc-UHPz689jRZ-EQYNVQhCJq76KcA_9Cm_AlAeRVMFlCRo" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img alt="" data-original-height="159" data-original-width="127" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/a/AVvXsEhqg6BslU16z5c5EvC_qZb3v2PtqLxIZKxmAwOzAXrfGtwymKWcgo5bcQGhyoE3iejQ_WkEwsGhpeWe3wNAmhRP0EeyEmhipdpjCL8I4TRrGW3Bq8Des4OM4xVpoo2ypa1OrMS3xWsc-UHPz689jRZ-EQYNVQhCJq76KcA_9Cm_AlAeRVMFlCRo" width="192" /></a></div><br /><div style="text-align: center;">Source: <a href="https://www.lehman.edu/academics/arts-humanities/philosophy/fac-brownson.php" target="_blank">Lehman College CUNY</a></div><p></p><p>I just finished reading a surprisingly persuasive disproof of God's existence. </p><span><a name='more'></a></span><p>It is very strange for me to write the previous sentence. I have always been skeptical of so-called <i>internal </i>inconsistency arguments, such as <a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/FINCGE" target="_blank">J.N. Findlay's argument that God is impossible</a> (because necessary existence is implicitly contradictory and one of God's essential attributes is necessary existence), which attempt to show that one or more divine attributes is (or are) incoherent. Why? I've always assumed that, in response to such arguments, theologians can endlessly redefine divine attributes and/or jettison certain attributes as "not essential." Likewise, I've always been skeptical of <i>external </i>inconsistency arguments, such as <a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/MACEAO" target="_blank">J.L. Mackie's famous argument from evil</a>, which attempt to show that God's existence is inconsistent with some "external" fact (such as the fact that evil exists). Why? I've always assumed that it would be impossible to identify a <i>known </i>external fact that is logically inconsistent with God's existence: there may be at least one "possible world" in which God exists and the known external fact obtains. </p><p>In <a href="https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3182&context=gc_etds" target="_blank">his exceptionally well-written and easy-to-read Ph.D. dissertation</a>, Carl Brownson fuses Findlay's internal inconsistency argument with Mackie's external inconsistency argument to produce a novel argument against God's existence, which he calls the "Ontological Problem of Evil." The argument is as follows. </p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px; text-align: left;"><p>(1) If God exists, then God exists necessarily.</p><p><span style="white-space: normal;">(2) If God exists necessarily, then nothing incompatible with God’s existence is metaphysically possible.</span></p><p><span style="white-space: normal;">(3) Evil incompatible with the existence of God is metaphysically possible.</span></p><p>Therefore:</p><p>(4) God does not exist.</p></blockquote><p>Unlike Findlay's ontological disproof, Brownson's ontological argument from evil does not make (or depend upon) the claim that necessary existence is impossible. Unlike Mackie's argument from evil, Brownson's argument does not make (or depend upon) the claim that a known fact about evil <i>in the actual world </i>is inconsistent with God's existence. Instead, the argument claims that God's existence is inconsistent with a fact about evil <i>in some metaphysically possible world. </i>Unlike the traditional problem of evil (which appeals only to the divine attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection), the ontological argument from evil appeals to those three attributes <i>plus God's necessary existence. </i>This seemingly simple move -- appealing to just one more divine attribute -- does a huge amount of work. It seems to render existing responses to arguments from evil (e.g., defenses, theodicies, skeptical theism, etc.) as fundamentally irrelevant. As Brownson (p. 52) points out, it is one thing to argue that <known facts about evil <i>in this world </i>are compatible with the goodness of God>; it is quite another to argue that <<i>all possible </i>evils in <i>all possible worlds</i> are compatible with the goodness of God>. </p><p>Later in his dissertation, Brownson uses the insights of his ontological problem of evil to develop what he calls a cosmological disproof of God's existence.</p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="text-align: left;">(5) If there is a God, then God must exist in worlds with unjustified evil, as he must be the ultimate metaphysical explanation of why this world exists rather than any other.</p><p>(6) If there is a God, then God must not exist in worlds with unjustified evil, as he must be perfect in all possible worlds.