Is Evil Evidence for God?

(Another backlog item)
 
Over at The Secular Outpost, I recently blogged about a 'turnaround' argument used by some critics of the argument from evil (AE). According to this turnaround argument, not only is evil not evidence against God's existence, but evil is evidence for God's existence. In this post, I want to examine one specific attempt to use this strategy, by Melinda Penner at Stand to Reason.

My basic plan will be as follows:

1. Provide an overview of a specific version of the argument from evil.
2. Provide an overview of Melinda's use of the turnaround strategy.
3. Assess the evidential value of Melinda's turnaround strategy against the argument from evil.

Let us begin with a specific version of the argument from evil.


1. Specific Version of the Argument from Evil

Informal Statement of the Argument

My favorite version of the argument from evil is Paul Draper's evidential argument from evil, which focuses on the biological role of pain and pleasure. The naturalistic explanation for this is obvious. If animals are the products of evolution by natural selection, we would expect physical pain to aid survival. But not all physical pain and pleasure aids survival. For example, think of the horrible pain that inflicts many people with terminal illnesses. If the hypothesis of indifference is true, this is what we would expect: evolution by natural selection is not an intelligent process; there seems to be no way for creatures to have evolved so that they only feel pain when it will aid survival. In contrast, if theism were true, God could "fine tune" humans so that they experience pain only when it is necessary for some greater good. If God did exist, what possible reason could he have for allowing people with terminal illnesses have to endure such agonizing pain until they finally die? The chances that such a reason would intersect with the biological goal of survival is pretty slim. Thus, the biological role of pain and pleasure is more likely on the hypothesis of indifference than on theism.

Formal Statement of the Argument

Abbreviations:
Pr(x): epistemic probability of X
Pr(x/y): epistemic probability of X conditional upon y
>! : much greater than
HT: hypothesis of theism
HI: hypothesis of indifference: neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings on earth results from benevolent or malevolent actions performed by supernatural persons.
O: observations of humans and animals experiencing pain and pleasure. O can be broken down into three specific observations: O1 & O2 & O3.

O1: moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure we know to be biologically useful
O2: sentient beings that are not moral agents experiencing pain or pleasure that we know to be biologically useful
O3: sentient beings experiencing pain or pleasure that we do not know to be biologically useful

Argument Formulated
 
(1) O1 is antecedently much more probable on the assumption that HI is true than on the assumption that HT is true, i.e., Pr(O1/HI) >! Pr(O1/HT).
(2) O2 is antecedently more probable on the assumption that both HI & O1 are true than on the assumption that HT & O1 are true, i.e., Pr(O2/HI & O1) > Pr(O2/HT & O1).
(3) O3 is antecedently much more probable on the assumption that HI & O1 & O2 are true than on the assumption that HT & O1 & O2 are true, i.e., Pr(O3/HI & O1 & O2) >! Pr(O3/HT & O1 & O2).
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
(4) Therefore, O is antecedently much more probable on the assumption that HI is true than on the assumption that HT is true, i.e., Pr(O/HI) >! Pr(O/HT). (from 1, 2, and 3)
(5) O is known to be true.
(6) HT is not much more probable intrinsically than HI.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
(7) Therefore, other evidence held equal, HT is probably false, i.e., Pr(HT < 0.5).

2. Melinda's Turnaround Strategy

Melinda writes:

In his arguments against God's existence, the atheist presupposes an ultimate standard of justice and good when he refers to evil.

1.  Ask, "What basis does the atheist have for saying there is evil in the world?" " Is this not an appeal to his own relative moral feelings and opinions?" "Why should his feelings be authoritative?" 
2.  Ask, "What's your explanation?" Never accept the burden of being the only one who has to hold to a cohesive and consistent world view.

For clarity, I shall refer to her first point as MP1 and her second point as MP2.

3. Assessment

Let us now turn to an assessment of Draper's argument against Melinda's turnaround strategy, by considering (4) - (7).

Objections to (4)

In the context of the argument from the biological role of pain and pleasure, I think the most charitable interpretation of Melinda's remarks is to treat MP2 as an objection to (4). So interpreted, this objection is very easily answered. On the assumption that HI is true, O is easy to explain. Again, if animals are the products of evolution by natural selection, we would expect physical pain to aid survival.  If HI is true, evolution by natural selection is "blind," so we have no antecedent reason to expect the pain systems of animals to be "fine-tuned" in a way that enables them to avoid feeling pain when it does not contribute to survival.


Objections to (5)

Does Melinda offer any reason to reject (5) and, if so, what is it? I think the most charitable interpretation of her remarks is to interpret MP1 as an objection to (5), since O reports facts that would typically be classified as examples of so-called "natural evil." So let's consider her questions.

Ask, "What basis does the atheist have for saying there is evil in the world?" " Is this not an appeal to his own relative moral feelings and opinions?" "Why should his feelings be authoritative?" 

We are now in a position to appreciate how weak those questions are, when construed as objections to (5).  Those questions are about the foundation of morality. As revealed by the second and third questions, Melinda seems to think morality could not have an objective foundation if God does not exist. Contrary to what Melinda states, proponents of AE do not have to presuppose "an ultimate standard of justice and good" in order to argue that evil is evidence against God's existence. The content of (5) shows why. Even if it were true that atheism implied there is no objective foundation of morality, that point would be irrelevant to (5), which simply reports observations of humans and animals experiencing pain and pleasure. (5) could be true even if there were no objective foundation of morality.

But in fact Melinda is mistaken about the implications of atheism for the foundation of morality. From the perspective of metaethics, all that follows from the non-existence of God is that theistic theories of metaethics (such as the divine command theory) are false.  Melinda, like many Christian apologists, seems to be making the following inference.

If God does not exist, then one possible foundation for objective morality (God) does not exist.
-----------------------------
Therefore, there are no possible foundations for objective morality.

Even if we put aside the entirely questionable assumption that a God-based foundation of morality is an objective one, that inference is, of course, logically fallacious. It wouldn't follow that all nontheistic, objective theories of metaethics are also false.

4. Conclusion

I conclude that Melinda's use of the turnaround strategy against the argument from the biological role of pain and pleasure fails. Known facts about so-called "natural evil"--specifically natural evil resulting from the biological role of pain and pleasure--are antecedently much more probable on the hypothesis of indifference than on the hypothesis of theism. Since, as premise (6) reports, theism is not intrinsically much more probable than the hypothesis of indifference, it follows that, other evidence held equal, theism is probably false.