</p></blockquote><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="text-align: left;">Therefore: </p></blockquote><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p>(7) God does not exist.</p></blockquote><p>A few pages later (pp. 132-33), Brownson next illustrates how the ontological problem of evil and the contingency argument come together to create yet another disproof of God's existence. What follows is my attempt at reconstructing the dilemma he presents.</p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="text-align: left;">(8) Necessarily, if God exists, then God exists in all metaphysically possible worlds. [Premise]</p></blockquote><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="text-align: left;">(9) Necessarily, if God exists, then God is a good being, i.e., God is essentially good. [Premise]</p></blockquote><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="text-align: left;">(10) Either God exists in all possible worlds (including the bad ones) or God does not exist in all possible worlds. [Law of Excluded Middle]</p></blockquote><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="text-align: left;">(11) If God exists in all possible worlds, including the bad ones, then God is not essentially good. [From 8 and the definition of essential goodness]</p></blockquote><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="text-align: left;">(12) If God is essentially good, then God does not exist in metaphysically possible worlds which are incompatible with his essential goodness. [From 9 and the definition of essential goodness]</p></blockquote><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="text-align: left;">(13) If God does not exist in metaphysically possible worlds which are incompatible with his essential goodness, then God does not exist in all metaphysically possible worlds. [From 12]</p></blockquote><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="text-align: left;">Therefore:</p></blockquote><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="text-align: left;">(14) If God exists, it would be true that <i>God exists in all metaphysically possible worlds </i>and it would be false that <i>God exists in all metaphysically possible worlds. </i>[From 8 and 13]</p></blockquote><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="text-align: left;">Therefore: </p></blockquote><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="text-align: left;">(15) It is impossible for God to exist. [From 14 by the LNC] </p></blockquote><p style="text-align: left;">As Brownson concludes, "The world cannot be explained in two fundamental philosophical respects, metaphysically and morally, by appeal to one necessary being. A necessary being could exist, or an essentially good being could exist, but not both." <i>N.B. I am not entirely confident my reconstruction in (8)-(15) is correct, so I encourage interested readers to read his dilemma and not rely upon my attempted reconstruction.</i></p><p style="text-align: left;">To sum up, I am very surprised where I have landed. Despite my skepticism about these kinds of arguments, I think Brownson's ingenious argument is <i>decisive </i>against any God concept which includes the essential attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, goodness / moral perfection, and (metaphysically) necessary existence. This much is clear: the only realistic way to defeat the argument is to defeat premise (3). I am unable to imagine a good defeater against his argument. I could be wrong, of course. In any case, Brownson's disproof deserves to be widely read, analyzed, considered, and promoted. In my opinion, it is "required reading" in the philosophy of religion. </p><p style="text-align: left;"><b>Update (10-July-2023):</b></p><p style="text-align: left;">I was just informed or reminded of three earlier, related papers or books which make a similar argument (albeit nowhere near as developed or as sophisticated). Whereas Brownson calls his argument the "ontological problem of evil," Guleserian and Bass call their (similar) arguments the "modal problem of of evil."</p><p>Theodore Guleserian, "<a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/GULGAP" target="_blank">God and possible worlds: The modal problem of evil</a>," <i>Noûs </i>17:2(1983): 221-238. H/T: ExApologist</p><p>Richard M. Gale, <i>On the Nature and Existence of God </i>(Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 228-229. H/T: RealAtheology. Here is an excerpt from p. 229:</p><blockquote><p>A theist who does not impute a necessary existence to God can accept 87 [which is roughly equivalent to Brownson's premise (3)] and then go on to construct a defense or theodicy for different types of moral and natural evil, depending on whether it is the deductive or inductive argument from evil that is being rebutted. But the problem of evil for the theist who either accepts an ontological argument or imputes necessary existence of God takes a far more acute form. It is the modal problem of evil, concerning the very <i>possibility </i>of there being a morally unjustified evil, the theistic response to which must take the form of an argument for the impossibility of there being an evil for which God does not have a morally exonerating excuse. It is not enough to give a FWD [free will defense], since this still leaves open the possibility of a morally unjustified natural evil, such as the example of the supernova. What these theists must establish is that it is more likely that it is possible that having unsurpassable greatness is instantiated than that being a morally unjustified evil is. At a minimum, they can challenge the intuitions underlying 87 with their own counterintuitions favoring 76-3.</p></blockquote><div>Robert Bass, "<a href="https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=BASMEA-2&proxyId=&u=https%3A%2F%2Fdrive.google.com%2Ffile%2Fd%2F0B9Z66YKTauRBQnp4dl80OExMSUk%2Fview%3Fusp%3Dsharing%26resourcekey%3D0-gtaC2KSmtz_Oy3KV7vNCzA" target="_blank">Modal Evil and Divine Necessity</a>," unpublished manuscript (n.d.). H/T: Joshua Parikh</div>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-25722961332848841012023-07-03T12:20:00.006-07:002023-08-16T21:55:50.939-07:00Thinking about Craig's Defense of the Kalam Cosmological Argument: Did God's Causing the Universe to Exist Itself Have a Cause?<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgr688GLfTrW97KJGDYyxagEK0prCzsvjAdHgBmBoUetBIAK4ZkC9Qhg6MtDjULA8_2SckIbA1LbGGkIZhJcnXpUcB_ySjDfDl8xOeKaQcbGVdhP_ArNjRzaBUaD_M4LCgbtFaHP564RRLMOWgGHadQZG02xDw8dYiimlTjel9bK4ljToYKv_Q7/s900/599px-William_Lane_Craig.jpg" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="900" data-original-width="599" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgr688GLfTrW97KJGDYyxagEK0prCzsvjAdHgBmBoUetBIAK4ZkC9Qhg6MtDjULA8_2SckIbA1LbGGkIZhJcnXpUcB_ySjDfDl8xOeKaQcbGVdhP_ArNjRzaBUaD_M4LCgbtFaHP564RRLMOWgGHadQZG02xDw8dYiimlTjel9bK4ljToYKv_Q7/s320/599px-William_Lane_Craig.jpg" width="213" /></a></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">William Lane Craig</div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">Source: <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:William_Lane_Craig.jpg" rel="nofollow" target="_blank">Wikimedia</a>; License: Public Domain</div><br /><p><br /></p><p>I've been thinking about Craig's defense of the kalam cosmological argument again. In this post, I will sketch two arguments I've formulated and then briefly discuss what I perceive to be the key issue which kalam proponents (hereafter, "kalamists") are likely to dispute.<span></span></p><a name='more'></a><p></p><p><b>Argument 1: Actual Infinite is Impossible vs Everything Which Begins to Exist Has a Cause</b></p><p>(1) God's causing the universe to exist is itself either caused or uncaused. [Law of Excluded Middle]</p><p>(2) If God's causing the universe to exist is caused, then there is an infinite regress of prior causes of God's actions. [by Strawson's proof of an infinite regress of rational choices]</p><p>(3) If there is an infinite regress of prior causes of God's actions, then it is false that <i>an actual infinite is impossible.</i> [From 2 and the definition of an actual infinite]</p><p>(4) If God's causing the universe to exist is uncaused, then it is false that <i>everything which begins to exist has a cause.</i></p><p>(5) Therefore, if God causes the universe to exist, then either it is false that <i>an actual infinite is impossible</i> or it is false that <i>everything which begins to exist has a cause.</i> [From 1, 3, 4]</p><p><b><br /></b></p><p><b>Argument 2: KCA's Agent Causation vs. Caused Beginnings</b></p><p>(1) If the kalam cosmological argument (and its ensuing conceptual analysis) is sound, then everything which begins to exist has a cause. [Premise]</p><p>(2) If the kalam cosmological argument (and its ensuing conceptual analysis) is sound, then the cause of the universe is a personal Creator who freely willed the universe to exist. [Premise]</p><p>(3) If the cause of the universe is a personal Creator who freely willed the universe to exist, then the personal Creator's act of creation is itself uncaused. [From 2 and the definition of libertarian free will]</p><p>(4) If the personal Creator's act of creation is itself uncaused, then it is false that everything which begins to exist has a cause. [From 3]</p><p>Therefore:</p><p>(5) If the kalam cosmological argument (and its ensuing conceptual analysis) is sound, then it is true that <i>everything which begins to exist has a cause</i> and it is false that <i>everything which begins to exist has a cause.</i> [From 1 and 4]</p><p>Therefore:</p><p>(6) The kalam cosmological argument (and its ensuing conceptual analysis) is unsound. [From 5]</p><p><br /></p><p><b>Discussion: The KCA's Causal Principle</b></p><p>One objection to both arguments is that they equivocate on the scope of the causal principle in the KCA. Premise (1) of the KCA states the causal principle as: "<i>Everything </i>which begins to exist has a cause." While the universe is a "thing," God's act to cause the universe to exist is not a thing. Instead, it is a mental event. Unlike objects coming into existence, mental events don't need causes. Therefore, premise (4) of both arguments is false.</p><p>I'm inclined to agree with this objection; there is no inconsistency in Craig's defense of the KCA. At the same time, this suggests a new objection to the KCA: the KCA's causal principle doesn't go far enough. The correct causal principle should be:</p><blockquote style="border: none; margin: 0px 0px 0px 40px; padding: 0px;"><p style="text-align: left;">(CP) Any thing or mental event which begins to exist has a cause.</p></blockquote><p>Why think CP is true? All changes require causes. Applied to the KCA, if God caused the universe to exist, then a change occurred and <i>that </i>change requires a cause. The critic can even grant the kalamist that mental events have final causes but not efficient causes; CP is neutral with respect to the kind of cause.</p><p>This will be very quick, but here's a quick sketch of how the revised objection to the KCA would go. On the assumption that theism is true and God has libertarian free will (LFW), what could be the cause of God's choice to cause the universe to exist? Let God's choice to cause the universe be action A0. Then A0 is fully determined by God's nature (=God's essential attributes) combined with God's reasons R0 at t0. Furthermore, God's sovereignty implies that God is is responsible for R0 at t0. But if God is responsible for R0 at t0, then God rationally chose R0 at t-1. Now, if God rationally chose R0 at t-1, then it follows that God's reasons R-1 at t-1 fully determined God's choice for R0. And so on. Thus, if God chose to create the universe, it would require the completion of an infinite regress of rational choices. But that entails, contrary to Craig / the kalamist, that an actual infinite can exist.</p><p><br /></p><p><b>Notes</b></p><p>[1] Argument 2 is inspired by Jonathan M.S. Pearce, <i>Did God Create a Universe from Nothing? Countering William Lane Craig's Kalam Cosmological Argument</i> (Onus Books, 2016).</p>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-20391737.post-49902864568711477972023-06-17T17:55:00.002-07:002023-08-03T11:33:44.016-07:00Podcast Interview with Justin Schieber of Real Atheology<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgll7iLBtkshk87P5pl4AYJdZLtCJzvPEKj54eOJzxjq9-dO97zjFPLrQk1V5_UfH2y9yKL2PJXlA21r3qvv7RrOKjrCjpPvC2aLzHfae46-Joqijtv2wXdE76yjaWhBhJauru9OMulSvlSwQ_VHPJWCtrNggrsntqwl38BTmrCYalb9hR6_VGi/s400/Justin-Schieber.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="400" data-original-width="400" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgll7iLBtkshk87P5pl4AYJdZLtCJzvPEKj54eOJzxjq9-dO97zjFPLrQk1V5_UfH2y9yKL2PJXlA21r3qvv7RrOKjrCjpPvC2aLzHfae46-Joqijtv2wXdE76yjaWhBhJauru9OMulSvlSwQ_VHPJWCtrNggrsntqwl38BTmrCYalb9hR6_VGi/s320/Justin-Schieber.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><p style="text-align: center;"><b>Justin Schieber</b></p><p>A few weeks ago, Justin Schieber interviewed me for an episode of the <i>Real Atheology</i> podcast. That episode just dropped. </p><p><b></b></p><blockquote><p><b>RA040: Jeffery Jay Lowder on Philosophy of Religion</b></p><p>"In this episode, Justin Schieber sits down with Jeffery Jay Lowder for a wide-ranging interview. Fans of the show will no doubt be familiar with Jeff's work. From founding Infidels.org and the <i>Secular Outpost </i>to his contributions to <i>The Empty Tomb </i>and his several public debates, Jeff has earned his reputation as a fair-minded and philosophically informed atheist. We discuss the origin of infidels.org, Paul Draper's famous argument from Pain and Pleasure and everything in between."</p></blockquote><p></p><p><a href="https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/real-atheology/episodes/RA040-Jeffrey-Jay-Lowder-on-Philosophy-of-Religion-e25s169" target="_blank">LINK</a></p>Secular Outposthttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10289884295542007401noreply@blogger.com0